HL
Your assuming that a hell of a lot happens, including two separate oil centres being discovered and developed very rapidly and that the Dutch one is captured pretty much intact. Then that the Axis make all the right decisions and the allies make no real changes.
Given Schoonebeek wasn't even discovered IOTL until 1943, I have no doubt the Germans would capture it intact given there was nothing for the Dutch to destroy and the fact its right on the German border; it's literally 14 miles or so, there is no time to do demolitions before the Panzers overrun them even if there was. From there, however, as pointed out however there is nothing the Allies can do differently and I assuming very logical changes on the part of the Axis. Can you explain why the Germans wouldn't translate greater rubber, steal, and oil into greater material outputs and operational actions? If your complaint is the ability of the the Germans to exploit this windfall, as has already been pointed out they did such with Maikop in the space of a single campaign season and even OTL from 1938 to 1944 massively developed existing sources in Austria; 1.4 million tons was being produced there by 1944. It's also materially much, much easier to access natural resources rather than develop a costly synthetic industry:
Even with the addition of the Romanian deliveries, overland oil imports after 1939 could not make up for the loss of overseas shipments. In order to become less dependent on outside sources, the Germans undertook a sizable expansion program of their own meager domestic oil pumping. Before the annexation of Austria in 1938, oil fields in Germany were concentrated in northwestern Germany. After 1938, the Austrian oil fields were available also, and the expansion of crude oil output was chiefly effected there. Primarily as a result of this expansion, Germany’s domestic output of crude oil increased from approximately 3.8 million barrels in 1938 to almost 12 million barrels in 1944.10 Yet the production of domestic crude oil never equaled in any way the levels attained by Germany’s other major supplier of oil, the synthetic fuel plants.
Also ignoring what Sillygoose is saying about Rommel. Apart from the fact he's still likely to attack in breach of his orders for the initial campaign a 'forward' defence for him does no good unless they do make it to Alexandria. He can inflict defeats and losses as OTL but if he moves into eastern Libya, let alone Egypt itself he exposes his own logistics greatly and eases those of the British. None of this would be changed by the Axis magically having a lot more oil and trucks. Your still likely to have something like Torch in late 42 as its the only location where the allies can hit the European Axis at a time where they have to be seen to do something and that would be even more so if the Soviets are even more clearly hard pressed than OTL.
I honestly don't know what you're going on about because Rommel did move into Eastern Libya and quite deeply in Egypt? If you think Torch will still happen, sure, but if Malta has fallen it would definitely be a smaller (in geographical terms) area of operations, with no landings in Algeria likely.
Malta is unlikely to fall before the occupation of Yugoslavia because until the collapse of the Italian position after Operation Compass Mussolini was determined that N Africa would be Italy's sphere of operation and 'success' and there's not really either time or resources to be committed to take Malta before an invasion of the Balkans. It could well fall later although there are contradictory opinions as to how important it was in restricting Axis operations in N Africa while it was a heavy drain on Britain to maintain it so its loss is a mixed blessing for both sides.
Taking Malta was easily within Italy's abilities in 1940, and I'm not sure what you are attempting to argue with the relevancy of North Africa to such; Malta lays directly astride the lines of communication and was clearly coveted by the Italians as part of securing their "Fourth Shore". Regardless, it is strategically vital and would massively improve Axis logistics in the theater as well as bisect the Med, prevent British movement across from it. Presuming Torch still happens as OTL, an invasion of Sicily is impossible without Malta.
Night bombing of Schoonebeek should be a lot more effective long before 1944 simply because its a lot closer than so many other targets so its easily to use electronic aids from Britain for targeting the region. Not to mention the USAAF making daylight attacks from 1942 which could be an earlier bloodbath for the Luftwaffe once they accept that the bombers need escorts.
You say
As has already been pointed out, there are no electronic aids and the poor performance of the Anglo-American bombers until 1944 against such defended targets points heavily to the negative for such assertions.
But this is assuming that the Germans are still using as much coal as OTL for the coal gassification. They can produce less to have more coal, although its still going to be short but that assumes less oil produced. As such your double counting this. Not to mention your assuming that the Germans are able to produce a lot more trucks which in themselves would require more oil to operate. Along with supplying additional oil for the Italian navy being proposed.
No double counting is occurring here. To quote again from the source listed in the OP about the synthetic industries:
Still, between 1938 and 1943, synthetic fuel output underwent a respectable growth from 10 million barrels to 36 million. The percentage of synthetic fuels compared to the yield from all sources grew from 22 percent to more than 50 percent by 1943. The total oil supplies available from all sources for the same period rose from 45 million barrels in 1938 to 71 million barrels in 1943.27
That massive expansion would be unneeded here, or at the most a very minor one.
Also unless there is a drastic change in the attack on Russia in 1941, the Germans are unlikely to have a strategic success in 42. They simply have lost too many men and equipment over the previous year. they can hurt Russia more but a knock out blow is [fortunately] pretty much impossible. They can fight longer and make it even bloodier but decisive victory is beyond them by this point.
Completely and utterly disagree,
Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943 reveals the idea the Germans were irreparably damaged in 1941 to be a complete myth. Furthermore, the idea a knockout blow can't be delivered isn't backed up by the records of both sides.
We have declassified documents from the time that were prepared for Stalin personally which show that by early 1943 the Red Army had effectively exhausted the manpower resources available to it and to sustain the Red Army would require continuous liberation of occupied territories; this was why Stalin was so heavily insistent on a Second Front during the course of the war and why he extended peace feelers out to the Germans over the course of 1943 and maintained contacts as late as the Fall of 1944.
IV. Remaining unused resources:
a) reserved for employment in the civil economy - 2 781 000
b) in labor columns - 1 321 000
c) recruits born in 1925 - 700 000
d) non-conscripted men fully fit for service in the Central Asian Military District - 600 000
e) non-conscripted men with limited fitness or in the age above 45 (without Far-East and Transcaucasus) - 500 000 (of them 277 000 in the Central Asia)
f) non-conscripted men in the Far East, Trasnbaikal and Transcaucasus Fronts 505 000 (including 200 000 with limited fitness and 200 000 in age above 45).
g) officers of reserve, not conscripted yet - 156 000
h) expected convalescents from hospitals in 3 nearest months - 350 000
i) in the penitentiary system - 1 156 000 men in age from 17 to 45.
Other sources confirm this:
Bagration, 1944, Osprey Campaign Series -
"Soviet rifle divisions were generally smaller than their German counterparts, averaging 2500-4000 troops. At the time of Operation Bagration a concerted effort was made to bring these units up to an average of 6000 troops. No serious effort was made to bring them up to their nominal TOE strength of 9600 troops."
Red Army Handbook, 1939-1945, by Steven J. Zaloga -
"By this time, however, it was becoming apparent that the Soviet force structure of 500-plus Divisions simply exceeded their capacity to support it. [..] in mid-1944 more drastic action was necessary. Either some of the rifle divisions would have to be demobilized and their personnel used to fill out other units, or divisional strengths far below envisioned norms would have to be accepted. The Stavka opted for the latter alternative."
Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991, by Willard C. Frank -
"Soviet sources reflect manpower deficiencies by emphasizing the low strength of rifle units and the draconian measures used to enlist soldiers in liberated regions. By 1945 Soviet rifle divisions were often under strength, with only 3,500 to 5,000 men each."
Outside of manpower, the Germans taking the Caucasus/Astrakhan removes 80-90% of Soviet oil supplies and shuts down the Persian route for Lend Lease, which accounts for 30-40% of the total from 1943 onward:
1941: 360,778t, of which 13,502t Persian Gulf, 193,229t Soviet Far East, 153,977t North Russia.
1942: 2,453,097t of which 705,259t Persian Gulf, 734,020 Soviet Far East, 949,711 North Russia, 64,107 Soviet Artic.
1943: 4,794,545t of which 1,606,979 Persian Gulf, 2,388,577 Soviet Far East, 681,043 North Russia, 117,946 Soviet Artic.
1944: 6,217,622t of which 1,788,864 Persian Gulf, 2,848,181 Soviet Far East, 1,452,775 North Russia, 127,802 Soviet Artic.
1945 3,673,819t (last shipments 20 Sept) of which: 44,513 Persian Gulf, 2,079,320 Soviet Far East, 726,725 North Russia, 680,723 Black Sea, 142,538 Soviet Artic.
From
The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison:
Roosevelt also contributed to Soviet stabilization. The first installment of wartime Allied aid that reached the Soviet Union in 1942, although small by later standards, amounted to some 5 per cent of Soviet GNP in that year. Although Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus increase in the payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend-Lease was stabilizing. We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it seems beyond doubt that collapse was near. Without Lend-Lease it would have been nearer. Stalin himself recognized this, although he expressed himself more directly. He told Khrushchev several times that the Soviet Union had suffered such heavy losses that without Allied aid it would have lost the war.19
Boris V. Sokolov (2007).
The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945,
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586.
In general, we can conclude that without Western supplies, the Soviet Union not only could not have won the Great Patriotic War, but was not even able to resist the German invasion, not being able to produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment and provide it with fuel and ammunition. This dependence was well understood by the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war. For example, the special envoy of President F.D. Roosevelt, G. Hopkins, reported in a message dated July 31, 1941, that Stalin believed it was impossible without American assistance from Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material might of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe. {70} Roosevelt, back in October 1940, announcing his decision to allow the military department to provide weapons and equipment that are surplus for the needs of the American armed forces, as well as strategic materials and industrial equipment to those countries that could protect American national interests, allowed the inclusion of these countries and Russia. {71} Without such an attitude on the part of the president, the pre-war placement in the United States of Soviet orders for equipment important for the production of weapons and military equipment would hardly have been possible.
Finally, the German advance into the Caucasus collapsed Soviet food production to just 38% of what it was in 1940, and triggered a rapid price increase from the fall on into the early Summer of 1943. Even after the Soviets regained all the land Case Blue took, food production in 1943 still decreased (Likely as a result of the two years hard fighting and scorched earth twice) to 37%. This set off a large amount of starvation deaths within the USSR that didn’t taper off until 1944, when food production increased back to 54% of the 1940 total due to Ukraine being reclaimed. Here, the Soviets wouldn’t have reclaimed any of the valuable agricultural land, and further adding on to this would be the fact Lend Lease food shipments through Persia might possibly be curtailed. For reference on this, here are two sources:
The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, by William Moskoff -
"The central fact behind the increased importance of the collective farm market was the drastic drop in food production, especially in 1942 and 1943, and the diminished proportion that went to the civilians. In 1943 overall agricultural production was only 38 percent of the 1940 level. In 1943, however, the Red Army began to recapture agricultural areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Caucasus and by the next year, 1944, agricultural output had risen to 54 percent of the 1940 level. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the food economy led to astonishing increases in prices. The most rapid
rate [Emphasis by author] of increase in prices took place in 1942 and began to taper off in mid-1943."
The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter Scott Dunn
-
"By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals."
Without the recovery of Eastern Ukraine and the Kuban achieved in 1943 by Soviet battlefield success, mass starvation would've broken out and crippled not only the Red Army but collapse their industrial production via death of workers.
