Buba
A total creep
I was referring to the thread being about Germany having those extra sources of oil and not about Churchill's mismanagement of the war effort. Mismanagement which I do not deny.
All good!
WI: Matzen and Schoonebeek Oil Fields discovered, 1938-1940
- Thread starter History Learner
- Start date
All good!
sillygoose
Well-known member
I thought we were talking about the Brandenburgers taking bridges, not the FJ operation against Den Haag. We could talk about the FJ bridge operations, which were all successful, same with the assault on Eben Emael.
I was talking about the surrender of Rotterdam, not the entire country:"The Dutch military had no effective means of stopping the bombers (the Dutch Air Force had practically ceased to exist and its anti-aircraft guns had been moved to The Hague), so when another similar ultimatum was given in which the Germans threatened to bomb the city of Utrecht, the Dutch supreme command in the late afternoon decided to capitulate rather than risk the destruction of another city.[34][35]"
The Dutch capitulated after the bombing.
German bombing of Rotterdam - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
German bombing of Rotterdam - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
The Netherlands didn't simply surrender due to a single bombing nor was the entire invasion a mess up. The Den Haag paradrop was, but the overall invasion was progressing very rapidly. As your quote states the Luftwaffe had already annihilated the Dutch air force and as we know they had already pushed armored trains over a major rail bridge captured intact and the FJ glider operations all succeeded...so if anything the Germans were winning handily other than the Den Haag operation.
History Learner
Well-known member
You would think the people who had weathered an attempt in 1940 would realize how ineffective such a strategy would be, however. Revenge is a powerful motivator, indeed.
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sillygoose
Well-known member
Ok...
Not to belabor the point, but since we were talking about the possibility of the British bombing the oil site I think Churchill's strategy has major bearing on the issue; if he wanted city bombing instead of oil targets that may well mean by 1942 he would block bombing of the oil to focus on cities. Not 100% certain of course, but just going off of his OTL strategy it would seem likely since bombing of oil was curtailed until the USAAF forced the issue.
sillygoose
Well-known member
I mean...Harris did make a very strong case that the only German failure was to concentrate their bombing and he could make it work with US provided material and greater scientific refinement of the bombing techniques and bomb mixes. After all the firestorm technique wasn't an accident and Conventry made quite an impression. Contrary to propaganda there were major breakdowns in morale in heavily bombed sites, so the impression was if worse shocks could be delivered repeatedly, something the Luftwaffe was not set up to achieve, then it was possible to collapse the enemy war effort. They did get close it seems, after all Goebbels and Speer warned that another couple/few Hamburg's and the war would be over.
In hindsight it was a semi-failure and a worse option compared to alternatives, but you do have to remember they didn't have said hindsight and were operating on impressions of what had already happened and theoretically what was possible. Things like Guernica made a massive impression on the British, who freaked out about it, but that was largely based on heavily exaggerated reporting; ironically the fear those reports generated, originally intended to get the Allies to oppose Germany, did exactly the opposite and convinced them going to war before they were ready would doom them; I think that psychology was projected on the Germans by the British who thought that they had the same thought process about bombing given their actions in 1940-41. Not only that, but you do have to remember that Rotterdam did a lot to break Dutch will to fight and the bombing of Warsaw did something similar to the Poles. Meanwhile British precision bombing in 1939-42 was an abject failure.
So it does make sense why the British chose what they chose, it is just with hindsight we can say they stuck with a flawed strategy too long, potentially for other reasons than just winning the war ASAP, though reading about their thought processes at the time it seems like they thought they were genuinely doing what it took to win the war as quickly as possible.
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And in the end the Allies win as like OTL Germany can not defend everything all at once.
The Allies can't attack everything at once either.
And your assuming that US still joins the war as per OTL.
No USA and the Allies are pretty much screwed.
Buba
A total creep
The POD is Germany discovering and developing certain oilfields earlier, not FDR losing his hateboner for Hitler.
Hence USA goes to war against Germany.
But the only way that these oilfield will be of any use to Germany is if they are found as early as possible.The POD is Germany discovering and developing certain oilfields earlier, not FDR losing his hateboner for Hitler.
Hence USA goes to war against Germany.
1938 is too late for the Matzen field, because it would take about 2 years to get full production and Germany has already spent a fortune on synthetic fuels already.
The only way for Germany to not have a few problem is if they have more stockpiles of oil prepared before the war.
Therefore, Matzen has to begin production earlier.
The only way to have that happen is if the Nazi annex Austria in 1934.
The only way for the Nazis to annex Austria in 1934 is a different Nazi Party, still Nazis with Hitler in charge but with less idiocy and more intelligent people liek Scheubner-Richter.
A different Nazi Party means FDR might just die in 1933, when the assassin misses the mayor he hit in OTL and hits Roosevelt instead. Only a few inches the other direction.
See my post below for further details.
Also, @History Learner
I checked your sources for Matzen and Schoonebeek and there are some major inconsistencies.
Schoonebeek is noted as having high production costs, even by modern standards, as the oil there is considered heavy crude.
This means high extraction costs and more refining, which is why it was abandoned in the 1990s.
Where is the evidence that 1940s Germany was capable of extracting lots of heavy crude when modern tech from the 1980s and 90s were incapable of doing so at a low enough cost?
Also, about Matzen (based on your own sources).
Total extraction (currently) is 12300 barrels/day.
12300*365 is about 4.49 million barrels/year.
Even if the Germans go all out and increase production to 15000 barrels/day, that only about 5.48 million barrels/year.
Schoonebeek is cited (by your source) as having a production of 3000 barrels/day, making just over 1 million barrels/year.
Lets say the Germans go all out and make 5000 barrels/day, thus increasing to 1.82 million barrels/year.
That's a minimum of 5.49 million barrels/year and a maximum of 7.3 million barrels/year.
And we have to consider the fact that Schoonebeek is heavy oil and only available after June 1940, which means
Where are you getting the number of over 20 million barrels/year from?
because I see no way that the Germans can achieve the goals you've placed for them, even if they put in maximum effort.
Thus, in order for Germany to have enough oil, they have to annex Austria in 1934 and discover Matzen in 1935-1936. Give 2 years to achieve full production (5.48 million barrels/year). That should be about 15 million barrels extra compared to OTL, all produced and stockpiled before the war.
That would double the German stockpile at the start of the war to 30 million.
Even still the Germans are in a precarious fuel situation, as Schoonebeek won't reach full production until 1942-43.
Now let's discuss your so called benefits:
"Without the focusing of the chemical industry on fuel, greater production of synthetic rubber can be achieved and thus a major bottleneck on German truck production would be removed. Obviously a net benefit to motorization and logistics capabilities of the Germans."
Truck production had little to do with rubber (German rubber supplies were in no danger until the final years of the war) and more to do with standardization. The website below proves my point very well as you can see the astounding number of different trucks the Germans produced domestically. An absolute nightmare for logistics, maintainence, and production.
Lorries (kfzderwehrmacht.de)
Solution would be to just host a contest ASAP (1934-1935), pick the best 3 ton and 4.5 ton truck (all factors, especially fuel consumption) and standardize production of that truck. Based on current data, these trucks would be the 3 ton Mercedes Benz L3000 (better handling than the Opel Blitz on rough terrain and ran on diesel instead of gasoline) and the 4.5 ton Mercedes Benz L4500 (big brother of the L3000, also a diesel truck, excellent performance as a flak truck carrying the 88mm Flak 18 and 36)
Mercedes-Benz L 4500 - Wikipedia
Mercedes-Benz L3000 - Wikipedia
"Less need for coal for synthetics means more coal for steel production, with all that means for more planes, tanks, etc."
The main German problem was no a shortage of coal but rather the lack of effective transportation to their destination.
In order to amend this, the Germans must abandon the Autobahn in favor of a complete overhaul of the Reichsbahn (railways), as trains can carry more cargo in a far more efficient manner and steam locomotives burn coal, compared to gas-guzzling trucks.
And more rolling stock would be need, a lot more in fact.
CHAD Reichsbahn >>> Virgin Autobahn
"the construction of the plants themselves consumed massive amounts of resources, in particular steel and manpower, which here can go to other purposes."
This I will agree with because synthetic production can almost be completely replaced by natural production. This saves thousands of workers for other projects along with over 2 million tons of steel (i remember seeing this somewhere but I forgot the source).
"Luftwaffe can achieve its 1942 expansion plane for plane outputs as well as maintain their training standards, preventing the collapse in quantity and quality of the LW that occurred over the course of the war."
Luftwaffe is a whole basket of problems that is best discussed in another thread.
however, I will note that there will be more fuel available for training, and perhaps more high quality 100 octane fuel as well, leading to better German aircraft performance.
"Training standards for truck drivers would not be reduced either, which was a major factor in truck losses in military operations from Barbarossa on; we are talking tens of thousands of trucks being saved from accidents and the like."
Truck losses were due to the cold and the German retreat, where thousands were abandoned after fuel ran out.
OP Barbarossa (especially Moscow) is a whole different basket of problems that is best discussed in another thread.
I will say this though, the Germans should have stopped after Bryansk-Vyasma and constructed a fortified line for the winter.
Soviet counterattacks will be like the OTL ones in spring 1942, complete catastrophes that the Germans can capitalize on by going on the offensive and taking the Soviet capital.
"The Afrika Korps would probably take a defensive-rather than offensive-stance in North Africa which would significantly delay any Allied progress in remove the Italians from Libya."
The Afrika Korps wouldn't even be neccessary ITTL, once Malta has been taken. (See point below)
Or the Germans could send a earlier Afrika Korps right after the victory over France and use the period of high morale and momentum to crush the British in Egypt with the help of Egyptian nationalists.
Vichy France would probably join in with the Axis after Mers-El Kabir, paving the way to Syria and Iraq/Iran, both of which are pro-Axis nations.
"The Germans could help supply the Italian Navy with fuel, making it more active and effective and thus likely have an impact on the campaign for Malta in 1940-1942."
Dunno about this one though.
Italian navy wouldn't have been much use against Malta. Too many RN submarines.
And as I posted earlier, Malta could be taken in 1940 by a swift, surprise attack.
Hitler can make a deal with Mussolini and offer him Tunisia (after France falls) in exchange for an Italian assault on Malta. Greece can be taken later by a combined German-Italian-Bulgarian offensive.
Malta was poorly defended in 1940, only 9 biplane fighters and 68 flak guns.
Italian units like the Decima Flottaglia MAS, Marines, and Paratroops can hit the island hard and fast, paving the way for infantry landing.
Germany can deploy their glider infantry to help the Italians out, take out all 3 airfields first using glider infantry (gliders land on runway, blocking it)
Malta falls and the Afrika Korps can be shipped without any risks, as are all further supplies to North Africa.
British morale takes a further hit with the fall of Malta.
BTW Sorry about the extra long post.
-Black Dragon
Buba
A total creep
The data switching between barrels and tons and back and per month and per year is confusing.
I do know that 7 barrels is one ton, but I still get lost ...
Refining a ton of oil yields (very roughly) 50% gasoline, 25% diesel, 10% kerosene. I'm not sure about the rest - lubricants? Bunker oil?
Hence a diesel bottleneck forms faster than a gasoline bottleneck. So, depending on how consumption of POL derivates looks like, having diesel burning trucks could either be good or bad.
From "Wages of Destruction" I remember that the Reichsbahn was run down before the war - and never got any TLC. For coal distribution barge is best - keeps the black stuff off the railways/roads and is cheapest - hence in OTL the RAF mining German riverways and canals.
I do know that 7 barrels is one ton, but I still get lost ...
This may be either good or bad ...
Refining a ton of oil yields (very roughly) 50% gasoline, 25% diesel, 10% kerosene. I'm not sure about the rest - lubricants? Bunker oil?
Hence a diesel bottleneck forms faster than a gasoline bottleneck. So, depending on how consumption of POL derivates looks like, having diesel burning trucks could either be good or bad.
From "Wages of Destruction" I remember that the Reichsbahn was run down before the war - and never got any TLC. For coal distribution barge is best - keeps the black stuff off the railways/roads and is cheapest - hence in OTL the RAF mining German riverways and canals.
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"Further success was had by the Malta Convoys. An urgent supply convoy from Gibraltar to Alexandria (Operation Tiger) coincided with reinforcements for the Mediterranean Fleet, two small convoys from Egypt to Malta and 48 more Hurricanes flew off HMS Ark Royal and Furious in Operation Splice, with only the loss of the SS Empire Song, which hit a mine and sank with 10 Hurricane fighters and 57 tanks on board.[77] Convoy Tiger transported 295 Matilda II tanks, new Crusader tanks and 24,000 tons of oil for operations in North Africa.[78] They were completed on 12 May. I., II., and III.; StG 1 made a determined effort against Tiger and Malta without result.[79]"
Siege of Malta (World War II) - Wikipedia
Very cut off indeed, and this was during a period of supposed Axis air superiority after the arrival of Fliegerkorps X.
You do notice this was a side issue of supplying Malta? Its also apart from a brief convoy in autumn 40 the only one I've aware of through the Med.
By May wasn't Fliegerkorps X already in the Balkans for the attack on Yugoslavia and Greece in April?
Doubt of it's Importance?
"In all, 2,304 Axis ships were sunk, with a combined tonnage of 3,130,969."
Siege of Malta (World War II) - Wikipedia
The cost of Malta not being taken in 1940 was far higher for the Axis compared to what the Allies lost defending the island.
And just so you know. . .
As stated earlier there are serious doubts about how much difference largely unimpeded access to Libyan ports would have made to Axis logistics. Not to mention even without Malta there would still be British subs operating in the region and in those periods when the Axis controlled Benghazi and Tobruk they would be vulnerable to air and naval attack as OTL.
CHERRY PICKING.
You take a look at the range data chart I added?
So over 300 Matilda II and Crusader tanks and 24,000 tons of fuel is just a side issue for you?
What are you? An Übermensch with a tank ripping distortion halo?
Can't ignore this again, can you?
Where are those planes going to operate from without Malta?
Your iceberg aircraft carrier?
If the Italians take Malta, this is the amount of airspace and open ocean they can cover, protecting Axis supply convoys.
RN subs gonna have a fun time.
As well, all those planes used to hammer Malta can be used to defend Benghazi and Tobruk instead.
You're making a bunch of empty points by assuming the Axis are idiots.
I took one look, did a few calculations, and came to said conclusion.The data switching between barrels and tons and back and per month and per year is confusing.
I do know that 7 barrels is one ton, but I still get lost ...
21 million barrels/year from Schoonebeek and Matzen is impossible.
"Diesel engines are more fuel-efficient and have more low-end torque than similar-sized gasoline engines, and diesel fuel contains roughly 10% to 15% more energy than gasoline. So, diesel vehicles can often go about 20% to 35% farther on a gallon of fuel than their gasoline counterparts."
Diesel Vehicles (fueleconomy.gov)
Improved and overhauled Reichsbahn means better transportation in USSR.
USSR railways were useless for the Germans because of the gauge difference and the lack of Russian gauge rolling stock.
Lots more German rolling stock means a quick gauge change will fix the problem.
German canals were also heavily neglected during the pre-war era.
There were some expansion projects, but they were cancelled after the war started.
Coal burning barges are pretty fuel efficient.
Barges are limited to waterways, which can be a problem for shipping men and equipment.
Thus I prefer rail, though barges are useful for transporting raw materials like oil, iron ore, and wheat in bulk.
Depth is actually an issue as the jamming problem is worse the farther you get into the continent and away from your own transmitters. As such it would be less difficult to use beams for guidence in somewhere like the Netherlands than deep into Germany. Also as I said it also means a closer angle between the beams from Britain as the baseline would be relatively narrow compared to what the Germans were able to do during the Blitz. Again targets closer to Britain are hence better here.
CHERRY PICKING.
You take a look at the range data chart I added?
So over 300 Matilda II and Crusader tanks and 24,000 tons of fuel is just a side issue for you?
What are you? An Übermensch with a tank ripping distortion halo?
Can't ignore this again, can you?
Where are those planes going to operate from without Malta?
Your iceberg aircraft carrier?
If the Italians take Malta, this is the amount of airspace and open ocean they can cover, protecting Axis supply convoys.
RN subs gonna have a fun time.
As well, all those planes used to hammer Malta can be used to defend Benghazi and Tobruk instead.
You're making a bunch of empty points by assuming the Axis are idiots.
Actually your making a lot of wild assumptions yourself. As well as insults to try and hide that? I didn't copy the images because they were largely irrelevant to the points I was making. Namely
a) That virtually nothing throughout the period 1940-43 went through the Med from Gib to Alexandria. No matter how many stupid images you post that doesn't change.
b) That the Axis will still have serious logistical problems maintaining forces on the Egyptian border simply because of limited port capacity and the problems with trying to move large quantities of supplies by truck from the front.
In terms of your last point seeking to maintain large amounts of air power in eastern Libya is going to further increase the Axis logistical burden. They can keep more than OTL there possibly but not the sort they could maintain from S Italy/Sicily and providing 24 hour cover is going to be an interesting challenge. Not to mention this won't apply to Fliegerkorps X as Hitler only usually allowed it to operate in the Med when it wasn't too useful in the east. Its not going to be switching out between Libya and Russia as easily given the problems in moving ground crews and facilities and the like is it?
So you have a decision to make. You can either present some arguments like an adult or you can continue to throw insults around like a spoiled 7 year old. Your choice.
The data switching between barrels and tons and back and per month and per year is confusing.
I do know that 7 barrels is one ton, but I still get lost ...
This may be either good or bad ...
Refining a ton of oil yields (very roughly) 50% gasoline, 25% diesel, 10% kerosene. I'm not sure about the rest - lubricants? Bunker oil?
Hence a diesel bottleneck forms faster than a gasoline bottleneck. So, depending on how consumption of POL derivates looks like, having diesel burning trucks could either be good or bad.
From "Wages of Destruction" I remember that the Reichsbahn was run down before the work - and never got any TLC. For coal distribution barge is best - keeps the black stuff off the railways/roads and is cheapest - hence in OTL the RAF mining German riverways and canals.
Canals and waterways have advantages in terms of bulk movement but they have the problem that a lot of the new production centres that Germany started up tended to be a lot further east and away from the canal system.
Yes the Nazis badly neglected the railways but I got the impression that the main issue was lack of repair/replacement of the rolling stock and that this was significantly lessened by the obtaining of such equipment from the occupied companies.
Steve
sillygoose
Well-known member
I think you're right. From what info I could find about the situation in 1945 it was less about the wrecked rail lines and more about the lack of rolling stock. I found one quote from a US officer about being surprised at how relatively intact the rail lines were. Though I think in the context he meant lines not the marshaling yards. In the cities/junctions they were pretty messed up though with enough labor that wasn't too much of an issue to fix. Having enough locomotives however is and by late 1944 the loss of those in retreats and especially in air attacks broke the system.
If you're really interested try to hunt down a copy of this book:
It mostly covers the rail system as that was the beating heart of the economy and its breakdown under air attack is what ultimately collapsed the economy when coal could no longer be delivered.
Assumptions are not backed up with data.
What I am presenting here is data. Pure and simple
300 Matilda and Crusader tanks and 24,000 tons of fuel is no laughing matter.
The Matilda was virtually invincible in North Africa, aside from 88mm flaks.
You grossly underestimate the impact of 300 tanks and 24,000 tons (168,000 barrels) of fuel on the Allied situation.
Just remember that there are no tanks factories in India and oil production in the MidEast is a fraction of what it is today.
Shipping around the Cape exposes ships to German merchant raiders and U-boats for prolonged periods of time.
And your point begs the question, if Malta wasn't worth it, why did the Allies have so many of their forces defending the damn place?
The genius Allies should have abandoned Malta if it wasn't worth defending, but instead they continuously shipped troops and gear there at astronomical costs.
I wonder who's smarter, Allied High Command or you?
Also . . .
"aircraft sank 1,326 ships, for a total of 1,466,208 tons."
Siege of Malta (World War II) - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Where are those aircraft going to based without Malta?
Because aircraft carriers aren't going to last long, as history proved with HMS Ark Royal and Eagle.
Once Malta falls there will no longer be any need to maintain as many aircraft because all those Italian aircraft used to bomb Malta are now available for use in Africa.
So what if Fliegerkorps X is transferred to Russia?
The Italian planes no longer needed at Malta can be transferred to Africa instead.
Your points are really full of nothing at all and have no logical backbone to them.
So because there is oil in the Netherlands, the United States does not declare war, doubt that.
sillygoose
Well-known member
The PAK38 would like a word:
A.12, Infantry Tank Mk.II, Matilda II - Tank Encyclopedia
The Matilda, nicknamed the "Queen of the Desert", became legendary because of its impressive armor, the best in western Europe in 1939.
tanks-encyclopedia.com
I don't know if you've ever taken a look at Crusader tank operational rates, but they were abysmal. So raw numbers without context shouldn't be taken at face value. Otherwise Rommel would have been destroyed in 1941 and we'd have never heard of the Desert Fox.