French unity, persistence, and strategy in a Germany goes east WWI- Union Sacree?

History Learner

Well-known member
Will you quite the bull shit. Especially pretending I'm saying things I clearly haven't and making things up. You should know about handwavium as its so common in your suggestions. Lets look at things quickly.

a) I stated I was considering a POD some time prior to the start of the war in which case the Russians will know that their facing the bulk of the German army. In which case they can prepare for that including updating the often obsolete fortifications and not launching attacks fairly piecemeal. You say they replaced the losses after the E Prussia defeats but here those forces will be combined with the forces assembled later, which would also make a difference. Its a lot easier to defeat an enemy in small chunks rather than concentrated.

There is no reason to assume such because it requires the Germans to literally hand their war plans over to the Russians; I know you said they would "telegraph" their plans to the Entente, but there is absolutely no reason to do this and doesn't fit with what any of the powers were doing in the lead up to the war. The fortifications was already mostly done IOTL and sure, assuming the Russians sit nice and pretty for the Germans, they could buildup....but that ignores the Germans here have 42 extra divisions and Gorlice-Tarnow IOTL showed what they could do even in World War I in terms of maneuver warfare. It also means the Austro-Hungarians have completed their mobilizations without damage, avoiding the Galician disasters and will have disposed of Serbia handily in late 1914, which means come Spring of 1915 they can throw their full might against the Russians too.

The Austro-Hungarians were, generally speaking, the equals of the Russians in terms of combat effectiveness if not moreso, while the Germans were definitely ahead of the former; here, they both have significantly more forces to place with and the Northern European Plain to operate on.

b) I would be interested to see what evidence there is that the strikes in the French army in 1917 had on the collapse of Russia?

That wasn't the claim? That military disasters had political ramifications in both France and Russia that year is obvious, and the same was found in Germany in 1918.

c) You have the idea that the French would continue fruitless attacks against defensive positions until their wiped out their entire regular army and reserves. Dream on.

No, I imagine they do what Joffre himself said they would do with him, ironically, even predicting the end result. To re-quote from what I've already provided:

Schlieffen had long before outlined how the Germans should exploit a massive French incursion through ‘the relatively narrow space between Metz and Strasbourg’. The aim must not be to push the enemy back to his fortified border. Rather, he had to be engaged on three sides, ‘from Metz, from the Saar and from Strasbourg’, and brought to a standstill there, which would give the Germans an excellent chance of decisive victory by means of envelopment attacks out of Metz and Strasbourg. The ultimate aim of this ‘attack on the enemy’s flank and rear’ would be to surround the French invasion forces and ‘not just defeat them, but lay them low and as far as possible annihilate them’ (Boetticher 1933, 260).

Joffre himself was acutely aware of the perils attending a French offensive in Lorraine. He said that the object would be to rupture the German front, but he conceded that:​

"In the course of this operation our forces would be liable to be taken in flank by attacks coming in all probability from both Metz and the region of Molsheim-Strasbourg. By penetrating like a wedge into the midst of the enemy’s lines we would be more or less inviting envelopment (Joffre 1932, 74-5)."​

The French launch their offensive into Molsheim-Strasbourg axis and the Germans conduct their pincer from Metz and Strasbourg, inflicting the envelopment Joffre himself expected would occur. That the French general in charge literally stays this speaks volumes, in that he recognized the brewing disaster being forced upon him by the political situation.

d) A map check suggests that the region borders Luxembourg not the German part of Lorraine. As such without invading Luxembourg or Belgium possibly the Germans, who according to you are totally defensive in the east must advance through all those attacking French armies to reach the region.

The Molsheim-Strasbourg Axis is a fair distance away, but even assuming the August 4th occupation doesn't occur, it will following the French disaster.

e) I call it stupidity because the belief of the German political leadership in using only one tool, i.e. military power, led them to bloody defeat twice in a generation. They got off very lucky the 1st time but paid a hell of a lot more the 2nd until they finally seem to have learnt that diplomacy and acceptance that other nations have valid interests matter.

Cool, but we're here to discuss alternate history. If your argument is "because it happened like this", then you're making a circular argument and further discussion between us is pointless in that context. You're under no obligation to respond to me dude.
 

Buba

A total creep
Austro-Hungarians have completed their mobilizations without damage, avoiding the Galician disasters and will have disposed of Serbia handily in late 1914,
IMO the Austro-Hungarians embarrass themselves in Serbia as in OTL, but here it would irrelevant. Kicking out the Russians beyond the Bug and Neman by September/October is what matters.
And in 1915 - without the Italian Front - we are looking at the CP reaching the Dvina-Dnepr line.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Some points of order:
Gorlice-Tarnow IOTL showed what they could do even in World War I in terms of maneuver warfare.
It was most definitely not a maneuver battle, it was one that relied on artillery to defeat Russian forces, since the Russians had committed the bulk of their effort to forcing the Carpathian passes and were relatively weak around Gorlice-Tarnow and they could be outgunned and dealt with. The A-Hs didn't have as much artillery/ammo and suffered substantially heavier losses as a result. G-T was a battle of material that the Germans could win given that the Russians were basically in an ammo famine by 1915. Dealing with the Russian forts would similarly be a battle of artillery that the Germans had the edge in, but it wouldn't be nearly as easy as Gorlice-Tarnow.

The Austro-Hungarians were, generally speaking, the equals of the Russians in terms of combat effectiveness if not moreso, while the Germans were definitely ahead of the former; here, they both have significantly more forces to place with and the Northern European Plain to operate on.
Not really. The pre-war professional army (a tiny force of something like 400,000 men) was as good or better than the Russian best, but they were the minority of A-H forces (the bulk being the Austrian and Hungarian national guard since the Hungarians refused to fund the combined army for political reasons). The A-H were very badly lacking in modern artillery, in many cases still using bronze pieces, thanks to the Hungarian parliament leveraging military spending against the Austrians to try and wring out political concessions. So not only was A-H artillery subpar except for certain categories, it also lacked a lot of tubes compared to the Russians.

I bought an excellent book when I was at the Vienna military museum about the A-H artillery arm (I hope I still have it in storage) that detailed all the issues they had until war funding allowed them to modernize, though due to heavy losses never really fully catching up. Since artillery was even more important in WW1 than in WW2 being behind the 8-ball there was a very big deal especially in 1914. Early in the fighting in Galicia the A-Hs benefited from attacking before their war plans said they would (the Russian intelligence had managed to get A-H war plans in 1912-13) and having quicker mobilization and attacking before their forces were fully ready. This meant that they were able to have at least numerical parity early on and by being extremely, recklessly aggressive they were able to defeat the Russians in the first clashes; due to a variety of mistakes though those early victories were ultimately thrown away though and once Russian armies got fully mobilized their artillery and numerical advantage began to tell. At that point the wrestling match began and the A-Hs simply couldn't compete, also due to the misdeployment of the A-H 2nd army. (see my Conrad Waits TL on AH.com for a very detailed description of what happened IOTL and an ATL where Conrad Waits for clarification about Russian entry into the war before ordering 2nd army deployed).

BTW an interesting POD would have been had the A-H army gotten the funding it needed since they had intended to fully modernize their artillery army and expand it to such a level that each A-H army corps would have had more guns than any other army's corps in the world. That and actually expand the combined army rather than having to fund two separate national guards due to political shit-fighting. That would mean the A-H naval expansion doesn't happen of course, but given that A-H mostly fought a land war that would be much smarter anyway. In that case the A-H army would have done much better in Galicia in 1914, not to mention against Serbia. That is assuming they expanded ammo production and stockpiles to feed the hungry beast that is WW1 artillery.

Truth be told there are a ton of WW1 PODs for A-H to do better, though to be fair a number of them require A-H politics to be completely different.

After all those tangents at least regarding the German turn East A-H would be much better supported, but would likely still lose in East Galicia since 2nd army would still get sent to Serbia first before a hasty redeployment and the A-H 3rd army, all by its lonesome, would still be massively outnumbered and gunned in the East. That likely means the Komarov battle still turns out to be a defeat, though potentially not as bad of one, as A-H forces are diverted to try and help the 3rd army with OTL results. Where the German armies would matter would be in the area of the A-H 1st army, since the Russian 9th army would be diverted to deal with German forces around Ivangorod-Lublin (also where the defeated Russian 4th army retreated to) and free up the 1st army to then help the 4th army at Komarov. Likely the 1st army would have to shed the Kummer Group reinforced with an addition corps to help with Lublin even with the extra German armies, but that would still leave the 1st army with plenty of units to pursue the defeated Russian 5th army once the A-H 4th army turned to help the A-H 3rd army after Gnila Lipa. That should free up the entire A-H 4th army for Rawa Ruska, as the 1st army would take over the pursuit of the Russian 5th after Komarov. Without needing to worry about the Russian 5th attacking them from the rear, the A-H 4th should be able to salvage something at Rawa, which prevents Galicia from being a total disaster and buys time for the A-H 2nd army to show up to tilt the scales.

I suppose the question is whether the A-H 1st army could continue inflicting defeats on the Russian 5th, because if they do and the Germans could pin down the Russian 9th and 4th armies at Ivangorod-Lublin by late August then the A-Hs have a chance to check the Russian advance in East Galicia once the 2nd army shows up from Serbia. Then it would be 4 A-H armies vs. 3 Russian and one of the three Russian ones would have suffered pretty heavy losses by late August with potentially worse to come and the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th armies should be able to achieve something against the Russian 3rd and 8th armies before the Russian 11th could be mobilized (IIRC their 7th was locked down on the Romanian border).

BTW here is a good description of the Galician campaign from a Russian perspective:
 

Buba

A total creep
@sillygoose
Please do not confuse the KuK Landwehr and Kiraly Honved with some sort of "National Guard" or 2nd line formation. It was just as 1st line as the KK Armee. It had a different name and the money came not from the "Imperial and Royal" budget, but the two "Royal" budgets, yet otherwise it was the same. The same 20 year old conscripts, same length of service, same officer and NCO corps.

True that compared to e.g. highly militarised France the A-H military was small and underfunded - and the Dual Monarchy paid the ultimate price for that. An SI into Franz Josef in 1912 or earlier will win WWI easily :)

I agree on that text being a very interesting read.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
@sillygoose
Please do not confuse the KuK Landwehr and Kiraly Honved with some sort of "National Guard" or 2nd line formation. It was just as 1st line as the KK Armee. It had a different name and the money came not from the "Imperial and Royal" budget, but the two "Royal" budgets, yet otherwise it was the same. The same 20 year old conscripts, same length of service, same officer and NCO corps.

True that compared to e.g. highly militarised France the A-H military was small and underfunded - and the Dual Monarchy paid the ultimate price for that. An SI into Franz Josef in 1912 or earlier will win WWI easily :)

I agree on that text being a very interesting read.
I'm well aware of what the Landwehr and Honved were. They were equivalent to the national guard as their names literally translate as such, I made no mention of quality. Compared to the KuK professional army they did not as quality of manpower, as neither were as prestigious, while the Honved and Landwehr had 1 less battalion per regiment as well.

They lacked heavy artillery (not howitzers, but the guns above corps level), aircraft, and 1 year volunteers got no pay and had to cover their own equipment costs.

What is "an SI into Franz Josef"?
 

Buba

A total creep
Heavy artillery - and other Corps Troops - were "federal". Landwehr/Honved Divisions were included in KuK Corps.

By "SI into FJ" I mean a fanfic story where a fanboy's consciousness is placed in Franz Josef's mind. Imagine the fun things you would do if you (hence SI="self insert") woke up in Franz Josef 's body on 1.VII.1914 :)
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Some points of order:

It was most definitely not a maneuver battle, it was one that relied on artillery to defeat Russian forces, since the Russians had committed the bulk of their effort to forcing the Carpathian passes and were relatively weak around Gorlice-Tarnow and they could be outgunned and dealt with. The A-Hs didn't have as much artillery/ammo and suffered substantially heavier losses as a result. G-T was a battle of material that the Germans could win given that the Russians were basically in an ammo famine by 1915. Dealing with the Russian forts would similarly be a battle of artillery that the Germans had the edge in, but it wouldn't be nearly as easy as Gorlice-Tarnow.

I don't think I can agree with this assessment, because artillery only played an important role in the initial phase and thereafter the course of the battle consisted of frequent and wide ranging flanking movements. 1914-1918 Online categorizes it thusly:

The joint German-Austro-Hungarian offensive began on the morning of 1 May 1915, with intense artillery bombardment, followed by an assault on the Russian positions. Although the defenders initially put up stiff resistance and available reserves were deployed swiftly, the Russians were soon overwhelmed by well-guided artillery fire and the onslaught of about 40,000 German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers in the first wave of attack. By the evening of the first day, the troops of the Central Powers had advanced more than ten kilometres into the enemy’s zone of defence, while the Russians were struggling to rally scattered troops, bring up reinforcements and re-establish a line of defence. All efforts, however, proved futile as the German and Austro-Hungarian troops kept advancing, while arriving Russian reinforcements were rushed into battle and consequently often isolated, outflanked and defeated. Within only eight days, the 3rd Army was almost completely destroyed, forcing the Russian high command to order a general retreat to a new defensive line along the river San. When this line was also penetrated by advancing German and Austro-Hungarian troops, the Stavka ordered the complete withdrawal of all Russian forces from Galicia on 21 June 1915. By that date, which marked the official end of the Gorlice-Tarnów campaign, about 100,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded in action, and another 250,000 captured by the Austro-Hungarian and German forces, along with large amounts of weapons and other war materiel. At the same time, the Central Powers had lost about 90,000 men, who had been killed, wounded or gone missing.​

Richard L. DiNardo's Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 concurs in this, directly categorizing it as a campaign of maneuver.

Not really. The pre-war professional army (a tiny force of something like 400,000 men) was as good or better than the Russian best, but they were the minority of A-H forces (the bulk being the Austrian and Hungarian national guard since the Hungarians refused to fund the combined army for political reasons). The A-H were very badly lacking in modern artillery, in many cases still using bronze pieces, thanks to the Hungarian parliament leveraging military spending against the Austrians to try and wring out political concessions. So not only was A-H artillery subpar except for certain categories, it also lacked a lot of tubes compared to the Russians.

I bought an excellent book when I was at the Vienna military museum about the A-H artillery arm (I hope I still have it in storage) that detailed all the issues they had until war funding allowed them to modernize, though due to heavy losses never really fully catching up. Since artillery was even more important in WW1 than in WW2 being behind the 8-ball there was a very big deal especially in 1914. Early in the fighting in Galicia the A-Hs benefited from attacking before their war plans said they would (the Russian intelligence had managed to get A-H war plans in 1912-13) and having quicker mobilization and attacking before their forces were fully ready. This meant that they were able to have at least numerical parity early on and by being extremely, recklessly aggressive they were able to defeat the Russians in the first clashes; due to a variety of mistakes though those early victories were ultimately thrown away though and once Russian armies got fully mobilized their artillery and numerical advantage began to tell. At that point the wrestling match began and the A-Hs simply couldn't compete, also due to the misdeployment of the A-H 2nd army. (see my Conrad Waits TL on AH.com for a very detailed description of what happened IOTL and an ATL where Conrad Waits for clarification about Russian entry into the war before ordering 2nd army deployed).

BTW an interesting POD would have been had the A-H army gotten the funding it needed since they had intended to fully modernize their artillery army and expand it to such a level that each A-H army corps would have had more guns than any other army's corps in the world. That and actually expand the combined army rather than having to fund two separate national guards due to political shit-fighting. That would mean the A-H naval expansion doesn't happen of course, but given that A-H mostly fought a land war that would be much smarter anyway. In that case the A-H army would have done much better in Galicia in 1914, not to mention against Serbia. That is assuming they expanded ammo production and stockpiles to feed the hungry beast that is WW1 artillery.

Truth be told there are a ton of WW1 PODs for A-H to do better, though to be fair a number of them require A-H politics to be completely different.

After all those tangents at least regarding the German turn East A-H would be much better supported, but would likely still lose in East Galicia since 2nd army would still get sent to Serbia first before a hasty redeployment and the A-H 3rd army, all by its lonesome, would still be massively outnumbered and gunned in the East. That likely means the Komarov battle still turns out to be a defeat, though potentially not as bad of one, as A-H forces are diverted to try and help the 3rd army with OTL results. Where the German armies would matter would be in the area of the A-H 1st army, since the Russian 9th army would be diverted to deal with German forces around Ivangorod-Lublin (also where the defeated Russian 4th army retreated to) and free up the 1st army to then help the 4th army at Komarov. Likely the 1st army would have to shed the Kummer Group reinforced with an addition corps to help with Lublin even with the extra German armies, but that would still leave the 1st army with plenty of units to pursue the defeated Russian 5th army once the A-H 4th army turned to help the A-H 3rd army after Gnila Lipa. That should free up the entire A-H 4th army for Rawa Ruska, as the 1st army would take over the pursuit of the Russian 5th after Komarov. Without needing to worry about the Russian 5th attacking them from the rear, the A-H 4th should be able to salvage something at Rawa, which prevents Galicia from being a total disaster and buys time for the A-H 2nd army to show up to tilt the scales.

I suppose the question is whether the A-H 1st army could continue inflicting defeats on the Russian 5th, because if they do and the Germans could pin down the Russian 9th and 4th armies at Ivangorod-Lublin by late August then the A-Hs have a chance to check the Russian advance in East Galicia once the 2nd army shows up from Serbia. Then it would be 4 A-H armies vs. 3 Russian and one of the three Russian ones would have suffered pretty heavy losses by late August with potentially worse to come and the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th armies should be able to achieve something against the Russian 3rd and 8th armies before the Russian 11th could be mobilized (IIRC their 7th was locked down on the Romanian border).

BTW here is a good description of the Galician campaign from a Russian perspective:

I defer to your expertise on the matter and stand corrected on this point.
 

ATP

Well-known member
Have you heard of the September Agenda I think it was called. Checking I found it, see Septemberprogramm for details. As early as September 1914 assorted significant political and economic interests in Germany were asked what Germany should get from the war and were talking about continued occupation/annexation of Belgium and chunks of France as well as a large colonial empire in central Africa and similar gains in the east.

Part of the problem was the militaristic mindset of the time, especially [but not only in Germany] and the perversion of Darwin's ideas of natural selection and 'survival of the fittest' The desire was for a lasting victory that kept all potential opponents too weak to oppose Germany again, which is actually a recipe for continued conflict and unrest.

Steve
All true,but they initially planned to create so called "Judeopolonia" - state made from former Polish lands before Partition of Poland/of course germans would keep what they stealed/,ruled by germans and co-ruled by jews.
Jews really was very loyal to germans,but they were poor soldiers,and such state would quarantee that not polish consprictsc would fight for it.Not mention,that all ukrainians hated them.
So,instead they decide in 1915 to made Poland,Ukraine,Belarus, and Baltic states.Which still made both ukrainian and poles mad at them,becouse both sides feel cheated.

All in all - if they win,all that states after 20 years of german peace would wait for anybody who would come to kill germans.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Heavy artillery - and other Corps Troops - were "federal". Landwehr/Honved Divisions were included in KuK Corps.

By "SI into FJ" I mean a fanfic story where a fanboy's consciousness is placed in Franz Josef's mind. Imagine the fun things you would do if you (hence SI="self insert") woke up in Franz Josef 's body on 1.VII.1914 :)
Very little since he was a figurehead and the parliaments had all the power of funding. Plus he had turned over management and command of the military to Franz Ferdinand by 1912 to prepare him as heir to the throne. Conrad was FF's pick as head of the army for example.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
I don't think I can agree with this assessment, because artillery only played an important role in the initial phase and thereafter the course of the battle consisted of frequent and wide ranging flanking movements. 1914-1918 Online categorizes it thusly:

The joint German-Austro-Hungarian offensive began on the morning of 1 May 1915, with intense artillery bombardment, followed by an assault on the Russian positions. Although the defenders initially put up stiff resistance and available reserves were deployed swiftly, the Russians were soon overwhelmed by well-guided artillery fire and the onslaught of about 40,000 German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers in the first wave of attack. By the evening of the first day, the troops of the Central Powers had advanced more than ten kilometres into the enemy’s zone of defence, while the Russians were struggling to rally scattered troops, bring up reinforcements and re-establish a line of defence. All efforts, however, proved futile as the German and Austro-Hungarian troops kept advancing, while arriving Russian reinforcements were rushed into battle and consequently often isolated, outflanked and defeated. Within only eight days, the 3rd Army was almost completely destroyed, forcing the Russian high command to order a general retreat to a new defensive line along the river San. When this line was also penetrated by advancing German and Austro-Hungarian troops, the Stavka ordered the complete withdrawal of all Russian forces from Galicia on 21 June 1915. By that date, which marked the official end of the Gorlice-Tarnów campaign, about 100,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded in action, and another 250,000 captured by the Austro-Hungarian and German forces, along with large amounts of weapons and other war materiel. At the same time, the Central Powers had lost about 90,000 men, who had been killed, wounded or gone missing.​

Richard L. DiNardo's Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 concurs in this, directly categorizing it as a campaign of maneuver.
There are plenty of detailed studies of the campaign and artillery was the major factor throughout it; contrasting the performance of the Austrians from the Germans and you see the big difference was the artillery and ammo supply the Germans brought to the battle that the Austrians lacked and suffered heavy losses as a result.

The above quote doesn't really tell you much about how the fighting actually played out. DiNardo is entitled to his opinion, but I'd say he's incorrect. Certainly movement happened but it was artillery that enabled said movement.

IMHO this book covers German doctrine developments to contextualize the fighting at Gorlice very well:


I can read German, so having read the Austrian and German official accounts of the battle they give a LOT more detail about the fighting and themselves state artillery was the primary factor of their success even after the initial breakthrough, as anytime the Russians put up a new defensive line the artillery smashed it and the movement started again; the Austrians didn't have the luxury and had to spend blood to take objectives when artillery wasn't available.

Mackensen was provided with a strong train of heavy artillery commanded by Generalmajor Alfred Ziethen, which included the huge German and Austro-Hungarian mortars that had crushed French and Belgian fortresses. Airplanes were provided to direct artillery fire, which was especially important since ammunition was short on both sides: only 30,000 shells could be stockpiled for the attack.[13] Another significant plus was the German field telephone service, which advanced with the attackers, thereby enabling front-line observers to direct artillery fire.[14] To increase their mobility on the poor roads, each German division was provided with 200 light Austro-Hungarian wagons with drivers.[15]
Mackensen had ten infantry and one cavalry divisions (126,000 men, 457 light guns, 159 heavy pieces, and 96 mortars) along the 42 km (26 mi) length of the breakthrough sector. Facing him were five Russian divisions consisting of 60,000 men but desperately short on artillery. For fire support the Russians could only count on 141 light artillery pieces and four heavy guns. And one of the four burst as soon as the battle began.[17]
On 1 May, the Central Powers’ artillery opened harassing fire, zeroing in their guns. The following morning at 0600 they began a sustained bombardment from field guns to heavy howitzers, at 0900 the mortars joined in. The huge mortar shells were especially terrifying, their blast killed men tens of meters from the explosion. The Russian fortifications were "... more ditches than trenches."[19] According to François, "The mortars began their destructive work. The ground trembled, hell seemed to be let loose." According to Arz, "Our tension peaked as the infantry set off from their assault positions precisely at 10 o'clock." Mackensen had already defined "lines that should be reached in a uniform and if possible simultaneous manner, without preventing the troops from collectively moving on to secure the next sector where possible." After the first day, Mackensen reported, So far, everything is proceeding well," and on 3 May he reported 12,000 prisoners had been captured. François reported, "Gorlice was almost demolished; the section of the town that had been fighting resembled a sea of ruins." Mackensen then issued orders for the advance upon the River Wisłoka as the next objective, which constituted the Russian third and final line of defense. In the meantime, Russian reserves in the form of the III Caucasian Corps, could not provide relief for at least a day. Yet, since this corps was committed to battle piecemeal, they proved of limited value in hindering the German advance.[8]:183–188,191–192

Later in the battle:
After two days the Russian front broke up over a width of 35 km. On May 4th the right wing of the 11th Army, the Xth Army Corps south of Zmigrod, the XXXXI. Reserve corps was in the Dembowiec area, the kuk VI. Corps at Jaslo and the Guard Corps north of it between Jaslo and Kolaczyce. There were no downstream positions, and so the Russian troops had to retreat across open fields. As a result, they were exposed to artillery fire and air raids, and many Russian soldiers were captured by armed forces of the Central Powers.
Another disadvantage arose from mistakes made by the Russian General Staff in the pre-war period. The light artillery had been given preference over the heavy artillery because a war of movement was expected. While the Central Powers were only able to record a superiority of two to one with light guns in the attack area , there were over 300 German heavy guns compared to only four Russian ones. As a result, the Germans were able to fight the enemy artillery effectively, while a counterfire on the enemy batteries was difficult due to the short range of the Russian light artillery.
While the infantry forces on both sides were roughly equal, the attackers showed a considerable superiority in the artillery: [1]

artilleryCentral PowersRussia
Heavy artillery3344th
Field guns1,272675
Mortar52-

Of course that doesn't even get into the ammo famine the Russians had by 1915:

Once the Russian front was shattered and the retreat started THEN it became a battle of maneuver...one to see who could move east more quickly:
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Very little since he was a figurehead and the parliaments had all the power of funding. Plus he had turned over management and command of the military to Franz Ferdinand by 1912 to prepare him as heir to the throne. Conrad was FF's pick as head of the army for example.

And what a horrible pick.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Actually it wouldn't end power politics in Europe, even if things go as dramatically well as the supporters of a German super empire want. Which is exceptionally unlikely. Even if Germany wins quickly and applies the draconian terms that were proposed in the September plan a quick victory also means less demand to France, both in terms of population and industrial wealth. No occupation and large scale destruction of its industrial heartland. Similarly seeing Germany continue to occupy vast areas in the east to maintain control of them is going to alienate everybody there as well as being a substantial drain on Germany both economically and socially.
Power politics is based on a multi-polar environment where two or more sides are balanced in power enough to have a legitimate threat of offensive force with which to push their national interests. In a situation where Germany wins they will be so relatively powerful on the continent that they can actually do that, France and Russia will not even assuming Britain is aligned with them. The outdated concept of a balance of power would be shattered.

The September program was never policy, it was an internal discussion that ultimately went nowhere. At worst for France there is a minor border adjustment against them (Longwy to Germany, who knows what to Italy), but politically the country will be a basket case once the failures of the French offensive become apparent and the Jaures general strike destroys national unity.

Russia is the center of gravity however, which if defeated will just like in 1905 face a national revolution against the Czar and Germany will take advantage of the situation (break off Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states if not Belarus if the situation permits) to break the Entente's relevance in international politics. France without a strong Russia is largely irrelevant vs the CPs with Italy strongly tied in even if Britain still aligns with France.

France was not well developed industrially in 1914 and it was actually WW1 that really developed the industry of France from small craft production to more mass production. Without a long war and British financing French industry will effectively fall behind even further when facing defeat and likely loss of Russian ability to pay back the loans the French had been giving them for years. No smashed industrial heart is fine, but losing Longwy and potentially colonies in the peace deal are going to hurt.

But again France isn't the heart of the alliance, Russia is. Germany without the horrible cost of WW1 and the serious problems of the early 1920s that collapsed the birthrates to levels even lower than those in current Europe will be quite a bit more relatively strong, especially without all the civilian deaths due to the British blockade and aftermath of the war.

Germany of WW1 is quite a bit different from WW2 Germany, so any states they carve out of the East will be collaborationist regimes, not Nazi-like occupation. So there will be the Kingdom of Poland, various Baltic duchies, Kingdom of Finland, and some Ukrainian state all run by the locals though with some friendly native regime in charge (Ukraine and Finland) or local ethnic Germans in charge (Baltics and Poland). Without the need to loot the east to feed Germany it is much less likely that a German friendly regime in Ukraine would collapse as did the 1918 one given that it was the requisitions that collapsed support for that government.

So rather than the East being a drain for the CPs without a long war there really isn't all that much of a drain since the locals would do just about everything and it is more in Germany's and Austria's interests to make sure the regimes stick and trade with the CPs rather than enrich Russia anyway. So rather than a Nazi 'forever war' in the East you seem to be imagining it would actually be a boon because it keeps Russia weak, doesn't really cost that much, provides a captive market, and gives a massive buffer zone vs. renewed conflict in the East as well as allied armies.

Why are you assuming that Germany is both able and willing to force a revolution and civil war in Russia? If they don't then the latter is going to be a hell of a lot better off than OTL?
I didn't say they would, I said it would be the natural result of defeat just like in 1905 and OTL 1917. The Czarist autocratic regime was increasingly unpopular, unable to reform, and unstable. If France craps out and Russia then catches the full force of the CP offensive from the beginning, which will result in major defeats and absence of their OTL victories, then they will probably face revolution sooner rather than later and when that happens and CP forces are on Russian soil then you will see the carve off of ethnic minority territories with local help (as per OTL).

Britain isn't going to have its independence lost so it wouldn't be surrendering to Germany, at least without a hell of a fight. Which is what accepting an aggressively expansionist German empire across Europe would mean given its clear and repeatedly displayed hostility to Britain.
Ok? Don't think I mentioned much about them. If they're out of the war ITTL, which they likely will be without the Belgian excuse, then they really have no say in anything, nor will the public be all that interested in a continental conflict without direct British interests being threatened. And no, the fate of Russia and France is not what the public actually cares about, that is politicians in smoke filled backrooms.

Well apart from the French and Russians there are probably the Austrians, as you mention below Germany is a threat to their empire, and possibly also the Italians. The Ottomans - or more accurately the Young Turk extremists - are likely to be friendly to Germany but those of their non-Turkish subjects that aren't slaughtered or enslaved could be less happy. With no clear check on German powers its even more likely to throw its weight about without any serious consideration.
Germany is a threat to their allies the Austrians? Where did you get that from? Italy would only gain from helping the CPs if France falls into infighting as a result of the Socialists and a failed invasion of Germany despite not being attacked. Once Italy picks a side it is basically stuck with them going forward, as France certainly won't forget, nor will the Brits.

The non-Turkish subjects didn't really have much say in anything and the vast majority remained loyal throughout the war. If they win then the Ottomans are revitalized and the B-B RR goes forward, same with continued economic development of Turkey and enhancement of its economic links to the CPs.

Given that Germany really didn't have much power projection ability in the ME without Ottoman help I don't know what sort of 'weight throwing' you see Germany doing. As you said the Young Turks were extremely friendly with Germany and would only welcome their economic aid in the region, given their own lack of capital and expertise, plus concern about British and maybe French intentions.

As you say if you get the desired huge wins for Germany there would be massive annexations and establishment of puppet states. If not, especially in the east how does Germany keep Russia on its knees?
What massive annexations? All they seriously talked about in 1914 was some border strips and setting up allied kingdoms, duchies, or some other governments. Since this isn't the Nazis they'd be run by the locals. Even the Kingdom of Poland, despite it's planned German or Habsburg monarch would be run by the Poles themselves. All the CPs would do is facilitate that regime getting set up and ensuring that they maintain strong economic and military relations. Given that IOTL interwar Poland had a lot of trade with Germany, a less industrial Poland will be dependent on the CPs for trade, as their exports would largely fit CP needs and import need also would most effectively serviced by the industrial CP economies.

So to establish a defence for its borders Germany needs to advance into and invade a neutral country.
To mobilize effectively given the rail system yes. Not like the Entente didn't do the same thing in Greece.

That's not a good sign for the Hapsburgs. Or the Swiss. Or even Italy if it gets German speaking parts of Austria as part of the deal that keeps them on-line with the CPs. Or for that matter for democracy in Europe that Berlin thinks people should have no say on whom governs them.
No one cared about Luxembourg. Nor did it signal much to any of those larger, much more powerful states. The Swiss certainly had nothing to worry about if they could and did deter Hitler a generation later and didn't worry about the Fall of France. Why would the Habsburgs care? The Prussians didn't want more Catholics in Germany. Italy has zero to worry about from Germany, they were just coveting Austrian territory. If anything it is the Habsburgs who have more to worry about from Italy than anything else.

Its hilarious you think only Berlin did that in this period. Methinks you have been indoctrinated with far too much British wartime propaganda that was turned into the first draft of history textbooks.

Strange that your saying it wouldn't exist then assuming its largely implemented. Apart from possibly Belgium maintaining a level of independence.
I said the situation would be different, so that particular memo wouldn't exist; annexations would largely be in the East, Belgium left out, Luxembourg and a bit of France taken, and the situation in the East based on the specific situation there. My point was the OTL document is irrelevant to TTL which is a quite different scenario as of September.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
There are plenty of detailed studies of the campaign and artillery was the major factor throughout it; contrasting the performance of the Austrians from the Germans and you see the big difference was the artillery and ammo supply the Germans brought to the battle that the Austrians lacked and suffered heavy losses as a result.

The above quote doesn't really tell you much about how the fighting actually played out. DiNardo is entitled to his opinion, but I'd say he's incorrect. Certainly movement happened but it was artillery that enabled said movement.

IMHO this book covers German doctrine developments to contextualize the fighting at Gorlice very well:


I can read German, so having read the Austrian and German official accounts of the battle they give a LOT more detail about the fighting and themselves state artillery was the primary factor of their success even after the initial breakthrough, as anytime the Russians put up a new defensive line the artillery smashed it and the movement started again; the Austrians didn't have the luxury and had to spend blood to take objectives when artillery wasn't available.





Later in the battle:




Of course that doesn't even get into the ammo famine the Russians had by 1915:

Once the Russian front was shattered and the retreat started THEN it became a battle of maneuver...one to see who could move east more quickly:


Honestly, this does seem like proto WWII maneuver warfare, especially the use of frontline communications and airplanes to direct fire support and the focus on ensuring sufficient wagons to enable greater mobility. It doesn't really read all that different from the early days of Operation Barbarossa, with artillery and airpower then used to reduce hard points while the army maneuvered; the ammunition shortages on the Russian side are even replicated.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Honestly, this does seem like proto WWII maneuver warfare, especially the use of frontline communications and airplanes to direct fire support and the focus on ensuring sufficient wagons to enable greater mobility. It doesn't really read all that different from the early days of Operation Barbarossa, with artillery and airpower then used to reduce hard points while the army maneuvered; the ammunition shortages on the Russian side are even replicated.
Much slower compared to WW2. It was basically the initial destruction of Russian forces that ripped open the front and every time the Russians managed to bring in reinforcements to stem the retreat they were destroyed with artillery again. So yeah a bit different since the aircraft were just spotting not bombing. And no panzers. More like the French 'artillery conquers, infantry occupies' thing, but with a broader front and less Russian reserves. I wouldn't say the army maneuvered as much as chased until they could fight again. The ammo stuff was even worse in WW1. The Czarist army command was even more incompetent than the Soviet one.
 
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stevep

Well-known member
Power politics is based on a multi-polar environment where two or more sides are balanced in power enough to have a legitimate threat of offensive force with which to push their national interests. In a situation where Germany wins they will be so relatively powerful on the continent that they can actually do that, France and Russia will not even assuming Britain is aligned with them. The outdated concept of a balance of power would be shattered.

The September program was never policy, it was an internal discussion that ultimately went nowhere. At worst for France there is a minor border adjustment against them (Longwy to Germany, who knows what to Italy), but politically the country will be a basket case once the failures of the French offensive become apparent and the Jaures general strike destroys national unity.

Russia is the center of gravity however, which if defeated will just like in 1905 face a national revolution against the Czar and Germany will take advantage of the situation (break off Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states if not Belarus if the situation permits) to break the Entente's relevance in international politics. France without a strong Russia is largely irrelevant vs the CPs with Italy strongly tied in even if Britain still aligns with France.

France was not well developed industrially in 1914 and it was actually WW1 that really developed the industry of France from small craft production to more mass production. Without a long war and British financing French industry will effectively fall behind even further when facing defeat and likely loss of Russian ability to pay back the loans the French had been giving them for years. No smashed industrial heart is fine, but losing Longwy and potentially colonies in the peace deal are going to hurt.

But again France isn't the heart of the alliance, Russia is. Germany without the horrible cost of WW1 and the serious problems of the early 1920s that collapsed the birthrates to levels even lower than those in current Europe will be quite a bit more relatively strong, especially without all the civilian deaths due to the British blockade and aftermath of the war.

Germany of WW1 is quite a bit different from WW2 Germany, so any states they carve out of the East will be collaborationist regimes, not Nazi-like occupation. So there will be the Kingdom of Poland, various Baltic duchies, Kingdom of Finland, and some Ukrainian state all run by the locals though with some friendly native regime in charge (Ukraine and Finland) or local ethnic Germans in charge (Baltics and Poland). Without the need to loot the east to feed Germany it is much less likely that a German friendly regime in Ukraine would collapse as did the 1918 one given that it was the requisitions that collapsed support for that government.

So rather than the East being a drain for the CPs without a long war there really isn't all that much of a drain since the locals would do just about everything and it is more in Germany's and Austria's interests to make sure the regimes stick and trade with the CPs rather than enrich Russia anyway. So rather than a Nazi 'forever war' in the East you seem to be imagining it would actually be a boon because it keeps Russia weak, doesn't really cost that much, provides a captive market, and gives a massive buffer zone vs. renewed conflict in the East as well as allied armies.


I didn't say they would, I said it would be the natural result of defeat just like in 1905 and OTL 1917. The Czarist autocratic regime was increasingly unpopular, unable to reform, and unstable. If France craps out and Russia then catches the full force of the CP offensive from the beginning, which will result in major defeats and absence of their OTL victories, then they will probably face revolution sooner rather than later and when that happens and CP forces are on Russian soil then you will see the carve off of ethnic minority territories with local help (as per OTL).


Ok? Don't think I mentioned much about them. If they're out of the war ITTL, which they likely will be without the Belgian excuse, then they really have no say in anything, nor will the public be all that interested in a continental conflict without direct British interests being threatened. And no, the fate of Russia and France is not what the public actually cares about, that is politicians in smoke filled backrooms.


Germany is a threat to their allies the Austrians? Where did you get that from? Italy would only gain from helping the CPs if France falls into infighting as a result of the Socialists and a failed invasion of Germany despite not being attacked. Once Italy picks a side it is basically stuck with them going forward, as France certainly won't forget, nor will the Brits.

The non-Turkish subjects didn't really have much say in anything and the vast majority remained loyal throughout the war. If they win then the Ottomans are revitalized and the B-B RR goes forward, same with continued economic development of Turkey and enhancement of its economic links to the CPs.

Given that Germany really didn't have much power projection ability in the ME without Ottoman help I don't know what sort of 'weight throwing' you see Germany doing. As you said the Young Turks were extremely friendly with Germany and would only welcome their economic aid in the region, given their own lack of capital and expertise, plus concern about British and maybe French intentions.


What massive annexations? All they seriously talked about in 1914 was some border strips and setting up allied kingdoms, duchies, or some other governments. Since this isn't the Nazis they'd be run by the locals. Even the Kingdom of Poland, despite it's planned German or Habsburg monarch would be run by the Poles themselves. All the CPs would do is facilitate that regime getting set up and ensuring that they maintain strong economic and military relations. Given that IOTL interwar Poland had a lot of trade with Germany, a less industrial Poland will be dependent on the CPs for trade, as their exports would largely fit CP needs and import need also would most effectively serviced by the industrial CP economies.


To mobilize effectively given the rail system yes. Not like the Entente didn't do the same thing in Greece.


No one cared about Luxembourg. Nor did it signal much to any of those larger, much more powerful states. The Swiss certainly had nothing to worry about if they could and did deter Hitler a generation later and didn't worry about the Fall of France. Why would the Habsburgs care? The Prussians didn't want more Catholics in Germany. Italy has zero to worry about from Germany, they were just coveting Austrian territory. If anything it is the Habsburgs who have more to worry about from Italy than anything else.

Its hilarious you think only Berlin did that in this period. Methinks you have been indoctrinated with far too much British wartime propaganda that was turned into the first draft of history textbooks.


I said the situation would be different, so that particular memo wouldn't exist; annexations would largely be in the East, Belgium left out, Luxembourg and a bit of France taken, and the situation in the East based on the specific situation there. My point was the OTL document is irrelevant to TTL which is a quite different scenario as of September.

SG

Your assuming that everything goes favourably for the Germans. That France either decides to desert its primarily ally or is crippled by internal discontent with the idea of opposing Germany becoming the overwhelmingly dominant power in Europe. That Russia either backs down - in which case it maintains its territorial integrity and Germany doesn't get to control much of its richest territories, or that it suddenly collapses much quicker than OTL despite the fact its now fighting on the defensive and Germany can seize control of those territories.

Also your arguing that in the west in this proposed war Germany will only make small territorial gains but that France will still be crippled for the foreseeable future as a power capable of defending itself against further aggression. Despite itself suffering less military casualties that OTL WWI and little/none of the devastation.

Yes Imperial Germany wasn't Nazi Germany but as its behaviour showed it had little/no respect for other populations. There might be some welcome in some of those new protectorates but that's likely to fade pretty quickly when they realise their status is fundamentally colonial.

I was making a tongue in cheek comments about the Swiss and Austrians being worried about the implied stance that 'if an areas German speaking it should be part of Germany'. And yet at the same time its going to absorb sizeable numbers of non-Germans.

You say that the September programme wasn't representative of German war aims but in the east at least it was pretty much what was followed and it does represent the views of a large amount of the German leadership in 1914.

Politics doesn't stop just because some things change. An overwhelmingly powerful Germany will have everybody looking for ways to maintain as much independence as they can. In theory Germany can crush any such combination by overwhelming force and the mentality of the German leadership were inclined towards that approach but each such operation is likely to cause more strain and also concern among the other powers.

Its hilarious you think only Berlin did that in this period. Methinks you have been indoctrinated with far too much British wartime propaganda that was turned into the first draft of history textbooks.

Not sure what your referring to here? Can you clarify please?
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Your assuming that everything goes favourably for the Germans. That France either decides to desert its primarily ally or is crippled by internal discontent with the idea of opposing Germany becoming the overwhelmingly dominant power in Europe. That Russia either backs down - in which case it maintains its territorial integrity and Germany doesn't get to control much of its richest territories, or that it suddenly collapses much quicker than OTL despite the fact its now fighting on the defensive and Germany can seize control of those territories.
Britain staying out and France experiencing a national strike are pretty much ideal CP scenarios; Germany going east is very good for Austria, and France being vulnerable is a very good situation for Italy to exploit given that Britain won't be in the war, so there is little reason to turn on the CPs.

France falling into internal issues was really only headed off by the German invasion, which per the OP won't be happening here. So no invasion means if France goes to war the French Left riots. They were more opposed to the French government and militarism (as well as autocratic Russia) than invading Germany regardless of the political/grand strategy of the government. Remember, socialist internationalism was the mentality of the day and to them Germany defeating Russia was if anything a good thing since it would mean revolution in Russia and the downfall of the Czar as well as the war situation heightening the internal contradictions in Germany and radicalizing the working class. So to them going to war to aid Russia was if anything counterproductive to their political goals, since they weren't thinking in terms of military grand strategy.

Russia also did very poorly on the defensive historically against the Germans due to the aforementioned artillery, ammo supply, and comms issues. Throughout the war in the East the technical/material war was heavily in Germany's favor, which is why much larger Russian forces were routinely defeated; in 1914-15 the situation was even worse before the Western Front really depleted Germany. Plus without the Austrians left on their own to be gooned by the Russians in Galicia they'd do quite a bit better even with the handicap of Conrad and his staff, which creates a virtuous circle for them and a vicious circle for the Russians. The more they lose early on, especially relative to the CPs, the worse the war would go for them. Given the CPs track record of smashing forts (and with no need to do so in the west) even supported by Russian armies I don't think the Russian fort shield is going to hold up very well. Even Verdun was pretty well smashed and useless during that battle, it was more about meat for the grinder rather than having a place that could handle being hammered by the heavy guns.


Also your arguing that in the west in this proposed war Germany will only make small territorial gains but that France will still be crippled for the foreseeable future as a power capable of defending itself against further aggression. Despite itself suffering less military casualties that OTL WWI and little/none of the devastation.
Materially not so much, more psychologically/politically (WW2 anyone?), and of course through the lack of allies, as they won't be as wedded to the British and the Russians won't be a viable option given how weak they will be. It is also a question of how relatively strong they would be given that they won't develop industry like they would have during WW1, nor would they have British finance behind them (IOTL they exhausted their funds in 1914 and relied on British and later US finance to carry them through WW1). You seem to only be fixated on a narrow category of power for France; certainly not losing so many men would of course be helpful, but that is relative to Germany and the CP alliance in general; in terms of destruction of territory that doesn't really matter given they gained much more via British finance during the war than they lost to the Germans, while also ignoring all the benefits they got from the ToV by taking stuff from Germany and crippling the German economy for over a decade after the war.

France will suffer plenty though and will face a lot of internal divisions and loss of allies and potentially colonies in the peace deal that will do more than simply manpower losses (which IOTL were somewhat compensated for by a post-war baby boom and large number of foreign men settling in France).

Yes Imperial Germany wasn't Nazi Germany but as its behaviour showed it had little/no respect for other populations. There might be some welcome in some of those new protectorates but that's likely to fade pretty quickly when they realise their status is fundamentally colonial.
Depends on where and when. Older historiography presented 'the Hun' as a beast in what they did without really allowing for the nuances of how they did actively try to develop collaborators in the East. Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, even the Baltic states were treated quite differently in WW1 than 2. Belgium of course was treated increasingly poorly throughout the war, but remember it was an active warzone and the Entente did the same where and when it benefited them (colonies, Greece, Middle East, etc.).

Given that the status of the various eastern protectorates would be quite a bit better than how Russia treated them, the greater autonomy would if anything be welcomed. OTL by 1918 was a different situation due to the need the CPs had to loot the East to feed themselves and keep the war going, which wouldn't be the situation if the war ends in 1915 at the latest in this scenario. Then the CPs can focus on setting up stable regimes that are economically tied in to Central Europe rather than Russia. Things aren't going to be sunshine and roses of course, but no worse than how Russia treated those areas (other than the new overlords not being Slavic, not that Poland cared) and probably much better than how Britain and France treated their non-white colonies. In fact the CP protectorates would if anything be better than the autocratic Czar, assuming the native peoples didn't care that they had Germanic rulers.

I was making a tongue in cheek comments about the Swiss and Austrians being worried about the implied stance that 'if an areas German speaking it should be part of Germany'. And yet at the same time its going to absorb sizeable numbers of non-Germans.
I didn't claim that though. Where is Germany going to absorb sizeable numbers of non-Germans? Any of the protectorates would be nominally independent, not part of the German empire. I guess technically they talked about making some of them 'associated states' (the Baltics) which I guess means part of the military alliance system, but without the same rights as the various German kingdoms of the empire.

You say that the September programme wasn't representative of German war aims but in the east at least it was pretty much what was followed and it does represent the views of a large amount of the German leadership in 1914.
What ended up happening IOTL in the East was the direct result of circumstances as of 1918, not as an outgrowth of the Septemberprogramm discussions. It was meant to punish the Bolsheviks for continuing the war while also seizing the necessary resources to fight the war to the conclusion in the west rather than a program thought up for the post-war. It was a 'during the war' ad hoc policy.

If you read the September Programm though all it says definitively about the East is the Poland would be broken off and formed into its own state, but economically associated to Germany through a customs union along with the rest of Central Europe:
'Under German leadership' meant having a German or Habsburg monarch, though they did (IOTL) have a Polish council of governance:

Disagreements between the CPs and Poles led to a new, more Poland-friendly system of self governance until a monarch could be selected:

Though the Polish article makes it seem like it was quite fleshed out:

So yeah, very different than WW2 and quite a bit better than how Russia treated Poland and much better than how non-white colonies were treated by the English and French.


Politics doesn't stop just because some things change. An overwhelmingly powerful Germany will have everybody looking for ways to maintain as much independence as they can. In theory Germany can crush any such combination by overwhelming force and the mentality of the German leadership were inclined towards that approach but each such operation is likely to cause more strain and also concern among the other powers.
Not sure how that would lead to more war though. Once the international pecking order is established and Germany has its buffer states to deal with as well as its desired captive markets and no need for colonial competition as a result, things should calm down in Europe since further war would not likely go well for the French-Russians-maybe British.

Not sure what your referring to here? Can you clarify please?
I was giving you a hard time, since a lot of the positions seem to have been old school anglophone views on WW1.
 

ATP

Well-known member
Do not forget about red pants.French generals really belived that sending soldiers against HMG would work better,if they have red pants.One even said,that red pants are France.What they were,WH40 orks ?
 

stevep

Well-known member
Britain staying out and France experiencing a national strike are pretty much ideal CP scenarios; Germany going east is very good for Austria, and France being vulnerable is a very good situation for Italy to exploit given that Britain won't be in the war, so there is little reason to turn on the CPs.

France falling into internal issues was really only headed off by the German invasion, which per the OP won't be happening here. So no invasion means if France goes to war the French Left riots. They were more opposed to the French government and militarism (as well as autocratic Russia) than invading Germany regardless of the political/grand strategy of the government. Remember, socialist internationalism was the mentality of the day and to them Germany defeating Russia was if anything a good thing since it would mean revolution in Russia and the downfall of the Czar as well as the war situation heightening the internal contradictions in Germany and radicalizing the working class. So to them going to war to aid Russia was if anything counterproductive to their political goals, since they weren't thinking in terms of military grand strategy.

Russia also did very poorly on the defensive historically against the Germans due to the aforementioned artillery, ammo supply, and comms issues. Throughout the war in the East the technical/material war was heavily in Germany's favor, which is why much larger Russian forces were routinely defeated; in 1914-15 the situation was even worse before the Western Front really depleted Germany. Plus without the Austrians left on their own to be gooned by the Russians in Galicia they'd do quite a bit better even with the handicap of Conrad and his staff, which creates a virtuous circle for them and a vicious circle for the Russians. The more they lose early on, especially relative to the CPs, the worse the war would go for them. Given the CPs track record of smashing forts (and with no need to do so in the west) even supported by Russian armies I don't think the Russian fort shield is going to hold up very well. Even Verdun was pretty well smashed and useless during that battle, it was more about meat for the grinder rather than having a place that could handle being hammered by the heavy guns.


Materially not so much, more psychologically/politically (WW2 anyone?), and of course through the lack of allies, as they won't be as wedded to the British and the Russians won't be a viable option given how weak they will be. It is also a question of how relatively strong they would be given that they won't develop industry like they would have during WW1, nor would they have British finance behind them (IOTL they exhausted their funds in 1914 and relied on British and later US finance to carry them through WW1). You seem to only be fixated on a narrow category of power for France; certainly not losing so many men would of course be helpful, but that is relative to Germany and the CP alliance in general; in terms of destruction of territory that doesn't really matter given they gained much more via British finance during the war than they lost to the Germans, while also ignoring all the benefits they got from the ToV by taking stuff from Germany and crippling the German economy for over a decade after the war.

France will suffer plenty though and will face a lot of internal divisions and loss of allies and potentially colonies in the peace deal that will do more than simply manpower losses (which IOTL were somewhat compensated for by a post-war baby boom and large number of foreign men settling in France).


Depends on where and when. Older historiography presented 'the Hun' as a beast in what they did without really allowing for the nuances of how they did actively try to develop collaborators in the East. Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, even the Baltic states were treated quite differently in WW1 than 2. Belgium of course was treated increasingly poorly throughout the war, but remember it was an active warzone and the Entente did the same where and when it benefited them (colonies, Greece, Middle East, etc.).

Given that the status of the various eastern protectorates would be quite a bit better than how Russia treated them, the greater autonomy would if anything be welcomed. OTL by 1918 was a different situation due to the need the CPs had to loot the East to feed themselves and keep the war going, which wouldn't be the situation if the war ends in 1915 at the latest in this scenario. Then the CPs can focus on setting up stable regimes that are economically tied in to Central Europe rather than Russia. Things aren't going to be sunshine and roses of course, but no worse than how Russia treated those areas (other than the new overlords not being Slavic, not that Poland cared) and probably much better than how Britain and France treated their non-white colonies. In fact the CP protectorates would if anything be better than the autocratic Czar, assuming the native peoples didn't care that they had Germanic rulers.


I didn't claim that though. Where is Germany going to absorb sizeable numbers of non-Germans? Any of the protectorates would be nominally independent, not part of the German empire. I guess technically they talked about making some of them 'associated states' (the Baltics) which I guess means part of the military alliance system, but without the same rights as the various German kingdoms of the empire.


What ended up happening IOTL in the East was the direct result of circumstances as of 1918, not as an outgrowth of the Septemberprogramm discussions. It was meant to punish the Bolsheviks for continuing the war while also seizing the necessary resources to fight the war to the conclusion in the west rather than a program thought up for the post-war. It was a 'during the war' ad hoc policy.

If you read the September Programm though all it says definitively about the East is the Poland would be broken off and formed into its own state, but economically associated to Germany through a customs union along with the rest of Central Europe:
'Under German leadership' meant having a German or Habsburg monarch, though they did (IOTL) have a Polish council of governance:

Disagreements between the CPs and Poles led to a new, more Poland-friendly system of self governance until a monarch could be selected:

Though the Polish article makes it seem like it was quite fleshed out:

So yeah, very different than WW2 and quite a bit better than how Russia treated Poland and much better than how non-white colonies were treated by the English and French.



If France backs down due to French socialists deciding they prefer Germany overwhelmingly dominating Europe to France being an independent state then their likely to lose support pretty rapidly. If they fight you suggest they will suffer a lot less than OTL although the resulting economic controls that Germany is likely to force on them might make a difference here.

Your arguing that Germany will do considerably better than they did OTL in the east even if the Russians have warning of Germany striking east 1st, which is almost certain to happen and hence time to change their plans and greatly improve their defences. Yes aided by Austrian siege guns the Germans were able to take down Liege pretty quickly but that I believe took up the vast bulk of their super-heavy guns so how quickly can they do that in multiple locations. Plus as you mention such firepower wasn't sufficient at Verdun.

I'm not assuming that Russia will win, especially if as you suggest France deserts them - although I believe the latter to be unlikely. I'm thinking it would be a longer and harder fight than your assuming. Especially since without losing a lot of manpower and resources in often poorly organised offensives to aid their allies elsewhere. Plus as the Germans force them back away from the frontier they not only stretch their own logistics but also the Czar can appeal to Russian/Orthodox nationalism. How far can they advance against a Russian army that stays organised and motivated? Note this might not even be under the Czar as OTL you saw the revolution replacing him in spring 1917 and under those circumstances Lenin's later coup that enabled the massive advances in 1918 are unlikely.

Yes without a blockade Germany will be able to trade somewhat on world markets but it will need either money, or goods that it doesn't commit to the military to buy such products. Also similarly Russia will also be able to trade with the outside world, although assuming the Ottomans still attack them their best supply route will still be cut. Is Germany going to send ships - or worse still subs - to attack British or US merchant ships sailing for Archangel?

Nobody likes being occupied, especially after hard fighting and I doubt that the Germans will be willing to treat the assorted other slavic nations especially any better than the Russians did while there will be differences in culture, religion and language. You may well see some support initially for German 'liberators' but once they realise they will have no real freedom and be tied to German economic control that's likely to dissipate pretty quickly.

Also we have a difference on wiki about the September programme. You posted a link to the German version, which apart from me being monolingual doesn't seem to show maps. The English speaking one does Septemberprogramm and they match quite closely with what Germany attempted in 1918. Its one of the problems of Wiki as its very much user driven. The link above gives quotes from I assume a couple of professional historians albeit that they could be being mis-interpreted by the poster. But then that could be the same for the German version.


Not sure how that would lead to more war though. Once the international pecking order is established and Germany has its buffer states to deal with as well as its desired captive markets and no need for colonial competition as a result, things should calm down in Europe since further war would not likely go well for the French-Russians-maybe British.

The problem is has a new pecking order been established. Neither Britain nor the US will accept the idea its allowed no real trade with most of Europe. France and any rump Russian/Slavic states won't be happy under the German heel. How long with Germany be willing to maintain large armies to maintain controls and threaten those areas beyond their direct control. Will they resume the naval threat to Britain? After a couple of years of war will the militants think their in total control and if so what happens when there's pressure for social reforms, especially with the restrictive Prussian franchise?


I was giving you a hard time, since a lot of the positions seem to have been old school anglophone views on WW1.

No my position is based on ~50 years of reading and thinking about history, politics and human behaviour. Note I'm not making assumptions about imperial Germany. I'm assuming that any militaristic and autocratic state will seek to behave in such a manner unless and until it realises that other will check it by force if necessary - or are actually defeated. WWI was far less black and white than WWII say but the basic rules still applied. As they did against Napoleon, Louis XIV, the Hapsburgs during the 30YWs, Spain under Philip II and the Hapsburgs again under Charles V. Most people don't want a foreign ruler dictating to them and this is a barrier that increased as national identities firmed up and social and political values changed.

Steve
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Sorry it has taken so long to get back to you, real life gets busy.

If France backs down due to French socialists deciding they prefer Germany overwhelmingly dominating Europe to France being an independent state then their likely to lose support pretty rapidly. If they fight you suggest they will suffer a lot less than OTL although the resulting economic controls that Germany is likely to force on them might make a difference here.
They didn't think about it like that, so the way you're framing the situation is already a problem.
French independence wouldn't be threatened if the country stayed out of the war and the French Left was pretty anti-war especially if it meant their participation would involved invading Germany to help Russia. Whether or not the majority of the public supported the general strike so long as the French Left supported it in their key strongholds then they will have the ability to shut down Paris and other industrial cities. If people turn on them then you have a civil war in the industrial heart of France. Either way it seriously negatively impacts the French war effort. When the bloody defeat inevitably happens at the border the French Left ends up looking like they were right anyway.

I'm not clear on what you're meaning in the second sentence above. Economic controls that the French government will impose won't really help given their lack of cash to actually pay for things; per Hew Strachan's magisterial work on the finance of WW1 the French relied on British loans taken out from the US to finance their war effort, so without Britain being in the war and borrowing from the US on their behalf the French don't have the money to fight a long war, so even without the invasion damage they are still unable to import the necessary materials to fight the war unless Britain is willing to give them unsecured loans or buy a colony off of them. Not sure the British public would be keen on that given that they aren't officially allied, Britain is likely neutral given that their tripwire in Belgium hasn't been hit, and Russia is still a rival of Britain, so helping them defeat Germany isn't really in their interest either.

Your arguing that Germany will do considerably better than they did OTL in the east even if the Russians have warning of Germany striking east 1st, which is almost certain to happen and hence time to change their plans and greatly improve their defences. Yes aided by Austrian siege guns the Germans were able to take down Liege pretty quickly but that I believe took up the vast bulk of their super-heavy guns so how quickly can they do that in multiple locations. Plus as you mention such firepower wasn't sufficient at Verdun.
Yes, because in 1915 they had that warning too and they got smashed despite being fully mobilized and Germany facing vastly heavier offensives in the west at the same time than the French could muster here. Oh and A-H was a basket case by 1915 and had to be propped up by Germany. So yeah all the advantages lie with the CPs, not Russia.

They had improved defenses in 1915 compared to 1914 not to mention vast combat experience and still they lost 1 million men and a huge swath of territory. So I have no idea why you think Russia would do so well in 1914 when basically facing 85% of the German and Austrian armies by itself. They'd be outnumbered and outgunned and those forts you think they can hide behind fell easily when actually attacked. If you want to see how quickly they could move and use their heavy artillery see the 1915 campaign and how quickly Russian forts fell:


That was while supported by field armies too.

I didn't say the firepower was insufficient at Verdun, I said the forts were useless when hit by the heavy artillery. It was the endless willingness to sacrifice men in trenches that decided Verdun, not the forts. The Russians did not display that same ability when defending their forts in 1915.

I'm not assuming that Russia will win, especially if as you suggest France deserts them - although I believe the latter to be unlikely. I'm thinking it would be a longer and harder fight than your assuming. Especially since without losing a lot of manpower and resources in often poorly organised offensives to aid their allies elsewhere. Plus as the Germans force them back away from the frontier they not only stretch their own logistics but also the Czar can appeal to Russian/Orthodox nationalism. How far can they advance against a Russian army that stays organised and motivated? Note this might not even be under the Czar as OTL you saw the revolution replacing him in spring 1917 and under those circumstances Lenin's later coup that enabled the massive advances in 1918 are unlikely.
My suggestion is to check out the fighting in 1915 then, given that they had fully mobilization, actual combat experience to improve on their poor track record in 1914, and material aid from the US too. Still they were badly defeated even with the Austrians beaten to a pulp and Germany more than half tied down in the west repelling much heavier French and British offensives than the French mounted in 1914 at the border.

If what you claim is true, why did none of that work in 1915? Seems like you're pretending that the entire year of 1915 didn't exist for us to use as a model of what a Russian defensive posture performed like.

Yes without a blockade Germany will be able to trade somewhat on world markets but it will need either money, or goods that it doesn't commit to the military to buy such products. Also similarly Russia will also be able to trade with the outside world, although assuming the Ottomans still attack them their best supply route will still be cut. Is Germany going to send ships - or worse still subs - to attack British or US merchant ships sailing for Archangel?
Which they had and did spend at blockade pricing (i.e. much higher than they would pay if they could trade freely with the US rather than having to smuggle things through neutrals) and with British purchasing driving up prices. The Germans actually had more cash on hand than the French (this isn't WW2 where everyone but the French were short on gold) and they took over the gold reserves of Austria and the Ottomans to purchase for the alliance since they had more leverage in trading.

Russia was able to trade with the outside world IOTL and had loans from the US as well and purchasing from Japan (all those Arisaka rifles and ammo led Fedorov using the 6.5mm cartridge and barrel for his Avtomat rifle), but that didn't really make a difference.

I highly doubt US merchant ships would get involved in the Archangelsk run. Britain very well might if Russia is purchasing, which Germany would have to accept given the worse problem of British entry into the war. Besides it wouldn't be necessary to even try to stop given how poorly the Russians did on the defensive.

Nobody likes being occupied, especially after hard fighting and I doubt that the Germans will be willing to treat the assorted other slavic nations especially any better than the Russians did while there will be differences in culture, religion and language. You may well see some support initially for German 'liberators' but once they realise they will have no real freedom and be tied to German economic control that's likely to dissipate pretty quickly.
Historically the Germans did treat the natives better than the Russians:
As the Russian army retreated, the Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Yanushkevich, supported by Grand Duke Nicholas, ordered the army to devastate the border territories and expel the "enemy" nations within.[8][9] The Russian authorities launched pogroms against German populations in Russian cities, massacred Jews in their towns and villages and deported 500,000 Jews and 250,000 Germans into the Russian interior.[9] On 11 June, a pogrom began against Germans in Petrograd, with over 500 factories, stores and offices looted and mob violence unleashed against Germans.[9] The Russian military leadership regarded Muslims, Germans and Poles as traitors and spies, while Jews were considered political unreliables.[8]

Several pogroms and mass repression reignited the political and ethnic fractures in the empire. If the anti-German riots of May 1915 in Moscow, directly linked to the war, only caused a few deaths,[18] the same is not true of the revolt against mobilization in Turkestan.[19] The unrest first grew in the oasis zone before reaching the towns in July. Violent protests and raids on the institutions of the Russian colonizers and the colonial administration set up in the 1860s ensued. In response, army attacks and retaliation on the part of the colonizers caused more than 1,000 deaths among the native population. The repression extinguished the revolt within a month in Turkestan, but it continued among the neighbouring Kazakh nomads. In August 1916, detachments of Kazakh horsemen swept down on the Russians around Lake Issyk-Kul, killed the men, carried off 1,500 women and children as hostages and burned everything in their path. Around 2,000 settlers, ten times more than in Turkestan, lost their lives in a new anti-colonial war.

Finally, the Jews became scapegoats in explanations for the series of defeats suffered by the Russian army on the western limits of the empire. Furthermore, they were used as outlets for the frustrations of the “white” units during the civil war. The imperial army was traditionally a hotbed of antisemitism. In September 1914, an army commander evicted the entire Jewish population in the Polish fortress of Pulawy, only allowing them twenty-four hours to leave. Continually accused of helping the enemy, the Jews found themselves up against all sorts of discrimination and were even taken as hostages.[20] During the Great Retreat of the summer 1915, the army evacuated all the populations considered to be a potential threat for the immediate rear of the retreating units. Only a strong resistance on the part of the civilian authority stopped the operation degenerating into death marches like those of the Armenian genocide. The violence of the Great War created a heavy legacy in which white military authorities enforced a whole range of forced displacements and ethnic segregations. The civil war was particularly violent in the old Pale of Settlement – the western regions of the empire where the tsarist laws had confined the Jews from 1791 onwards, forbidding them to enter the main towns and villages. In Ukraine during the civil war, they were the target of the riots against "speculators"; approximately 150,000 men, women and children fell victim to the series of pogroms from 1918 to 1920.[21]



Remember the Russian empire was an absolute monarchy and quite violent at maintaining its rule:


Also we have a difference on wiki about the September programme. You posted a link to the German version, which apart from me being monolingual doesn't seem to show maps. The English speaking one does Septemberprogramm and they match quite closely with what Germany attempted in 1918. Its one of the problems of Wiki as its very much user driven. The link above gives quotes from I assume a couple of professional historians albeit that they could be being mis-interpreted by the poster. But then that could be the same for the German version.
Google translate. I'm not aware of any maps being present in the memo.
The US ones just have 'possible maps' from modern interpretations. Also note the only part of the East that is even mentioned in the English version only mentions Poland as an associated state.
The OTL 1918 situation ended up being very different from what the Septemberprogramm talked about.

The problem is has a new pecking order been established. Neither Britain nor the US will accept the idea its allowed no real trade with most of Europe. France and any rump Russian/Slavic states won't be happy under the German heel. How long with Germany be willing to maintain large armies to maintain controls and threaten those areas beyond their direct control. Will they resume the naval threat to Britain? After a couple of years of war will the militants think their in total control and if so what happens when there's pressure for social reforms, especially with the restrictive Prussian franchise?
The US didn't really care if the CPs and Russia fight and if France invades. They were just upset about Germany fighting Britain and invading Belgium. British politicians might care, but the average Brit did not. In fact were it not for Grey and Asquith's backroom dealing Britain might not have gone to war in 1914 at all.

France couldn't really be conquered and would likely just cut a deal in conjunction with Russian as soon as it was clear Russia was beaten, so that means losses to France and Russia would likely be minimized. Likely Britain would encourage a deal sooner rather than later to ensure to avoid the balance of power being disrupted too much. That likely means there isn't going to be a long war that would disrupt things too much, as no one really wanted a long costly war and Russia/France would be worried about internal stability if things go on for long given the unique issue TTL presents them. So no major need to really have continued long term mobilization if it is a relatively short war; occupation of Lithuania and Poland would just mean peacetime garrisons are set up in those areas rather than in Germany, much like how the US and UK stationed troops in Germany during the Cold War without major issue.

There never was a naval threat to Britain from Germany, that was just fearmongering the RN did to get parliament to spend on the navy to replace the BB fleet given that the Dreadnought obsoleted the entire world's BB fleet overnight.
By securing a head start in dreadnought construction, the United Kingdom ensured its dominance of the seas continued.[89]

The battleship race soon accelerated once more, placing a great burden on the finances of the governments which engaged in it. The first dreadnoughts were not much more expensive than the last pre-dreadnoughts, but the cost per ship continued to grow thereafter.[k] Modern battleships were the crucial element of naval power in spite of their price. Each battleship signalled national power and prestige, in a manner similar to the nuclear weapons of today.[90] Germany, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and Austria all began dreadnought programmes, and second-rank powers—including the Ottoman Empire, Greece, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—commissioned British, French, German, and American yards to build dreadnoughts for them.[91]

And don't forget that Britain initiated the race and was planning on blockading Germany long before the German fleet became a threat:
From 1905 onward, Admiral John Fisher developed war plans for blockading the German coast; it became a central British strategy and was implemented in 1914.[8] In 1906, Fisher declared that Germany was the "only probable enemy" and that the Royal Navy should keep a force twice as powerful as Germany's navy within a few hours of Germany's shores.[9] Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office wrote a memorandum on 1 January 1907 to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey that became policy. In it, Crowe urged stalwart resistance to what he viewed as Germany's attempts at hegemony in Europe. He argued that German actions might be the result of a confused strategy, but that the intent was irrelevant to British national security. [2]

Up to Germany's 1908 naval bill, Britain in general had largely ignored the buildup, though some individuals in the military and government were already keenly aware of the potential threat. In December 1907, the Admiralty had in fact proposed reducing the rate of battleship construction to one dreadnought and one armored cruiser the following year, which was in line with the Liberal government's priorities to increase spending on social programs and reduce overall government spending, under the new leadership of Prime Minister H. H. Asquith in May 1908. However, in the summer following the 1908 bill, alarm among the public and in the government rose.[2]

Funny, just after the Dreadnought was launched in 1905 and the German naval bill provided for funding a new class of BBs to match them while the Liberal government in Britain was planning on cutting the naval budget...


No my position is based on ~50 years of reading and thinking about history, politics and human behaviour. Note I'm not making assumptions about imperial Germany. I'm assuming that any militaristic and autocratic state will seek to behave in such a manner unless and until it realises that other will check it by force if necessary - or are actually defeated. WWI was far less black and white than WWII say but the basic rules still applied. As they did against Napoleon, Louis XIV, the Hapsburgs during the 30YWs, Spain under Philip II and the Hapsburgs again under Charles V. Most people don't want a foreign ruler dictating to them and this is a barrier that increased as national identities firmed up and social and political values changed.
That's the problem, the older stuff written in English about the war was heavily influenced by British propaganda before and during the war.

I also don't think you realize just how much of the continent was dominated by specific ethnicities that forced their rule on others; the French for instance worked very hard to crush regionalism and dialects to the point that by the end of WW1 they were virtually wiped out other than Breton identities. Russia was an entire empire set up to dominant dozens of groups. Meanwhile Germany had the Sorbs who were pretty happy with being German; the Poles of course wanted their own country, but the great majority were dominated by Russia, while those in Austria were generally happy with the arrangement as it was other than some nationalists who joined the Polish legion under Austrian control.

Germany was not an autocracy and no more militaristic than any other state of the era with the exception of perhaps France given its strong left wing movement. Russia was the most autocratic and militaristic of the European states of the time, which British politicians didn't mind supporting despite their colonial rivalries. Also the British weren't exactly above a fuck ton of militarism and imperialism. They weren't exactly known for their honest and moral deals with colonial native populations either.

So yeah history is a lot more complicated even that what you present above.
 
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