WI: Matzen and Schoonebeek Oil Fields discovered, 1938-1940

[BlackDragon98]

Could be, but if the Dutch commit more resources to defend the area the offset will be on both sides and moot each other out. Though likely I think it would be a small team plus some Dutch Nazis which were used by the Germans historically. Maybe they'll avoid some of the failed missions like the attempted air-landing operation.

The Brandenburg operations were complete failures for the most part.
"The Germans, executing a plan approved by Hitler,[132] tried to capture the IJssel and Maas bridges intact, using commando teams of Brandenburgers that began to infiltrate over the Dutch border ahead of the main advance, with some troops arriving on the evening of 9 May. During the night of 10 May they approached the bridges: several teams had a few men dressed as Dutch military police pretending to bring in a group of German prisoners, to fool the Dutch detonation teams. Some of these "military policemen" were real Dutchmen, members of the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, the Dutch Nazi party.[133] Most of these attempts failed and the bridges were blown, on two occasions with Brandenburgers and all. The main exception was the Gennep railway bridge.[134] Immediately an armoured train crossed it followed by a troop train, both driving right through the Peel-Raam Position at Mill and unloading an infantry battalion behind the defence line.[135]"

German invasion of the Netherlands - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Brandenburgers should have been used for recon and scouting instead, to see if the airfields were usable or not, because turned out to be half finished and Ju 52 sank into the soft mud after landing.
Gliders would have solved the problem and enabled the troopers to carry their main weapon as well, along with being able to transport heavier, crew served weapons.


The airborne ops was terribly planned, with the Germans throwing away the element of surprise by flying over the Hague and then turning around to attack them. Gave the Dutch enough time to prep and man their MGs and Flak. And the Germans thought they were being smart.
Why not just go straight at them? Absolutely stupid I say.
"As planned, the Luftwaffe flew over the Netherlands in the early morning hours of 10 May, but rather than deceiving the citizens of The Hague, their passage alarmed them.[6]"

Battle for The Hague - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Over 1500 paratroops captured and shipped to England.
Other problems included their parachutes, which prevented them from carrying their main weapons.
However, a cheap and easy solution was readily available.
It's called the 7.63x25mm Mauser C96 with 20 round detachable magazines.
Better range, higher velocity, and better piercing power compared to 9mm Parabellum weapons and the biggest magazine of any pistol in WW2.
Heavy but stable, as my great-grandfather noted in his journal.
Problem is, the idiot Goering like the shitty expensive Luger P08 better.

Mauser C96 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Overall, Holland was a total screwup of cataclysmic proportions for the Germans that was only saved by the indiscriminate bombing of Rotterdam.
Most of the problems suffered by Fallschirmjagers at Crete had already shown themselves at Holland.
Also, Goering is an idiotic druggie.
Red Baron for the win!

 

[lordhen]

Oil, and the need for it to run their war effort, was arguably one of the greatest if not the greatest complicating factor in the German war effort in World War II. To offset their own domestic lacking, the Germans turned to a very extensive-and expensive-program of synthetic fuel production which consumed massive resources and helped to engender the coal famine the Reich had to endure during the course of the war. Likewise, this need to find natural sources was a major motivator behind Germany strategy in both Operation Barbarossa and the Afrika Korps, with the dream of Middle Eastern as well as Caucasus oil fields being the end goal. The entire strategic framework on the Eastern Front in 1942, for example, was the need for a mad dash to the latter oil fields, to secure Grozny and Maikop; such would grant the Germans sufficient fuel production to enable the Luftwaffe to challenge the coming Anglo-American bombing offensive.

Ironically for the Germans, however, the solution to their issues was readily available to them and they barely missed finding them. To that which I refer is the Matzen oil field and Schoonebeek oil field in the Netherlands, both of which had come into German hands by the Spring of 1940 and collectively with 1940s technology readily available to the Germans could produce up to 3 Million tons on top of existing natural and synthetic production. To put this into context:



Roughly 7 barrels is equal to 1 ton of oil, so the 3 million tons produced would equate to ~20 million barrels of fuel. This, from 1941 onward, means that the monthly shortfall would be reduced from 1.9 million barrels to just around 300,000 tons. This remainder could be eliminated via the Romanians, since the Germans would have the ability to adequately supply their coal needs without the expansion of their synthetic program to the same extent:



So let's say in 1938 after the annexation of Austria, Matzen is discovered and developed while Schoonebeek falls in 1940/1941. On the industrial level this confers many benefits:

- Without the focusing of the chemical industry on fuel, greater production of synthetic rubber can be achieved and thus a major bottleneck on German truck production would be removed. Obviously a net benefit to motorization and logistics capabilities of the Germans.
- Less need for coal for synthetics means more coal for steel production, with all that means for more planes, tanks, etc.
- As a sort of addendum to the above, the construction of the plants themselves consumed massive amounts of resources, in particular steel and manpower, which here can go to other purposes.

On the military level, the effects are also obvious:

- The Luftwaffe can achieve its 1942 expansion plane for plane outputs as well as maintain their training standards, preventing the collapse in quantity and quality of the LW that occurred over the course of the war.
- Training standards for truck drivers would not be reduced either, which was a major factor in truck losses in military operations from Barbarossa on; we are talking tens of thousands of trucks being saved from accidents and the like.
- The Afrika Korps would probably take a defensive-rather than offensive-stance in North Africa which would significantly delay any Allied progress in remove the Italians from Libya.
- The Germans could help supply the Italian Navy with fuel, making it more active and effective and thus likely have an impact on the campaign for Malta in 1940-1942.
- Finally, as alluded to earlier, there would be no mad dash for Maikop and Grozny in 1942. This means the Germans keep to their phased planning for the campaign, as well as avoid the debacle of sending 4th Panzer Army to Rostov. Case Blue would thus be a success and its likely the damage done to the Soviets in it would be fatal, leading to their collapse in 1943/1944.

If they are discovered before the war and in service during the war by the Germans, expect heavy British/American raids on the oil fields, not a good thing for the people living there.

 

[BlackDragon98]

If they are discovered before the war and in service during the war by the Germans, expect heavy British/American raids on the oil fields, not a good thing for the people living there.

Not a problem, considering German and Romanian performance during OP Tidal Wave.

Operation Tidal Wave - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It'll become a meatgrinder for RAF aircraft.

 

[History Learner]

So Germany is going to get additional oil from a field that hasn't been discovered or developed yet? Please make up your mind. If its in existence in 1940 and economically important then its going to be something which the Dutch realise is a strategic target for Germany. As such they would be stupid not to have some plans for either defending it - resulting in fighting there - or if they think its loss is inevitable some capacity to deny its use to any enemy.

You misunderstand the OP; I stated that Schoonebeek is discovered and developed after the occupation of the Netherlands.

And as a result his logistics were deeply strained. That's exactly what I'm getting at. Even with sizeable captures of equipment and supplies from British forces.

Avalanche Press

See my reply to Blackdragon98

Okay, but that's not what your original statement was either. Further, as has already been pointed out, Rommel would have massively improved logistics.

The Luftwaffe was using radio beams in 1940 and the UK was using counter measures. Its a simple step to reply in kind and that the oilfields are so close to the UK reduces the problems from deeper penentrations into German controlled airspace. Furthermore since its fairly close to the coast, such targets were markedly easier to locate due to the advantages in navigating.

For the USAAF once they accept that escort fighters are necessary its a lot easier to hit locations in the Netherlands since it will be in range of allied fighters sooner.

So basically we are agreed that an effective bombing campaign is not possible until 1944?

As I said it might be that the Germans won't expand coal gassification as much post 1940 and the capture of the Dutch fields and that would be more efficient of coal. However saying that the addition of both sets of fields would reduce the monthly deficiet to 300k barrels a month is double counting as your assuming the same level of coal to oil work.

Again, there is no double counting. All the resources that went into the expansion of coal gasification Post 1940 are freed to be used elsewhere since they are not needed.

I would have to disagree on the 1st assumption. Germany was weakened in 42 in manpower as in other terms as the Germans themselves reported.

You may disagree, but that doesn't invalidate that your opinion is wrong and the Germans never said that. Again, please review the source in question because it reveals the Germans were not weakened in manpower; actually in 1942 relative to what the Soviets had they were arguably stronger sans in the fields of logistics given the depth of their advance into the Soviet heartland.

On the rest your arguing that Germany will somehow overcome those difficulties and capture markedly more territory in the south than it achieved OTL and hold it as well as cutting off L-L through Iran, which requires going even further. With extra resources and somewhat different operations they might do some of the 1st but holding that is another issues.

Actually I am assuming they capture about what did IOTL 1942, perhaps slightly less, due to sticking to their phased plan which involved taking Stalingrad first and securing their flanks before moving into the Caucasus to take Maikop and Grozny. What happened IOTL is Hitler got desperate and ordered a full rush to secure the latter targets, resulting in unsecured flanks and a protracted fight for Stalingrad itself, both of which are avoided here. Come 1943, however, the Germans can take Baku and Astrakhan.

Again your also assuming that the allies change nothing. The US can send even more foodstuff in replacement for military equipment which would mean the Soviets are a bit weaker militarily in 43 but can avoid a fatal level of starvation. The Germans even if they manage to hold onto more of any gains in 42 are still going to be massively overstretched.

There is literally no shipping or transportation capacity to do such; the Bengal Famine was the end result of this. Murmansk, Archangelsk, and the Pacific Route were maxed out in terms of port capacity while here we have assumed the Persian Route has been cut. Even if the Americans could magically send more food, that doesn't fix the oil or manpower issues for the Soviets.

 

[sillygoose]

The Brandenburg operations were complete failures for the most part.
"The Germans, executing a plan approved by Hitler,[132] tried to capture the IJssel and Maas bridges intact, using commando teams of Brandenburgers that began to infiltrate over the Dutch border ahead of the main advance, with some troops arriving on the evening of 9 May. During the night of 10 May they approached the bridges: several teams had a few men dressed as Dutch military police pretending to bring in a group of German prisoners, to fool the Dutch detonation teams. Some of these "military policemen" were real Dutchmen, members of the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, the Dutch Nazi party.[133] Most of these attempts failed and the bridges were blown, on two occasions with Brandenburgers and all. The main exception was the Gennep railway bridge.[134] Immediately an armoured train crossed it followed by a troop train, both driving right through the Peel-Raam Position at Mill and unloading an infantry battalion behind the defence line.[135]"

German invasion of the Netherlands - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

All you need is one to work, though that claim is contradicted by other sources I've seen on the subject. I'd trust the German records over that of a niche Dutch historian who's sources aren't listed.

Brandenburgers should have been used for recon and scouting instead, to see if the airfields were usable or not, because turned out to be half finished and Ju 52 sank into the soft mud after landing.
Gliders would have solved the problem and enabled the troopers to carry their main weapon as well, along with being able to transport heavier, crew served weapons.

Taking the bridges was vastly more important and largely paid off in every major offensive the Germans launched in 1940-42 even if there were a number of failures.

Overall, Holland was a total screwup of cataclysmic proportions for the Germans that was only saved by the indiscriminate bombing of Rotterdam.
Most of the problems suffered by Fallschirmjagers at Crete had already shown themselves at Holland.
Also, Goering is an idiotic druggie.
Red Baron for the win!

You do know the Dutch surrendered before the bombing, right? The Luftwaffe comms broke down and the bombing went forward anyway because they couldn't call it off and the flares weren't visible to stop it in time.

The Crete situation is a whole other bag of worms and I disgree that it was the same problems.

 

[lordhen]

Not a problem, considering German and Romanian performance during OP Tidal Wave.

Operation Tidal Wave - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It'll become a meatgrinder for RAF aircraft.

But the Netherlands oil fields are a lot closer to reach for the Allies then the Romanian oil field.

 

[Buba]

But the Netherlands oil fields are a lot closer to reach for the Allies then the Romanian oil field.

The real issue is not the range, but finding the production facilities (RAF) and hitting anything worthwhile (RAF and USAAF both).
And once the above issues are resolved - the Higher Ups having a lightbulb moment and ordering bombers to show up again ever two weeks of so. Up to 1944 the allies kept on skipping from one sort of target to another so that the Germans repaired the damage and went back to business while the bombers were pounding Churchill's newest "oooh, shiny, destroying that will win us the war ASAP ... "

 

[lordhen]

The real issue is not the range, but finding the production facilities (RAF) and hitting anything worthwhile (RAF and USAAF both).
And once the above issues are resolved - the Higher Ups having a lightbulb moment and ordering bombers to show up again ever two weeks of so. Up to 1944 the allies kept on skipping from one sort of target to another so that the Germans repaired the damage and went back to business while the bombers were pounding Churchill's newest "oooh, shiny, destroying that will win us the war ASAP ... "

But oil would be on the top of the list would it.

 

[Buba]

But oil would be on the top of the list would it.

Prepare to be surprised ...

 

[History Learner]

But oil would be on the top of the list would it.

It wasn't historically until 1944, but presuming it is made a priority target that comes with a MASSIVE opportunity cost. See Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, starting Page 596:

In the spring of 1943, however, the German war economy itself was sucked directly into the fighting. As we have seen, the threat of Anglo-American bombing had bulked large in German strategic thinking at least since 1940. But until early 1943 it proved remarkably easy to counter. The Royal Air Force simply did not have enough heavy bombers to do sustained damage to the German home front, nor did it have the technology necessary to guide them to their targets. The heavy air raids on Luebeck (28/29 March 1942), Rostock (23/24 April 1942) and the 'thousand-bomber raids' on Cologne (30/31 May 1942) and Essen (1 June 1942) gave some indication of what was in store, but they did not develop into a sustained campaign of aerial destruction.26 It was not until March 1943 that RAF Bomber Command had the planes with which to mount a prolonged attack on the heart of German heavy industry, or the technology with which to guide them to their targets.​

​

The 'Battle of the Ruhr' began on 5 March with an attack on the industrial city of Essen, the home of Krupp.27 Between 8.58 p.m. and 9.36 p.m., following the invisible beam of the OBOE electronic guidance system, 362 bombers hit the main target with a combination of incendiaries and high explosives leaving a trail of blazing destruction.28 This time the RAF not only attacked in force but returned repeatedly over a period of five months, dropping a total of 34,000 tons of bombs. The sequence of heavy attacks was relentless and interspersed by daily harassing raids by small forces of light Mosquito bombers. Heavy attacks were delivered against every major node of the Ruhr conurbation: Essen (5 March, 12/13 March, 3/4 April, 30 April, 27 May, 25 July), Duisburg (26/27 March, 8/9 April, 26/27 April, 12/13 May), Bochum (13/14 May, 12 June), Krefeld (21 June), Duesseldorf (25 May, 11 June) and Dortmund (4 May, 23 May), Barmen-Wuppertal (29 May), Muelheim (22 June), Elberfeld-Wuppertal (24 June), Gelsenkirchen (25 June, 9 July), Cologne (16 June, 28 June, 3 July, 8 July). To increase the misery, on 16 May specially adapted bombs destroyed the dams on the Moehne and Eder rivers, inundating the surrounding countryside and cutting off the water supply. The bombers killed thousands of people and did heavy damage to the urban fabric. Above all, however, they struck against the most vital node in the German industrial economy, precisely at the moment that Hitler, Speer and the RVE were hoping to energize armaments production with a fresh surge in steel production.​

​

Reading contemporary sources, there can be no doubt that the Battle of the Ruhr marked a turning point in the history of the German war economy, which has been grossly underestimated by post-war accounts.29 As Speer himself acknowledged, the RAF was hitting the right target.30 The Ruhr was not only Europe's most important producer of coking coal and steel, it was also a crucial source of intermediate components of all kinds. Disrupting production in the Ruhr had the capacity to halt assembly lines across Germany. When the first of the heavy raids struck Krupp in Essen, Speer immediately travelled to the Ruhr with a view to learning general lessons in disaster management.51 He was forced to return in May, June and July to energize the emergency response and to rally the workforce with well-advertised displays of personal bravery.32 The Ruhr was raised from the status of the home front to that of a war zone. Speer established a special emergency staff with absolute authority over the local economy and made plans for the total evacuation of the non-essential population. The remaining workforce was to be organized along para-military lines, uniformed and housed in camp accommodation so that they could be redeployed at a moment's notice to whichever plants were still operational.33​

​

But all Speer could do was to limit the damage. He could not stop the bombers or prevent them from seriously disrupting the German war effort. Following the onset of heavy air raids in the first quarter of 1943, steel production fell by 200,000 tons. Having anticipated an increase in total steel production to more than 2.8 million tons per month and allocated steel accordingly, the Zentrale Planung now faced a shortfall of almost 400,000 tons. All the painstaking effort that had gone into reorganizing the rationing system was negated by the ability of the British to disrupt production more or less at will. In light of the steel shortage, Hitler and Speer had no option but to implement an immediate cut to the ammunition programme.34 After more than doubling in 1942, ammunition production in 1943 increased by only 20 per cent.35 And it was not just ammunition that was hit.​

​

In the summer of 1943, the disruption in the Ruhr manifested itself across the German economy in a so-called 'Zulieferungskrise' (sub-components crisis). All manner of parts, castings and forgings were suddenly in short supply.56 And this affected not only heavy industry directly, but the entire armaments complex. Most significantly, the shortage of key components brought the rapid increase in Luftwaffe production to an abrupt halt. Between July 1943 and March 1944 there was no further increase in the monthly output of aircraft. For the armaments effort as a whole, the period of stagnation lasted throughout the second half of 1943. As Speer himself acknowledged, Allied bombing had negated all plans for a further increase in production.37 Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks.​

If the USAAF and RAF are busy trying to destroy Schoonebeek, then German armaments output in 1943 is going to be double or even higher than what it was historically.

 

[Buba]

To increase the misery, on 16 May specially adapted bombs destroyed the dams on the Moehne and Eder rivers, inundating the surrounding countryside and cutting off the water supply.

This strike at the dams was a total waste of effort.
Why?
1 - it siphoned off elite crews and leaders from line squadrons, lowering effectiveness of bread&butter operations. This is why, boys and girls, one should be very careful about forming elite units composed of personnel drawn from other formations;
2 - it is THE textbook example of the RAF doing nothing to hinder reconstruction, most of these dams filling up with '43 autumn rains and were back in the electricity making business in the winter ...

 

[History Learner]

This strike at the dams was a total waste of effort.
Why?
1 - it siphoned off elite crews and leaders from line squadrons, lowering effectiveness of bread&butter operations. This is why, boys and girls, one should be very careful about forming elite units composed of personnel drawn from other formations;
2 - it is THE textbook example of the RAF doing nothing to hinder reconstruction, most of these dams filling up with '43 autumn rains and making electricity in the winter ...

It would've been worth it had they kept the pressure up, the problem was from the top deciding to do area bombing/de-housing. Bomber Harris is not only a war criminal, but probably the reason why WWII continued in Europe for another two years from 1943.

 

[Buba]

area bombing

Hence my skepticism about effectiveness of nightbombing of oilfields.

It would've been worth it had they kept the pressure up,

Amen.

Bomber Harris is not only a war criminal

He was just following orders ...

 

[sillygoose]

It would've been worth it had they kept the pressure up, the problem was from the top deciding to do area bombing/de-housing. Bomber Harris is not only a war criminal, but probably the reason why WWII continued in Europe for another two years from 1943.

The fault lies with Churchill and his advisor, which is why Harris rose to power. They wanted that strategy. Agreed that the war went on at least 18 months longer than necessary as a result.

 

[History Learner]

The fault lies with Churchill and his advisor, which is why Harris rose to power. They wanted that strategy. Agreed that the war went on at least 18 months longer than necessary as a result.

It's so wild how often issues like this popped up on both sides during the war, like honestly cutting off the nose to spite the face.

 

[Buba]

The fault lies with Churchill and his advisor, which is why Harris rose to power. They wanted that strategy. Agreed that the war went on at least 18 months longer than necessary as a result.

SQUEEE!
Churchill bashing derail!
I'm not sure about 18 months, but the fat drunk extended the war for at least half a year for sure. Invasion of France should had been in '43 ...
BTW - with the big oil field in Austria ITTL Churchill will be raving and spewing spittle about soft underbellies even more than in OTL ...

 

[BlackDragon98]

Taking the bridges was vastly more important and largely paid off in every major offensive the Germans launched in 1940-42 even if there were a number of failures.

over 1500 highly trained Fallschirmjagers captured and over 150 Ju 52 transports utterly destroyed.
The cost was far too high, considering the fact that these failures were due to German error and stupidity rather than Dutch competence.

You do know the Dutch surrendered before the bombing, right? The Luftwaffe comms broke down and the bombing went forward anyway because they couldn't call it off and the flares weren't visible to stop it in time.

"The Dutch military had no effective means of stopping the bombers (the Dutch Air Force had practically ceased to exist and its anti-aircraft guns had been moved to The Hague), so when another similar ultimatum was given in which the Germans threatened to bomb the city of Utrecht, the Dutch supreme command in the late afternoon decided to capitulate rather than risk the destruction of another city.[34][35]"

German bombing of Rotterdam - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Dutch capitulated after the bombing.

 

[BlackDragon98]

1 - it siphoned off elite crews and leaders from line squadrons, lowering effectiveness of bread&butter operations. This is why, boys and girls, one should be very careful about forming elite units composed of personnel drawn from other formations;

That's basically how the Germans made new divisions.
Take the veteran cadre of one division and build up a new division around it.

But the Netherlands oil fields are a lot closer to reach for the Allies then the Romanian oil field.

All the better.
It'll be a reverse BoB.

 

[sillygoose]

It's so wild how often issues like this popped up on both sides during the war, like honestly cutting off the nose to spite the face.

I mean that was in part an issue of hindsight, but in this specific case also one of revenge. So I do think they thought they were doing what it took to win the war based on Douhetian principles, but also really wanted revenge for the bombing they faced as well as to punish Germany. It was an ugly war.

 

[sillygoose]

SQUEEE!
Churchill bashing derail!
I'm not sure about 18 months, but the fat drunk extended the war for at least half a year for sure. Invasion of France should had been in '43 ...
BTW - with the big oil field in Austria ITTL Churchill will be raving and spewing spittle about soft underbellies even more than in OTL ...

Derail? It is pretty well accepted history he and his advisor Lindeman were the ones who put Harris in charge with the mandate to area bomb. Overy and others have contended it extended the war 18 months and had they focused on other targets it would have ended the war that much sooner due to Germany's economic collapse.