Trump Investigations Thread

DarthOne

☦️

The Uniparty Is Saying the Silent Part Out Loud Now

"Defend Democracy" = "Defend State Security, not National Security"

At what point would a villain ever openly reveal their plans?
When they believe they've already won.

"What convinced you of your theory?"
"Well, what stared to happen was they just started saying it publicly in front of cameras."
 

Captain X

Well-known member
Osaul
Cool. I can't watch a 10 second video right now. I usually am not watching videos when I am on here, so I do appreciate summaries.
They are openly talking about "fortifying" the 2024 election, and talking about how, if Trump runs, he may seem to win in the polls, "but then the mail-in ballots will come in." So basically a repeat of last election, with fraud committed through mail-in ballots.
 

Carrot of Truth

War is Peace
They are openly talking about "fortifying" the 2024 election, and talking about how, if Trump runs, he may seem to win in the polls, "but then the mail-in ballots will come in." So basically a repeat of last election, with fraud committed through mail-in ballots.

We're going to end up with our version of this sooner or later if they keep going that route.

8276561.jpg
 

Megadeath

Well-known member
Respectfully, I understand exactly what you’re arguing. What you apparently missed was my pointing out that the definition of the word “fraud” in U.S. law *as a whole* is limited to money or tangible property/something of tangible worth.

So, some background on this, just so you’re clear:

In the decades after Haas and Hammerschmidt, prosecutors kept trying to stretch the definition of “fraud” to cover all sorts of deception. This meant that there was, theoretically, no limiting principle on what was vs what wasn’t fraud. In the world of criminal law, this is a problem because people could be charged arbitrarily for fraud despite there being no such intent.

So, enter the McNally case in 1987. The background was that the former chairman of the Kentucky Democratic Party conspired with a state official to have a contract for unemployment insurance awarded to a company secretly controlled by the chairman, with McNally as the front man. McNally argued (successfully) that the language of the statute itself did not say anything about “honest services” and when the Court reviewed the statute, agreed. The reasoning was that if Congress had intended for it to be covered, they needed to make it explicit and clearly defined (which is required of any criminal law).

Now, in the 2-person dissent, John Paul Stevens argued for the stance you take, namely that “fraud” should be interpreted far more broadly than just money or tangible property.The other seven justices disagreed, and so McNally stood while the more expansive interpretations from Haas and Hammerschmidt were rendered invalid.

So, we go to 1988 when Congress amends the statute in question to include “honest services.” However, once again, they failed to actually spell out what that meant and who it covered (public officials or private officers of companies) and what specific kind of conduct it prohibited (again, a no-no in constitutional law). More importantly, though, Congress did NOT explicitly make the kind of conduct Trump allegedly engaged in a crime under the fraud statute, and under the long-standing principle of “if it isn’t explicitly banned, it’s legal” in law, any interpretation by the courts would have to invalidate this interpretation…which is exactly what happened.

Now we come to 2010, and in Skilling, the Supreme Court ruled explicitly that “honest services fraud” only applies to schemes involving kickbacks or bribery.

The bottom line is that it doesn’t matter what Haas or Hammerschmidt say…they were rendered invalid by McNally and Skilling. Smith is trying to play games hoping the courts will rule differently this time around, but from a legal perspective it’s incredibly doubtful he will succeed here, and unless the composition of the Supreme Court changes before it gets to them (if it gets to them), any conviction would be struck down.

I say “if” because the D.C. Circuit would likely wind up on SCOTUS’ shit list if they tried to play games on this front. But seriously, when the best example a lawyer can cite is a case that’s 99 years old AND has been rendered invalid…they have a problem.
Except, those later rulings were all on cases charged under sections 1341, 1343 & 1346. Fraud in those cases is legally and clearly distinct from defraud as it's laid out in 371. The distinction is clearly laid out in the DoJ CRM.
 

The Immortal Watch Dog

Well-known member
Hetman
We're going to end up with our version of this sooner or later if they keep going that route.

8276561.jpg

Pinochet was objectively good for Chile and frankly a right wing strong man would be much better than the clowns we have now.

Just gotta keep his wife from stealing shoes, that seems to be a weird thing all wives of junta leaders have in common. Embezzling millions and buying and hoarding tens of thousands of shoes.
 

strunkenwhite

Well-known member
Except, those later rulings were all on cases charged under sections 1341, 1343 & 1346. Fraud in those cases is legally and clearly distinct from defraud as it's laid out in 371. The distinction is clearly laid out in the DoJ CRM.
@Airedale260
I am not exactly highly qualified here, but I think I can at least help move this discussion along to a useful end point: that site refers to, among other things, Tanner v. United States (1989[edit: 87, two days before the other one]), which notably came close on the heels of the events of 1987 and 1988 that Airedale refers to. That decision contains the following:

Section 371 is the descendent of and bears a strong resemblance to conspiracy laws that have been in the federal statute books since 1867. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484 (prohibiting conspiracy to "defraud the United States in any manner whatever"). Neither the original 1867 provision nor its subsequent reincarnations were accompanied by any particularly illuminating legislative history. This case has been preceded, however, by decisions of this Court interpreting the scope of the phrase "to defraud . . . in any manner or for any purpose." In those cases we have stated repeatedly that the fraud covered by the statute "reaches 'any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.' " Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 1844, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966), quoting Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479, 30 S.Ct. 249, 253, 54 L.Ed. 569 (1910); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 66, 62 S.Ct. 457, 463, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188, 44 S.Ct. 511, 512, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924). We do not reconsider that aspect of the scope of § 371 in this case. Therefore, if petitioners' actions constituted a conspiracy to impair the functioning of the REA, no other form of injury to the Federal Government need be established for the conspiracy to fall under § 371.
 
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DarthOne

☦️
Pinochet was objectively good for Chile and frankly a right wing strong man would be much better than the clowns we have now.

Just gotta keep his wife from stealing shoes, that seems to be a weird thing all wives of junta leaders have in common. Embezzling millions and buying and hoarding tens of thousands of shoes.

Seriously, what in the Lords name is it with women and buying tons of expensive shoes?!

Is it some sort of misapplied hold over from the Hunter gatherer days or something?
 
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Rocinante

Russian Bot
Founder
Seriously, what in the Lords name is it with some and buying tons of expensive shoes?!

Is it some sort of misapplied hold over from the Hunter gatherer days or something?
Same reason people buy Gucci bags and Rolex watches.

Same reason Roman royalty wore purple dyed robes, which was very expensive back then because it required a bunch of oysters or shellfish or some shit for the dye.

Same reason Joe Biden liked to drive around in that Camaro and Trump liked everything covered in gold.

It's all about status symbols. Their idea being: what good is being rich and powerful if you can't rub into everyone's faces, that you're rich and powerful?
 
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Airedale260

Well-known member
@Airedale260
I am not exactly highly qualified here, but I think I can at least help move this discussion along to a useful end point: that site refers to, among other things, Tanner v. United States (1989), which notably came close on the heels of the events of 1987 and 1988 that Airedale refers to. That decision contains the following:
Actually, Tanner ALSO involved money. More importantly, SCOTUS just this year ruled in two cases (Ciminell v United States and Percoco v United States) that, in order to meet the definition of “fraud” under criminal law:

"[T]he federal fraud statutes criminalize only schemes to deprive people of traditional property interests”

Keep in mind, the Tanner decision did involve money changing hands, and in 2000 in Cleveland v. United States, the Court explicitly stated that to fit the definition of fraud *under federal criminal law* the scheme must involve deception AND the objective must be to gain money or traditional property (things like land or tangible goods).

The Court didn’t say that “intangibles can’t ever be considered objects of fraud” per se, but rather said that the definition under the statute has to involve money or property until Congress explicitly states otherwise. Which Congress has never done. Now, could they do it in the future, yes, but Trump couldn’t be charged under it because the Constitution explicitly prohibits prosecution for crimes ex post facto (that is, if it wasn’t a crime at the time the act occurred, one cannot be prosecuted even if a future law prohibits the act).

Again, the cases you cite did involve the interpretation you defend AT THE TIME, but they’ve been invalided in the decades since by several other cases since that take precedence over the older ones. And Percoco and Ciminelli both involved unanimous agreement on the definition itself.

If I get the chance I’ll dig a full list up but for now (all “v United States” by the way):

McNally (1987)
Cleveland (2000)
Skilling (2010)
Kelly (2020)
Ciminelli (2023)
Percoco (2023)
 
Same reason people buy Gucci bags and Rolex watches.

Same reason Roman royalty wore purple dyed robes, which was very expensive back then because it required a bunch of oysters or shellfish or some shit for the dye.

Same reason Joe Biden liked to drive around in that Camaro and Trump liked everything covered in gold.

It's all about status symbols. Their idea being: what good is being rich and powerful if you can't rub into everyone's faces, that you're rich and powerful?

I get the mentality but too much of that and the hounds will eat you alive especially if they feel like they have a chain around their neck keeping them from moving.
 

strunkenwhite

Well-known member
Actually, Tanner ALSO involved money. More importantly, SCOTUS just this year ruled in two cases (Ciminell v United States and Percoco v United States) that, in order to meet the definition of “fraud” under criminal law:

"[T]he federal fraud statutes criminalize only schemes to deprive people of traditional property interests”

Keep in mind, the Tanner decision did involve money changing hands, and in 2000 in Cleveland v. United States, the Court explicitly stated that to fit the definition of fraud *under federal criminal law* the scheme must involve deception AND the objective must be to gain money or traditional property (things like land or tangible goods).

The Court didn’t say that “intangibles can’t ever be considered objects of fraud” per se, but rather said that the definition under the statute has to involve money or property until Congress explicitly states otherwise. Which Congress has never done. Now, could they do it in the future, yes, but Trump couldn’t be charged under it because the Constitution explicitly prohibits prosecution for crimes ex post facto (that is, if it wasn’t a crime at the time the act occurred, one cannot be prosecuted even if a future law prohibits the act).

Again, the cases you cite did involve the interpretation you defend AT THE TIME, but they’ve been invalided in the decades since by several other cases since that take precedence over the older ones. And Percoco and Ciminelli both involved unanimous agreement on the definition itself.

If I get the chance I’ll dig a full list up but for now (all “v United States” by the way):

McNally (1987)
Cleveland (2000)
Skilling (2010)
Kelly (2020)
Ciminelli (2023)
Percoco (2023)
"Tanner also involved money" is not a valid counterpoint to Tanner saying "Therefore, if petitioners' actions constituted a conspiracy to impair the functioning of the REA, no other form of injury to the Federal Government need be established for the conspiracy to fall under § 371."

Please note that neither Ciminelli nor Percoco mention § 371, as far as Ctrl-F is concerned at least.

Your list of "decades later" cases includes McNally, yet Tanner postdates Mcnally. In fact, this is key to the following argument:
1. Granted that McNally says that certain types of fraud must involve money or tangible assets.
2. Granted that Congress's 1988 response to McNally is immaterial to the argument at hand.
3. Nevertheless, after McNally, USSC reaffirmed that § 371 fraud cases (where there is a conspiracy to impair government functions) do not require involvement of money or tangible assets. [edit: timeline wrong, see below]

Which of the cases you cite has an answer to this?
 
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Doomsought

Well-known member
The more broad interpritation of "Fraud" you are arguing for would open every politician ever elected up to liability for failed campaign promises.
 

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