WI: Matzen and Schoonebeek Oil Fields discovered, 1938-1940

stevep

Well-known member
To the food point Spain was actually exporting a lot of food to Germany until 1944.

I note that the 2nd paragraph of that report states
The United States and Britain joined in a continuing effort to keep Franco’s Spain out of the War by providing essential exports like gasoline and grain to prop up the Spanish economy, which had been in a state of collapse since the end of the Spanish Civil War.

Similarly on page 4, below the quote about supplying goods to a then still neutral Italy it states.

With the opening of the Franco-Spanish frontier in 1942, the composition of Spanish trade with the Axis changed. Before the War, foodstuffs comprised the bulk of Spain’s trade with Germany and Italy. By 1942, however, these had declined by a third and were replaced by items more essential to Germany’s war industries: minerals and metals. Seventy percent of the metal trade was composed of iron ore and pyrites used in making steel.

Similarly on page 5
Allied wartime trade objectives in Spain were threefold: to procure certain vital goods that they could not easily obtain elsewhere; to limit as much as possible the export of certain strategic goods needed by the Axis, either through Spain’s acceptance of export limits or Allied purchases of its exportable surpluses, known as preclusive buying; and to wean Spain from its dependence on German supplies of coals, armaments, fertilizers, chemicals and manufactured items by making Allied supplies more economically attractive. To further this policy, in March 1940 Britain signed a series of agreements with Spain promising it certain quantities of petroleum, rubber, ammonium and copper sulphate, and food products, in exchange for British purchases of iron ore and other minerals and citrus fruits. Britain loaned the Spanish 2 million pounds ($8 million) to make its purchases and set up a clearing agreement with credits based on pre-Spanish Civil War debts to Britain. Spain, in turn, promised to limit its exports to theAxis of copper alloys, cotton, oilseeds, tin, and wool. The trade program was set to last six months but was continually renewed throughout the War, although with changes in amounts and quotas. In December1941, Britain granted Spain additional credits of 2.5 million pounds ($10 million). Pro-Axis members of Franco’s government attempted to delay implementation of the agreements but were ultimately rebuffed. Inaddition to these agreements, in July 1940, Portuguese Premier Salazar concluded a trade agreement between his country and Spain which, by assuring that certain key goods would be traded between them and not with the Axis, indirectly aided the Allies. The agreement was renewed and extended in September1942 and February 1943

Overall while Spain may have exported some food items to the Axis, in areas they probably had surpluses such as citrus fruits, this supports the argument I have seen elsewhere that Spain was dependent on food imports and largely supplied metals and ores to Germany. The next few pages of the article mentions attempts to restrict Spanish exports of tungsten [wolfram] to Germany and then the rest of the document seems to relate to attempts to regain looted gold and other resources that Germans sought to hide in Spain but I only quickly skimmed through that.

Steve
 

stevep

Well-known member
If we are taking 1939 synthetic production and then natural production rates achieved by around 1941 is sufficient to provide Germany with its historical fuel situation and still have enough to supply the Spanish.

Is the 1939 date for synthetic production working on the assumption that Germany continues building very resources extensive capacity until then? As opposed to greatly restricting such once they realise that Matzen provides a much cheaper alternative?

Note this would provide Germany with its historical fuel situation, not that which would be needed to supply the very large forces your assumed elsewhere would be constructed to challenge the allied forces, especially in the air.

Steve
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
I note that the 2nd paragraph of that report states
Yes they did. US supplies enabled Franco to export food and other goods, which is why they throttled imports to him.

Similarly on page 4, below the quote about supplying goods to a then still neutral Italy it states.
Ok? They still exported 2/3rds of their pre-war food exports and included much more metals.

Similarly on page 5
Again, ok? The Allies bribed Spain to stay neutral while they still continued to export to German until 1944 when their last avenue for export was cut off. Franco made a mint off Allied economic warfare while still helping Germany. Point is if cut off from said supplies of Allied largess Franco could cut off exports to Germany of food and have considerable amounts to feed his people with. He'd still need German help, but less than commonly though, since there wouldn't be the same need to replace all Allied supplies. Plus rationing would extend things further as AFAIK rationing was only imposed on ex-Republican areas of the country to keep them in line during the war.

Overall while Spain may have exported some food items to the Axis, in areas they probably had surpluses such as citrus fruits, this supports the argument I have seen elsewhere that Spain was dependent on food imports and largely supplied metals and ores to Germany. The next few pages of the article mentions attempts to restrict Spanish exports of tungsten [wolfram] to Germany and then the rest of the document seems to relate to attempts to regain looted gold and other resources that Germans sought to hide in Spain but I only quickly skimmed through that.
See above.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Is the 1939 date for synthetic production working on the assumption that Germany continues building very resources extensive capacity until then? As opposed to greatly restricting such once they realise that Matzen provides a much cheaper alternative?

Note this would provide Germany with its historical fuel situation, not that which would be needed to supply the very large forces your assumed elsewhere would be constructed to challenge the allied forces, especially in the air.

Steve

As specified in the OP, Matzen isn't discovered until the annexation of Austria which means the plans online by then or currently building as of 1939 would still be online or about to be. By 1941, Matzen would be built up and Schoonebeek, having been discovered in 1940, would also be starting to come online as well. It's just the Post-1940/1941 wave of plant construction doesn't occur here.
 

stevep

Well-known member
Yes they did. US supplies enabled Franco to export food and other goods, which is why they throttled imports to him.


Ok? They still exported 2/3rds of their pre-war food exports and included much more metals.


Again, ok? The Allies bribed Spain to stay neutral while they still continued to export to German until 1944 when their last avenue for export was cut off. Franco made a mint off Allied economic warfare while still helping Germany. Point is if cut off from said supplies of Allied largess Franco could cut off exports to Germany of food and have considerable amounts to feed his people with. He'd still need German help, but less than commonly though, since there wouldn't be the same need to replace all Allied supplies. Plus rationing would extend things further as AFAIK rationing was only imposed on ex-Republican areas of the country to keep them in line during the war.


See above.

Except that the article states that Spain was dependent on allied food sources. It mentions that Spain exported foodstuffs to Italy and later Germany but not how large those were or of what types. Assuming that those foodstuffs could fully/largely replace imports from the allies is just an assumption.

For instance the one food export I can recall mentioned is citrus items to Britain. Spain could well be exporting items such as that, which its climate was more suitable to but while tasteful and healthy you can't base your diet on them.

Similarly I don't know if Spain produces olives - and hence olive oil like a number of other Mediterranean countries but the same would apply there. Another product its famous for is wine which also has the advantage of often being an high value product when exported. That wouldn't help them feed themselves without allied supplies.

A quick check on the CIA factbook mentions its agricultural products are "barley, milk, wheat, olives, grapes, tomatoes, pork, maize, oranges, sugar beet " but it doesn't give quantities. Plus this is 80 years after 1940 and the civil war that the country was then still reeling from. If anyone know actual figures on what exports Spain was making of agricultural goods and how much that would give us a clearer idea but the suggestion from the article is that food imports was important for Franco.

Steve

 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Except that the article states that Spain was dependent on allied food sources.
Yes I know, I didn't say otherwise, just that if they stop exporting to Germany they could require much less imports. IIRC most of the country wasn't under rationing either.

It mentions that Spain exported foodstuffs to Italy and later Germany but not how large those were or of what types. Assuming that those foodstuffs could fully/largely replace imports from the allies is just an assumption.
IIRC it was close to 1 million tons per year.

For instance the one food export I can recall mentioned is citrus items to Britain. Spain could well be exporting items such as that, which its climate was more suitable to but while tasteful and healthy you can't base your diet on them.
No, but you can ration and replace a substantial part of the grains in your diet with it. Rationalizing the national diet can be made to work, see Britain, who had to import much more and had to deal with the uboat war imposing major rationalization on people's diets.

Similarly I don't know if Spain produces olives - and hence olive oil like a number of other Mediterranean countries but the same would apply there. Another product its famous for is wine which also has the advantage of often being an high value product when exported. That wouldn't help them feed themselves without allied supplies.

A quick check on the CIA factbook mentions its agricultural products are "barley, milk, wheat, olives, grapes, tomatoes, pork, maize, oranges, sugar beet " but it doesn't give quantities. Plus this is 80 years after 1940 and the civil war that the country was then still reeling from. If anyone know actual figures on what exports Spain was making of agricultural goods and how much that would give us a clearer idea but the suggestion from the article is that food imports was important for Franco.
Yes Spain does grow olives, I've bought a fair amount of olive oil from Spain and there are references back to the Roman era about said industry.

Again, yes Spain would have trouble and need food from Germany, no one disagrees about that, it is just a question of how much that could be mitigated via rationing, stopping exports to Germany, and importing somewhat from Germany and Vichy France, since their colonies had a fair amount of food production.
 

stevep

Well-known member
Yes I know, I didn't say otherwise, just that if they stop exporting to Germany they could require much less imports. IIRC most of the country wasn't under rationing either.


IIRC it was close to 1 million tons per year.


No, but you can ration and replace a substantial part of the grains in your diet with it. Rationalizing the national diet can be made to work, see Britain, who had to import much more and had to deal with the uboat war imposing major rationalization on people's diets.


Yes Spain does grow olives, I've bought a fair amount of olive oil from Spain and there are references back to the Roman era about said industry.

Again, yes Spain would have trouble and need food from Germany, no one disagrees about that, it is just a question of how much that could be mitigated via rationing, stopping exports to Germany, and importing somewhat from Germany and Vichy France, since their colonies had a fair amount of food production.

sillygoose

Agreed they can make efforts to cut their reliance on food imports but how much is unclear. Some rationalisation is definitely possibly but there will be limits and unlike Britain, which saw disruption of food imports Spain would be facing a pretty much total cut off.

They can try and get food from Germany and France but Germany is looting as much as it can from just about everywhere it controls which makes those countries seem a dubious source.

Another factor that might be important is non-food imports that could be affected. France suffered after its fall because the British blockade cut off fertilizer imports which hit food production. They couldn't get replacements from Germany so I doubt Spain would be able to either.

Steve
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
As specified in the OP, Matzen isn't discovered until the annexation of Austria which means the plans online by then or currently building as of 1939 would still be online or about to be. By 1941, Matzen would be built up and Schoonebeek, having been discovered in 1940, would also be starting to come online as well. It's just the Post-1940/1941 wave of plant construction doesn't occur here.
Do the Germans still have their synthetic production? How much oil is gained through that?
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
sillygoose

Agreed they can make efforts to cut their reliance on food imports but how much is unclear. Some rationalisation is definitely possibly but there will be limits and unlike Britain, which saw disruption of food imports Spain would be facing a pretty much total cut off.
Cut off from where though? They'd still be connected to the rest of Europe and North Africa given that Gibraltar would be shut down from day 1 of their entry. In 1940 the RN was very stretched thin, more so with Gibraltar lost as a base and who knows how many naval vessels lost in the process of it being cut off, so won't really have much ability to interdict Spanish shipping to it's colonies, even less when the Germans base aircraft and uboats in all of Spain and their North African colonies (they had clandestinely already built bases in the Canaries by then).

If anything blockade running might very well be more of a thing (South America was desperate to export to Europe) and German uboat range extended quite far into the Atlantic which further increases British reliance on the US and cuts them off from being able to ship via the Cape of Good Hope.

At that point it is a question of who can outlast whom. LL wasn't on the table yet and will likely be less so given how badly the war just turned against Britain with Spanish entry right after France being defeated. We very well may not see the Destroyers for Bases deal given US perceptions of British ability to continue the war.

They can try and get food from Germany and France but Germany is looting as much as it can from just about everywhere it controls which makes those countries seem a dubious source.
Given the huge bounty taken in 1940 and with the fall of Gibraltar the ability to link to Vichy and Spanish North Africa (Vichy blockade runners brought in a huge amount of food to France historically, much of which ended up in German hands via the black market).
By this time there were increasing reports of Vichy French vessels in the Mediterranean running the British blockade from North African ports and ignoring the orders of the British Contraband Control to stop and submit to search.[55] Vichy Vice-Premier Admiral Darlan declared that the Vichy merchant marine had so far brought through the blockade 7m bushels of grain, 363,000 tons of wine, 180,000 tons of peanut oil together with large amounts of fruit, sugar, cocoa, meat, fish and rum. Darlan, who during the battle of France had given Churchill the solemn pledge that the French navy would never surrender to Germany, claimed that the British were reluctant to risk a third bloody clash like those at Dakar and Oran, and that, while they had sunk seven unescorted French food ships, they had never sunk, or even stopped, a French ship escorted by warships.

We also have a rather warped view of the food situation considering the massive disruption the war caused in summer 1940 to the harvest, the political fall out of the German conquest, and the flooding of the Danube that year which was not repeated the next.

Plus by 1941 Hoover had organized food relief for Europe and was feeding millions of people:
Hoover said that his information indicated that the Belgian ration was already down to 960 calories – less than half the amount necessary to sustain life – and that many children were already so weak they could no longer attend school, but the British disputed this. Even so, many Americans were appalled by the continuing hardship. There were 16m French Americans alone, and by early March at least 15 different organizations – collectively known as the Coordinating Council for French Relief – were distributing aid in France through The American Friends Service Committee, while the Quaker Committee also distributed around $50,000 worth of food, clothing and medical supplies a month throughout France. The American Red Cross chartered a 'mercy ship', SS Cold Harbor to take 12,000,000 lb (5,400,000 kg) of evaporated and powdered milk and 150,000 articles of children's clothing, 500,000 units of insulin and 20,000 bottles of vitamins to Marseilles and shortly afterwards sent a second, the SS Exmouth, to carry $1.25m worth of relief supplies into unoccupied France.

Another factor that might be important is non-food imports that could be affected. France suffered after its fall because the British blockade cut off fertilizer imports which hit food production. They couldn't get replacements from Germany so I doubt Spain would be able to either.

Steve
See the above source about Vichy blockade running. The British blockade was leaky. With Spain in the war and cutting off Gibraltar they will not really be able to blockade anything in the Western Mediterranean (Vichy then gets to do whatever it wants), get none of the Tiger convoys through (bye bye Malta in 1940 or early 41), or have bases in the region to threaten anything. Given that the Brits failed to take Dakar (with de Gaulle's forces help) from Vichy despite it being isolated there is no way they can take the Canaries with German air and naval units based there.
BTW that naval force staged from Gibraltar, so good luck trying to repeat that with Gibraltar out of the picture and who knows how many naval losses in the process.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Do the Germans still have their synthetic production? How much oil is gained through that?

To quote from the OP:

In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. Although the total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels), this high proportion of overseas imports only indicated how precarious the fuel situation would become should Germany be cut off from them.2​
Having Matzen and Schoonebeek at full production by 1942 would reduce the monthly shortfall (based on 1941 figures) from 1.9 million tons to just 300,000 tons. Such could be made up for with higher deliveries from Romania.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
To quote from the OP:

In 1938, of the total consumption of 44 million barrels, imports from overseas accounted for 28 million barrels or roughly 60 percent of the total supply. An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically. Although the total overseas imports were even higher in 1939 before the onset of the blockade in September (33 million barrels), this high proportion of overseas imports only indicated how precarious the fuel situation would become should Germany be cut off from them.2​
Having Matzen and Schoonebeek at full production by 1942 would reduce the monthly shortfall (based on 1941 figures) from 1.9 million tons to just 300,000 tons. Such could be made up for with higher deliveries from Romania.
Doesn't that 1938 number include civilian consumption that was seriously cut back once the war started?
 

stevep

Well-known member
Cut off from where though? They'd still be connected to the rest of Europe and North Africa given that Gibraltar would be shut down from day 1 of their entry. In 1940 the RN was very stretched thin, more so with Gibraltar lost as a base and who knows how many naval vessels lost in the process of it being cut off, so won't really have much ability to interdict Spanish shipping to it's colonies, even less when the Germans base aircraft and uboats in all of Spain and their North African colonies (they had clandestinely already built bases in the Canaries by then).

If anything blockade running might very well be more of a thing (South America was desperate to export to Europe) and German uboat range extended quite far into the Atlantic which further increases British reliance on the US and cuts them off from being able to ship via the Cape of Good Hope.

At that point it is a question of who can outlast whom. LL wasn't on the table yet and will likely be less so given how badly the war just turned against Britain with Spanish entry right after France being defeated. We very well may not see the Destroyers for Bases deal given US perceptions of British ability to continue the war.


Given the huge bounty taken in 1940 and with the fall of Gibraltar the ability to link to Vichy and Spanish North Africa (Vichy blockade runners brought in a huge amount of food to France historically, much of which ended up in German hands via the black market).


We also have a rather warped view of the food situation considering the massive disruption the war caused in summer 1940 to the harvest, the political fall out of the German conquest, and the flooding of the Danube that year which was not repeated the next.

Plus by 1941 Hoover had organized food relief for Europe and was feeding millions of people:



See the above source about Vichy blockade running. The British blockade was leaky. With Spain in the war and cutting off Gibraltar they will not really be able to blockade anything in the Western Mediterranean (Vichy then gets to do whatever it wants), get none of the Tiger convoys through (bye bye Malta in 1940 or early 41), or have bases in the region to threaten anything. Given that the Brits failed to take Dakar (with de Gaulle's forces help) from Vichy despite it being isolated there is no way they can take the Canaries with German air and naval units based there.
BTW that naval force staged from Gibraltar, so good luck trying to repeat that with Gibraltar out of the picture and who knows how many naval losses in the process.

I think we're talking about different time periods. I was referring to the pressure that was put on Spain, primarily by the US, after the latter had entered the war.

Yes there were special features affected food production in France in 1940, but some of them, such as widespread looting by the Germans, their continuing to hold millions of French POWs, many of who would have been working on the farms and as I said the continued blockade limiting factors like the importation of fertilizers. As you say the blockade in the western Med was very leaky but the issue is getting materials from outside occupied Europe and its N African colonies.

There is a suggestion that there was an informal German support system in the Canaries but that wasn't a direct military presence. I've seen a programme on it and there's a lot of suggestions but relatively little hard evidence.

I know that Churchill had plans to occupy the islands if Franco joined the Axis and suspect very much that the Us would have gotten heavily involved in such an operation in say 42. By 43 of course its too late as the allies have started occupying NW Africa and Vichy has to all intents and purposes gone.

Steve
 

stevep

Well-known member
Do the Germans still have their synthetic production? How much oil is gained through that?

As History Learner has mentioned the opening post assumed that the Germans do the OTL synthetic production as well as being able to fully ultilise the two oil fields. In that case their deficit in oil is relatively small, presuming they have no larger consumption than OTL.

SillyGoose has suggested that this would not happen as the synthetic oil production was very expensive in terms of costs, steel and other matters. Instead once its realised that oil from the two sources is available it would replace rather than supplement the historical synthetic production. This would free up other resources but still mean than Germany had a shortfall similar to OTL, all other matters being roughly the same.

Steve
 

History Learner

Well-known member
German success on the Eastern Front in 1942-1943 would create a virtuous cycle in terms of fuel availability:
We should also account for LW combat fuel burn on the Eastern Front. Even in 1944, LW flew 65% of its combat sorties on the Eastern Front.

Taking the average of fuel capacity for Me-109 (.54t) and Ju-88 (2.32t) as the average per-sortie fuel burn [i.e. 1.44t], that implies ~500,000t burned on the Eastern Front in combat missions during 1944 - about a quarter of the LW's avgas budget. [That's a very rough estimate, I know. Better figures welcome] LW fuel burn was almost certainly higher in the East in '43 than '44 but to be conservative let's stick with 500k t.

The ATL specifies that planes will be expended in the West rather than East, but in the West they don't survive very long: ~8x more likely to be splashed per sortie. Planes shifted East to West, therefore, burn only ~13% as much fuel as OTL.

So simply shifting LW operations from East to West "saves" something on the order of 400k mt of avgas on combat operations for a given attrition magnitude.

Per Caldwell and Mueller's The Luftwaffe over Germany: Defense of the Reich the Germans planned to expend 60-80k mt of avgas monthly on training in mid-'44, graduating 1,200 day-fighter pilots monthly plus 469 others (events nixed these plans of course).

The fuel saved from Eastern Front air operations would allow several months of LW training or (more likely) an increase in the quality of pilots.

Again, this is the roughest of estimates. It's sufficient to make the point, however, that saving fuel on Eastern Front combat ops would enable better training.
 

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