Can't remember that off-hand but could well be wrong. Could this be a reference to the appalling quality of many of the roads even before the late autumn floods? He does comment on how impractical the 1941 campaign was due to the massively over-stretched logistics. Which wasn't primarily anything to do with the number of trucks the German forces had. More simply with the sheer distances involved over which a vehicle can carry loads before the total load is needed for the pettrol to get it to that point. There was a reason why the German battle plans relied on defeating the Red Army west of the Dnieper and Dvina. Additional oil won't make a great difference to that.
Wages of Destruction, Pages 412, by Adam Tooze:
In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for the motor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chronic shortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotorization' of the Wehrmacht.68 It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots, due in large part to the shortage of air fuel.69 But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing its soldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-road experience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles during the Russian campaign.70 Shortages made themselves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations that in November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at its Brandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lacked the petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off the assembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to be arranged by the Wehrmacht's economic office so as to ensure that there were no further interruptions.71
Also you seem to be assuming that Germany having more fuel automatically means they have more trucks. Not the case. Those additional vehicles have to be constructed - which means money, trained manpower and industrial capacity and raw materials. Germany was operating at the limit for much of the 1930's in terms of its breakneck expansion so if its going to double the number of military trucks what will it give up? Furthermore a lot more trucks means a lot more people to operate and support them. Possibly not a great deal in terms of drivers once trained given how many men Germany conscripted but the mechanics and other maintenance staff will need pretty well trained men that somewhere else won't have.
Very much the case, as cited above; the only hindrance was fuel, as noted.
They can probably take Stalingrad, if Hitler doesn't get impatient as OTL, which a stronger transport force if it can be assembled might still prompt him to do. Its still going to be very costly however and the Soviets might prolong the battle by pumping in more forces, albeit this would reduce its forces for any counter attack.
They would've taken it off the march-i.e. undefended-in late July/early August if Hitler had not diverted 4th Panzer Army to Rostov.
Its still a very strong distance to travel over difficult terrain to get to Baku, let alone capture its ruins. Such forces also would need to be maintained and supported, which would consume a lot of additional transport. Their also going to have even longer lines to defend now so its unclear that they will be able to resist at least one large Soviet counter attack. As it is OTL Army Group A, which was directed towards Baku, was under peril for some time after the hammer fell at Stalingrad because Hitler refused to give up on the ground gained. There is an argument that if the Soviets hadn't over-estimated the forces in the Stalingrad pocket they could have driven for Rostov earlier and threatened the entire Army Group. Escape would still be possible via the Crimean as long as the Germans hold Novorossisk but an advance on that would be a possibility as well.
Baku is likely the target for the 1943 campaign season, I agree, but good thing the Germans will have markedly better logistics. Army Group A would be under no threat because the Soviet operations you refer to resulted in the encirclement of Army Group B, thus removing AG-A's flank protection.
The USSR is gravely weakened but there are still resources, manpower and industrial east of that point and they have no reason to stop fighting. Given the nature of the Nazi regime continued resistance is their only option, as it is for many in the huge area Germany now has to control. Germany can withdraw some forces but there's going to be a huge manpower and material demand especially since casualties are still likely to be far from trivial in the east, albeit not the massive level of OTL.
No, there are no resources, industrial, natural or manpower wise from which resistance can be maintained, as I have cited to you many times previously.
Case in point, see the manpower situation:
IV. Remaining unused resources:
a) reserved for employment in the civil economy - 2 781 000
b) in labor columns - 1 321 000
c) recruits born in 1925 - 700 000
d) non-conscripted men fully fit for service in the Central Asian Military District - 600 000
e) non-conscripted men with limited fitness or in the age above 45 (without Far-East and Transcaucasus) - 500 000 (of them 277 000 in the Central Asia)
f) non-conscripted men in the Far East, Trasnbaikal and Transcaucasus Fronts 505 000 (including 200 000 with limited fitness and 200 000 in age above 45).
g) officers of reserve, not conscripted yet - 156 000
h) expected convalescents from hospitals in 3 nearest months - 350 000
i) in the penitentiary system - 1 156 000 men in age from 17 to 45.
The loss of the Ukraine and other occupied areas had already engendered shortages of coal (The Donbass was home to roughly 60% of Soviet output by itself), aluminum (Main Soviet facility was along the Dnieper, about 60-80% of production), iron ore (60% of production), steel (50% of production), electric power (30% of output), manganese ore (30% of production), and nickel (30% of production). Overall output of the machinery and metal goods sector had fallen by 40%. In addition, the USSR was also unable to meet the demand for copper, tin, zinc, lead, aluminum, and nickel with remaining sources; Lend Lease was sufficient to meet all of these demands except for aluminum and nickel. Antimony, tungsten, cobalt, vanadium, molybdenum, tin, and magnesium were also almost entirely lacking.
Unfortunately for the Soviets, the A-A Line means they have lost roughly 50% of their Lend Lease supplies as well as 90% of their oil, roughly 90% of their coal, and virtually all of their domestic sources of aluminum and nickel.
@sillygoose has already touched on the food situation, and I have cited it to you in the past, but I will be happy to post it again from
Hunger and War:
In terms of forces available then there was an army group Britain established in the Iraq/Iran area in 42 in case the Germans reached the Baku region, which I doubt they would do until in 43 under the circumstances. This actually had more divisions than Montgomery had in the 2nd El Alamein battle according to one source, although I suspect the quality of equipment/experience might be lower. In the longer term everything the US army sent to Britain in 42 and 43 is theoretically available as well as some British forces. Especially if a large scale collapse of the Soviets mean that no invasion of France is practical then fight them where their at a huge logistical disadvantage such as the Caucasus region.
It was entirely an Army Group solely on paper, with no real combat forces attached to it.
See the British concern for the defense of Turkey in 1942:
If you are assuming the U.S. sends what it has available, that means no TORCH or operations against Italy. Very likely then Rommel can overrun the Suez in 1943.
That assumes it can extract them in between slaughtering the inhabitants and generally messing things up as it did OTL. It still has serious resource limitations and extacting materials from a war torn wasteland won't be easy. More resources but not massively so especially since those raw materials have to be dragged back to Germany.
Which it did handily IOTL with the portions it did overrun and had established a railway network built specifically for this purpose. Did you know the German Army in the East was fed off local resources and Ukrainian ores were used to help double munitions productions in 1942 and were set to provide for a massive increase in 1943 until the RAF conducted the Ruhr Campaign?
That seems unlikely to put it mildly. By last 43 the war in the Pacific is largely won, although not clear to all. The B-29 campaign in 1945 was an additional nail in the coffin for the Japanese economy but reducing the front to 2ndary status and slowly wearing them down is possible. As is freeing up resources by only making one rather than two main thrusts. As you say Germany is even more than OTL the primary threat so full concentration should be on it.
Not possible, politically or military. The Imperial Japanese Navy remains undefeated and in 1944 was capable of very serious fleet action; reducing the Pacific to secondary status is just not possible without making it so that peace would eventually have to be made with the Japanese on favorable terms to them. By 1944-1945 the Anglo-Americans have exhausted their manpower and political willingness to fight the war, while Japan remains in control of the Pacific;
you can't expect their publics to accept literally millions of additional casualties in Europe and then go on to fight until 1948-or later-to defeat the Japanese:
In one way or another, George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, had long been expecting a sharp reduction in military morale. He had witnessed, as aide-decamp to General John J. Pershing, America's mood after World War I. Once Germany asked for an armistice (and before it signed a surrender), Congress and the public had demanded a swift demobilization. This indelible memory of November 1918 shaped Marshall's resolve to minimize military responsibilities after the Nazi capitulation. In Europe, this meant an end to operations in the eastern Mediterranean, where internal political conflicts and instabilities might require a large and long-term occupation by an army about to be drastically reduced in size. In the Pacific, the Japanese would have to be beaten into a position where their surrender would occur shortly after V-E Day. Otherwise, there might not be a capitulation at all, something Marshall predicted in 1943: "the collapse of Germany would impose partial demobilization and a growing impatience ... throughout the United States." This mood could lead to a compromise settlement along the lines the Japanese Army was hoping to obtain: that is, the retention of the core empire it still occupied (Formosa, Manchuria, and Korea) and no change in the political institutions of Japan.2
America's military timing was exceptionally good, considering the enormous perplexities of the war. When Germany surrendered in May, the United States had already made what Marshall called the "preparation for the final kill." Its armed forces surrounded the home islands of Japan from the south and the east. It had also obtained from Russia a pledge to attack the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria, thereby completing the ironclad blockade that the U.S. Navy once planned to execute alone. However, the denial of imports of strategic items, from oil to coal and protein, did not mean that a mere mop-up operation was in the works, Most of the U.S. military, especially the Army, conducted planning on the premise "that defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender." Even before Japan strongly reinforced Kyushu, the first home island the United States would invade, the American military calculated that America would still have to conduct the toughest landings and follow-up battles seen in World War II --- actions that would likely result in some 200,000 casualties and 50,000 fatalities.3 Admiral William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an advocate of the blockade strategy, would later complain that "the Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan."
The flaw in Leahy's argument was that the Japanese Imperial Army refused to accept the fact that it had lost the war, at least by the standard of unconditional surrender. That demand was completely unacceptable to an institution that ordered wounded soldiers to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war.4 Leahy admitted however, that there was "little prospect of obtaining unconditional surrender" in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, would write that the Navy "in the course of time would have starved the Japanese into submission" (Italics mine). Time, however, was a waning asset, especially to Marshall, who would later say that American "political and economic institutions melted out from under us [the U.S. military]". The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion told the JCS what magazines and newspapers had been printing since late 1944: there was overwhelming public pressure to increase production of consumer goods. I am "afraid of unrest in the country," said Director Fred Vinson. I have never seen "the people in their present frame of mind." Aside from reports about the "national end-of-the-war psychology among [the] citizens" of the United States, the JCS heard from its own military intelligence community. Their best estimate was that total victory through encirclement, blockade, and bombardment might well take "a great many years."5
Even the strategic bombing campaign in Europe is of dubious merit given the resources consumed, so there is potential, if the will is there in Washington, for continuing to fight in Europe. If you accept a peace with Hitler in charge of the continent up to the Caucasus's and the A-A line then you would need to maintain sizeable forces to prevent him grabbing more at a time of his choosing so it would be a very heavily armed peace. However from what I have seen mentioned it was the B-29 that was the huge resource pit that made the Americans decide not to go for a larger army.
The Germans themselves, the Americans Post-War in their military assessments and modern day historians heartily disagree with that claim. As for the B-29, absolutely not and any basic math shows that; rather, it was the Army Air Force and U.S. Navy as a whole that prevented a larger Army because of their manpower requirements. Here you go:
3,970 B-29s built x Crew of 11 = 43,670 personnel
To put this into perspective, that's about four divisions lol.
The US rejected the Balkans because they were doctrinely committed to a frontal attack via N France. If they accept that is no longer possible other operations become not just worthwhile but arguably essential. Fighting where the Germans are at an huge logistical disadvantage such as the ME and a lesser one such as the Balkans is playing to allied strengths in terms of greater mobility due to control of the seas. There is the route to Iran which instead of supplying the Soviets can now support substantial allied forces there to contest the Caucasus region while the Germans have a very long land supply line. N Africa can be cleared up as OTL by May 43 or if the allies commit more forces a lot quicker, although that won't trap anything like the Axis forces it did OTL. With that secured the defences in the ME can be strengthen, or as suggested forces wasted OTL in Britain could be directed there even earlier.
Nope, they rejected it because of logistics and the fact they could never defeat the Germans there, in their own words. See Mark Stoler's
Allies and Adversaries, Pages 110-111:
The problems with this strategy, according to the jssc, were both military and political. Eastern Mediterranean operations would require previously committed U.S. naval support, Turkish belligerency the jssc rated an overall liability rather than an asset, and offensives at the end of long and tenuous supply lines in an area so mountainous and remote from the center of German power as to be indecisive and invite stalemate or defeat. Moreover, such operations were based on the assumption that indirect campaigns in the Mediterranean against Germany’s satellites, combined with blockade, bombing, and guerrilla operations, could force a German collapse. Dubious under the best of circumstances, this assumption ignored the fact that an approach relegating to the Soviet Union the brutal task of fighting the bulk of the Wehrmacht while London reaped political benefits in the eastern Mediterranean and Balkans, an area of historic Anglo-Russian rivalry, might so arouse Russia’s anger and suspicion as to make it ‘‘more susceptible’’ to German peace feelers— especially ones which would grant Moscow its centuries old desire to control the Dardanelles. The resulting separate peace would leave Germany undefeated and dominant in Central and Western Europe and would make Allied victory impossible.31
Also, you are playing fast and loose with your arguments. You're talking about the Anglo-Americans using their naval might to conduct operations on the periphery but just earlier suggested they reduce their production in this category in favor of more land forces; likewise, you are talking about North Africa being cleared out in early 1943 as per IOTL but just earlier suggested sending the American forces used to do such to Iran. You need to pick a strategy for this debate and stick with it.
Also even with almost unlimited oil Germany will still be massively outnumbered in the air. It simply can't produce either a.c or trained pilots and it can only approach allied numbers by staying with fairly outdated designs like the Me 109 as the core of its fighter force. This can be used either in a solely European strategic campaign or tactical ones or both.
Not really, given the resources available to them. The entire German planning was to defeat the USSR and then use the resources to engage in and win the air war. With unlimited oil comes unlimited pilot training, no Army needs in the East means literally millions of trained production workers and future pilots available, and, finally, all the resources that went into Army production are now free for air production. In 1944, German rivaled Britain in air production and that was with all the resources it had devoted to the land war in the East and West; said ground war in the East, which consumed 150 Divisions, is not there and thus frees up massive resources for use in the Luftwaffe.
Despite what you may think, the Bf-109G was basically comparable to Allied models, and for the cost of one B-17 you could produce about four of them. Four fighters and four pilots for the same cost as one bomber that uses 10 air crew; very bad math for the Allies. There's also nothing to prevent the Germans from massively switching to other, more effective aircraft and weapons; the Wasserfall AAM/SAM as well as the Me-262 for example. Given German sortie rates and casualty infliction rates of OTL with the Me-262, even with just a tripling or so of their OTL air fleet of the aforementioned Jet would result in American bomber losses almost equal to their entire annual production in 1944!
en.wikipedia.org
