September 20, 1940
Third Republic of Poland
Mazovian Voivodeship
Radom
It was late evening, the sun had long set, enveloping the area in darkness. The streets were devoid of people. Nothing strange about that; Radom was not the kind of city with vibrant nightlife.
Even the fact that it was a Friday didn't change this.
Moreover, this Friday was special. The results of the local elections across the entire Republic were about to be announced, which had taken place two days earlier.
Thus, in homes and apartments, like the one belonging to the Białas family situated in a typical post-communist block of flats, a relic of the golden era of the People's Republic of Poland, the atmosphere was tense.
Everyone remembered the shock from a year ago when the distribution of seats in the Sejm was revealed. The Zjednoczona Prawica (United Right), in a slightly expanded composition, dominated once again and just barely secured the minimal majority needed for independent governance, which was 235 seats.
This achievement was made possible, among other things, by the absorption of the Obóz Jedności Narodowej (National Unity Camp) by the United Right—a kind of coalition comprising Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice),Suwerenna Polska (Sovereign Poland), Partia Republikańska (Republican Party)—where deputies from the remaining parties were placed on the electoral lists of PiS and formally appeared in the Sejm under the banner of this formation during voting.
On similar principles, the National Unity Camp joined the United Right, forming the fourth component, of comparable strength to Sovereign Poland. It was responsible for the electoral success of the "NeoSanation" in the Borderlands, although all it did was absorb the former OZN voters in those places.
The second winner was the Konfederacja (Confederation) with over 90 seats, a significant leap from the previous 11. Two factors contributed to this. The collapse of the (Koalicja Obywatelska) Civic Coalition and the shift of their voters with more liberal views towards the Confederation as the only realistic option with free-market tendencies, as well as the incorporation of the opposition to the National Unity Camp into their ranks, augmenting the respective parts of the Confederation—a kind of oddity that somehow works.
Why an oddity? Because de jure, the Confederation is one party, but de facto, it's a coalition of three distinct factions bound mainly by being more right-wing than the United Right, alias PiS (or at least that's what they proclaim, which seems more like a slogan than the truth), and by expressing strong opposition to the European Union and the progressiveness it brings to both the left and the right.
These factions are New Hope (formerly KORWiN), National Movement, and Crown Polish Confederation.
Liberals, nationalists, and monarchists all in one party. It sounds like the beginning of a joke, yet it's the Polish reality. It experienced its first surge during the time of Covid when it gained considerable strength due to its actions. Another influx occurred during the War in Ukraine, and the current power arose from the chaos of the Back in Time, which shattered the convictions of many more left-leaning and liberal voters.
Solid foundation, adhering to their own ideological principles, and above all, not relying on foreign support, significantly boosted their strength, especially since they managed to convince many non-voters that action needed to be taken in the current chaos for the good of Poland.
As a result, the Confederation became the main opposition force, replacing the previous "total opposition."
The third force was the Stronnictwo Ludowe (People's Party) with 50 seats—the true People's Party—gained through combined votes from the peasants in the Borderlands and dissatisfied farmers not aligned with PiS. It shattered the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People's Party) and its associated groups, attracting a significant portion of its voters. Thus, the old PSL, now SL, was one of the two parties with roots in the Borderlands that gained real votes and mandates from Poles in the West and Center.
The fourth force was the Civic Platform, or PO, with what it managed to absorb from other liberal parties, securing 40 seats. This was a crushing defeat for the latter, as they fell from the second place with 126 seats.
The last significant party was the old Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party) with 37 seats. Though it had a certain base in the most developed parts of the Borderlands, it also managed to capture a significant number of votes from the left-leaning portion of Poles in the West who sought an alternative to the Left (a coalition or party similar to the Confederation, but composed of leftist parties), which, in short, consisted of well-known figures with a communist background.
The last eight seats were won by national minorities—five by Ukrainians, three of which went to the Ukraińskie Zjednoczenie Narodowo-Demokratyczne (Ukrainian National-Democratic Union), for whom Ukrainians from the Borderlands voted, and two for the Sługa Narodu (Servant of the People Party), for whom Ukrainians from the future voted. Two seats were won by Jews from two different factions, a Zionist and a Mizrahi, but they formed a joint parliamentary group. The last, unaffiliated seat belonged to a representative of the German minority, Ryszard Galla.
If not for Polish law exempting minorities from the minimum electoral threshold, thus requiring reserved seats for them in the 460-member Sejm, most likely these representatives would not be there. The turnout seen in last year's elections on the future Polish territory would have completely marginalized all minorities. Only Ukrainians would have secured any mandates in such a situation, as they number around 6 million out of Poland's population of over 52 million, including refugees.
The remaining 51 seats belong to the 3 million other minority members and 43 million Poles.
This was a kind of novum, unseen in Poland for decades. Nevertheless, over 83% of the population still consisted of Poles, mostly residing in a compact territory. They were separated as if by a thick line from the majority of Ukrainians, who could pose issues. And the lessons from the past made people closely observe Eastern Lesser Poland, alias Galicia.
Efforts were aimed at diffusing any tensions. However, the results of the local elections were meant to be a true test and demonstration of the extent of Ukrainians' reluctance toward future Poland and to identify the support base for self-governing Ukraine, which needed attention.
This was important because a considerable stretch of land, where Poles lived, separated Galician Ukrainians from Ukrainians in Ukraine—almost like a dividing line between the two parts of the nation. Any demands or attempts to take away these lands would require taking over areas where Poles were present.
Where does this anomaly come from? Normally, there were more Poles and fewer Ukrainians per square kilometer. If a portion of Poles from the Third Polish Republic were resettled to Ukrainian territories, creating villages and towns from scratch where there was room, the population ratio could quickly tip in favor of Poland.
Volhynia was one of those places; it constituted one of the important regions subjected to investments aimed at alleviating Ukrainians' negative sentiments. The infamy it gained due to the genocide in 1943 did not hinder the immigration of Poles to these lands, drawn by investments and available land waiting to be utilized.
"How much longer can we wait?" complained Marcin Białas senior, one of the sons of the Białas family, seeing that the announcement of the results was dragging on.
"Well, they have more votes to count. Currently, we have twenty-two voivodeships, eight of which require a lot of work with populations who speak a foreign language and have a different culture. Especially Zamorze," replied his father, Janusz Białas, a middle-aged man.
"But Zamorze has barely 200,000 people living there; that's fewer than just Radom! Moreover, I doubt that the local inhabitants, except for the colonists, were interested in voting. Actually, I doubt they even noticed that the entire territory changed allegiance."
"They probably noticed. Soldiers' uniforms and the change in all the markings to completely foreign ones—it's documented in Polnet, our guys encountered locals in the forest. They were extremely surprised and suspicious of the new arrivals. As you noticed in one of the videos I showed you," interjected the younger son of the Białas family, Jan.
"Yeah, I remember," Marcin responded. "Let's hope no serious incidents arise from this. Nevertheless, that doesn't change the fact that they probably prefer to be left alone, not bothering with us."
"I guess only the more important localities inherited from the French and the Dutch are participating in the elections and passing on information," Jan began to say, but he was interrupted by his mother.
"Quiet, boys, they're announcing the results!" said Helena Białas, the boys' mother.
The brothers fell silent, and those engaged in discussing the anticipated results in front of a TVP INFO station screen—the state-owned public television available "for free" (meaning funded by your taxes)—were informed by the host that the National Electoral Commission had just announced the results.
After a moment, the image changed. The older men and women took their seats at a table against a backdrop displaying the logo and name of the National Electoral Commission. Then, the eldest among them, a man with a visible wrinkle on his forehead and glasses, began to read from a piece of paper.
"The National Electoral Commission, on September 20, 2025, based on the Act on... ...declares as follows. The Law and Justice Electoral Committee secured 274 mandates and the majority in 10 Voivodeship Councils, namely in the Masovian, Podlaskie, Subcarpathian, Pre-subcarpathian, Świętokrzyskie, Silesian, Lower Silesian, Łódź, Lesser Poland, and Black Ruthenian Voivodeships."
"So, they maintained what they had and only grew by new voivodeships from the Borderlands," Marcin commented, remembering that Pre-subcarpathian and Black Ruthenian were two new voivodeships from the Borderlands.
"One could have expected that; overnight, they won't seize the opposition stronghold," his mother remarked.
Meanwhile, the chairman of the National Electoral Commission continued his speech. "...Confederation secured 215 mandates and the majority in 6 Voivodeship Councils, namely in the Greater Poland, Pomeranian, Kuyavian-Pomeranian, Warmian-Masurian, and Guianan Voivodeships."
"They captured one of the Guianan Voivodeships? Interesting," Jan remarked.
"Well, no surprise there. Before the purchase, there were around 20,000 people in Guiana; it grew to 87,000 over the last year. Add to that the fact that most of them are people with an ethos that fits the typical Confederation voter, so this was to be expected," Marcin explained.
"True, many of them are Polish diaspora from the States; they're probably more accustomed to a free-market party than the average Pole," Jan replied.
"Not just that; many of them are the most resourceful individuals, as they typically opt for emigration if they feel they can't act as they wish in their homeland. And Confederation aims to reach such individuals and encourage them to vote," Marcin added.
"You can discuss that later; for now, be quiet," their father said, cutting off the discussion.
Meanwhile, the chairman, who had already announced the results for the People's Party, which secured 81 mandates but didn't gain a significant majority in any voivodeship, either needing to form a coalition with PiS or Confederation, moved on to the Non-Partisan Local Government Officials. Apart from the Surinam Voivodeship, they didn't secure a substantial majority anywhere else.
Next, he presented the modest yet existent success of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which secured the Zielona Góra and Poleskie Voivodeships, although the latter held only a slight majority against the Jewish parties, which were the second force in that voivodeship.
The pitiful image of the Civic Coalition, which only maintained control in a few major cities—Gdańsk, Warsaw, Poznań, and Opole—while being relegated to the opposition elsewhere, including Opole where they were expected to be a stronghold, was displayed, much to the surprise of those watching.
Then, a series of minor factions representing various minority or regional parties were presented; apart from the Jewish parties in the Borderlands, they didn't achieve much success.
The last Electoral Committees of note were those of the Ukrainian National-Democratic Union (UNDO) and the Volhynian Ukrainian Union (WZU). Both parties had a base in the Borderlands, with UNDO having fewer mandates and focusing mainly on the areas between Lviv and Ternopil; it's worth noting the highly visible line on the electoral maps that separated UNDO's territories from PiS, showing the effects of the Operation Vistula near the Bieszczady region. Occasionally, it also intruded into Volhynia, occupying parts of that voivodeship.
WZU, as its name suggests, exclusively focused on Volhynia and served as a fig leaf for Ukrainians outwardly loyal to the government. This isn't surprising, as it emerged as a pro-sanation party, with its goal from the very beginning being to build Ukrainian loyalty to Poland. Considering what happened in 1943, one could say it was far from successful.
UNDO itself was problematic; on one hand, it was a peaceful and manageable formation. In a way, the Third Polish Republic did what UNDO demanded from the Second Polish Republic, which was provincial self-government in the territories of the Lwów (now Subcarpathian), Tarnopol (now Western Podolia), and Stanisławów (now Pre-subcarpathian) voivodeships, in accordance with the will of the Great Powers regarding the final allocation of Galicia to Poland (though this was quite stretched, as Poland simply took these territories without asking anyone for permission), in exchange for Ukrainian autonomy within the framework of self-government.
Considering the fact that the demands were met rather casually—unlike the Second Polish Republic (II RP), which only had self-government in the Silesian Voivodeship—UNDO's position persisted, as the election results clearly demonstrated. This was a reason for relief, as the Ukrainian National Organization (OUN) seemed to have weakened, so it wouldn't be able to wreak havoc as it did in the OTL.
On the other hand, it was also a cause for concern, as UNDO only shifted to at least a neutral stance towards Poland after the Holodomor, having been hostile towards Poland before. It was an open secret that many UNDO politicians had connections to the OUN, something that the ruling party was well aware of. This was hardly surprising; one just had to delve into the archives from the pacification of 1938 to uncover this fact.
Observations made by the ABW (Internal Security Agency) confirmed this information and even expanded the existing database, revealing additional uncertainties who might pose a threat or at least serve as a support network and cover for Ukrainian terrorists affiliated with the OUN.
"Well, the die is cast. The Ukrainians have their piece of Poland; let's see how they fare," Marcin commented on this fact with an exceptionally cool tone. In doing so, he ignored the wisdom coming from the television conversation where commentators were discussing the election results.
Among them was a UNDO politician who, speaking impeccable Polish, was clearly delighted with the success, glancing at his pro-government opponent from the Volhynian Ukrainian Union (WZU). Both gentlemen, much like the man from the People's Party or the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), looked quite out of place, even anachronistic in their attire.
Nevertheless, they impressed with their elegance and composure. In their presence, the rest of the politicians seemed like children, even though, on the other hand, they could easily engage in fistfights (at best) and create such a ruckus that it reminded everyone why the Marshal's Guard responsible for order in the Sejm during the Second Polish Republic had firearms right in the Sejm chamber.
A practice the present-day Marshal's Guard had to refresh after a few incidents where simple means didn't yield the desired results. Suffice it to say that it was a novelty that somewhat shook the Poles accustomed to regular name-calling and shouting matches among politicians.
And it was no different this time when an outraged Civic Coalition (in fact, Civic Platform, but formality is formality) MP engaged in a nasty and quite childish verbal exchange with a member of the ruling party. A brawl erupted, with both men coming very close to exchanging blows, all broadcast live on television.
How did it end? Well, the Białas family wasn't interested; they simply changed the channel upon seeing what was happening. After a few channel switches, they settled on TVP1, where a new series was airing—a kind of remake or reboot, but one striving for originality, namely "Four Tank-Men and a Dog: In the West."
This series emerged during the resurgence of interest in World War II. So, the old show from the time of the Polish People's Republic (PRL), "Four Tank-Men and a Dog," regained significant attention. Someone at TVP (Polish Television) saw reason when they realized that there had been a sudden surge in popularity for "Four Tank-Men and a Dog" on TVP VOD, the online platform where you can watch all works produced by Polish public television and those that have entered the public domain.
Someone thought that if people wanted to watch "Four Tank-Men and a Dog," maybe they could create a new series, but this time set in the West with the 1st Armoured Division under General Maczek? As conceived, it was done, and the series received good ratings, especially since the decision was made to stick to the original format rather than reinvent the whole thing. This, of course, quickly yielded tangible results, resulting in one of the best Polish TV series in years.
The Białas family tuned in at a good moment, as they were witnessing the battle scene near Falaise. The heroes were fighting aboard their tank, the Rycerz II (Knight II), a medium Cromwell tank, defending against a desperate assault by trapped German armored divisions.
There was much to watch, and the battle scenes were staged with an uncommon scale for Polish cinema. Certainly, it was better to watch the example of heroic tank crewmen and compare them to the crew of Rudy 102 (Orange 102) than to watch politicians arguing amongst themselves.
Life is too short to waste time on nonsense, isn't it?
@ATP Wzywałeś? Masz
