It's because (Thanos voice) I did it myself.
On the first article, if I'm not mistaken the most advanced of these efforts is the same one I found on Wikipedia and described as "20 years behind the cutting edge", Mikron Group, although to be fair just going by the nanometer size is doubtless oversimplifying.
On the second, I think it's fair to say that the flow of computer hardware won't be completely cut off, but that doesn't mean Russia "can get what they need anyway".
1. Sanction evasion via complexity of the market would probably be quite small in comparison to what would be successfully cut off.
2. It's a decent idea that strategically critical manufacturers can tell the government to pound sand and get away with it because the government can't afford to blacklist them, but we've been surprised before at the willingness of both the government and business worlds to stick it to Russia despite the consequences.
3. I feel like the article is trying to have it both ways with 'the sanctions are a no-go because of the hardship already imposed on the west by semiconductor shortages' versus 'but Russia can afford to lose 30% on top of that'.
4. If the black market's already being relied on by Russia, there may be limits on how much it can realistically expand that pipeline, especially when at the same time the west cares more about cracking down than it did previously.
5. China's not going to war for Russia. At best, this talking point is a supporting argument for #3 in that Biden can't afford to go after China
too hard if it flouts efforts to cut Russia off. (Because in that case Russia would just be the spark of a more direct US-China battle.)
On the third, more on China. It's true that China's response will be key. But it's far from given that it will so much as continue its normal supply unabated, let alone make up for the shortage of western business. Huawei,
for example, seems to be straddling the fence rather than standing firm on Russia's side.