Trump Investigations Thread

Airedale260

Well-known member
"Tanner also involved money" is not a valid counterpoint to Tanner saying "Therefore, if petitioners' actions constituted a conspiracy to impair the functioning of the REA, no other form of injury to the Federal Government need be established for the conspiracy to fall under § 371."

Please note that neither Ciminelli nor Percoco mention § 371, as far as Ctrl-F is concerned at least.

Your list of "decades later" cases includes McNally, yet Tanner postdates Mcnally. In fact, this is key to the following argument:
1. Granted that McNally says that certain types of fraud must involve money or tangible assets.
2. Granted that Congress's 1988 response to McNally is immaterial to the argument at hand.
3. Nevertheless, after McNally, USSC reaffirmed that § 371 fraud cases (where there is a conspiracy to impair government functions) do not require involvement of money or tangible assets.

Which of the cases you cite has an answer to this?
Okay, a couple of things:

First, and incidentally, Tanner does NOT postdate McNally. In fact, Tanner was actually decided two days before.

Second, the relevant issue in this discussion is that in Tanner, the conspiracy to defraud that he was charged with involved him ripping off a government contractor on a construction project by using substandard materials and overcharging on other materials. In other words, cheating the contractor out of money.

Third, where this is spelled out in Ciminelli (second page of the decision has a brief summary, which I’ve copied here; the whole bit on what constitutes ‘fraud’ is more clearly spelled out on pages 312-317).


When the federal wire fraud statute was enacted, the "common understanding" of the words "to defraud" referred "to wronging one in his property rights." Cleveland v. United States, 531 U. S. 12, 19. This Court has therefore consistently understood the statute's "money or property" requirement as limiting the "scheme or artifce to defraud" element. Ibid. Even so, lower federal courts for decades interpreted the mail and wire fraud statutes to protect intangible interests unconnected to traditional property rights. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 400. This Court halted that trend in McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, which confned [sic] the statutes to the "protect[ion of] individual property rights." Id.,

In other words, what Thomas (the author) is saying on behalf of a unanimous court, is that the definition of “defraud” MUST involve money or property. Not just for the purposes of defining mail fraud or wire fraud, but ANY fraud. It reiterated this in Cleveland, in Skilling, in Kelly, and in Percoco. That is, even when talking about “depriving of honest services” it relates only to kickbacks or bribery, because otherwise there would be no limiting principle, including the possibility that yes, the idea that one could criminally charge a politician down the line for violating a campaign promise. And that would run afoul of the First Amendment, not to mention the other headaches it would create.

The reason this has to be spelled out is that, even after McNally, when the Court declared exactly what the definition of “fraud” is under U.S. criminal law, lower courts have still tried to pull a fast one. And with Ciminelli and Percoco, SCOTUS declared that, no, the definition as laid out in McNally still applies. Congress can change the definition of fraud in the statute if it so chooses but to this day it hasn’t. It did try to change the statute by adding “honest services” to the statute, but it didn’t define “honest services”, which the Court ended up having to reiterate involves money or tangible property.

So I’m not entirely sure where the confusion is, but again, the definition of “fraud” under federal criminal law has been spelled out, repeatedly. And for whatever reason, Jack Smith decided to ignore that, again. Which means if this doesn’t get tossed because it doesn’t actually fit, it’ll go to SCOTUS once again. And SCOTUS will have to reiterate WHAT FRAUD IS, if they don’t just ax the whole “honest services” bit completely because of the repeated headaches.
 

strunkenwhite

Well-known member
First, and incidentally, Tanner does NOT postdate McNally. In fact, Tanner was actually decided two days before.
Thank you very much for the correction. I had somehow got it in my head that Tanner was from 1989.

It seems to me that the fact that the two cases were decided essentially simultaneously highlights the need to illuminate the seeming conflict between the quotes you provide and "no other form of injury to the Federal Government need be established for the conspiracy to fall under § 371." To be clear, that is no other form than " 'any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.' " which I hope you'll agree does not necessarily entail "a deceptive scheme designed to obtain money or tangible property".

You spent a lot of time talking about the McNally case and its descendants, but none talking about Tanner other than to correct me about its date. But if McNally and Tanner seem to be saying two contradictory things about what is necessary to establish fraud, and if § 371 is the statute in question for Tanner but not for McNally, and if the case that inspired this discussion is being brought under § 371, why is McNally so different? Why would the Court hand down two unanimous decisions with blatantly contradictory views on what constitutes fraud?
So I’m not entirely sure where the confusion is
I need to understand why Tanner says what it does (quoted above) if your interpretation of things is true for § 371.

P.S. On review of § 371, if your answer will be "ah, but they could mean it's merely a conspiracy to commit offense, not a conspiracy to commit fraud" my answer will be "oh my fucking god fine then it's an offense not fraud that's not the real point"
 

Airedale260

Well-known member
Thank you very much for the correction. I had somehow got it in my head that Tanner was from 1989.

It seems to me that the fact that the two cases were decided essentially simultaneously highlights the need to illuminate the seeming conflict between the quotes you provide and "no other form of injury to the Federal Government need be established for the conspiracy to fall under § 371." To be clear, that is no other form than " 'any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government.' " which I hope you'll agree does not necessarily entail "a deceptive scheme designed to obtain money or tangible property".

You spent a lot of time talking about the McNally case and its descendants, but none talking about Tanner other than to correct me about its date. But if McNally and Tanner seem to be saying two contradictory things about what is necessary to establish fraud, and if § 371 is the statute in question for Tanner but not for McNally, and if the case that inspired this discussion is being brought under § 371, why is McNally so different? Why would the Court hand down two unanimous decisions with blatantly contradictory views on what constitutes fraud?

I need to understand why Tanner says what it does (quoted above) if your interpretation of things is true for § 371.

P.S. On review of § 371, if your answer will be "ah, but they could mean it's merely a conspiracy to commit offense, not a conspiracy to commit fraud" my answer will be "oh my fucking god fine then it's an offense not fraud that's not the real point"
I didn’t address it because A) Tanner was decided *before* McNally -by only two days, yes, but still BEFORE. Therefore, whatever the substance of text of Tanner is (which I’ll address in a moment).

But there are two other things to consider:

1) The sentence RIGHT before the one starting your quote says:

We do not reconsider that aspect of the scope of § 371 in this case.”

In other words, the Court did not feel it necessary to address this point. Why? Simple. Even though the Court knew what its decision would be on the exact definition of “fraud” in another case before it that same term -again, not JUST as it pertains to 371 or 1341, but IN ALL OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW- it would not -and indeed did not- have any bearing whatsoever on Tanner, because the conspiracy in Tanner was a scheme to cheat the government out of money. Which was one of the two things that the Court said could be the object of a fraud scheme under criminal law, the other being “traditional property”, i.e. things like land, jewelry, precious metals, cars, high-end electronics, etc. At no time in Tanner did the defense ever claim that the purpose of the scheme was NOT to deprive the government of money; rather, they tried arguing that 371 didn’t apply because the scheme was perpetrated against a government contractor rather than against the government directly (the Court position, which still holds, actually, states that defrauding an entity acting in a capacity on behalf of the government *is* the same as defrauding the government).

So, you see, the two cases DON’T have a “blatantly contradictory definition” of fraud. This is why it’s important to read the background of a case as well. Tanner involved something that the Court still recognizes as “fraud” under the definition it spelled out in McNally and other cases.

As for why Smith is bringing it under 371, it’s because he is flat-out ignoring the Court’s prior definitions (and to be fair, he is only the most recent in a LOOOONNNGGG line of prosecutors who have tried to pull this ever since SCOTUS handed down McNally just because they disagreed with the decision) with district and circuit courts winking at this, because the Court has only so much time to devote to addressing petitions, and can’t/won’t address every case in every petition submitted to it for various reasons. Smith is apparently hoping that the Court won’t be bothered enough to address this point and that the district judge and the circuit will either come up with a new definition that somehow satisfies SCOTUS (theoretically possible but in reality HIGHLY unlikely) or that SCOTUS just won’t take the matter up if it gets to that point.

And yes, I realize that may sound bizarre but again, prosecutors of all stripes have been known to try and bend the law to get their way. But that’s why legislatures are SUPPOSED to clearly define terms in statutes, and when a statute is too vague to be enforced, either a court has to narrow down the definition or else strike the statute entirely (generally the former; unless it’s REALLY egregious they won’t do the latter).

I’m hoping this clears things up. I don’t mean to sound heated, and I don’t think you do either, but this isn’t just me being obtuse.
 

Megadeath

Well-known member
-Snip- I’m hoping this clears things up. I don’t mean to sound heated, and I don’t think you do either, but this isn’t just me being obtuse.
My understanding still doesn't match yours, but for myself I don't think further discussion is likely to be productive. I do appreciate that sentiment though, and that you've argued intelligently, clearly and reasonably.
 

Airedale260

Well-known member
My understanding still doesn't match yours, but for myself I don't think further discussion is likely to be productive. I do appreciate that sentiment though, and that you've argued intelligently, clearly and reasonably.
Fair enough. And you’re welcome; I appreciate good discourse as well.
 

strunkenwhite

Well-known member
1) The sentence RIGHT before the one starting your quote says:

We do not reconsider that aspect of the scope of § 371 in this case.”

In other words, the Court did not feel it necessary to address this point. Why? Simple. Even though the Court knew what its decision would be on the exact definition of “fraud” in another case before it that same term -again, not JUST as it pertains to 371 or 1341, but IN ALL OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW- it would not -and indeed did not- have any bearing whatsoever on Tanner, because the conspiracy in Tanner was a scheme to cheat the government out of money. Which was one of the two things that the Court said could be the object of a fraud scheme under criminal law, the other being “traditional property”, i.e. things like land, jewelry, precious metals, cars, high-end electronics, etc. At no time in Tanner did the defense ever claim that the purpose of the scheme was NOT to deprive the government of money; rather, they tried arguing that 371 didn’t apply because the scheme was perpetrated against a government contractor rather than against the government directly (the Court position, which still holds, actually, states that defrauding an entity acting in a capacity on behalf of the government *is* the same as defrauding the government).

So, you see, the two cases DON’T have a “blatantly contradictory definition” of fraud. This is why it’s important to read the background of a case as well. Tanner involved something that the Court still recognizes as “fraud” under the definition it spelled out in McNally and other cases.
If I may, it seems like you're saying that they DO have blatantly contradictory definitions, but only because the Court knew full well it intended to blow up that precedent two days hence and the contradictory PART of the definition was completely immaterial for the purpose of resolving the case at hand.

Which would be an interpretation that I cannot refute. If you dispute the above characterization please do let me know.
 

Airedale260

Well-known member
If I may, it seems like you're saying that they DO have blatantly contradictory definitions, but only because the Court knew full well it intended to blow up that precedent two days hence and the contradictory PART of the definition was completely immaterial for the purpose of resolving the case at hand.

Which would be an interpretation that I cannot refute. If you dispute the above characterization please do let me know.
Nope, you hit the nail on the head.

Quite honestly, I appreciate the back and forth on this. I apologize for having only limited time to go back into this today but I appreciate you taking the time to go do some digging on this at your end as well to teach me a couple of things!

As to the case itself, we will see what happens.
 

Cherico

Well-known member
Yeah, but for how much longer and how much damage will they do first? And will it be a case of ‘here comes the new boss, same as the old boss’?

1. Most likely a lot the managerial elite we currently have are a special kind of asshole.

2. No, I cant understate how unusual our current situation is by historical standards, the current elite is invasive and gets into peoples private lives and is far more controlling then most elites through out history. And unlike former elites who had a codified dogma where you would be safe if you followed the rules. The managerial elite doesnt' have a coherent rule set and is basically in it just to fuck with people.

Its a nightmare of controll freaks who form mobs and are constantly offended and are constantly on the offense this is not normal.... at all.

The next boss might be brutal but they will most likely leave the apolitical alone as is the historical norm throughout history.
 

Sir 1000

Shitlord
No, this is one of the most absolutely fucking retarded Q-anon style takes I've ever seen. Explain the logic here. What's Trump got to gain by this? Why would he have a deal?

Oh idk maybe he's been in charge all along. Next month they're going to remove Biden and reveal Trump has been president secretly the whole time!

Yeah. Retarded. There's no logic or reason behind your theory. They're trying to destroy the man and prevent him from running.
First check your tone when replying to me as i do not appreciate being insulted for a prediction🤬, secondly perhaps you could drop the well poisoning.

As for why he would make a deal i think avoiding prison and getting the presidency in a ''come back arc'' is a great motive. Avoiding the system going after his family/friends is another.

The system doesn't just want Trump destroyed but his followers rendered impotent and politically ineffective, it's funny that you mention q shit as that ''pied piper'' strategy is heavily favored by the establishment. I know how often and frequently shills try and d&c so i will remind everyone to vote for the man simply to cause the globalist system problems, but don't anyone get their hopes up. Watch the upcoming legal procedings, if i'm right it will be perfectly calculated to infuriate the right but in the end he won't be punished to any significant degree. If i'm wrong America has much larger problems.🤔
 

Vyor

My influence grows!
if i'm right it will be perfectly calculated to infuriate the right but in the end he won't be punished to any significant degree. If i'm wrong America has much larger problems.🤔

He won't be punished very hard because the democrats, while retarded, are not suicidal. And even if they were the cases have no real legal weight to them.
 

bintananth

behind a desk
He won't be punished very hard because the democrats, while retarded, are not suicidal. And even if they were the cases have no real legal weight to them.
It's out of their hands if he's convicted because the judge can't go any lighter than the minimum prescribed by law.

Remember that whole Malheur National Wildlife Refuge kerfluffle back in 2016? That was kicked off because some ranchers who pleaded guilty were ordered back to prison. The judge went below the minimum, the prosecution appealed that, and the appeals court agreed with the prosecution that the judge done goofed.

Intrestingly, the ranchers who went back to prison weren't publicly upset with how the appeals court ruled. Other people making an issue of it is what gave us that shitshow.
 
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