WI: Matzen and Schoonebeek Oil Fields discovered, 1938-1940

[stevep]

Sillygoose

Part 4. Why making peace is a bad idea.

The basic thing is Nazi Germany will be your enemy. You may think that it won't go to war with you again, despite the historical evidence and there's a small possibility that you would be right. However even if it ends up with a prolonged cold war why make yourself weaker and your opponent stronger? That's what the proposed agreement would do as you would strip yourself of allies and assets and also make the US an extremely unpopular potential ally. At the same time your going to considerably strengthen the Germans by giving them resources and territory they can't win while the allies fight, and others they can only take with great difficulty. If as I suspect they will go to war with you at a time of their choosing then things will be a lot worse.

Looking at option a) - that the Germans actual keep their word
As I've argued in my previous post the allies can continue the fight if the US is willing. By this point its the key nation in the alliance and with it Britain and its empire and a rump Russia can keep fighting. This makes it far more difficult for the Nazis to gain the empire they desire. If their opposed to further fighting resistance collapses. I'm not clear what territory your suggesting that the US will concede to them but assuming at least anything of the Soviet Union they want, most of Africa directly or indirectly and probably the bulk of the ME. Also made clear that your willing to see Britain become a satellite of Nazi Germany, which would mean its resources are added to those of their empire. Considering the military capacity of Britain at this time and its existing resources that is a hell of a power shift.

At the same time it makes your war in the Pacific more difficult. China is totally isolated now and your lost the resources of at least Britain and India. If Britain retains any level of independence its in its interests to make a separate peace in turn with Japan. Which could well take Australia out of the war as well. As such Japan would have greater resources to oppose the US which is also losing a lot of bases and resources. Unless you intend to maintain presences in Australia, India etc. by force? If your lucky that will delay the invasion of Japan long enough for the development of nuclear weapons so you avoid the costs of that operation.

b) If Germany makes peace and then, having absorbed the promised territories then quickly rejoins the conflict. The US is has lost allies and territory and now faces a markedly more powerful Germany as well as Japan. With hindsight the US might still win, given that its likely to obtain nukes, although that could be delayed in this scenario. However that's with hindsight and its going to be a very bloody war. Unless the US simply withdraws to N America which leaves it politically and economic isolated.

c) That Hitler simply refuses to accept a separate peace but insists on peace with Japan as well - with territorial gains for Japan as well. Probably less likely but Hitler's beliefs that the US is 'morally' weak has been reinforced. In which case what does the US do? If the decision is to reject such terms might not have totally alienated your allies by planning to dump them in such a way but they, especially Britain and the dominions are going to be a lot less trusting. As such you might end up fighting but in a weaker position. Or do you meet such demands in which case the fascists hold pretty much all the world outside the Americas.

A lot depends on what terms you think the US is willing to accept? However even an attempt, especially since its clear that Washington is willing to throw allies to the wolves will weaken the alliance and probably also further divide the US.

Steve

 

[History Learner]

Worth considering for the 1943 campaign season, is this secret report directly presented to Stalin concerning the manpower situation of the USSR as of September, 1942:

I. Available by the start of the war:​

a) reservists of 1890-1921 classes (as of 1.01.41) - 20 230 800​

b) officers of reserve 893 200​

c) enlisted men in the peace-time army 3 679 200​

d) officers of the peace-time army 554 200​

e) recruits of 1922-23 classes - 2 118 600​

f) -------1924-25 - 1 450 000​

g) men reserved for employment in industry - 2 781 000​

Total 31 500 0000 men or about 16,4% of the entire population according to Tschadenko​

​

II. used for the armed forces by 1.09.42 - 18 069 000, including:​

a) on active service in the army, navy, NKVD forces - 11 055 700​

b) in hospitals - 766 000​

c) discharged due to unfitness - 1 115 000​

d) died of wounds in hospitals - 177 000​

e) killed and missing in action - 4 920 300​

​

III. Other usage and losses:​

a) men not subject to initial mobilization and lost with the occupied territory - 5 631 000, including:​

- classes of 1890-1904 - 3 628 000​

- men without military training - 822 000​

- men from Moldavia and Baltic republics - 668 000​

- classes of 1923-24 - 513 000​

b) exempt from military service due to national affiliation (Germans, Romanians etc) - 250 000​

c) planned transfers to the armed forces in September and later according to the GKO decree No.2100 - 1 380 000 (of them 880 thousands newly conscripted and 500 thousands relieved from the navy and auxiliary forces)​

Total used up 1 September 1942 - 24 830 000 men​

​

IV. Remaining unused resources:​

a) reserved for employment in the civil economy - 2 781 000​

b) in labor columns - 1 321 000​

c) recruits born in 1925 - 700 000​

d) non-conscripted men fully fit for service in the Central Asian Military District - 600 000​

e) non-conscripted men with limited fitness or in the age above 45 (without Far-East and Transcaucasus) - 500 000 (of them 277 000 in the Central Asia)​

f) non-conscripted men in the Far East, Trasnbaikal and Transcaucasus Fronts 505 000 (including 200 000 with limited fitness and 200 000 in age above 45).​

g) officers of reserve, not conscripted yet - 156 000​

h) expected convalescents from hospitals in 3 nearest months - 350 000​

i) in the penitentiary system - 1 156 000 men in age from 17 to 45.​

​

About the only source left is the 700,000 men in the 1925 age class and the 600,000 in CAMD, but the latter are of questionable utility for political reasons. Soviet losses in 1943 Q1 was 726,714 irrecoverable losses, and 1,425,692 wounded/sick. Basically from Spring onward, the Red Army is declining rapidly in not only quantitative terms, but also qualitative if they are relying on limited fitness, above 45 and CAMD recruits to try to make up for losses. Combining the starvation effect of no Eastern Ukraine and the Kuban, and I foresee a total collapse of the USSR by early 1944.

 

[Sol Zagato]

Without the recovery of Eastern Ukraine and the Kuban achieved in 1943 by Soviet battlefield success, mass starvation would've broken out and crippled not only the Red Army but collapse their industrial production via death of workers.

I disagree. According to Dunn (The Soviet Economy and the Red Army) it wasn't just lack of arable land, but diversion of resources and typical Soviet agricultural incompetence that led to the reduced output. However, most of the people that starved to death were considered acceptable casualties by Soviet central planners. Rations for invalids were basically "hope you have friends or a private garden feeding you, because we certainly aren't".

If food becomes a more severe issue, then the likely outcome is increased lend-lease food %, reduced Soviet war production, reduced army size, and increased agricultural investment. Smoothly planned such that the Soviets are still a valid opponent, if weaker.

It's still possible they do something stupid. Like, "just one last push and we'll turn the tide" stupid. In the case that the tide is in fact not turned immedately, the (entirely planned!) hollowing out of nonessential industries becomes so severe that the nonessential industries are suddenly essential, so war production and the draft are severely cut, diverting resources to the formerly nonessential industries (like agricultural equipment) to prevent the collapse of the country.

Done in a chaotic fashion that makes the Soviets a comparative non-factor offensively for awhile.

 

[History Learner]

I disagree. According to Dunn (The Soviet Economy and the Red Army) it wasn't just lack of arable land, but diversion of resources and typical Soviet agricultural incompetence that led to the reduced output. However, most of the people that starved to death were considered acceptable casualties by Soviet central planners. Rations for invalids were basically "hope you have friends or a private garden feeding you, because we certainly aren't".

I'm not sure why you disagree then, because those issues are still in play and, worse, they have not recovered the croplands of East Ukraine and the Kuban. Even worse, in 1943 there was a mass crop failure in the potato fields of the Urals, which further caused a decrease in food output to the extent that rations for everyone-not just invalids-were cut:

Any further cuts would mean cuts for critical sectors, i.e. the Army and the industrial workers.

If food becomes a more severe issue, then the likely outcome is increased lend-lease food %, reduced Soviet war production, reduced army size, and increased agricultural investment. Smoothly planned such that the Soviets are still a valid opponent, if weaker.

For one, increase food imports could only come at the expense of forgoing other war materials because shipping and port capacity were maxed out at this time, as was the Soviet railway network. The United States was also already exporting 40% of its food production, so further supplies to the USSR could only come via the institution of a much stricter rationing system there, which seems politically untenable.

As for reduced Soviet war production, it's important to note that in 1943 the Germans destroyed more tanks than the Soviets produced for one. If you are diverting Lend Lease supply efforts to emphasize food more and reducing domestic war production, the inescapable conclusion is that the Red Army is incapable of offensive from 1943 onwards because it is a smaller, less equipped and primarily infantry force rather than the combined arms military it managed to become.

It's still possible they do something stupid. Like, "just one last push and we'll turn the tide" stupid. In the case that the tide is in fact not turned immedately, the (entirely planned!) hollowing out of nonessential industries becomes so severe that the nonessential industries are suddenly essential, so war production and the draft are severely cut, diverting resources to the formerly nonessential industries (like agricultural equipment) to prevent the collapse of the country.

Done in a chaotic fashion that makes the Soviets a comparative non-factor offensively for awhile.

Adam Tooze notes that by 1944 the Soviet economy was basically reaching the ends of its tether, the earlier mobilization efforts no longer sustainable:

With farm labour cut to the bone, to permit the maximum concentration of manpower on the Red Army and on armaments production, only those who worked received adequate rations. By the same token, the extraordinary pitch of mobilization achieved by the Soviet Union in 1942 and early 1943 was not sustainable. By 1944 Germany had clawed back the Soviet advantage in every category.​

​

You've moved this forward by a year, and by the same token have put the USSR in a position where the Germans have avoided the massive losses they sustained historically in 1942-1943, meaning they have the advantage in mobility, firepower and have cut the Soviet advantage in force size even without assuming de-mobilizations on the Soviet side to boost Farm labor. Now, as noted, the Soviets could call upon about 1.1 Million replacements in 1943 (assuming they don't mess with their economic sector) because they haven't reclaimed Ukraine and the occupied areas of the Kuban/Caucasus region. To put that into perspective:

1942 Q4 irrecoverable losses - 515,508
1943 1st Q ditto - 726,714
1943 2nd Q ditto - 191,904

Even assuming OTL loss rates, by May/June of 1943, the Red Army has exhausted its entire supply of manpower for the year. So we have a less mobile and vastly smaller Red Army going forward, lacking in basically all categories against a much strong German Army.

 

[stevep]

I'm not sure why you disagree then, because those issues are still in play and, worse, they have not recovered the croplands of East Ukraine and the Kuban. Even worse, in 1943 there was a mass crop failure in the potato fields of the Urals, which further caused a decrease in food output to the extent that rations for everyone-not just invalids-were cut:

Any further cuts would mean cuts for critical sectors, i.e. the Army and the industrial workers.

For one, increase food imports could only come at the expense of forgoing other war materials because shipping and port capacity were maxed out at this time, as was the Soviet railway network. The United States was also already exporting 40% of its food production, so further supplies to the USSR could only come via the institution of a much stricter rationing system there, which seems politically untenable.

As for reduced Soviet war production, it's important to note that in 1943 the Germans destroyed more tanks than the Soviets produced for one. If you are diverting Lend Lease supply efforts to emphasize food more and reducing domestic war production, the inescapable conclusion is that the Red Army is incapable of offensive from 1943 onward because it is a smaller, less equipped and primarily infantry force rather than the combined arms military it managed to become.

Where was US exports going and how much spare capacity was there? Economic exports to countries not involved in the combat could be a saving factor here without introducing significant rations in the US. Or as I've already suggested before if the US doesn't insist on dumping a very large proportion of its military into the UK that could free up some capacity as well. Not just from not having to feed a significant number of military forces but also from the loss of good farmland in the UK cutting its own production - since US military forces were rarely based in the Scottish islands Highlands or had air bases in the mountains of N Wales for instance.

If many are sent to N Africa/ME as suggested then there is much more land for such bases and at the time far smaller populations so some capacity for local food sources to take up some of the slack.

Adam Tooze notes that by 1944 the Soviet economy was basically reaching the ends of its tether, the earlier mobilization efforts no longer sustainable:

With farm labour cut to the bone, to permit the maximum concentration of manpower on the Red Army and on armaments production, only those who worked received adequate rations. By the same token, the extraordinary pitch of mobilization achieved by the Soviet Union in 1942 and early 1943 was not sustainable. By 1944 Germany had clawed back the Soviet advantage in every category.​

​

You've moved this forward by a year, and by the same token have put the USSR in a position where the Germans have avoided the massive losses they sustained historically in 1942-1943, meaning they have the advantage in mobility, firepower and have cut the Soviet advantage in force size even without assuming de-mobilizations on the Soviet side to boost Farm labor. Now, as noted, the Soviets could call upon about 1.1 Million replacements in 1943 (assuming they don't mess with their economic sector) because they haven't reclaimed Ukraine and the occupied areas of the Kuban/Caucasus region. To put that into perspective:

1942 Q4 irrecoverable losses - 515,508
1943 1st Q ditto - 726,714
1943 2nd Q ditto - 191,904

Even assuming OTL loss rates, by May/June of 1943, the Red Army has exhausted its entire supply of manpower for the year. So we have a less mobile and vastly smaller Red Army going forward, lacking in basically all categories against a much strong German Army.

You also seem to be assuming that in such a different scenario the Soviets will do exactly the same as OTL and suffer the same casualties, in both military and equipment terms. They may do or they may not. Especially those heavy losses in 43 Q1 which were in the over-stretch that occurred as they reached for the Dnieper and retook Kharkov briefly as their unlikely to occur here.

As I've said before the point isn't that the Red Army's potential for military actions stays the same, because it obviously doesn't. Its that they stay as a potentially potent force that the Axis has to guard against rather than disappearing totally.

 

[History Learner]

Where was US exports going and how much spare capacity was there? Economic exports to countries not involved in the combat could be a saving factor here without introducing significant rations in the US. Or as I've already suggested before if the US doesn't insist on dumping a very large proportion of its military into the UK that could free up some capacity as well. Not just from not having to feed a significant number of military forces but also from the loss of good farmland in the UK cutting its own production - since US military forces were rarely based in the Scottish islands Highlands or had air bases in the mountains of N Wales for instance.

If many are sent to N Africa/ME as suggested then there is much more land for such bases and at the time far smaller populations so some capacity for local food sources to take up some of the slack.

There was no spare capacity; the Bengal Famine was caused by how serious the shipping crisis alone had come. As for the idea of sending troops to the Middle East, that doesn't fix it because they still have to eat the same amount of food and sending them to the Middle East consumes more shipping than it would be to send them to the UK.

You also seem to be assuming that in such a different scenario the Soviets will do exactly the same as OTL and suffer the same casualties, in both military and equipment terms. They may do or they may not. Especially those heavy losses in 43 Q1 which were in the over-stretch that occurred as they reached for the Dnieper and retook Kharkov briefly as their unlikely to occur here.

As I've said before the point isn't that the Red Army's potential for military actions stays the same, because it obviously doesn't. Its that they stay as a potentially potent force that the Axis has to guard against rather than disappearing totally.

I agree, Soviet casualties will likely be much worse in a situation where they are flinging men against fortified river lines backed up by German air power and armored forces on the Don and Volga. I agree that the USSR will not instantly collapse in early 1943, but their ability to pose any real threat will begin to seriously degrade over the course of 1943 to the extent that, by 1944, they would be unable to offer any real resistance.

 

[stevep]

There was no spare capacity; the Bengal Famine was caused by how serious the shipping crisis alone had come. As for the idea of sending troops to the Middle East, that doesn't fix it because they still have to eat the same amount of food and sending them to the Middle East consumes more shipping than it would be to send them to the UK.

Please read what I said. You will find you are at fault on two points. Actually three come to think of it.

I agree, Soviet casualties will likely be much worse in a situation where they are flinging men against fortified river lines backed up by German air power and armored forces on the Don and Volga. I agree that the USSR will not instantly collapse in early 1943, but their ability to pose any real threat will begin to seriously degrade over the course of 1943 to the extent that, by 1944, they would be unable to offer any real resistance.

That assumes that the Soviets keep attacking after a presumed failure of TTL's winter 42 offensive.

 

[History Learner]

Please read what I said. You will find you are at fault on two points. Actually three come to think of it.

I did read what you said and I find I am not at fault for anything. The onus for proving your argument is on you and solely you; you don't get to say I am wrong without providing evidence. If you are not interested in a good faith debate, then you are under no obligation to respond. As I said, however, sending American forces to the Middle East makes the shipping crisis worse and does nothing to increase port and railway capacity of the USSR itself.

Further, if you sincerely believe that basing American troops in the UK consumed farmland-which is a stretch, to say the least-then you have to provide the evidence for it. Further then, you have to explain how that fixes the USSR's food issues given the aforementioned shipping, port, and railway constraints.

That assumes that the Soviets keep attacking after a presumed failure of TTL's winter 42 offensive.

I presume said winter offensives will be much more costly than historical for them because attacking fortified river lines supported by armored reserves and German air power is much most casualty intensive than launching attacks from pre-established bridge-heads over said rivers against overstretched and poorly supported forces. Likewise, if the USSR has surrendered the initiative to the Germans, going in 1943 that is just as bad because without losses of the Winter 1942-1943 nor the reclaiming of manpower resources their successes entailed puts the USSR at an extreme disadvantage.

 

[stevep]

I did read what you said and I find I am not at fault for anything. The onus for proving your argument is on you and solely you; you don't get to say I am wrong without providing evidence. If you are not interested in a good faith debate, then you are under no obligation to respond. As I said, however, sending American forces to the Middle East makes the shipping crisis worse and does nothing to increase port and railway capacity of the USSR itself.

Further, if you sincerely believe that basing American troops in the UK consumed farmland-which is a stretch, to say the least-then you have to provide the evidence for it. Further then, you have to explain how that fixes the USSR's food issues given the aforementioned shipping, port, and railway constraints.

You said:

There was no spare capacity; the Bengal Famine was caused by how serious the shipping crisis alone had come. As for the idea of sending troops to the Middle East, that doesn't fix it because they still have to eat the same amount of food and sending them to the Middle East consumes more shipping than it would be to send them to the UK.

I have pointed out that:
a) Not sending huge numbers of men and air forces to Britain means that large areas of flat lands in the south of the country are not taken up by military camps, training areas, airfields etc. Its not surprising that many of the latter especially were quickly returned to argicultural use after the war. Not all by no means. The MOD site I used to work at started off as an air base for the US in WWII. If you honesty think that all those US facilities were based in the Welsh Mt's or Scots Highlands then there's no point arguing with you. Or do you suggest they did their training in British cities or floated in mid-air. Be serious.

b) As I pointed out the proposed areas in N Africa and ME were not massive importers of food so those areas shouldn't have the same demand for extra food supply. Furthermore with plenty of non-agricultural flat lands there is plenty of room for facilities without impacting on local production. I would take a little addition shipping in the initial case but after that any difference is minimal or possibly even beneficial.

c) The 3rd point is somewhat pedantic but the Bengal famine wasn't caused by a lack of shipping from the US. The prime causes were periodical food shortages in the region coupled with the loss of Burma which was a regular supplier of food to the region. With a further factor being that after the Japanese commandeering local boats among other items in the invasion of Malaya the authorities sought to control such boats in the Bengal region. Which worsened it as those boats in previous famines has been used to move food and/or people from area to area.

I presume said winter offensives will be much more costly than historical for them because attacking fortified river lines supported by armored reserves and German air power is much most casualty intensive than launching attacks from pre-established bridge-heads over said rivers against overstretched and poorly supported forces. Likewise, if the USSR has surrendered the initiative to the Germans, going in 1943 that is just as bad because without losses of the Winter 1942-1943 nor the reclaiming of manpower resources their successes entailed puts the USSR at an extreme disadvantage.

So your assuming that the Germans not only take Stalingrad markedly earlier but than advance all the way down to the mouth of the Volga and fortify the entire length north to Stalingrad in depth in a couple of months? Remembering as well to do this they would largely have to forget driving further south towards the Caucasus and Baku. Especially since their already exposed their flank by not attacking forces in the Rostov region.

I can see a greater encirclement being needed or possibly more modest counter attack aims with the Germans holding a longer stretch of the lower Volga. However some sort of counter attack is very likely. If more modest or more especially if a Operation Uranus isn't followed by the hugely costly Operation Saturn then Soviet losses could well be markedly less, albeit that German losses will also be reduced.

Since we're already allowing your assumptions about the extra oil leading to the rapid fall of Stalingrad and then the Germans holding this region causing a massive crisis in food supply from late 43 then yes the Soviets will be weaker than OTL, quite possibly by a substantial amount. However the argument is whether Russian resistance throughout the Soviet Union ceases to exists or whether as I've been saying there is a substantial basis for continued resistance, albeit on a much lower level.

 

[BlackDragon98]

TBFH, oil alone is not going to do much for the Germans.
I've seen dozens of such scenarios where "Nation X gets X and then what happens"?
Overall, nothing really. Wars aren't won or lost due to one single factor, but a combination of diverse factors.

First of all, the oil itself needs to be the good quality stuff that can be made into high-grade aviation fuel and other valuable fuels.
The oil in Matzen is pretty good, but the Schoonebeek oil was heavy oil, difficult to extract and difficult to refine. It's why Schoonebeek was abandoned during the 90s. High extraction cost compared to Mideast oil.

Next you need the infrastructure to transport said oil from pumps to refinery to users.
For the Germans, fixing up the Reichsbahn and expanding their canal system was the best bet.
Steam engines and steam barges use coal, which is abundant in Germany compared to oil.

Now you have to build the actual machines that use oil (trucks, tanks, planes, ships, subs, etc.)
That means lots and lots of steel and other metals, especially in the case of tanks and ships that use a variety of metals in their armor plating.
Now, I will note that more natural oil means a significantly lower demand for synthetic oil, which means millions of tons of structural steel used to build those synthetic refineries are now available for use.
Still that doesn't solve the rare metal problem that plagued Germany throughout WW2, especially later during the war when they lost control of territories possessed mines producing those rare metals.

Lastly we have the supply line problem.
If you can't keep your supply lines safe and keep them running efficiently than everything will still fall apart.
Case in point: The Germans had plenty of winter clothing in 1941, it's just that the supply lines were so overloaded there was no room to ship those winter coats from their depots in Poland to the front with sacrificing space on convoys that were filled with food, ammo, and spare parts.
Of course, this could be alleviated by using ships to transport stuff for AGN instead of using trucks, freeing up trucks for AGS and AGC. However, that hinges on the swift capture of the Baltic ports and Leningrad while they're still intact, which is going to be rather difficult given Soviet scorched earth orders.

So yeah, that's my 2 pfennigs right there.
Feel free to disagree.

-Black Dragon

 

[sillygoose]

TBFH, oil alone is not going to do much for the Germans.
I've seen dozens of such scenarios where "Nation X gets X and then what happens"?
Overall, nothing really. Wars aren't won or lost due to one single factor, but a combination of diverse factors.

How 1% Performance Improvements Led to Olympic Gold

An interview with the former head of British Cycling.

hbr.org

Sometimes marginal improvement has a big impact.

 

[BlackDragon98]

How 1% Performance Improvements Led to Olympic Gold

An interview with the former head of British Cycling.

hbr.org

Sometimes marginal improvement has a big impact.

That's a single event.
A war consists of a lot of single events.

 

[sillygoose]

That's a single event.
A war consists of a lot of single events.

It was a bunch of 1% improvements that led to the success in that event, taking a last place team and making it first. The point is that minor changes can add up to have massive effects. We've already established that more natural oil means less need for synthetic oil production, which means major resource savings that can be used elsewhere in the economy, which leads to a bunch of knock on improvements in the overall war effort. A bunch of more than 1% improvements that add up.

 

[BlackDragon98]

It was a bunch of 1% improvements that led to the success in that event, taking a last place team and making it first. The point is that minor changes can add up to have massive effects. We've already established that more natural oil means less need for synthetic oil production, which means major resource savings that can be used elsewhere in the economy, which leads to a bunch of knock on improvements in the overall war effort. A bunch of more than 1% improvements that add up.

Less synthetic oil means more steel available for use that doesn’t mean much when steel wasn’t the main problem. What the Germans lacked more was rare metals like chromium, tungsten, molybdenum, etc.

More oil means better trained Luftwaffe aircrew. OK, but that doesn’t mean much unless the Germans can back that up with a consistent supply of high-quality 100 octane avgas. It was avgas that allowed British and US aircraft to consistently perform better than their German counterparts.
And the Germans will still be using the same aircraft they did, which were not as good as they could be because of Goering and Co.’s meddling and stupidity.

Let’s see, more workers are freed up because there’s no need to build big synthetic fuel plants. However, that doesn’t do much for the war effort if the workers are then put to work building Hitler’s new Chancellery and his Olympic stadiums.

Also doesn’t solve the problem how the oil will be transported from the pumps to the refineries to the users. And the fact that it takes at least 2 years for all the initial problems to be solved and for production to get up to pace. So unless Austria becomes part of Nazi Germany in 1934, it’s all for naught.

 

[sillygoose]

Less synthetic oil means more steel available for use that doesn’t mean much when steel wasn’t the main problem. What the Germans lacked more was rare metals like chromium, tungsten, molybdenum, etc.

More oil means better trained Luftwaffe aircrew. OK, but that doesn’t mean much unless the Germans can back that up with a consistent supply of high-quality 100 octane avgas. It was avgas that allowed British and US aircraft to consistently perform better than their German counterparts.
And the Germans will still be using the same aircraft they did, which were not as good as they could be because of Goering and Co.’s meddling and stupidity.

Let’s see, more workers are freed up because there’s no need to build big synthetic fuel plants. However, that doesn’t do much for the war effort if the workers are then put to work building Hitler’s new Chancellery and his Olympic stadiums.

Yeah, you're clearly not getting the point about the 1% improvements.

You're also incorrect about steel availability not being a limiting factor; see "Wages of Destruction" about how the British bombing of steel production in the Ruhr in 1943 crippled German armaments production for 6 months that year. Even earlier steel was the limiting factor, which is why there was such a focus by Speer in expanding production.

Battle of the Ruhr - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In his study of the German war economy, Adam Tooze stated that during the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command severely disrupted German production. Steel production fell by 200,000 tons. The armaments industry was facing a steel shortfall of 400,000 tons. After doubling production in 1942, production of steel increased only by 20% in 1943. Hitler and Speer were forced to cut planned increases in production. This disruption resulted in the Zulieferungskrise (sub-components crisis). The increase of aircraft production for the Luftwaffe also came to an abrupt halt. Monthly production failed to increase between July 1943 and March 1944. "Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks".[24]

Having that extra steel pre-war would have been a huge help.

The Germans had equally high quality fuel, it was more an issue of trying to get too much from it with the engines they had (both higher compression ratios and boost pressures, while the Allies just went for higher boost performance). Ultimately they opted for higher displacement and increased RPMs to extract the most from lower quality fuels since they were cheaper to make. In the end though the issue wasn't an issue of performance, it was having too many enemies, especially ones who could focus on having massive air forces and small armies since they outsourced the army duties largely to the Soviets.

So the issue is winning before the large numbers of the Allies can be brought to bear and that would be better served by having more fuel available early on, the resources plowed into synthetic oil instead can be used for other things including expanding production in factories earlier on, and there would be more labor and resources to make weapons and ammo. Again "Wages of Destruction" covers all that in detail, including how the lack of things like steel determined what production output was more than anything.

Also doesn’t solve the problem how the oil will be transported from the pumps to the refineries to the users. And the fact that it takes at least 2 years for all the initial problems to be solved and for production to get up to pace. So unless Austria becomes part of Nazi Germany in 1934, it’s all for naught.

I trust you've heard of things like trains, trucks, oil pipelines, and even river barges. Same way OTL oil got to refineries and end users. I don't know why you think 2 years is some sort of limiting factor here, being taken over in early 1938 would mean the oil comes on line in a big way in 1940 assuming the Austrians have done 0 to exploit Matzen before the German take over. All the additional synthetic production facilities from 1938 can be curbed and the resources used elsewhere; those facilities weren't simply built pre-war.

 

[BlackDragon98]

Yeah, you're clearly not getting the point about the 1% improvements.

You're also incorrect about steel availability not being a limiting factor; see "Wages of Destruction" about how the British bombing of steel production in the Ruhr in 1943 crippled German armaments production for 6 months that year. Even earlier steel was the limiting factor, which is why there was such a focus by Speer in expanding production.

Battle of the Ruhr - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Having that extra steel pre-war would have been a huge help.

Serves them right for putting all their industries in the Ruhr when Silesia was a much better choice.
The failure of the Luftwaffe in the Defense of the Reich is mostly attributed to the absolutely stupid decisions made by Luftwaffe leadership before the war. The failures that followed in the war were simply a reflection of how badly they screwed up.
AKA the following idiots and/or drunkard and/or losers.
Joseph Schmid - Wikipedia
Hans Jeschonnek - Wikipedia
Ernst Udet - Wikipedia
Bruno Loerzer - Wikipedia
and the obese idiot himself,
Hermann Göring - Wikipedia

Without good Luftwaffe leadership, the Ruhr will be bombed to shit regardless.

The Germans had equally high quality fuel, it was more an issue of trying to get too much from it with the engines they had (both higher compression ratios and boost pressures, while the Allies just went for higher boost performance). Ultimately they opted for higher displacement and increased RPMs to extract the most from lower quality fuels since they were cheaper to make. In the end though the issue wasn't an issue of performance, it was having too many enemies, especially ones who could focus on having massive air forces and small armies since they outsourced the army duties largely to the Soviets.

So the issue is winning before the large numbers of the Allies can be brought to bear and that would be better served by having more fuel available early on, the resources plowed into synthetic oil instead can be used for other things including expanding production in factories earlier on, and there would be more labor and resources to make weapons and ammo. Again "Wages of Destruction" covers all that in detail, including how the lack of things like steel determined what production output was more than anything.

German did also have the stuff, but their production methods were far more cumbersome and expensive compared to the Allies, who have USA pumping out fuel for them.

I trust you've heard of things like trains, trucks, oil pipelines, and even river barges. Same way OTL oil got to refineries and end users. I don't know why you think 2 years is some sort of limiting factor here, being taken over in early 1938 would mean the oil comes on line in a big way in 1940 assuming the Austrians have done 0 to exploit Matzen before the German take over. All the additional synthetic production facilities from 1938 can be curbed and the resources used elsewhere; those facilities weren't simply built pre-war.

Trucks eat gas/diesel. One of the reasons why I regard the Autobahn as a disaster and one of the worst decisions.
Problem is all the steel has already been used.
The German synthetic fuel industry went from 90,000 metric tons in 1927 with the Leuna plant to over 1 million metric tons in 1939.
Oh and IG Farben kicks the can if you don't support them because they were on death's door when new oil fields were found in Texas and Oklahoma in the early 1930s and oil prices skydived.

"German chemical giant IG Farben entered the realm of synthetic petroleum production with its first processing plant at Leuna in 1927. Production in that first year of operation yielded an impressive 2.2 million barrels, which was soon increased to an average output of 3.6 million
annually.
It is little wonder that Germany was optimistic about the capabilities of synthetic fuel. So confident was Germany in their new technology that I.G. Farben Director, Dr. Heinrich Bütefisch, stated during post-war interrogations that it was the Reich’s intention “that half of the whole of the oil used in Germany should be synthetic.”
Whether a by-product of this enthusiasm, or a result of Hitler’s demand for a petroleum independent Germany in his Four Year Plan, between 1934-1935 four additional I.G. Farben plants were constructed at Böhlen, Magdeburg, Schwarzheide and Zeitz."

The above is from a PDF titled "TURNING POINT: A HISTORY OF GERMAN PETROLEUM IN WORLD WAR II AND ITS LESSONS FOR THE ROLE OF OIL IN MODERN AIR WARFARE"

The steel has already been used, pre-war. Therefore, your prewar steel plans are completely empty.

 

[sillygoose]

Serves them right for putting all their industries in the Ruhr when Silesia was a much better choice.

Ignorant comments like these are exactly why it is so hard to take what you post seriously. Every country built up industry in areas with strategic mineral deposits like coal, which is why the Ruhr, long before WW1, was the confluence of rail lines, river shipping, and industrial build up. Silesia was too, but there were limits in how much could be built in one place given existing infrastructure, industry, and population/work force concentrations. Since the Ruhr was a massive pre-existing industrial area it was vastly cheaper to improve output there and air defenses rather than trying to build up a brand new industrial area in some unoccupied region or already over-developed areas. So places like Leuna were built up because they pre-dated the Nazis and it was easier to develop it than start from scratch elsewhere. So expanded Ruhr production was ready before Silesian upgrades were ready.

I'll get to the rest of your post later, it requires a lot of debunking as well.

 

[sillygoose]

The failure of the Luftwaffe in the Defense of the Reich is mostly attributed to the absolutely stupid decisions made by Luftwaffe leadership before the war. The failures that followed in the war were simply a reflection of how badly they screwed up.
AKA the following idiots and/or drunkard and/or losers.
Joseph Schmid - Wikipedia
Hans Jeschonnek - Wikipedia
Ernst Udet - Wikipedia
Bruno Loerzer - Wikipedia
and the obese idiot himself,
Hermann Göring - Wikipedia

Without good Luftwaffe leadership, the Ruhr will be bombed to shit regardless.

Remember, the bomber will always get through. You should come up with a list for France, Britain, and the USSR as well since they were all heavily bombed during the war too.

Ultimately when the enemy has enough bombers even with the best defenses they will get through and do damage, the question is what their loss rates will be. The German air defenses were regularly inflicting unsustainable losses on their enemies, hence the ending of the Bombing of the Ruhr in 1943, the ending of the Battle of Berlin in 1943-44, only a single dam buster raid, the near suspension of US daylight bombing after 2nd Schweinfurt, etc. The bigger issue was political: Hitler made too many enemies for Germany to be able to fight off.

German did also have the stuff, but their production methods were far more cumbersome and expensive compared to the Allies, who have USA pumping out fuel for them.

Right, because the Germans had to rely on synthetic oil to make avgas since they didn't have natural sources in sufficient quantities. Meanwhile the US had the largest developed oil resources in the world and Mr. Houndry.

Trucks eat gas/diesel. One of the reasons why I regard the Autobahn as a disaster and one of the worst decisions.
Problem is all the steel has already been used.
The German synthetic fuel industry went from 90,000 metric tons in 1927 with the Leuna plant to over 1 million metric tons in 1939.
Oh and IG Farben kicks the can if you don't support them because they were on death's door when new oil fields were found in Texas and Oklahoma in the early 1930s and oil prices skydived.

One plant. You realize that many more were constructed after 1940, right? And then there was the Maikop fiasco. By the end of the war plants with the capacity to make 1 million tons per year, 25% of the existing capacity by 1944, were still being built in Silesia and Sudetenland. Expansion at existing facilities happened too, so that from 1939 when there was only 1 million tons of synthetic fuel production capacity via the hydrogenation process it jumped to over 4 million tons by 1944. So there had to have been major new facilities plus expansion of existing ones to get to that point. F-T plants weren't manufactured after 1940, but if Austria is annexed with the known Matzen deposit and potentially already partially developed, then the ones built from 1938-40 probably wouldn't have even been started.

Plus in 1938 the synthetic oil program was set for the war years, called the Karin Hall Program:

Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen Germany

books.google.com

This article goes to show just how many more resources are required for the synthetic oil program vs. natural oil

Oil Division Final Report

books.google.com

This article notes that the steel used for the synthetic oil plant production expansion from 1938-44 was enough to build a naval battle fleet 400% larger than the one the US had in 1940. Also note they point out too that the demands of the synthetic oil industry were especially onerous to the steel industry because they required alloys which used up the strategic non-ferrous metals you mentioned were in short supply. So yeah, it wasn't simply steel, it was vital alloys and high skilled labor in major quantities that were diverted and ultimately kept the synthetic rubber program from reaching its planned and needed output.

IG Farben wasn't on deaths door in the 1930s; they just weren't going to shoulder the cost to build an industry for the state on their own dime. With natural oil they can make just enough plants to cover the needs Matzen won't satisfy and save the resources used to make the rest for other projects, like making enough synthetic rubber.

"German chemical giant IG Farben entered the realm of synthetic petroleum production with its first processing plant at Leuna in 1927. Production in that first year of operation yielded an impressive 2.2 million barrels, which was soon increased to an average output of 3.6 million
annually.
It is little wonder that Germany was optimistic about the capabilities of synthetic fuel. So confident was Germany in their new technology that I.G. Farben Director, Dr. Heinrich Bütefisch, stated during post-war interrogations that it was the Reich’s intention “that half of the whole of the oil used in Germany should be synthetic.”
Whether a by-product of this enthusiasm, or a result of Hitler’s demand for a petroleum independent Germany in his Four Year Plan, between 1934-1935 four additional I.G. Farben plants were constructed at Böhlen, Magdeburg, Schwarzheide and Zeitz."

The above is from a PDF titled "TURNING POINT: A HISTORY OF GERMAN PETROLEUM IN WORLD WAR II AND ITS LESSONS FOR THE ROLE OF OIL IN MODERN AIR WARFARE"

The steel has already been used, pre-war. Therefore, your prewar steel plans are completely empty.

See above.

 

[sillygoose]

For anyone interested in why this POD would be a game changer check out the USSBS oil division report I linked. It has all the numbers you need to see just how even with getting access to the field in Austria in March 1938 would still be a massive game changer in terms of resources saved that were spent IOTL from Summer 1938 to the end of the war. Even if it had to be developed from scratch from 1938 on.

 

[sillygoose]

Ok, I'll have to reply in shifts because you wrote a lot and I don't have the time/patience to try and do even all of this post in one sitting.

I'm working on the greater economic and technological potential that the German empire being proposed would have, since both were almost insanely aggressive.

From what I understand of the German system under Hitler it was basically a case that Hitler made decisions and then plans had to be made for their implication. There might have been more detailed war plans, such as the US colour plans, which would be logical given the military history of the Prussian/German army - although rather myopic in cases such as in 1914 - but not aware of any.

Even with said potential Hitler and the Nazi leadership really didn't want to fight the US. This is quite well documented. They wanted to dominate Europe and have a trade bloc from which they could economically compete with the US, since they would have more than enough to occupy them in their backyard; "Man In The High Castle" is not great alternate history.

During wartime when the situation was fluid war planning did at times exist like that, but in the pre-war period there were war plans based on likely war scenarios, which like the Color War Plans of the US are well documented and did not necessarily stem from Hitler ordering them. Planning was done in OKH independent of Hitler's whims especially pre-1942, OKW is where Hitler had his way since they were his personal staff after he took over War Minister duties for himself. Even though technically head of OKH after 1941 the CoS of that organization generally operated with substantial independence in the realms where they had domain, like the Eastern Front. I'd imagine in peace time Hitler, assuming he was still in charge and healthy, they revert to a more theoretical series of contingency planning.

Of course you do also have to realize that what you describe is also how things worked for the Allies; the politicians in charge set directives based upon their Grand Strategy and had their staffs carry out planning; certainly said staffs have serious input, but then so did they often in Hitler's planning, like at Kursk as one example.

Not just on shipping to Britain. Their 2nd happy time was basically on the US coastal traffic and shipping in the Caribbean because they had correctly realised/guessed it was largely undefended. True in themselves they aren't a threat to the US other than its commercial and overseas trade but in the medium term there are potential options even if the Germans are still as off-course as OTL with their nuclear programme.

I mean the shipping they hit was even indirectly servicing British war potential; every ship knocked out from east coast US shipping is one that would have to be replaced, so the resources to make it couldn't be used on a ship for Britain or to ship goods to Britain, while the loss of said ship cut resources that could be moved around for US production, which was servicing the British.

What do you mean about medium term potential options to threaten the US? Their sabotage mission failed badly:

Operation Pastorius - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I was thinking more of possible economic penetration given that they would be a lot more willing to encourage exports to German Europe than the US was to its own territory and also given the US's history of interference in Latin America.

I'm not understanding what you mean here.

Are you sure about the Irish, other than a few hot heads and political figures? Especially after the bombing of Dublin?

Yep:

Anti-British sentiment - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

During the World War II alliance, anti-British sentiment took different forms. In May 1942, when conditions were highly problematic for British prospects, American journalist Edward R. Murrow privately gave a British friend an analysis of the sources of persistent anti-British sentiment in the United States. He attributed it especially to:

partly the hard-core of anglophobes (Irish, Germans and isolationists); partly the frustration produced by war without early victories; partly our bad behaviour at Singapore; and partly the tendency common to all countries at war to blame their allies for doing nothing.[27]

Anglo-phobia was actually extremely common in the US at the time and only got worse so that by 1944 there were actually anti-British protests on US university campuses! Of course by then Britain was behaving pretty shittily towards any number of countries, not least of which was Greece. Anti-Imperialism was even worrying British newspapers:

BRITISH PAPER PROTESTS; Says Anti-Empire Propaganda in U.S. Aids Japanese (Published 1944)

London Daily Sketch charges US anti-Brit propaganda aids Japanese

www.nytimes.com

As to the Irish themselves, they kept up contact with the Nazis until they were convinced they would lose as late as 1944, yes even after the accidental bombing of Dublin:

The IRA's links with Nazi Germany | Frank Ryan | Queen's University Belfast

www.qub.ac.uk

Supposedly de Valera even was open to invading Northern Ireland if the Germans invaded Britain.

Irish Republican Army–Abwehr collaboration - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Yes in the short term Germany was happy with the existing US investments there but how likely is that to continue given the steady carving up of industry in the Reich and empire by assorted interest groups, of which Goring was the most notorious. Plus given the attitude of total control and seeking to weaken any enemies [which is anyone not under their control in the Nazi mentality.]

I think they'd be more than willing to work with US businesses like Ford and IBM if the US didn't touch German patents and industries in North America. If they did then US investments would be nationalized too, so both sides had a 'live and let live' incentive there. Goering didn't nationalize US industries, even during WW2, which is why US properties, like the Ford owned factory wasn't bombed by the US:

United States Strategic Bombing Survey - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The third largest producer, Ford's subsidiary at Cologne was never attacked

These companies (Ford, GM, IBM) even received profits from their German subsidiaries during the war and had contacts with these subsidiaries that were even investigated by the US government for treason during the war.

He did refer to unlimited oil. He's also repeatedly ignore actual limitations they did have and still would have. For instance in his mention of German plans for massive increases in air production which were "only canceled due to oil restrains." The regime may have declared that other assets were to be committed to such a programme but often didn't meet their targets in such plans. Also contrary to his arguments, such resources would have restricted other production as if those resources [skilled manpower, machine tools, engine production, steel etc] had been committed and somehow the oil had been found they wouldn't have been left standing unused for the rest of the war. As such if that programme had become practical and entered production it would have reduced resources for other activities as OTL. Ditto his insistence that there is no population, industry or raw materials in the Soviet Union east of the A-A line. Or that because the German army could live off the land in the food rich Ukraine it could just as easily do so in the severely food deficit northern core territories. I could mention others but those are the ones off the top of my head. Those are the basic reasons why I didn't respond to his post as he has proved so unreliable.

I'll let you and him hash that out, which I think you've already done.

Actually there are ways of winning the war without the bulk of the Soviet resources, one of which we're both well aware of, although it wasn't clear at the time. Plus given the knowledge at the time the need for the Soviets might have been unclear. For instance there was no eastern front in 1918 and Germany had a massive 'empire' but it still collapsed.

In WW2 the A-bomb isn't an insta-win button, especially if enemy air defense hasn't already been broken. It was able to work so well against Japan due to facing virtually zero air defenses. Of course they only knew that it worked in July 1945, you don't fight out a war for years on the potential that eventually down the road a secret weapon might work, one they couldn't reveal to the US public before it was used in combat. Plus the US public won't continue to fight for years with rationing and privation without hope of victory at reasonable cost, hence the panic the US and UK had that the Soviets might ever make a separate peace deal.

1918 is not 1942 and Nazi Germany's empire is quite a bit more powerful than Imperial Germany's holdings.

The point however is that I dispute the idea that surrendering vast resources to Nazi Germany, most of which they can't get with any reasonable allied planning for defence is better than fighting on.

How do you think they can actually prevent anything without the USSR?

Yes but given that while a dramatic force German armour was a relatively small proportion, in terms of production demand, of the total German armed forces. As such it can be misleading to the

I think you didn't finish the thought. And yes I know, that's my point: naval construction used up vastly more resources than panzers and panzers were a large line item in German production.

If you reduce investment you also release massive resources for elsewhere. Also the big problem with the strategic bombers was like the armies in WWI they were often committed prematurely with insufficient support and organisation and then used rather erratically. As I understand it, as you say elsewhere, the main effect was after the landings in France, or more significantly the breakout across most of northern France started to dismantle the German early warning systems. I could see ways in which the strategic bombers could be used more efficiently, or largely allowed to lapse which would free up massive resources for the western powers - although the most obvious positive feedback loop, by winning the Atlantic battle earlier, was already largely a lost opportunity by 1942. It would also free up some German resources but given the largely ineffective bombing campaigns prior to 1944 - unless you accept Tooze's argument for a continued Ruhr campaign - I think the allies are the biggest winners here.

Theoretically they could, but given Allied politics and the personalities involved they wouldn't without a major and separate POD. Without the USSR the Allies have no serious way to fight at a cheap cost in terms of lives other than their strategic bombing and they signaled that if the USSR quit that is how they would fight anyway. I highly disagree that the bombing campaign was ineffective prior to 1944, it just wasn't yet properly applied to achieve the full effect it would later on when better intel came with the invasion of France and they could review what the impact of their bombing actually was; without the invasion of France though then it would still be misapplied. And if the Allies turned to tactical bombing and large armies then they give the Germans a massive break on the production end, which means a lot more Allies battle deaths at the sharp end of the spear. Strategic bombing was the cheap way to fight believe it or not; the Germans found that out the hard way when fighting the Soviets.

Yes they will be markedly less limited but there will still be limits. This is something that HL seems to refuse to accept, while also assuming that the allies are incapable of any improvement on their own performance. Germany was already largely maxed out in manpower because of their huge military commitment and that's unlikely to change much, if the allies maintain the war effort.

Why would the Allies improve their own performance? Their problems were structural too. I disagree with your characterization of HL's arguments, I think you're strawmanning what he's saying. And yes Germany does have resource limits even with a defeated USSR, but there are major gains to be had by knocking out the USSR even as late as 1944 given that something like 45% of the entire war economy was dedicated to fighting them by that point. Germany being maxed out in manpower is somewhat deceptive given that they were still able to generate major replacements as late as March 1945, its just that they couldn't keep up with the major losses of 1944 and expanding Allies armies on top of continuous Soviet pressure. So the USSR out in 1943 saves them millions of men, especially minus the Stalingrad debacle, which then all end up used against the Wallies. Even with the Soviets in the war on the ground until the collapse in March 1945 the Germans were still getting 1:1 or better combat casualty ratios (overall) vs. the Wallies despite every possible disadvantage and there is no way the Wallies would accept millions of casualties necessary to beat the Germans.

Plus you're forgetting that the main reason the Germans didn't have more Eastern European manpower available was the general feeling those people's had that Stalin wouldn't lose the war after 1941-42, so desertions, surrenders, and collaboration dried up and partisan war increased (which was also a major factor suppressing further collaboration since the threat of assassination was extremely high, the Soviets not only found collaborators easier to kill since they had less security than the Germans, but targeting them was a higher priority given the threat unpunished collaboration posed to the survival of the Soviet state). If Stalin is basically defeated there would be millions of opportunists who would be interested in saving their own skins by working with Hitler. Even if just 2% of the population (much less than in France) collaborated then the Nazis wouldn't have any problem managing the East with a skeleton crew of German manpower.

From most of what I've read there wasn't a massive increase in efficency but rather more resources, especially forced labour which of course raises doubts about quality, and raw materials diverted from an already tight domestic market. Coupled with the growing encroachment by sectional interests in the party seeking more power and resources. There will be increases in total production, especially with longer access to resources from the east but its still limited and I can't see it matching the western allies who have much greater resources overall.

That would be incorrect. US reports about the German economy were quite clear about how efficient the German war economy had become from 1939-45. Unfortunately guys like Tooze overplayed the myth of Speer and his 'take down' of that and distorted the historical record in order to sell books with their 'ground breaking' thesis. The reality is that Germany was not at all prepared for a general war in Europe in 1939 and took years to finally get everything sorted. 1942 was the inflection year and Speer was the guy who organized that. Certainly he exaggerated parts of his success, but there was a major improvement in production without additional resources committed from the point he took things over. Funny how just about every history of the Nazi war economy can demonstrate that, but somehow Tooze is the the only correct historian to people online. Bias confirmation is a real issue.

Wallied resources, though greater even in a Germany wins in the east scenario, are still bottlenecked due to the need to also fight Japan and ship everything across the Atlantic or from the Empire. Shipping then is the constraint, which limits all else and it is split between the Atlantic and Pacific (mainly). If they cut off the USSR from L-L (or not offer it for whatever reason) then there is more shipping and production resources of course, but then more Allied manpower is needed to fight, which means taking men out of the factories and putting them into combat, which means reduced production and increased need for resources for combat units, including global sustainment infrastructure, which is vastly more expensive and resource intensive than simply building up new divisions. IIRC it took 9 men to equip and sustain 1 man in Europe and then on top of that something like 8 men to sustain 1 man in combat.