French unity, persistence, and strategy in a Germany goes east WWI- Union Sacree?

[raharris1973]

Britain's course of action towards a continental war that starts in 1914 over the Sarajevo incident and July Crisis where Germany instead starts the war striking east instead of striking west is a perennial and constantly debated topic on this forum. Will Britain declare war on Germany anyway or not- we've all heard it and discussed it.

By contrast, France's course of action is far less discussed or debated. It's generally assumed the French declare war, attack into Alsace-Lorraine and keep at it. If any debate comes up, it's typically about whether the French will at some point try an end run through Belgium into Germany.

But I think it's worth discussing. If Germany declares war on and attacks Russia only, making no threats or demands on France and simply making defensive precautions on its own side of the border, will France immediately declare war?

If the the Poincare-Viviani government does declare war and initiate hostilities without the Germans invading or telegraphing hostilities first, will they have the wide-backing of socialist deputies and no problems with labor strikes?

Does it make a difference to this question if one of the butterfly effects is Jean Jaures surviving or avoiding his assassination right before the war?

Of course that's an interesting timeline if a general strike breaks out or if there's a broad socialist opposition to going to war on behalf of the Russian alliance, possibly led by a living Jaures.

A Viviani-Poincare crackdown and arrest/suppression of of Jaures and other Socialist deputies and strike leaders while pushing the war declaration through would be an interesting (in the Chinese sense) mess.

However, left opposition to going to war could just as likely turn out to be bluff, even in the absence of a German invasion of la patrie, and Socialists could basically fall in line behind a Union Sacree in support of the war, with either a living Jaures or a dead one. There could still be a French consensus, including even Socialists, that the moment is right to get back Alsace-Lorraine, and the Russian alliance must be honored for the sake of France's security in Europe.

However, supposing that is the case, would the wartime Union Sacree be as strong and persist as long as OTL's when the French had not only Alsace-Lorraine to recover, but chunks of northern France freshly occupied by the German enemy?

The French Army, charging into Alsace-Lorraine in bright red pants, is likely to initially suffer monstrously high casualties for little gain. So that won't be good for morale. On the other hand, for as long as the French hold the initiative, they can modulate how many men they choose to throw away in subsequent offensives.

Also, there should some material benefits, leading to morale benefits, from having French national territorial under control and less damaged- a better economy, fewer refugees, a wider recruiting base, a couple months ago somebody had a thread going on munitions production advantages.

If the French hang in there, would they keep focusing all their military energies on Alsace-Lorraine in 1914, 1915, and 1916 even if that stalls? Or would they have an "easterner" faction emerge, supporting employment of colonial and expeditionary forces on a another front like the Balkans to put pressure on a Central Powers flank?

Or could the French have grueling, hard-win territorial victories in Alsace-Lorraine that turn out to be fatal for France's commitment to the overall war effort and Russian alliance. As in, over the course of slow-moving and sometimes reversing see-saw battles, the French gain back pretty much the entirety of Alsace-Lorraine bite-by-bite over the course of 1914 and 1915 and 1916, and then, rather than press for the Rhineland or Berlin, they signal they are ready to peace out based on the battlefield status quo?

 

[ATP]

French being french,they would charge in their red pants - and get massacred.

 

[stevep]

Interesting point. I think the French government and many of the people would still want to fight, both to recover the lost territories and revenge for 1870-71 and to protect themselves by not leaving their primary ally in the lurch. Assuming no POD that changes that their still likely to have the insane Plan XVII which called for the rash frontal assaults that prompted such mass casualties.

In the event of such a war and especially assuming Britain stays neutral then France would have to continuing attacking, as the only real way they could aid their ally and without the dire threat further north they would do so longer. Hopefully sooner rather than later they would realise that they needed different tactics and much heavier artillery. This would have to develop over time but from 1916 at least they did seem to have the basic ideas and equipment sorted out. although the bloodbath that was Verdun and then the return to insanity with the spring 1917 offensive shows they would still go off the rails.

A lot would depend on the circumstances. For instance:
a) How does the war go in the east? If Germany isn't telegraphing that any war in Europe will start with a massive invasion of France then the Russians are less likely to go for rapid offensives as OTL to aid France. Knowing they will be facing the Austrians and probably the majority of the German army they are more likely to take a defensive stance. If doing so for some time some of the largely obsolete fortifications in the region might have been upgraded, making them a lot tougher. Simply having the army defending rather than attacking against both opponents would also make things tougher for the Germans, let alone any rash attacks by Conrad. Their almost certain to be forced to retreat but with lower initial losses and their vast depth plus the poor logistics at the time a German march to Moscow or even Petrograd is going to be bloody difficult and costly for Germany and their not certain of victory.

b) Does Britain stay neutral and how neutral? OTL it had already committed to keeping the German navy out of the Channel even if not at war so it would well declare that area a 'protected' region, especially given its importance to British trade. Also without access to Belgium ports German naval bases are a long way away. Similarly with Britain neutral Germany is unlikely to launch a U boat campaign against merchant shipping as there would be too great a danger of British ships being attacked. Or in closed waters like the channel possibly surfacing to check a ship and while finding out its British then being found and attacked by French ships. Similarly Britain would want to keep trade links open with numerous powers including probably all belligerence and assorted neutrals so that would limit actions by both sides in the North Sea.

However I suspect that apart from anything else Britain wouldn't want either side winning big. Too much of a danger to British security. Plus the war would still drastically impact world trade. Hence I can see repeated attempts by Britain to negotiate a peace settlement, one without drastic changes in the balance of power. Also to make this less a suggestion and more a 'or else' if it looks like one side is likely to win a decisive victory.

c) What would the stance of other powers, most noticeably probably Italy and the Ottomans be? Suspect that Italy would stay neutral and seek bribes from both sides unless there was an early agreement to large scale concessions by Austria, which would be unlikely. Also that the Ottomans would likely join the war roughly as OTL since there were closer military links with Germany and negotiations for the Ottomans to join the war on the CP side. [Only exception might be if the UK made clear this would be a clear casus belli for them which might deter this.] This would isolate Russia as OTL although it would still have linked via the Arctic and Pacific and not sure what Germany would do to neutrally flagged shipping, especially British or US going to Russia via the Baltic. Japan is another possible figure, which could decide it want to secure those vulnerable German colonies in the Pacific. - Possibly alternatively on the German side but I suspect the alliance with Britain would prevent that.

d) One other option of course is possibly, with attacks in A-L being relatively unsuccessful and Italy still neutral is that France, with more troops and resources due to not having to fight across Belgium and NE France could try a Balkan campaign. This could see landings in support of Serbia via Montenegro, which was allied to Serbia. Logistically difficult but could make fighting in the region last longer, especially if possibly Bulgaria was prevented from joining the CPs.

Anyway initial thoughts on a scenario with a lot of potential.

 

[Buba]

IMO Italy does not join the Entente in the winter of 1914. With an Ostaufmarsch the army of A-H is not destroyed in Galicia as in OTL, hence the Dual Monarchy does not look like easy pickings.

 

[stevep]

IMO Italy does not join the Entente in the winter of 1914. With an Ostaufmarsch the army of A-H is not destroyed in Galicia as in OTL, hence the Dual Monarchy does not look like easy pickings.

Italy didn't join the war until May 1915. Their real problems were the internal disunity inside the empire and also poor leadership, especially by Conrad. This was shown by them twice failing to defeat Serbia as well as the heavy losses they suffered in Galicia.

 

[Buba]

May, you say? I thought it had been February or March.
But we broadly agree on the reasons

 

[History Learner]

French unity collapses after 60% or more of their army is killed or captured attacking into Alsace-Lorraine, which enables the Germans to then effectively walk to Paris if the French don't see reason with the only real delaying factor being making the logistics for such an advance available in an East First context. As for the Russians, it's exceedingly likely they get demolished in Poland in 1914, preventing the Austro-Hungarian disasters in Galicia as well as forcing the Great Retreat a year early. Entirely possible that latter effort fails and see much of the Pre-War Russian Army killed or captured likewise.

End result of East First is the collapse of the Entente war effort in late 1914 or early 1915, most likely. The Brits are definitely still in, by the way, because Belgium was just a convenient excuse; they had promises extending back to 1904 and IIRC the cabinet had already decided upon war in August before learning of the violation of Belgian neutrality.

 

[Buba]

End result of East First is the collapse of the Entente war effort in late 1914 or early 1915, most likely.

I'd date it to late 1915 myself, but otherwise I agree with your broad strokes.

The Brits are definitely still in, by the way, because Belgium was just a convenient excuse;

Indubitably.

 

[sillygoose]

I thin that if the Germans don't declare war first the French government would find themselves in serious trouble, as they get slaughtered against German border defenses, while not really having a good reason to declare war; IOTL they planned to round up potential anti-war activists, which might go forward here and would push the French Left over the edge, which was quite powerful, and was already somewhat incensed about the assassination of one of the head Socialist by a member of the French Far Right. IOTL that was papered over quickly by the German invasion, but without that Paris might actually break out and revolt against the government:

Shock waves ran through the streets of Paris. One of the government's most charismatic and compelling orators had been assassinated. His opponent, President Poincaré, sent his sympathies to Jaurès' widow. Paris was on the brink of revolution: Jaurès had been advocating a general strike and had narrowly avoided sedition charges. One important consequence was that the cabinet postponed the arrest of socialist revolutionaries. Viviani reassured Britain of Belgian neutrality but "the gloves were off".

If they don't arrest socialist revolutionaries there will be likely at least a strike if not a general one that shuts down the capital and if they do there will be potentially a violent uprising. Either way France entering the war would be a massive mess politically and might touch off a civil war, especially if the initial invasion of German bloodily fails at least as badly as the OTL one. Given that they cannot invade Belgium due to British sensibilities and likely Belgian resistance that means trying to bash through A-L, which given the fortifications, terrain, and Franco-German tactical competency differentials will mean a bloody repulse with major consequences for the government.

I have to disagree that Britain would be in for sure given that if Germany does respect Belgian neutrality there is no way politically for the warmongers in Britain to actually force through the DoW. That really did require the invasion of Belgium by Germany to happen. Germany is militarily disadvantages by all the demands Britain made of the German navy, but given that huge political problems France would have it is still very much to Germany's benefit to keep Britain out and watch France eat itself alive.

 

[Buba]

if Germany does respect Belgian neutrality there is no way politically for the warmongers in Britain to actually force through the DoW.

Maaaybe ... IIRC Churchil ordered the fleet to fire at German warships before the DoW (Germans slipped away,though). He later ordered shelling of Turkish forts pre-DoW. And in WWII the UK with - yes, you guessed, Churchill as Lord of the Admiralty again - was about to invade neutral Norway when the Germans got there some 48 hours sooner.
Also, wasn't there pesistent talk in British newspapers about "Kopenhagening the German fleet"?
So, I believe that the warmongering elements of the UK Gov't will be looking very, very hard for a casus belli. Probably not in August, but sooner than later Britain will dogpile the Central Powers.

If France attacks through Belgium I believe that it is possible that Britain simply looks the other way. Especially that (large) clashes between French and Belgian troops are not likely - the Belgian army is in the north, between Antwerp and Liege, whereas the French would be moving through the Ardennes.

 

[stevep]

Various points here.
a) Despite serious losses on the offensive Russia lasted until 1917 OTL so on the defensive, especially if that is a plan for some years before I can't see a Russian collapse prior to at least 1916 and probably a year or two later. Given that a defensive war with mean a less imbalance in casualties and that as the CPs advance Russian patriotism will be activated I'm far from certain such a war would end in a CP victory.

b) France will have to aid its only formal ally when its attacked. Also while there was socialist unrest that occurred in virtually every country the vast bulk of the socialists quickly got behind the war effort in every country. As such I don't see this as a problem. Especially given the desire to regain both A-L and revenge after 1870-71.

c) France will suffer heavy losses on the A-L front, probably for longer than OTL because of its desire to aid its ally. How quickly it starts adjusting its tactics would be the key issue as by 1916 it had the equipment and doctrine to make limited successes such as on the Somme - despite the bulk of its army being tied up in the Verdun campaign. You might still get the triumphalism that lead to the 1917 spring disaster but you might not.

d) Without a German invasion of some of its key agricultural and its primary industrial areas France does have greater resources economically, industrially and demographically. Also once the position on the eastern front stabilizes, as its likely to for a while at least the incentive for frantic attacks to aid the Russians decline.

e) I suspect without the massive invasion of France via Belgium, which poses both the threat of a quick German victory over France and occupation of the channel region and also the diplomatic/political issue of a breach of Belgium neutrality then an early British dow is unlikely. Even with it the debate in the cabinet was long and heated and a number of ministers resigned rather than support that action. I would expect that Britain would seek to end the war by negotiation which is likely to be rejected initially by both sides. It would express its interest in safeguarding its shipping in the channel and N Sea especially which is likely to prevent either bloc doing anything aggressive in those areas but that's probably it.

Its not in Britain's interest for either bloc to win, especially big and early. Nor is a large war as while it offers Britain economic advantages while major rivals are at war it also plays bloody hell with a lot of world trade and finance and both of those are very important to the British economy. Its likely to favour the EPs rather than the CPs due to German belligerence, especially on naval issues and especially if the CPs start making major gains but baring something dramatic is going to stay neutral for a while.

f) As such, unless Berlin was willing to accept a limited victory, say the occupation of Serbia by Austria and Poland by the CPs after both those occurred, which seems unlikely, then we're in for a multi-year and very costly war. The CPs will have an edge over the EPs, especially if Britain stays neutral - albeit probably more friendly to the EPs - and more so if as is likely the Ottomans join the CPs and if Italy stays neutral. If they do look to win big then British intervention is highly likely although how effective that might be would depend on the circumstances.

Steve

 

[ATP]

French unity collapses after 60% or more of their army is killed or captured attacking into Alsace-Lorraine, which enables the Germans to then effectively walk to Paris if the French don't see reason with the only real delaying factor being making the logistics for such an advance available in an East First context. As for the Russians, it's exceedingly likely they get demolished in Poland in 1914, preventing the Austro-Hungarian disasters in Galicia as well as forcing the Great Retreat a year early. Entirely possible that latter effort fails and see much of the Pre-War Russian Army killed or captured likewise.

End result of East First is the collapse of the Entente war effort in late 1914 or early 1915, most likely. The Brits are definitely still in, by the way, because Belgium was just a convenient excuse; they had promises extending back to 1904 and IIRC the cabinet had already decided upon war in August before learning of the violation of Belgian neutrality.

Wery probable.But,there would be no russian revolution,or at least not commies ruling here,so we have 100million+ people surviving.And WW2 started by France,Russia and England against German Europe.With every minority under german boot supporting them.

 

[sillygoose]

Wery probable.But,there would be no russian revolution,or at least not commies ruling here,so we have 100million+ people surviving.And WW2 started by France,Russia and England against German Europe.With every minority under german boot supporting them.

That's the thing, I don't know if there would actually be a WW2 if Germany won quickly. France would be pretty badly humiliated and unable to start trouble for a while and the French Left would be able to cite the loss in TTL of the frontier battles as why not to wage a war of aggression; politically they'd probably become ascendant after defeat.

Russia would likely be a mess too and perhaps even stopped in its tracks in terms of being able to arm up and start another war due to the likely revolution that will end the Czardom as we knew it as well as cut off French loans for the foreseeable future. Britain would have her hands full with the Irish Home Rule Crisis, while Germany would likely be too strong to challenge for quite some time. The public in Britain, even if fed hysterical war propaganda, wouldn't likely be moved to wage aggressive war out of the blue against Germany.

Plus there wouldn't likely be much changed in the way of territorial shifts with a quick win in 1914/early 1915, so less resentments for another war, especially given that likely the loss of A-L would be confirmed for France. Russia might lose Poland, which becomes an somewhat independent kingdom under a Habsburg (as was the plan early on) with a Polish wife. Lithuania might be a German duchy and ruled by the existing German nobility in the area. Not really like a foundation for another major war, if anything the buffer states in the East and the confirmed stability of the Habsburgs would make war less likely.

If anything Italy eventually joins the CPs when France looks weak and is confirmed as a CP ally going forward, especially if they get a cut of France as a reward.

 

[ATP]

That's the thing, I don't know if there would actually be a WW2 if Germany won quickly. France would be pretty badly humiliated and unable to start trouble for a while and the French Left would be able to cite the loss in TTL of the frontier battles as why not to wage a war of aggression; politically they'd probably become ascendant after defeat.

Russia would likely be a mess too and perhaps even stopped in its tracks in terms of being able to arm up and start another war due to the likely revolution that will end the Czardom as we knew it as well as cut off French loans for the foreseeable future. Britain would have her hands full with the Irish Home Rule Crisis, while Germany would likely be too strong to challenge for quite some time. The public in Britain, even if fed hysterical war propaganda, wouldn't likely be moved to wage aggressive war out of the blue against Germany.

Plus there wouldn't likely be much changed in the way of territorial shifts with a quick win in 1914/early 1915, so less resentments for another war, especially given that likely the loss of A-L would be confirmed for France. Russia might lose Poland, which becomes an somewhat independent kingdom under a Habsburg (as was the plan early on) with a Polish wife. Lithuania might be a German duchy and ruled by the existing German nobility in the area. Not really like a foundation for another major war, if anything the buffer states in the East and the confirmed stability of the Habsburgs would make war less likely.

If anything Italy eventually joins the CPs when France looks weak and is confirmed as a CP ally going forward, especially if they get a cut of France as a reward.

In theory,yes.
In practice - Germans being germans would manage something that made all french get them again.
Russians being russians would want their empire back,tsar ot not tsar.
England being England would wait for first occasion to create great coalition against germany.
And in OTL they created situation where they made lithuanian and ukrainian state and planned to made polish one,but all that nations still hated them.So,gave germans 20 years,and all those buffer states would turn from supporters into enemies waiting for first chance to attack.

 

[Buba]

As to post-war internal messes - Germany would have its own, involving the franchise of the Prussian Parliament. The very same would apply to some smaller ones (Saxony?), but Prussia was 2/3rds of the Kaiserreich.
Besides Ireland - the UK has its movement for female enfranchisement, which included a terrorist wing. Also - Scottish Home Rule was being looked at.
Re franchises - there'd be fun and games in Hungary ... and the UK - by now the holdout without universal male franchise.
A-H - besides the Hungarian electoral franchise the shit hits the fan in 1917 with Ausgleich negotiations. However, a butterfly - the Fossil might live longer, in OTL dying due a chill caught when seeing off troops headed for the front. This can very well not happen and FJ lives until 1920.
Italy would be stable and happy

The OTL German and A-H occupation was not very nice, but far cry from awful. The Polish 2nd Republic inately hating Germany? I don't think so - Weimar Germany was hostile towards it from Day One*.

* following the French post 1871 revanchiste textbook, BTW.

 

[raharris1973]

As such, unless Berlin was willing to accept a limited victory, say the occupation of Serbia by Austria and Poland by the CPs after both those occurred, which seems unlikely, then we're in for a multi-year and very costly war.

Actually, you say this is unlikely, but what more do Vienna and Berlin really have to fight for once they've:

a) occupied and punished Serbia - the original point of the war
b) occupied Poland gaining buffer space against Russia, thereby protecting their own borders, and neutralizing any Russian impact on the Balkan/Serbian fight,
c) successfully repelled the French invasion of German Elsass-Lothingren.

At that point aren't the the Austro-Hungarians ready to say, "we won what we fought for" and peace out with their Serbian winnings? Likewise the Bulgarians who likely join in to finish off Serbia? And probably the Turks who didn't start off with territorial ambitions but were just looking for great power protectors? Of the CPs, the Germans have the greatest chance of holding out and keeping the war going for greater ambitions, but what would they be trying to do? Decisively defeat Russia in a way that Napoleon and Charles of Sweden never did? Re-do the Franco-Prussian war against a far more mobilized France? I'm not discounting Germany's ability to drag out the war for some unrealistic objectives, but a halfway intelligent Germany could also say, "we won, we proved our alliances work, and our enemies alliances don't work, we proved our armies are better, we made sure the war went from our territory to their territory, because it was the right thing to do. When Russia and France acknowledge the new reality, accept Serbia is lost, and accept border security arrangements to our satisfaction, they can have peace."

 

[History Learner]

Various points here.
a) Despite serious losses on the offensive Russia lasted until 1917 OTL so on the defensive, especially if that is a plan for some years before I can't see a Russian collapse prior to at least 1916 and probably a year or two later. Given that a defensive war with mean a less imbalance in casualties and that as the CPs advance Russian patriotism will be activated I'm far from certain such a war would end in a CP victory.

Presuming the Russians adopt a defensive stance despite them having already activated their planning in July/August, which I presume is the POD of the OP in that the East First option pushed by the Kaiser is adopted, it has no real effect on their ability to hold back the German-Austro Hungarian tide. Not only will the latter avoid the Galician disasters if the Russians are passive, the Germans are able to amass massive force dispositions that will enable them to conduct an encirclement of much of the Russian Army in Poland, unless the Russians conduct the Great Retreat much earlier.

I know your position is the Russians magically do exceedingly better than OTL, but there is nothing to support such. Case in point is the frontier battles of late 1914 and early 1915, with the Russians fighting in well prepared fortifications and having replaced all of their losses from Tannenberg....and still getting smashed by smaller German forces. Here, you have the majority of the German Army coming down on them from the North and from the West, while the Austro-Hungarians have completed their mobilization and can strike out of Galicia to effect the southern pincer of the encirclement.

b) France will have to aid its only formal ally when its attacked. Also while there was socialist unrest that occurred in virtually every country the vast bulk of the socialists quickly got behind the war effort in every country. As such I don't see this as a problem. Especially given the desire to regain both A-L and revenge after 1870-71.

Except this ignores the unique circumstances of France in 1914, and the fact we saw what could happen in 1917 if unrest is allowed to explode.

c) France will suffer heavy losses on the A-L front, probably for longer than OTL because of its desire to aid its ally. How quickly it starts adjusting its tactics would be the key issue as by 1916 it had the equipment and doctrine to make limited successes such as on the Somme - despite the bulk of its army being tied up in the Verdun campaign. You might still get the triumphalism that lead to the 1917 spring disaster but you might not.

They won't be able to adjust tactics because the Army will be decimated in the course of a single campaign season; we are talking almost their entire 1914-1918 losses compacted into a single campaign season.

d) Without a German invasion of some of its key agricultural and its primary industrial areas France does have greater resources economically, industrially and demographically. Also once the position on the eastern front stabilizes, as its likely to for a while at least the incentive for frantic attacks to aid the Russians decline.

They will still lose most of their iron production because the Germans quite literally walked in and occupied Briey Longwy unopposed on August 4th IOTL. Outside of that, see the above.

f) As such, unless Berlin was willing to accept a limited victory, say the occupation of Serbia by Austria and Poland by the CPs after both those occurred, which seems unlikely, then we're in for a multi-year and very costly war. The CPs will have an edge over the EPs, especially if Britain stays neutral - albeit probably more friendly to the EPs - and more so if as is likely the Ottomans join the CPs and if Italy stays neutral. If they do look to win big then British intervention is highly likely although how effective that might be would depend on the circumstances.

Berlin will have no reason to accept a limited victory when it crushes the French Army in 1914 and likely does the same to the Russians in 1915. After that, it's merely a matter of marching to construct the peace they want that favors them.

 

[History Learner]

I think it bears further explanation why the East First/French offensive into Alsace Lorraine would be bad, since I have repeatedly said it now. Terrence M. Holmes, writing in "Not the Schlieffen Plan 1914", explains the situation thusly:

​

If Moltke had followed Schlieffen’s real intentions for the counter-offensive conduct of a two-front war, the first great battle of 1914 would have been fought in Lorraine in the third week of hostilities, on terms much more favourable to Germany than they were at the battle of the Marne. We can reconstruct this alternative scenario because we know exactly what the French chief of staff Joseph Joffre intended to do if the Germans did not invade Belgium.

French war planning was constrained by two political imperatives. In the first place, France was committed by agreement with her Russian ally to launch an ‘all-out and immediate’ attack against Germany as soon as possible after the outbreak of war. Moreover, the French government had resolved not to encroach on Belgian territory unless the Germans did so first. Joffre was therefore obliged to incorporate in his war plans a variant which allowed for a full-scale offensive avoiding Belgian territory altogether, and that would have come into effect in 1914 if the Germans had stayed on the defensive and not entered Belgium. For this eventuality Joffre decided that three of his five armies, comprising some 60 percent of his first-line troops, should invade Lorraine on 14 August, aiming initially to reach the line of the river Saar between Sarrebourg and Saarbrücken (Doughty 2010, 146-8, 155-8, 168). Ominously, that position was flanked at both ends by the German fortresses of Metz and Strasbourg.

Schlieffen had long before outlined how the Germans should exploit a massive French incursion through ‘the relatively narrow space between Metz and Strasbourg’. The aim must not be to push the enemy back to his fortified border. Rather, he had to be engaged on three sides, ‘from Metz, from the Saar and from Strasbourg’, and brought to a standstill there, which would give the Germans an excellent chance of decisive victory by means of envelopment attacks out of Metz and Strasbourg. The ultimate aim of this ‘attack on the enemy’s flank and rear’ would be to surround the French invasion forces and ‘not just defeat them, but lay them low and as far as possible annihilate them’ (Boetticher 1933, 260).

Joffre himself was acutely aware of the perils attending a French offensive in Lorraine. He said that the object would be to rupture the German front, but he conceded that:​

"In the course of this operation our forces would be liable to be taken in flank by attacks coming in all probability from both Metz and the region of Molsheim-Strasbourg. By penetrating like a wedge into the midst of the enemy’s lines we would be more or less inviting envelopment (Joffre 1932, 74-5)."​

​

But a German defensive posture in 1914 would have compelled Joffre to embark on that hazardous course of action — that was precisely what he was committed to if the Germans refrained from attacking through Belgium and waited instead for the opportunity to counter-attack. In that event, the war would have started with a great battle of encirclement as soon as the French First, Second and Fourth Armies had completed their short advance into the danger zone between Metz and Strasbourg. Speaking in 1904 of the strategic importance of these fortresses, Schlieffen once again emphasized their role in counter-offensive operations: ‘I do not mean a Metz and Strasbourg that are to be besieged and defended, but rather a Metz and Strasbourg in which armies are assembled and through which they march in order to attack the enemy by surprise’ (Zuber 2004, 160).
​

In short, 60% of the French Army in August of 1914 was walking into a trap, which they only escaped thanks to the French re-orienting themselves to respond to the German advance through Belgium and into France itself. It would've been a war winning blow from which the French never would've recovered from. An Eastern Front-first strategy will also allow the Germans to build up four armies-42 Divisions-in the East. Serbia thus is likely destroyed by 2nd Army in October, as OTL their severe munition shortages nearly forced the Serbs to surrender anyway.

Likely, the French seek peace in late 1914, with the Russians to follow suit soon after with the Central Powers probably holding Poland up to the Bug river and half of Lithuania, while Serbia has been crushed and occupied.

 

[Culsu]

It stands to keep in mind that a relatively quick end of the war - under two years, for example - would also see comparably limited territorial changes as compared to later demands as realized by Brest-Litowsk, for example, as these were a direct result of the terrible losses and deprivations suffered by continued trench warfare and supply shortages. The shorter the war, the more lenient the victors' demands, most likely. France, for example, as the offensive party here, would most likely only be made to suffer diplomatic concessions and monetary/physical reparations rather than suffer territorial losses. In the east, I'm not sure how much direct territory the central powers would gobble up, or if they would not opt for the creation of buffer states plus some limited territories for themselves.

 

[Buba]

They will still lose most of their iron production because the Germans quite literally walked in and occupied Briey Longwy unopposed on August 4th IOTL.

So what? France can import ore - and of much better grade - from anywhere in the world.
I've read in similar threads that use of Lorraine ores was crony capitalism - e.g. the owners of those mines had enough clout as to torpedo development of iron mines in Algeria.
Also - Ffance can do what the UK did in WWII - import ready steel for reworking. This produces saving both on shipping and coal use.