WI: Matzen and Schoonebeek Oil Fields discovered, 1938-1940

History Learner

Well-known member
Oil, and the need for it to run their war effort, was arguably one of the greatest if not the greatest complicating factor in the German war effort in World War II. To offset their own domestic lacking, the Germans turned to a very extensive-and expensive-program of synthetic fuel production which consumed massive resources and helped to engender the coal famine the Reich had to endure during the course of the war. Likewise, this need to find natural sources was a major motivator behind Germany strategy in both Operation Barbarossa and the Afrika Korps, with the dream of Middle Eastern as well as Caucasus oil fields being the end goal. The entire strategic framework on the Eastern Front in 1942, for example, was the need for a mad dash to the latter oil fields, to secure Grozny and Maikop; such would grant the Germans sufficient fuel production to enable the Luftwaffe to challenge the coming Anglo-American bombing offensive.

Ironically for the Germans, however, the solution to their issues was readily available to them and they barely missed finding them. To that which I refer is the Matzen oil field and Schoonebeek oil field in the Netherlands, both of which had come into German hands by the Spring of 1940 and collectively with 1940s technology readily available to the Germans could produce up to 3 Million tons on top of existing natural and synthetic production. To put this into context:

In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. Although the total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels), this high proportion of overseas imports only indicated how precarious the fuel situation would become should Germany be cut off from them.2

At the outbreak of the war, Germany’s stockpiles of fuel consisted of a total of 15 million barrels. The campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France added another 5 million barrels in booty, and imports from the Soviet Union accounted for 4 million barrels in 1940 and 1.6 million barrels in the first half of 1941. Yet a High Command study in May of 1941 noted that with monthly military requirements for 7.25 million barrels and imports and home production of only 5.35 million barrels, German stocks would be exhausted by August 1941. The 26 percent shortfall could only be made up with petroleum from Russia. The need to provide the lacking 1.9 million barrels per month and the urgency to gain possession of the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus mountains, together with Ukrainian grain and Donets coal, were thus prime elements in the German decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941.3

Roughly 7 barrels is equal to 1 ton of oil, so the 3 million tons produced would equate to ~20 million barrels of fuel. This, from 1941 onward, means that the monthly shortfall would be reduced from 1.9 million barrels to just around 300,000 tons. This remainder could be eliminated via the Romanians, since the Germans would have the ability to adequately supply their coal needs without the expansion of their synthetic program to the same extent:

Even before the Russian prospects had come to naught, Romania had developed into Germany’s chief overland supplier of oil. From 2.8 million barrels in 1938, Romania’s exports to Germany increased to 13 million barrels by 1941,6 a level that was essentially maintained through 1942 and 1943.7 Although the exports were almost half of Romania’s total production, they were considerably less than the Germans expected. One reason for the shortfall was that the Romanian fields were being depleted. There were other reasons as well why the Romanians failed to increase their shipments. Foremost among these was Germany’s inability to make all of its promised deliveries of coal and other products to Romania. Furthermore, although Romania was allied with Germany, the Romanians wished to husband their country’s most valuable resources.8 Finally, the air raids on the Ploesti oil fields and refineries in August 1943 destroyed 50 percent of the Romanian refinery capacity. Aerial mining of the Danube River constituted an additional serious transportation impediment. Even so, Romanian deliveries amounted to 7 million barrels in the first half of 1944 and were not halted until additional raids on Ploesti had been flown in the late spring and summer of 1944.9

So let's say in 1938 after the annexation of Austria, Matzen is discovered and developed while Schoonebeek falls in 1940/1941. On the industrial level this confers many benefits:

- Without the focusing of the chemical industry on fuel, greater production of synthetic rubber can be achieved and thus a major bottleneck on German truck production would be removed. Obviously a net benefit to motorization and logistics capabilities of the Germans.
- Less need for coal for synthetics means more coal for steel production, with all that means for more planes, tanks, etc.
- As a sort of addendum to the above, the construction of the plants themselves consumed massive amounts of resources, in particular steel and manpower, which here can go to other purposes.

On the military level, the effects are also obvious:

- The Luftwaffe can achieve its 1942 expansion plane for plane outputs as well as maintain their training standards, preventing the collapse in quantity and quality of the LW that occurred over the course of the war.
- Training standards for truck drivers would not be reduced either, which was a major factor in truck losses in military operations from Barbarossa on; we are talking tens of thousands of trucks being saved from accidents and the like.
- The Afrika Korps would probably take a defensive-rather than offensive-stance in North Africa which would significantly delay any Allied progress in remove the Italians from Libya.
- The Germans could help supply the Italian Navy with fuel, making it more active and effective and thus likely have an impact on the campaign for Malta in 1940-1942.
- Finally, as alluded to earlier, there would be no mad dash for Maikop and Grozny in 1942. This means the Germans keep to their phased planning for the campaign, as well as avoid the debacle of sending 4th Panzer Army to Rostov. Case Blue would thus be a success and its likely the damage done to the Soviets in it would be fatal, leading to their collapse in 1943/1944.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
One part about the extra coal: the majority of the savings would be in lignite coal which is not really all that good for much beyond making synthetic rubber since they didn't have coal densification technology. Certainly the savings in coal used for electrical production for synthetic oil instead could be plowed into other things, but there would still be a strong need for some synthetic oil, as that process was the major way aviation gas was made since it could be made to a higher octane for the base product than the refining methods they had for natural oil; AFAIK only the US and Britain had access to the Houndry method.

Otherwise I think most of your post is spot on and well thought out, though Luftwaffe training would be reduced in hours simply due to casualties needing to be replaced, so you need to cut some corners to keep pace.

I disagree about the Afrika Korps as they were driven against orders by Rommel since he understood how outnumbered they were, so couldn't afford to sit on the defensive; rather they needed to attack to keep the enemy off balance and destroy his extra numbers in maneuver battles where the attacker could multiple his effective force by setting the pace of action and striking unexpectedly.
 

Bacle

When the effort is no longer profitable...
Founder
Just means the RAF, RN, and allies in general have a new target in easy range of the heavy bombers in Britain, and a new objective to capture.

The Germans might get some more fuel from it initially, but once they declare war on France and Britain, those fields end up a priority target, and probably get bombed into uselessness fairly early on.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Just means the RAF, RN, and allies in general have a new target in easy range of the heavy bombers in Britain, and a new objective to capture.

The Germans might get some more fuel from it initially, but once they declare war on France and Britain, those fields end up a priority target, and probably get bombed into uselessness fairly early on.
The Vienna basin was out of range until 1944, so it is safe and the largest oil field in Europe. Schoonebeek is very in range, but AFAIK no one bothered trying to bomb oil fields in WW2 given how hard they were to bomb effectively. However the rail lines leading out would potentially be a good target and one of the things that were heavily targeted in the bombing of Ploesti IOTL.

Also given that the RAF avoided bombing precision targets by day due to the heavy losses and night bombing such a target before 1944 when better electronic aiming was available was impossible. Cities couldn't even be reliably hit until 1942.

Of course both the US and British failed to successfully bomb such defended targets until 1944:
A total of 6,552 bomber sorties over 20 US Eighth Air Force and 2 RAF attacks dropped 18,328 tons of bombs on Leuna.[8] As the most heavily defended industrial target in Europe, Leuna would become so dark from flak, German smoke pots, and exploding oil tanks that "we had no idea how close our bombs came to the target.". On clear days, only 29% of the bombs aimed at Leuna landed inside the plant gates; on radar raids the number dropped to 5.1%. During the first raid of the Oil Plan, 126 Leuna workers were killed. However, after defenses were increased, only 175 additional workers were killed in 21 subsequent raids. Leuna bombing from May 12, 1944 to April 5, 1945 cost the Eighth Air Force 1,280 airmen. In three separate attacks by the Eighth, 119 planes were lost and not one bomb fell on the Leuna works.[9] The Eighth Air Force also dropped 12,953 tons of explosives on nearby Merseburg.

They did eventually get it with reliable blind bombing aids that were only available later in 1944.
 
Last edited:

Bacle

When the effort is no longer profitable...
Founder
The Vienna basin was out of range until 1944, so it is safe and the largest oil field in Europe. Schoonebeek is very in range, but AFAIK no one bothered trying to bomb oil fields in WW2 given how hard they were to bomb effectively. However the rail lines leading out would potentially be a good target and one of the things that were heavily targeted in the bombing of Ploesti IOTL.

Also given that the RAF avoided bombing precision targets by day due to the heavy losses and night bombing such a target before 1944 when better electronic aiming was available was impossible. Cities couldn't even be reliably hit until 1942.

Of course both the US and British failed to successfully bomb such defended targets until 1944:


They did eventually get it with reliable blind bombing aids that were only available later in 1944.
The US bombed the shit out of the Romanian fields once we had bases in Italy, and they could probably hit the Vienna fields from Italy as well.

They allies might resort to partisan sabotage groups or commando attacks against the Vienna fields till they get bombers in range.

Also, both the fields might change the calculus for Stalin's non-aggression pact, and for Italy's attempt on Greece.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
The US bombed the shit out of the Romanian fields once we had bases in Italy, and they could probably hit the Vienna fields from Italy as well.

They allies might resort to partisan sabotage groups or commando attacks against the Vienna fields till they get bombers in range.

Also, both the fields might change the calculus for Stalin's non-aggression pact, and for Italy's attempt on Greece.

Once they had bases in Italy is kinda the point; those aren't available until 1944, which means 3-5 years of use before the Anglo-Americans are even able to get at Matzen. You're not going to be able to insert commandos that deep into the Reich, nor are you going to find partisans in Austria in, say, 1942. I don't see any impact of greater German fuel supply affecting Greece or the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; the Germans still need other goods beyond oil while Stalin still is wanting to buy time to buildup the Red Army.
 

Buba

A total creep
IMO very little changes.
- The Luftwaffe can achieve its 1942 expansion plane for plane outputs as well as maintain their training standards, preventing the collapse in quantity and quality of the LW that occurred over the course of the war.
I do not see the link between plane production and availability of gasoline.
The collapse of the training system has many causes beyond fuel.
- Training standards for truck drivers would not be reduced either, which was a major factor in truck losses in military operations from Barbarossa on; we are talking tens of thousands of trucks being saved from accidents and the like.
There need to be trucks first.
- The Afrika Korps would probably take a defensive-rather than offensive-stance in North Africa
I don't understand why
- The Germans could help supply the Italian Navy with fuel, making it more active and effective and thus likely have an impact on the campaign for Malta in 1940-1942.
A more aggressive Regia Marina could indeed had prolonged the North African campaign and in consequence delayed Husky.
- Finally, as alluded to earlier, there would be no mad dash for Maikop and Grozny in 1942. This means the Germans keep to their phased planning for the campaign, as well as avoid the debacle of sending 4th Panzer Army to Rostov. Case Blue would thus be a success and its likely the damage done to the Soviets in it would be fatal, leading to their collapse in 1943/1944.
Case Blue failed for many reasons ...
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
The US bombed the shit out of the Romanian fields once we had bases in Italy, and they could probably hit the Vienna fields from Italy as well.
AFAIK they never bombed the actual fields themselves, they hit the refineries and rail yards servicing them since the oil pumps themselves were very difficult to attack especially if defended:

AFAIK the biggest Allied success of the oil campaign of mid/late-1944 (when they started going after oil after the RAF failure to do it effectively in 1941-42) was hitting the refineries and synthetic facilities and mining the Danube and Rhine to shut down transport.

They allies might resort to partisan sabotage groups or commando attacks against the Vienna fields till they get bombers in range.
What partisans existed in the heart of Austria? The commandos they did historical insert (only in 1945) achieved little more than scouting and didn't last long:

The one guy they inserted to attack the Brenner Pass didn't even make it out of Italy.

It's not so easy to get agents into the heart of enemy territory; the Germans had the same problems in Britain. Even the Allies had issues in places like the Netherlands:

Slovakia (late 1944) turned into a mess too despite the very active partisan groups and national uprising as well as Soviets on their doorstep:

Also, both the fields might change the calculus for Stalin's non-aggression pact, and for Italy's attempt on Greece.
Interesting point, how do you think it would effect either of those?
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
The collapse of the training system has many causes beyond fuel.
He's referring to a report the US did about the death spiral of the Luftwaffe which cited the lack of fuel in 1942 for the curtailing of training.
3. Reduction of GAF Fighter Experience Level. The cycle which underlay the deterioration of the OAF worked in this manner: When more pilots were killed In 1942 than the Gorman High Command has anticipated, pressure was put upon the fighter training schools to speed the output of replacements. But Germany's fuel situation, Inherently weak, required careful allocation of all oil products, especially aviation gasoline. Increased fuel allocation for pilot training was very difficult for the schools to obtain. The alternatives were either to fall short of the number of replacements or to cut hours of training so that fuel allocations would be sufficient to train the requisite number of pilots. The Germans chose the latter course, with the result that replacements arrived at combat units subnormally trained (Reference Note 1). As skilled and experienced pilots were killed, they were replaced with pilots with no battle experience and insufficient training. Thus, the average level of experience fell, reducing the tactical capabilities of the force. The rising tempo of combat worked cumulatively against the OAF. On the other hand, combat seasoned many Allied pilots who were fighting on a solid background of thorough training at less than expected rates of attrition.

4. The deterioration of pilot quality was first really apparent about March 1944. The cycle had undoubtedly been operating all through 1943, since the first large cut in total training hours of German pilots came late in 1942, followed by a similar cut in mid-1943, and much greater cut in mid-1944 (Figure 3). The last reduction in training hours of German pilots came at a time when oil targets in Germany were given first priority fop Allied strategic bombing. Then the inadequate allocations of fuel which the fighter schools had received could no longer be delivered. The early decision to skimp on gasoline allocations to training schools was turned painfully against the GAF planners who were now unable to ward off the attacks on oil. This was doubly painful because it occurred at a time when German fighter production was increasing.

The entire report is worth reading, it gets into the death spiral of the Luftwaffe, which had roots in training cuts starting in 1942 (and worsened every year as fuel became tighter) due to lack of oil.

There need to be trucks first.
True.

Case Blue failed for many reasons ...
True, but a big part of it was the rush Hitler imposed to get at the oil, which ultimately altered the operational plan in the midst of the fighting and caused Hitler to fire von Bock at the same time, taking command himself, and splitting army group South into two separate and diverging army groups after skipping steps in the offensive plan. That resulted in Stalingrad not being attacked until it was defended and caused the extended campaign there. There are many good books on the campaign and it is pretty clear, at least in my opinion, that the biggest reason for the failure was Hitler's feeling of needing to rush and interfering in the conduct of the operation so that he could get oil ASAP. Without that pressure it is likely Hitler is somewhat more hands off as he was in other operations.

A good book that describes the planning and conduct of the campaign:
 

History Learner

Well-known member
IMO very little changes.

I do not see the link between plane production and availability of gasoline.
The collapse of the training system has many causes beyond fuel.

The collapse in the training system was primarily rooted in the fuel cuts as already cited, but also in the transfer of the instructor cadres to active fronts from 1942 due to the deterioration of the war situation; case in point, Stalingrad and Tunisgrad. Both, here, have been avoided, though. Specifically as it pertains to the supply of fuel to aircraft production, see the Wages of Destruction, Pages 450-451, by Adam Tooze:

"The floodgates in Luftwaffe planning finally opened in the summer of 1941 with the completion of the army's Barbarossa programme and the long-awaited decision to shift priority to the air war. In June 1941 the Air Ministry proposed a doubling of output to 20,000 aircraft per year over the following three years.72 To implement this expansion, Goering's staff came to an agreement with Fritz Todt to carry out the reallocation of resources from the army to the Luftwaffe in a 'consensual fashion'. Todt himself was to oversee the identification of spare capacity and to ensure continuity of employment for army contractors.73 Days after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe revealed the full urgency and ambition of its new plans. At a meeting with representatives of the OKW, State Secretary Milch announced that, as of 1 May 1941, German intelligence believed that combined British and American output had exceeded that of Germany and Italy. The United States alone was turning out 2,800 high-performance aero-engines per month. On current trends, Anglo-American output would be twice that of the Axis by the end of 1942. 'There is not a minute to lose...', Milch declared.​
By the summer of 1942 Germany needed to increase its production of aircraft by 150 percent, to roughly 3,000 planes per month.74 The precise target set by Milch was new, but not the basic thrust of his comments. As we have seen, the expansion in productive capacity had already begun in the autumn of 1940. Milch's new target of 3,000 aircraft per month, however, required a further scaling up. Since earlier in the year Krauch had been envisioning a medium-term increase in the production of air fuel from 1 to 1.5 million tons. Now he raised his target to no less than 3 million tons. Given the cost of the hydrogenation process, it was unrealistic to assume that this could be produced from German coal. Hydrogenation was simply too expensive. Krauch's promise therefore hinged on the assumption that the Wehrmacht would conquer the Caucasus in the next few months and that Germany by 1942 would be importing Russian oil at the rate of at least one million tons per annum.75​

There need to be trucks first.

And there was? To put it into perspective, the Wehrmacht invaded the USSR in 1941 with roughly 600,000 motor vehicles; the myth the German Army was largely horse drawn is exactly that, a myth. Here, also, because of the greater rubber and steel output/availability, more truck production is likely to occur compared to OTL anyway. Equally important, however, is that-just like with the Luftwaffe training program-there will not be cuts to the Army's own programs to train its logistics personnel. To quote Tooze again, this time from Page 412:

In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for the motor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chronic shortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotorization' of the Wehrmacht.68 It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots, due in large part to the shortage of air fuel.69 But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing its soldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-road experience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles during the Russian campaign.70 Shortages made themselves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations that in November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at its Brandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lacked the petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off the assembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to be arranged by the Wehrmacht's economic office so as to ensure that there were no further interruptions.71​

I don't understand why

There's no need to drive for the Middle Eastern oil fields when domestic production-and expected booty conquests in the USSR-are more than sufficient. This does not preclude an active defense, but really here Rommel has no need to lunge for Suez/Cairo unless an opportunity really presents itself.

A more aggressive Regia Marina could indeed had prolonged the North African campaign and in consequence delayed Husky.

It could also result in the fall of Malta, which could have serious diplomatic effects vis-a-vis the Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks. It also immensely improves Rommel's logistics in North Africa and makes anything beyond landings in Morocco untenable if a TORCH analogue still occurs.

Case Blue failed for many reasons ...

Mostly because of Hitler's desperation to secure the oil, which effectively dissolved the pre-existing strategy and led to several bad decisions, especially the aforementioned diversion of 4th Panzer Army to Rostov. With the fuel situation much better, there is no need to abandon the strategic framework established before the start of the campaign in order to do the mad dash for Maikop and Grozny. Stalingrad will be secured in July/August, which frees up massive German armor and air assets to clear their flanks along the Don and Volga Rivers, as well as target the infrastructure along the Caspian and in Astrakhan. Such makes the Soviet counter-attacks that winter impossible to succeed, which in 1943 means manpower and oil shortages as well as mass starvation breaking out in the USSR.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
There's no need to drive for the Middle Eastern oil fields when domestic production-and expected booty conquests in the USSR-are more than sufficient. This does not preclude an active defense, but really here Rommel has no need to lunge for Suez/Cairo unless an opportunity really presents itself.
That wasn't what drove Rommel in 1941-42. He was actually ordered to stay on the defensive, but acted anyway. In 1942 though oil and the ME was a factor largely it was because with the US in and British resources quickly growing if Egypt wasn't invaded soon then the entire theater would face defeat from combined US-UK forces. The ME-Caucasus pincer move in 1942 was thought to be a way to secure that entire region as well as deny it to the Wallies (there was the problem of HALPRO bombing Ploesti in 1942 from Palestine) so that Rommel/Axis forces could then confront any attempt to invade North Africa from the west without having to face the Brits from behind at the same time. The oil was a bonus. Baku was always the oil prize, not the ME given how underdeveloped it was at the time and how far away the established sources were in Iraq.

It could also result in the fall of Malta, which could have serious diplomatic effects vis-a-vis the Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks. It also immensely improves Rommel's logistics in North Africa and makes anything beyond landings in Morocco untenable if a TORCH analogue still occurs.
Malta falling is a game changer for the North African campaign. Not sure it matters for diplomacy, but in terms of military operations it sucked in disproportionate resources from both sides. The Allies could afford that, the Axis could not. With the Italian navy ready to go though it very well could be viable to actually take it out in say 1940-41 or maybe early 1942 when 2nd air fleet showed up and bombed it into a defensive crouch.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
That wasn't what drove Rommel in 1941-42. He was actually ordered to stay on the defensive, but acted anyway. In 1942 though oil and the ME was a factor largely it was because with the US in and British resources quickly growing if Egypt wasn't invaded soon then the entire theater would face defeat from combined US-UK forces. The ME-Caucasus pincer move in 1942 was thought to be a way to secure that entire region as well as deny it to the Wallies (there was the problem of HALPRO bombing Ploesti in 1942 from Palestine) so that Rommel/Axis forces could then confront any attempt to invade North Africa from the west without having to face the Brits from behind at the same time. The oil was a bonus. Baku was always the oil prize, not the ME given how underdeveloped it was at the time and how far away the established sources were in Iraq.

Kinda what I meant with active defense; in 1941 he can't sit still because the British are deep in Libya and letting them get consolidated will only end badly. Long term though, going after Cairo/Suez is avoided because there really is no need so you avoid a lot of the strategic mistakes made in desperation over the course of 1942. That, combined with a better performance in 1942-1943 on the Eastern Front could be used to cajole the Turks into the Axis, I would argue.

Malta falling is a game changer for the North African campaign. Not sure it matters for diplomacy, but in terms of military operations it sucked in disproportionate resources from both sides. The Allies could afford that, the Axis could not. With the Italian navy ready to go though it very well could be viable to actually take it out in say 1940-41 or maybe early 1942 when 2nd air fleet showed up and bombed it into a defensive crouch.

If Malta falls, the Yugoslavs are really going to need to sit and think it through before siding against the Axis, the Turks are going to have to consider the further reduced capability of the Commonwealth in the region in terms of their dealings with the Germans and, finally, depending on timing it could impact the decisions that led to the Italian-Greek War.
 

Buba

A total creep
In OTL Yugoslavia was doing the sensible thing - keeping its head low. It was a British funded coup which put the "lets fight the Axis who surround us 90% and have enormous military superiority" morons back in power. Hence ITTL the fall of Malta will keep the crazies out of power. Yugoslavia will be better off for it ...
 
Last edited:

History Learner

Well-known member
In OTL Yugoslavia was doing the sensible thing - keeping its head low. It was a British funded coup which put the "lets fight the Axis who surround us 90% and have enormous military superiority" morons back in power. Hence ITTL the fall of Malta will keep the crazies out of power. Yugoslavia will be better off for it ...

Basically my thoughts; it's a lot harder to convince themselves the British will be able to support them when they can't even run ships through the Med as a whole.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Kinda what I meant with active defense; in 1941 he can't sit still because the British are deep in Libya and letting them get consolidated will only end badly. Long term though, going after Cairo/Suez is avoided because there really is no need so you avoid a lot of the strategic mistakes made in desperation over the course of 1942. That, combined with a better performance in 1942-1943 on the Eastern Front could be used to cajole the Turks into the Axis, I would argue.
Going off of the strategic deliberations described in the Germany and the Second World War series all the same calculus would be present if the US is in the war. Oil was not the motivating factor for lunging on Suez after the success as Tobruk, the ticking clock of US intervention was. So just little to no oil issues wouldn't change the equation that led to the offensive. It nearly worked IOTL, so maybe it might given that fuel would be less of an issue with all the butterflies that come with it.

I heavily disagree about Turkish entry; they would only join in if the Axis successfully invaded the Middle East; the USSR unraveling helps, but is not sufficient for them to join with the US in the war IMHO. If the USSR is still in then of course Rommel would need to leap the Suez and be into Palestine before Turkey would even consider joining, which brings us back to the need to invade the ME for all sorts of strategic reasons, not least of which is US entry and the need to deny them bomber bases to hit Baku and Ploesti.

If Malta falls, the Yugoslavs are really going to need to sit and think it through before siding against the Axis, the Turks are going to have to consider the further reduced capability of the Commonwealth in the region in terms of their dealings with the Germans and, finally, depending on timing it could impact the decisions that led to the Italian-Greek War.
I doubt it, it seems like the guys who pulled the coup understood they'd face some pretty nasty retaliation, but did it anyway. Their slogan was something like 'death before slavery'; given how they acted during the occupation they meant it. No one, not even the Soviet partisans, fought as savage of a guerrilla war as the Yugoslav partisans regardless of cost. IIRC Yugoslavia lost the largest percentage of population in WW2, virtually all of it after occupation, so they stood on principle regardless of the human cost.

Certainly if the Axis does better the Turks would probably start selling to the Germans sooner than they did IOTL though.

I don't see how any of this changes anything regarding the Italian-Greek war except perhaps timing unless Italy is so beat up from Malta that they don't have the strength to try it.

Basically my thoughts; it's a lot harder to convince themselves the British will be able to support them when they can't even run ships through the Med as a whole.
I honestly don't think they were under any illusions about the ability of the British to actually support them. Besides despite British support for the coup the coupists started and organized it themselves and the king even warned before signing the alliance that if he did he'd be couped by his officers ASAP:
 
Last edited:

Husky_Khan

The Dog Whistler... I mean Whisperer.
Founder
Sotnik
I'd imagine it'd be easier to target the Schoonebeek Oil Field since its aboot sixty miles inland then it would be hitting Ploesti or some Oil Fields nestled in Austria or what have you. Granted... still out of battleship range sadly so we can't get cool shore bombardment but still closer to the coastline then most of the targets of the Bomber force which means it can be clumsily targeted earlier on if so desired. Plus, whatever benefits the Dutch Resistance/Intelligence Services could offer would likely be more real and tangible then one could get in Romania or Austria as well.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
I'd imagine it'd be easier to target the Schoonebeek Oil Field since its aboot sixty miles inland then it would be hitting Ploesti or some Oil Fields nestled in Austria or what have you. Granted... still out of battleship range sadly so we can't get cool shore bombardment but still closer to the coastline then most of the targets of the Bomber force which means it can be clumsily targeted earlier on if so desired. Plus, whatever benefits the Dutch Resistance/Intelligence Services could offer would likely be more real and tangible then one could get in Romania or Austria as well.
Theoretically yes, but if it gets the air defenses that Ploesti or Leuna got the RAF wouldn't be able to hit it until at least mid-1944 since they'd need some good blind bombing aids that were enough to find an oil field electronically and reliably hit it at 20,000 feet or more. No easy task even for the world-beating Mosquito. Though I would expect that they'd certainly give it a good try.

But the Brits gave lower priority to oil targets pretty early in the war due to their lack of success hitting anything at night:
The British had identified the importance of Germany's fuel supplies before the war in their "Western Air Plan 5(c)".[9]:56 The focus of British bombing during 1940 changed repeatedly in response to directives from the Air Ministry. At the start of June, oil targets were made a priority of night bombing with attacks on other war industry to be made on dark nights (when the oil targets could not be located) but with the proviso that "indiscriminate action" should be avoided. On 20 June oil targets were made third priority below the German aircraft industry and lines of communication between Germany and the armies at the front. Following a brief period when German shipping was given priority, oil targets were made secondary priority in mid July under a policy of concentrated attack with five oil refineries listed for attention.[9]:56–57 Sir Charles Portal was skeptical of the likelihood of success, saying that only a few targets could be located by average crews under moonlit conditions.

As to the Dutch resistance was heavily infiltrated and the external support from Britain was entirely controlled by the Germans:
Englandspiel was a "catastrophe" for SOE and the Dutch resistance, "a textbook illustration, the world over, in how not to conduct clandestine work."[2] Fifty-four SOE agents sent from England were captured by the Germans and 50 were executed.

Englandspiel (England Game), or Operation North Pole (German: Unternehmen Nordpol), was a successful counterintelligence operation of the Abwehr (German military intelligence) from 1942 to 1944 during World War II. German forces captured Allied resistance agents operating in the Netherlands and used the agents' codes to dupe the United Kingdom's clandestine organization, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), into continuing to infiltrate agents, weapons, and supplies into the Netherlands. The Germans captured nearly all the agents and weapons sent by the United Kingdom (Britain).

We're talking Double Cross levels of success, so expect no help from the Dutch resistance at SOE direction, especially given that Schoonebeek is on the German border and the entire site can be entirely sealed off from Dutch civilians and use just German workers as they had thousands of people ready to go to get Maikop back online IOTL...who can just instead develop something literally next to Germany:


If anything Germany might just annex it and kick out all the Dutch villagers nearby.
 
Last edited:

sillygoose

Well-known member
Just came across an interesting article, at least tangentially related to this thread, about the oil fields at Maikop if anyone is interested:

It challenges the notion that it was destroyed and the Germans got no oil out of it using German reports on the state of the field.
 
Well, this changes the Eastern Front quite considerably. The Germans won't decide to de-mechanize much of their army, and will instead produce even more trucks, along with the fact they won't run out of oil means they'll make significantly more gains. Also, with oil not being a priority, Hitler may not shift the effort Southwards during Barbarossa and instead aim for taking Moscow. They may be able to reach Moscow with these changes, and if so, that not only means a propaganda victory, but also, takes out a significant chunk of the Soviet's industry, railroad network, and infrastructure. This, in conjunction with a successful Fall Blau, ensures the collapse of the Soviets, as they'd have no means to fight the Germans. Although, this probably just means that they have to now deal with an entire country of partisans, as it would be do or die for the entire Slavic people. It'll be the bloodiest guerilla war in history, for both the occupiers and the partisans, not to mention the civilians involved as well. Though, without the Soviets fighting, the Allies will find it impossible to land anywhere in Europe, and the Germans will have become self-sufficient.

If both Malta and the Soviet Union fall to the Germans, then the Spanish might very well be tempted to join in the war on the Axis' side. Which will definitely lead to the fall of Gibraltar, and a possible invasion of Portugal and the Azores, which would close off the main route to Egypt for the British, thus elongating the supply lines considerably for the British. Turkey might then also be convinced to join, or maybe even coerced, which could open up a second front in the Middle East for the British. If then the OKW shifts it's focus towards fully supporting Rommel and his Afrika Korps in North Africa, then the Middle East will likely fall.

Edit: grammar.
 

Buba

A total creep
1 - before '43 - if not '44 - allied bombing will be a niusance at the best of times;
2 - I did not know that POL limits were a factor even before mid '41 - I thought that Germany was swimming in Soviet supplied oil. Thanks for educating me;
3 - not making trucks in '41-42 'cause there was no gasoline for them - I didn't know that, thank you. Still did not stop the Germans from churning out airplanes by the thousands in '44 ... ;
4 - more trucks is nice, naturally, but operations will still be in c.300-500km jumps due to all other factors affecting logistics;
5 - you've convinced me - with no pressing need for Soviet oil the '42 campaign in the Russia should be very different.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Top