French unity, persistence, and strategy in a Germany goes east WWI- Union Sacree?

[stevep]

Actually, you say this is unlikely, but what more do Vienna and Berlin really have to fight for once they've:

a) occupied and punished Serbia - the original point of the war
b) occupied Poland gaining buffer space against Russia, thereby protecting their own borders, and neutralizing any Russian impact on the Balkan/Serbian fight,
c) successfully repelled the French invasion of German Elsass-Lothingren.

At that point aren't the the Austro-Hungarians ready to say, "we won what we fought for" and peace out with their Serbian winnings? Likewise the Bulgarians who likely join in to finish off Serbia? And probably the Turks who didn't start off with territorial ambitions but were just looking for great power protectors? Of the CPs, the Germans have the greatest chance of holding out and keeping the war going for greater ambitions, but what would they be trying to do? Decisively defeat Russia in a way that Napoleon and Charles of Sweden never did? Re-do the Franco-Prussian war against a far more mobilized France? I'm not discounting Germany's ability to drag out the war for some unrealistic objectives, but a halfway intelligent Germany could also say, "we won, we proved our alliances work, and our enemies alliances don't work, we proved our armies are better, we made sure the war went from our territory to their territory, because it was the right thing to do. When Russia and France acknowledge the new reality, accept Serbia is lost, and accept border security arrangements to our satisfaction, they can have peace."

Have you heard of the September Agenda I think it was called. Checking I found it, see Septemberprogramm for details. As early as September 1914 assorted significant political and economic interests in Germany were asked what Germany should get from the war and were talking about continued occupation/annexation of Belgium and chunks of France as well as a large colonial empire in central Africa and similar gains in the east.

Part of the problem was the militaristic mindset of the time, especially [but not only in Germany] and the perversion of Darwin's ideas of natural selection and 'survival of the fittest' The desire was for a lasting victory that kept all potential opponents too weak to oppose Germany again, which is actually a recipe for continued conflict and unrest.

Steve

 

[stevep]

That's the thing, I don't know if there would actually be a WW2 if Germany won quickly. France would be pretty badly humiliated and unable to start trouble for a while and the French Left would be able to cite the loss in TTL of the frontier battles as why not to wage a war of aggression; politically they'd probably become ascendant after defeat.

Russia would likely be a mess too and perhaps even stopped in its tracks in terms of being able to arm up and start another war due to the likely revolution that will end the Czardom as we knew it as well as cut off French loans for the foreseeable future. Britain would have her hands full with the Irish Home Rule Crisis, while Germany would likely be too strong to challenge for quite some time. The public in Britain, even if fed hysterical war propaganda, wouldn't likely be moved to wage aggressive war out of the blue against Germany.

Plus there wouldn't likely be much changed in the way of territorial shifts with a quick win in 1914/early 1915, so less resentments for another war, especially given that likely the loss of A-L would be confirmed for France. Russia might lose Poland, which becomes an somewhat independent kingdom under a Habsburg (as was the plan early on) with a Polish wife. Lithuania might be a German duchy and ruled by the existing German nobility in the area. Not really like a foundation for another major war, if anything the buffer states in the East and the confirmed stability of the Habsburgs would make war less likely.

If anything Italy eventually joins the CPs when France looks weak and is confirmed as a CP ally going forward, especially if they get a cut of France as a reward.

I think if Germany won big quickly then future conflict would be inevitable. Simple power politics plus the character of imperial Germany. I can't see them being willing to accept that the interests of others matter.

 

[stevep]

Presuming the Russians adopt a defensive stance despite them having already activated their planning in July/August, which I presume is the POD of the OP in that the East First option pushed by the Kaiser is adopted, it has no real effect on their ability to hold back the German-Austro Hungarian tide. Not only will the latter avoid the Galician disasters if the Russians are passive, the Germans are able to amass massive force dispositions that will enable them to conduct an encirclement of much of the Russian Army in Poland, unless the Russians conduct the Great Retreat much earlier.

I know your position is the Russians magically do exceedingly better than OTL, but there is nothing to support such. Case in point is the frontier battles of late 1914 and early 1915, with the Russians fighting in well prepared fortifications and having replaced all of their losses from Tannenberg....and still getting smashed by smaller German forces. Here, you have the majority of the German Army coming down on them from the North and from the West, while the Austro-Hungarians have completed their mobilization and can strike out of Galicia to effect the southern pincer of the encirclement.

No actually, as I said, I'm assuming that Germany goes for a east 1st from some time before. I know about the suggestion that the Kaiser's idea of "can we only go to war with Russia" has been mentioned but he gave up on that because the army insisted it was impossible and would cause chaos. Changing such massive plans for the mobilisation of millions of men in a day or two just isn't practical.

Nothing about the Russians doing magically better. Just that instead of rushing to attack E Prussia to aid a threatened France they know the main blow is coming against them and hence their entire plan of operation is different. Fortifications are upgraded rather than being left obsolete and units are in defensive positions. The CPs are still likely to drive them out of the Polish salient of course but that's going to be costly for them and as the front - and distance to the front - increases their goi8ng to face more and more problems. Germany was able to advance to the Don in 1918 simply because between the terrible losses of 4 years of war, mostly on the offensive, and the sheer incompetence of Lenin's regime there was no opposition to them. That's highly unlikely to happen here.

Except this ignores the unique circumstances of France in 1914, and the fact we saw what could happen in 1917 if unrest is allowed to explode.

Yes the army, bled out after 3 years of bitter fighting, refused to attack again. Which prompted much needed reforms in the way the ordinary solider was treated, such as allowing leave, especially for men who hadn't seen their families since the start of the war.

They won't be able to adjust tactics because the Army will be decimated in the course of a single campaign season; we are talking almost their entire 1914-1918 losses compacted into a single campaign season.

You are projecting that but there's no evidence for such a set of losses. The French lost heavily in their ill thought out frontier offensives and their likely to continue longer here because of the desire to support their allies. However they will have to change their plans and will realise this quickly - talking a couple of months here. What they won't have is massive German armies invading their industrial heartland and occupying a good chunk of the country. Which not only avoids the military losses but also the demographic and economic losses of those territories. Which along with Belgium will no longer be available for Germany to loot.

They will still lose most of their iron production because the Germans quite literally walked in and occupied Briey Longwy unopposed on August 4th IOTL. Outside of that, see the above.

So the Germans are still invading Luxembourg and through it into France on the 1st day.

Berlin will have no reason to accept a limited victory when it crushes the French Army in 1914 and likely does the same to the Russians in 1915. After that, it's merely a matter of marching to construct the peace they want that favors them.

That is the stupidity that got Germany into the mess in the 1st place.

 

[stevep]

It stands to keep in mind that a relatively quick end of the war - under two years, for example - would also see comparably limited territorial changes as compared to later demands as realized by Brest-Litowsk, for example, as these were a direct result of the terrible losses and deprivations suffered by continued trench warfare and supply shortages. The shorter the war, the more lenient the victors' demands, most likely. France, for example, as the offensive party here, would most likely only be made to suffer diplomatic concessions and monetary/physical reparations rather than suffer territorial losses. In the east, I'm not sure how much direct territory the central powers would gobble up, or if they would not opt for the creation of buffer states plus some limited territories for themselves.

In what way is France the aggressor here, coming to the aid of its attacked ally? Plus see my comments on the September Programme which was what Germany was already thinking of right from the start of the war.

 

[Buba]

The German September Programme was just as plausible and official like e.g. Sazanov's memorandum with Russia's border on the Oder-Neisse.
The French also had such fanciful pie in the sky "programmes".
IMO meaningless wishlists ...

ADDED LATER:
Here you have an overview of French "September Programmes".
Border on the Rhine up to Kleve? No problem ...

War Aims and War Aims Discussions (France) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)

On 4 August 1914, in his first speech after the declaration of war, Raymond Poincaré, president of the French Republic, did not outline any aims other than the ''Union sacrée'' (sacred union) and the defence of the country’s borders. Once the hopes for a short war had been dispelled, it was...

encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net

 

[History Learner]

No actually, as I said, I'm assuming that Germany goes for a east 1st from some time before. I know about the suggestion that the Kaiser's idea of "can we only go to war with Russia" has been mentioned but he gave up on that because the army insisted it was impossible and would cause chaos. Changing such massive plans for the mobilisation of millions of men in a day or two just isn't practical.

Except it was done historically, in that memorandums were drawn up at the time and staff officers looked at it; Post-War one even did a detailed study who found it definitely could've worked and would've resulted in the bulk of the German Army in the East within two to three weeks. It was the General's Pressure and Kaiser Wilhelm excepting it that resulted in No East First.

Nothing about the Russians doing magically better. Just that instead of rushing to attack E Prussia to aid a threatened France they know the main blow is coming against them and hence their entire plan of operation is different. Fortifications are upgraded rather than being left obsolete and units are in defensive positions. The CPs are still likely to drive them out of the Polish salient of course but that's going to be costly for them and as the front - and distance to the front - increases their goi8ng to face more and more problems. Germany was able to advance to the Don in 1918 simply because between the terrible losses of 4 years of war, mostly on the offensive, and the sheer incompetence of Lenin's regime there was no opposition to them. That's highly unlikely to happen here.

In other words, you're assuming magic because the Russians did all of that and were still ejected out of Poland with heavy losses by early 1915. Again, if you want to see what happens with no Tannenberg, look at what happened in East Prussia in late 1914 and early 1915; the Russians went into fortifications and even had larger numbers of troops than the Germans, having replaced their previous losses, and were still decisively beaten. Here, it's exceedingly like the Germans and Austro-Hungarians have the numbers advantage and the Russians going passive passive means they can conduct maneuver war to isolate and encirclement any strong points. Trench Warfare did not work in the East they same way it did in the West because of the size of the front.

Yes the army, bled out after 3 years of bitter fighting, refused to attack again. Which prompted much needed reforms in the way the ordinary solider was treated, such as allowing leave, especially for men who hadn't seen their families since the start of the war.

It also resulted in incidents such as Algerians and Moroccans being used to shoot up formations that were attempting to reach Paris. In the East, it outright led to the fall of the Russian Empire as a result of their own crisis. The set up here is almost exactly identical to that which befell France in 1870.

You are projecting that but there's no evidence for such a set of losses. The French lost heavily in their ill thought out frontier offensives and their likely to continue longer here because of the desire to support their allies. However they will have to change their plans and will realise this quickly - talking a couple of months here. What they won't have is massive German armies invading their industrial heartland and occupying a good chunk of the country. Which not only avoids the military losses but also the demographic and economic losses of those territories. Which along with Belgium will no longer be available for Germany to loot.

See my post here, which quotes Terence Holme's works and which cites both the French and Germans at the time who outlined exactly what the French were walking into. In the space of a campaign season the French Army is effectively gone, and the Germans can then march as far as their logistics can carry them while a new commune is likely to breakout in Paris.

So the Germans are still invading Luxembourg and through it into France on the 1st day.

No, it was it's own thing; they literally just marched in and occupied it for no other reason than to do so.

That is the stupidity that got Germany into the mess in the 1st place.

The fact you call it stupidity does not make it so, especially with the amounts of handwavium you use to do so.

 

[History Learner]

So what? France can import ore - and of much better grade - from anywhere in the world.
I've read in similar threads that use of Lorraine ores was crony capitalism - e.g. the owners of those mines had enough clout as to torpedo development of iron mines in Algeria.
Also - Ffance can do what the UK did in WWII - import ready steel for reworking. This produces saving both on shipping and coal use.

France's produced 21.57 million tons of iron ore in 1913, of which 90% was mined in Lorraine (i.e. Briey Longwy), according to Abraham Berglund's "The Iron-Ore Problem of Lorraine" in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 3 (May, 1919), pp. 531-554. Importing from elsewhere requires you to find someone capable of export, having the funds or trade goods to do so and the shipping in of itself to do so; importing does not constitute a savings in shipping because home production did not require any shipping since it could be run on the internal railway network.

 

[The Whispering Monk]

So you're talking French unity. I think the biggest influence will be HOW the French unify.

Does it take bloody suppression of the Socialists? - that would be bad in the short term for certain, and likely worse in the long term.

What if your divergence is the growth of a dynamic, tactically/strategically smart, and charismatic French military commander?

How bout the Socialists are convinced to get wholeheartedly behind the idea of rescuing A-L territory and volunteer in droves. Does the govt. send them in first to absorb the lion's share of the butcher's bill? Do the Socialists come through stronger b/c of their role in securing military victory?

I don't think you can really come to a conclusion til we figure that out.

 

[sillygoose]

I think if Germany won big quickly then future conflict would be inevitable. Simple power politics plus the character of imperial Germany. I can't see them being willing to accept that the interests of others matter.

That's the thing, Germany winning quickly would be a very different situation to OTL after WW1. Had they knocked out the Russians while France falls into infighting internally if not full blown civil war, it would be at least a generation before the Entente could threaten the CPs. Russia would no doubt be crippled by the defeat since that would mean civil war (and Germany carving up Russia while suffering no where near badly enough not to make their new client states stick), A-H would not be mortally wounded and may well be actually politically strengthened in victory, and France would be a basket case politically for quite a while after the disaster I laid out in earlier posts. Italy too would just throw in with the side that looks to be winning, so they'd be bound to the winners for the foreseeable future, which basically leaves the CPs the dominant alliance.

Britain might be an issue, but the balance of power would be way off at that point and if anything Britain might well be served cutting a deal with the CPs rather than trying to counter balance Germany, since France and Russia together wouldn't be strong enough allies and if anything a massive financial drain to Britain to keep them in any future war.

Actually Germany being the hegemon would end the power politics game in Europe, since there really wouldn't be anyone capable of overpowering them. Russia would have her progress derailed for a generation, France too would be thrown even further behind, while Germany, A-H, and Italy not suffering from a long drawn out war and territorial and economic gains plus have the benefits of winning the war and imposing a favorable peace would be tremendously more powerful than they were in the aftermath of Versailles. Losing WW1 dramatically retarded their growth and set back their power relative to other states enormously. Italy of course being on the winning side IOTL still suffered quite a bit worse than the other victors due to gaining so little, losing so much, and facing so much debt from their effort, virtually none of which would happen here given all the problems France would face without Britain and of course with all their internal issues.

In theory,yes.
In practice - Germans being germans would manage something that made all french get them again.

Except minus the ability of the French to do anything about it. France gained a lot from winning WW1 despite the manpower losses suffered; their industrial (developed during the war with British finance) and more importantly resource gains from territorial acquisition (Lorraine iron and Saar coal) were huge for their economy in the interwar period, which wouldn't happen here. Certainly France would be out before the worst of the manpower losses, but they'd likely lose their border forts and not gain any resources they had IOTL, nor would they have the chance to build up their industry; they'd just fall so much further behind, including in manpower relative to Germany, that they'd basically have to face facts that even with their colonies (some might be lost ITTL) they would only be a regional power in Europe without the resources to threaten their much stronger neighbor, especially if Russia was now a basket case.

Russians being russians would want their empire back,tsar ot not tsar.

Wanting and being able to do so are different things. Losing WW1, losing territory, having a civil war/revolution of some sort, etc. while their enemies are only relatively strengthened by the war would effectively relegate them to basket case status.

England being England would wait for first occasion to create great coalition against germany.

What coalition would that be? Italy would be bound to the CPs and France and Russia would be severely diminished relative to the CPs, so Britain would if anything have to change its tune and work out a deal with Germany as her only resort.

And in OTL they created situation where they made lithuanian and ukrainian state and planned to made polish one,but all that nations still hated them.So,gave germans 20 years,and all those buffer states would turn from supporters into enemies waiting for first chance to attack.

IOTL there wasn't really any plan settled on, just a bunch of proposals from a bunch of different actors. H-L won't be rising here if Germany goes East, which means Moltke would be the guy in charge and that changes everything anyway.

Regentschaftskönigreich Polen – Wikipedia

de.wikipedia.org

So maybe there are some annexations, perhaps there is a separate kingdom, perhaps A-H sets up a situation where Galicia is still part of the Habsburg empire. Each of our guess is as good as any other given how much things would change ITTL vs. OTL proposals; the only certainty is that Russia would lose Poland and Lithuania at a minimum. If they fall into revolution or even full civil war then Ukraine and Belarus, plus Finland and the Baltic states would be broken off and set up by the CPs.

We also haven't even gotten into the Ottoman role in all of this and the results of the Berlin-Baghdad RR being completed in a victorious CP scenario. Basically this is a British nightmare scenario.

No, it was it's own thing; they literally just marched in and occupied it for no other reason than to do so.

There was a reason, Luxembourg's rail network was vital to the invasion of France and mobilizing troops on the border. ITTL Germany would have to do so to mobilize defenses for the region:

If you check out the road/rail net of modern Luxembourg (no new lines have been constructed since WW1 AFAIK) you can see why it was so vital for transportation:

Luxembourg

www.google.com

Plus of course Germany wanted the German speaking territory anyway, which was also quite economically valuable (iron and steel industry). Other than the Luxembourgish army being a joke (400 men) even the government and people just accepted annexation as inevitable:

German occupation of Luxembourg during World War I - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Have you heard of the September Agenda I think it was called. Checking I found it, see Septemberprogramm for details. As early as September 1914 assorted significant political and economic interests in Germany were asked what Germany should get from the war and were talking about continued occupation/annexation of Belgium and chunks of France as well as a large colonial empire in central Africa and similar gains in the east.

Part of the problem was the militaristic mindset of the time, especially [but not only in Germany] and the perversion of Darwin's ideas of natural selection and 'survival of the fittest' The desire was for a lasting victory that kept all potential opponents too weak to oppose Germany again, which is actually a recipe for continued conflict and unrest.

Steve

That memo has been way overblown thanks to Fritz Fischer claiming it was the German annexation plan to make his 'sonderweg' thesis work. In reality it was a memo to get some ideas and then basically ignored and left to rot in the archives until Fischer discovered it. It was never the basis of any serious plans that I've ever seen, just discussions that didn't lead to any decision.

Plus, in the context of TTL it wouldn't even likely exist, at least as we know it, given that the entire strategic situation is radically different.

 

[raharris1973]

French unity collapses after 60% or more of their army is killed or captured attacking into Alsace-Lorraine,

How many months does it take them to even fit that much of their army into such a constricted battle space? Can they accomplish it in a single campaigning year?

 

[raharris1973]

I thin that if the Germans don't declare war first the French government would find themselves in serious trouble, as they get slaughtered against German border defenses, while not really having a good reason to declare war; IOTL they planned to round up potential anti-war activists, which might go forward here and would push the French Left over the edge, which was quite powerful, and was already somewhat incensed about the assassination of one of the head Socialist by a member of the French Far Right. IOTL that was papered over quickly by the German invasion, but without that Paris might actually break out and revolt against the government:

If they don't arrest socialist revolutionaries there will be likely at least a strike if not a general one that shuts down the capital and if they do there will be potentially a violent uprising. Either way France entering the war would be a massive mess politically and might touch off a civil war, especially if the initial invasion of German bloodily fails at least as badly as the OTL one. Given that they cannot invade Belgium due to British sensibilities and likely Belgian resistance that means trying to bash through A-L, which given the fortifications, terrain, and Franco-German tactical competency differentials will mean a bloody repulse with major consequences for the government.

I have to disagree that Britain would be in for sure given that if Germany does respect Belgian neutrality there is no way politically for the warmongers in Britain to actually force through the DoW. That really did require the invasion of Belgium by Germany to happen. Germany is militarily disadvantages by all the demands Britain made of the German navy, but given that huge political problems France would have it is still very much to Germany's benefit to keep Britain out and watch France eat itself alive.

What about the variant I suggest where Jean Jaures lives?

 

[History Learner]

How many months does it take them to even fit that much of their army into such a constricted battle space? Can they accomplish it in a single campaigning year?

Pretty much it would happen in August.

 

[stevep]

The German September Programme was just as plausible and official like e.g. Sazanov's memorandum with Russia's border on the Oder-Neisse.
The French also had such fanciful pie in the sky "programmes".
IMO meaningless wishlists ...

ADDED LATER:
Here you have an overview of French "September Programmes".
Border on the Rhine up to Kleve? No problem ...

War Aims and War Aims Discussions (France) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)

On 4 August 1914, in his first speech after the declaration of war, Raymond Poincaré, president of the French Republic, did not outline any aims other than the ''Union sacrée'' (sacred union) and the defence of the country’s borders. Once the hopes for a short war had been dispelled, it was...

encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net

Reading your link the French had numerous ideas, from virtually no change to control -note disarmament and a military presence for a while NOT annexation - of the west bank of the Rhine and its detachment from Germany. That's only to be expected from a democratic nation with a variety of views. Even the return of A-L wasn't always present in French ideas. Also I have yet to see any mention of annexation of parts of a state that wasn't part of the CPs.

In comparison the German plan was prepared for the German Chancellor from discussions with "Germany's industrial, military, and political leadership". Note that within 6 weeks of invading Belgium, while declaring it had no designs on Belgium territory or independence the idea was that all of Belgium would either be annexed or under a German protectorate. Note also that the Germans did seek to implement the plan in the east after Lenin brought further disaster to Russia and prevented its defence. There are probably other ideas presented in Germany including some not so extreme but this was a formal idea that was prepared within just over a month of the start of the war.

 

[stevep]

Except it was done historically, in that memorandums were drawn up at the time and staff officers looked at it; Post-War one even did a detailed study who found it definitely could've worked and would've resulted in the bulk of the German Army in the East within two to three weeks. It was the General's Pressure and Kaiser Wilhelm excepting it that resulted in No East First.



In other words, you're assuming magic because the Russians did all of that and were still ejected out of Poland with heavy losses by early 1915. Again, if you want to see what happens with no Tannenberg, look at what happened in East Prussia in late 1914 and early 1915; the Russians went into fortifications and even had larger numbers of troops than the Germans, having replaced their previous losses, and were still decisively beaten. Here, it's exceedingly like the Germans and Austro-Hungarians have the numbers advantage and the Russians going passive passive means they can conduct maneuver war to isolate and encirclement any strong points. Trench Warfare did not work in the East they same way it did in the West because of the size of the front.



It also resulted in incidents such as Algerians and Moroccans being used to shoot up formations that were attempting to reach Paris. In the East, it outright led to the fall of the Russian Empire as a result of their own crisis. The set up here is almost exactly identical to that which befell France in 1870.



See my post here, which quotes Terence Holme's works and which cites both the French and Germans at the time who outlined exactly what the French were walking into. In the space of a campaign season the French Army is effectively gone, and the Germans can then march as far as their logistics can carry them while a new commune is likely to breakout in Paris.



No, it was it's own thing; they literally just marched in and occupied it for no other reason than to do so.



The fact you call it stupidity does not make it so, especially with the amounts of handwavium you use to do so.

Will you quite the bull shit. Especially pretending I'm saying things I clearly haven't and making things up. You should know about handwavium as its so common in your suggestions. Lets look at things quickly.

a) I stated I was considering a POD some time prior to the start of the war in which case the Russians will know that their facing the bulk of the German army. In which case they can prepare for that including updating the often obsolete fortifications and not launching attacks fairly piecemeal. You say they replaced the losses after the E Prussia defeats but here those forces will be combined with the forces assembled later, which would also make a difference. Its a lot easier to defeat an enemy in small chunks rather than concentrated.

b) I would be interested to see what evidence there is that the strikes in the French army in 1917 had on the collapse of Russia?

c) You have the idea that the French would continue fruitless attacks against defensive positions until their wiped out their entire regular army and reserves. Dream on.

d) A map check suggests that the region borders Luxembourg not the German part of Lorraine. As such without invading Luxembourg or Belgium possibly the Germans, who according to you are totally defensive in the east must advance through all those attacking French armies to reach the region.

e) I call it stupidity because the belief of the German political leadership in using only one tool, i.e. military power, led them to bloody defeat twice in a generation. They got off very lucky the 1st time but paid a hell of a lot more the 2nd until they finally seem to have learnt that diplomacy and acceptance that other nations have valid interests matter.

 

[stevep]

So you're talking French unity. I think the biggest influence will be HOW the French unify.

Does it take bloody suppression of the Socialists? - that would be bad in the short term for certain, and likely worse in the long term.

What if your divergence is the growth of a dynamic, tactically/strategically smart, and charismatic French military commander?

How bout the Socialists are convinced to get wholeheartedly behind the idea of rescuing A-L territory and volunteer in droves. Does the govt. send them in first to absorb the lion's share of the butcher's bill? Do the Socialists come through stronger b/c of their role in securing military victory?

I don't think you can really come to a conclusion til we figure that out.

If your replying to me yes I'm thinking pretty much about what happened OTL. As I've said elsewhere there were differences about post-war aims and what was needed to protect France but there was widespread unity in waging the war, as occurred initially in all countries and it only really started to fade in most countries form ~1917 onward.

 

[stevep]

That's the thing, Germany winning quickly would be a very different situation to OTL after WW1. Had they knocked out the Russians while France falls into infighting internally if not full blown civil war, it would be at least a generation before the Entente could threaten the CPs. Russia would no doubt be crippled by the defeat since that would mean civil war (and Germany carving up Russia while suffering no where near badly enough not to make their new client states stick), A-H would not be mortally wounded and may well be actually politically strengthened in victory, and France would be a basket case politically for quite a while after the disaster I laid out in earlier posts. Italy too would just throw in with the side that looks to be winning, so they'd be bound to the winners for the foreseeable future, which basically leaves the CPs the dominant alliance.

Britain might be an issue, but the balance of power would be way off at that point and if anything Britain might well be served cutting a deal with the CPs rather than trying to counter balance Germany, since France and Russia together wouldn't be strong enough allies and if anything a massive financial drain to Britain to keep them in any future war.

Actually Germany being the hegemon would end the power politics game in Europe, since there really wouldn't be anyone capable of overpowering them. Russia would have her progress derailed for a generation, France too would be thrown even further behind, while Germany, A-H, and Italy not suffering from a long drawn out war and territorial and economic gains plus have the benefits of winning the war and imposing a favorable peace would be tremendously more powerful than they were in the aftermath of Versailles. Losing WW1 dramatically retarded their growth and set back their power relative to other states enormously. Italy of course being on the winning side IOTL still suffered quite a bit worse than the other victors due to gaining so little, losing so much, and facing so much debt from their effort, virtually none of which would happen here given all the problems France would face without Britain and of course with all their internal issues.


Except minus the ability of the French to do anything about it. France gained a lot from winning WW1 despite the manpower losses suffered; their industrial (developed during the war with British finance) and more importantly resource gains from territorial acquisition (Lorraine iron and Saar coal) were huge for their economy in the interwar period, which wouldn't happen here. Certainly France would be out before the worst of the manpower losses, but they'd likely lose their border forts and not gain any resources they had IOTL, nor would they have the chance to build up their industry; they'd just fall so much further behind, including in manpower relative to Germany, that they'd basically have to face facts that even with their colonies (some might be lost ITTL) they would only be a regional power in Europe without the resources to threaten their much stronger neighbor, especially if Russia was now a basket case.

Wanting and being able to do so are different things. Losing WW1, losing territory, having a civil war/revolution of some sort, etc. while their enemies are only relatively strengthened by the war would effectively relegate them to basket case status.

Actually it wouldn't end power politics in Europe, even if things go as dramatically well as the supporters of a German super empire want. Which is exceptionally unlikely. Even if Germany wins quickly and applies the draconian terms that were proposed in the September plan a quick victory also means less demand to France, both in terms of population and industrial wealth. No occupation and large scale destruction of its industrial heartland. Similarly seeing Germany continue to occupy vast areas in the east to maintain control of them is going to alienate everybody there as well as being a substantial drain on Germany both economically and socially.

Why are you assuming that Germany is both able and willing to force a revolution and civil war in Russia? If they don't then the latter is going to be a hell of a lot better off than OTL?

Britain isn't going to have its independence lost so it wouldn't be surrendering to Germany, at least without a hell of a fight. Which is what accepting an aggressively expansionist German empire across Europe would mean given its clear and repeatedly displayed hostility to Britain.

What coalition would that be? Italy would be bound to the CPs and France and Russia would be severely diminished relative to the CPs, so Britain would if anything have to change its tune and work out a deal with Germany as her only resort.

Well apart from the French and Russians there are probably the Austrians, as you mention below Germany is a threat to their empire, and possibly also the Italians. The Ottomans - or more accurately the Young Turk extremists - are likely to be friendly to Germany but those of their non-Turkish subjects that aren't slaughtered or enslaved could be less happy. With no clear check on German powers its even more likely to throw its weight about without any serious consideration.

IOTL there wasn't really any plan settled on, just a bunch of proposals from a bunch of different actors. H-L won't be rising here if Germany goes East, which means Moltke would be the guy in charge and that changes everything anyway.

Regentschaftskönigreich Polen – Wikipedia

de.wikipedia.org

So maybe there are some annexations, perhaps there is a separate kingdom, perhaps A-H sets up a situation where Galicia is still part of the Habsburg empire. Each of our guess is as good as any other given how much things would change ITTL vs. OTL proposals; the only certainty is that Russia would lose Poland and Lithuania at a minimum. If they fall into revolution or even full civil war then Ukraine and Belarus, plus Finland and the Baltic states would be broken off and set up by the CPs.

We also haven't even gotten into the Ottoman role in all of this and the results of the Berlin-Baghdad RR being completed in a victorious CP scenario. Basically this is a British nightmare scenario.

As you say if you get the desired huge wins for Germany there would be massive annexations and establishment of puppet states. If not, especially in the east how does Germany keep Russia on its knees?

There was a reason, Luxembourg's rail network was vital to the invasion of France and mobilizing troops on the border. ITTL Germany would have to do so to mobilize defenses for the region:


If you check out the road/rail net of modern Luxembourg (no new lines have been constructed since WW1 AFAIK) you can see why it was so vital for transportation:

Luxembourg

www.google.com

So to establish a defence for its borders Germany needs to advance into and invade a neutral country.

Plus of course Germany wanted the German speaking territory anyway, which was also quite economically valuable (iron and steel industry). Other than the Luxembourgish army being a joke (400 men) even the government and people just accepted annexation as inevitable:

German occupation of Luxembourg during World War I - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

That's not a good sign for the Hapsburgs. Or the Swiss. Or even Italy if it gets German speaking parts of Austria as part of the deal that keeps them on-line with the CPs. Or for that matter for democracy in Europe that Berlin thinks people should have no say on whom governs them.

That memo has been way overblown thanks to Fritz Fischer claiming it was the German annexation plan to make his 'sonderweg' thesis work. In reality it was a memo to get some ideas and then basically ignored and left to rot in the archives until Fischer discovered it. It was never the basis of any serious plans that I've ever seen, just discussions that didn't lead to any decision.

Plus, in the context of TTL it wouldn't even likely exist, at least as we know it, given that the entire strategic situation is radically different.

Strange that your saying it wouldn't exist then assuming its largely implemented. Apart from possibly Belgium maintaining a level of independence.

 

[sillygoose]

What about the variant I suggest where Jean Jaures lives?

That would probably result in a similar outcome given that Jaures was going to release info about bribes the French government took to support Russia:

Jean Jaurès - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Jaurès and Caillaux believed, after the latter was cleared of the murder his wife had committed, that they could expose the President's secret deal with Russia. This would have led to a policy of détente with Germany, preventing war and the inevitable carnage from 1915. Russia had covertly subsidized Poincaré's election campaign.[19] Poincaré had, in this theory, therefore abandoned socialism for another party and warfare.

So yeah, interesting in the Chinese sense is spot on. It is possible he's able to stop France from declaring war if he acts quickly enough with a general strike after Germany turns east. Russia would probably back down and the war averted in that case.

 

[stevep]

That would probably result in a similar outcome given that Jaures was going to release info about bribes the French government took to support Russia:

Jean Jaurès - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

So yeah, interesting in the Chinese sense is spot on. It is possible he's able to stop France from declaring war if he acts quickly enough with a general strike after Germany turns east. Russia would probably back down and the war averted in that case.

The rest of that wiki quote continues

Even if Germany intentionally condemned Belgium to occupation, they had already accused Russia of starting the conflict. This theory, downplaying Germany’s aggressive moves, was not widely supported in France.

Allowing a German/Austrian crushing of Russia would leave France very exposed. Both to a later German attack and to the point that it had deserted an ally of long standing which would make other unwilling to trust French promises. In the event of a latter attack Britain would probably support it out of desperate self-interest but it would be a very bad decision for France and is extremely unlikely to occur.

Even a Russia humulated by being able to aid its last ally in the Balkans against Austrian aggresison due to German threats is likely to weaken both it and France against further German actions. Plus its exceedingly unlikely given German beliefs at the time that they would refrain from fighting Russia under such favourable conditions.

 

[Buba]

Wouldn't an Ostaufmarsch strengthen A-H versus Germany?
In OTL the Battle of Galicia was no walk over for the Russians, up to a point it was a close run thing. Here A-H is not gutted by the defeat and retreat and later bled white during the winter fighting in the Carpathians.

 

[sillygoose]

The rest of that wiki quote continues

Not sure which period that quote is referring to. Sounds like that was after Belgium was occupied by Germany, which wouldn't happen here. I'm not particularly surprised given that the government of France had surpressed news that Russia mobilized first and that info wouldn't be revealed in the west until after WW1. Wouldn't matter if the Socialists could shut down Paris though, the heart of the French Left and power base of Jaures as well as the industrial and rail transport heart of the country. The majority of rural France could have thought something, but if the power center of the country could be shut down by the workers of the country, disproportionately concentrated in the capital, then things get interesting.

Allowing a German/Austrian crushing of Russia would leave France very exposed. Both to a later German attack and to the point that it had deserted an ally of long standing which would make other unwilling to trust French promises. In the event of a latter attack Britain would probably support it out of desperate self-interest but it would be a very bad decision for France and is extremely unlikely to occur.

If France has to back down due to Socialist opposition then the Russians cut a deal and they don't get crushed, but have to allow Serbia to be crushed, which no one really cared about other than the Russian people. Then you could see a revolution, which is what the French Left wanted for Russia anyway. So arguing geopolitics ignores what the average Socialist in France actually thought/wanted; IOTL they were behind the war effort due to the German invasion, but ITTL they would strongly oppose an aggressive war despite whatever the politicians thought about grand strategy.

Even a Russia humulated by being able to aid its last ally in the Balkans against Austrian aggresison due to German threats is likely to weaken both it and France against further German actions. Plus its exceedingly unlikely given German beliefs at the time that they would refrain from fighting Russia under such favourable conditions.

Austrian aggression? Serbian intelligence had assassinated the heir to the throne. Any other country would have invaded too if they could. Again you're focused on the politicians' view of grand strategy, not what the French Left thought about the situation. They had no interest in war to support Russia if France wasn't being attacked directly as they hated the system of government of the autocratic Czar, who was basically a dictator in charge of a rather Fascist system.

No doubt Germany would fight if the Russians wouldn't deal, but if all alone Russia would deal rather than be crushed. Germany wasn't looking to get into a long drawn out war in Russia, they still had 1812-phobia.