Section 371 is the descendent of and bears a strong resemblance to conspiracy laws that have been in the federal statute books since 1867. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30,
14 Stat. 484 (prohibiting conspiracy to "defraud the United States in any manner whatever"). Neither the original 1867 provision nor its subsequent reincarnations were accompanied by any particularly illuminating legislative history. This case has been preceded, however, by decisions of this Court interpreting the scope of the phrase "to defraud . . . in any manner or for any purpose." In those cases we have stated repeatedly that
the fraud covered by the statute "reaches 'any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.' "
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855,
861, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 1844, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966), quoting
Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462,
479, 30 S.Ct. 249, 253, 54 L.Ed. 569 (1910); see also
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
66, 62 S.Ct. 457, 463, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942);
Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182,
188, 44 S.Ct. 511, 512, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924). We do not reconsider that aspect of the scope of § 371 in this case.
Therefore, if petitioners' actions constituted a conspiracy to impair the functioning of the REA, no other form of injury to the Federal Government need be established for the conspiracy to fall under § 371.