French unity, persistence, and strategy in a Germany goes east WWI- Union Sacree?

[stevep]

True. Likely support for the Russians by going after the Ottomans would be politically easier ITTL assuming the Ottomans even join in. If not then I don't see how they don't pull something with Greece given the lack of other options. Well besides sending an expeditionary force to Russia much like Russia did for France IOTL:

Russian Expeditionary Force in France - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Montenegero though gets them nowhere and is pretty hard to advance out of. Without a rail line to support Serbia they're SOL. Maybe if Bulgaria joins the war then it clarifies the situation and France can land in Salonika to attack Bulgaria since apparently the French were already allowed to use the port to ship supplies to Serbia IOTL 1914 well before Entente forces landed there. Frankly the entire situation is very murky for this ATL.

I suggested Montenegro because its already a belligerent and while it would be difficult forces and equipment sent there would aid the Serbs. Definitely Greece would be a better option if you could get it to joining the EPs but with the advantage of hindsight while there was strong political support for this the monarch, which had a lot of influence was strongly opposed so unless the French are willing to effectively launch a coup against him - and do it successfully - its a no go.

Russian desire matters because if they say "f-it, let's bail on the war" then France is in a really bad situation, especially given that Russia owes them money and may not be able to or willing to pay it back if they feel France didn't honor its obligations and Russia paid the price. Plus the British government at the time didn't want to see Russia lose the war quickly; if anything it would be in their interest for both the CPs and Russia bleed each other white. So why not promise the moon?

I was assuming you were referring to post war sharing out of territory. Assuming Germany defeated and in this scenario Russia will probably have taken the bulk of the losses and be weakened then unless they already hold Constantinople how would they gain it if Britain and France opposed the move?

I suppose there is a counter argument that under such circumstances Constantinople is a somewhat mixed blessing for Russia as it now has to hold onto a region including a large city with no native Russians there. Especially since they will win the emnity of the Turks and Greeks and probably also Bulgaria as well. Plus while it gets them an entrance to the Med they still have to get passed Britain at Malta and Gib going west or the Suez canal going south - or even with possibly Greece in alliance with Britain as a result bases on the Greek islands further constraining the Russians in the event of a clash.

Can we agree that Britain had multiple interests in doing what they did IOTL?

Never had any other viewpoint. Its just that some weigh more than others and the people with the most power and influence in Britain were more concerned with the big issues, such as the balance of power in Europe.

Yes I do. The imperialists are still imperialists and will want valuable markets that potentially have oil. Control over the majority of the world's oil supplies gives them intense leverage over everyone. Contrary to Anglophone perceptions the Entente were just as big of self interested dicks as the CPs and WW1 as well as the preceding few centuries were about European state trying to dominate the world. Or do you think the British and French empires happened by accident?

You seem to lack an understanding of events and politics in Britain. There are imperialists, most noticeably in the Tory party as well as people who want to change Britain's tradition of free trade - again largely the Tories. The latter is important because additional territories, as well as being costly to administer and protect provided little additional wealth for Britain while free trade was in control. Its noted that for most nations, even with protectionism in place many colonies costs more to rule than they supplied in economic returns.

I'm not saying that 1914 Britain's political leadership were angels - they weren't - but in Britain especially there was a strong opposition, especially in the Liberals, to ruling more territory. This was a major reason why the British empire was as small as it was as it could have been a hell of a lot larger.

I'll have to defer to you on that, I'm not all that familiar with the Irish situation specifics.

That's what I've read anyway.

The US wasn't neutral and I'm willing to bet that is why the operations like that never led to any significant breach of US-German relations. Plus in 1916 (election year) the US wasn't in a position to go to war either and was even less so early on.

Plus the US wasn't in a position to really figure out what actually happened:

Black Tom explosion - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Too bad the linked source is invalid.

Technically it was neutral and as the Deutschland case showed the US was quite happy to trade with Germany. Its growing economic ties to the allies and the behaviour of Germany were changing that but it was still a stupid thing to do as it was technically an act of war.

Perceived by whom? The average person had no interest in fighting before Belgium and France were invaded. It really was mostly naval and a few top level Liberal cabinet members who were viewing Germany was a threat. If they were focused on Russia very few in Britain would see them as any sort of threat, especially if the French were busy invading them (even if badly). Do you have prewar sources that show Germany was viewed at the time by the majority of the public as a threat in 1914 in July?

Except that the navy and the security it supplied were perceived as very important to Britain, including the bulk of the population and also naval superiority was a matter of prestige. As such the German threat was seen as very real and threatening. The OTL invasion of Belgium helped unify public opinion in favour of war against Germany but there would have been substantial feelings of hostility towards it anyway and especially if it looked like it would be become a lot more powerful due to a clear victory in the war.

Hey, why not use your own argument against you?
Though I meant it more as British perception rather than reality, but it would keep Germany firmly fixated in the East and on their army to hedge against a resurgent revanchist Russia. Actually I could see Russia going Fascist here (I mean more so than the Czar already was, especially if replaced by Michael).

A fascist Russia is a possibility, as might still be a more militant Germany depending on how the struggle goes to challenge the influence of the junkers and other such groups.

However the problem with rejecting your own arguments is that you weaken them in general discussion. One complication of course is that assorted groups are likely to have different interpretations of the impacts of such an eastern expansion and reality can be different again. As such, especially with imperialist feeling at a peak as it was in some ways - due in part to social darwinism - even if gaining control of very large areas of the former Russian empire actually weaken Germany it could well be perceived otherwise by assorted groups - including for instance many people in Britain, Germany and other nations.

How would Britain ensure that? They could try and invade Germany proper via sea landing or Belgium, but then in the former case they'd probably face serious operation issues even attempting that not to mention problems from the public for even trying to enter the war when unlike OTL Germany couldn't be said to be a direct threat to Britain. In the latter case I'm sure you can see the issue there.

If it looks like Germany is winning, after a bitter fight, and is refusing to accept moderate gains then Britain can throw its own hat into the ring in supporting the EPs. Say if Russian was suffering badly and Germany was making demands on France such as assumed in the September programme because it believes France is too weak to stand against it. Especially since Britain, given the ongoing conflict is likely to have boosting its own forces and probably gained known of doctrine and battle tactics through officers assigned to study the war alongside the French forces. [Having a senior moment as the exact term is escaping me but think you know what I mean. ]

Again you're thinking like a politician in a dictatorship, not a democracy where the public doesn't see their interests directly threatened. Plus the average Brit, until they joined the war in 1914, weren't really pro-Russia as far as I can tell.

Its not a question of being pro-Russia, although as in WWII there's probably been a fair amount of press put out about the gallant Russians defending their homelands against the German hordes and references to 1812. Which is a far easier sell than what both Britain and the US did in WWII with the USSR. Its a question of Britain's interest and especially its security. Given the displaced hostility towards Britain and the perceived German gains from a victory plus probably references to other threats to Britain from a single power dominating the continent, going back to 1588 there will be plenty of scope for moblising public opinion for war. Especially if Germany has rejected proposals from Britain for a moderate peace, which will be the view presented by the government in Britain.

They lasted into 1914 though. So maybe due to the Irish parties the Home Rule crisis isn't able to be put on the backburner if Britain doesn't join the war. BTW what is your source for the claim the Tories were pro-war in July before Belgium was invaded? Also what about Labour? The Liberals were already in support of more social spending and were interested in cutting the military budget.

Yes but that could change if the Liberals lost Irish support or were seen to be too pro-'Irish' by the bulk of the British people, although the latter could be fairly insufficient prior to the expected election in 1916. One other factor here could if the Liberals were seen as being too soft on the issue of German successes in the war ongoing on the continent. Which I think could well last into 1916.

I'm not a professionally trained historian and as you may have gathered have collected few new books in recent years. As such I tend not to have marked sources as well compared with what was said. However from numerous sources that the Tories were more radical in things like economic policy, being concerned about a perceived decline in Britain's power and position. Hence they were the primary forces pushing for an end to free trade and to introducing conscription. They were the party pushing for more military spending whereas the Liberals wanted to cut military spending to increase social spending, as they did in their early years and only reluctantly later increased it in the face of the German naval challenge.

British government interests aren't the average people's interests and in a democracy they'd need to be highly concerned with getting public support well before they could declare war without an obvious casus belli. Plus even in victory in a short sharp war the CPs wouldn't dominate the continent, they'd just have an edge on France and Russia, though they'd have lost Italy as an ally for sure by then. The question is whether France and Russia would face actual revolution during or after the war, but that isn't likely to make Britain go to war, just perhaps send troops to help the governments stay in power.

If it was a short war with no great devastation for any power or major territorial changes. However I'm doubtful that would happen. Germany after all is worried that Russia could soon eclipse her so what is the point for Germany of waging a war that costs it a lot but doesn't massively weakened Russia? Especially since Russia not only has much greater manpower but its population is growing a lot faster. As such Russia could afford to lose twice as many casualties as Germany and unless its seriously weakened Germany has possibly delayed things a little but will have to consider another war a few years down the line.

In this scenario then while Russia is likely to suffer substantially it being on the defensive is going to make a comparative shift in loss ratios - albeit I take your point that they will be facing a lot more Germans from the start. However with France not looking like collapsing then a withdrawal from the frontier regions is a viable prospect and Germany losses a lot of its advantages once logistics restrict how much firepower it can apply on the front because of the need to move heavy equipment in very large amounts. Plus your likely to see at least some rallying around the motherland in Russia when there's a clear threat as opposed to what looks like increasingly fruitless and costly attacks on German positions. As such I can easily see the war going into 1916 and possibly the front reaching about the Prepeit marshes which are likely to further hinder German potentials. The further back they are pushed the longer both German supply lines and the front.

Similarly while France, assuming no butterflies, will have the insane plan 17 for frontal assaults but that simply can not last and as OTL France will find alternative ideas and will have less threat and more resources due to not having a lot of their most developed territories occupied.

As I say I'm not suggesting that the EP without Britain would win, especially given the expected Turkish entry against Russia. [Although I wouldn't consider it totally impossible.] However I think the war will last a lot longer than your expecting, both because I don't think Germany can win a victory as quickly as you suggest nor, for reasons I mentioned above are they likely to be willing to accepted a relatively minor level of victory. A further factor here would be the sunken costs fallacy where having waged such a conflict and suffered heavy losses - even if their opponents suffer more - they will need to demand a clear and big victory to satisfy public opinion. That both powers are more autocratic then the western powers doesn't significantly change that factor.

Steve

Corrected faulty quote commands. Apologies for that.

 

[Buba]

Especially since they will win the emnity of the Turks and Greeks and probably also Bulgaria as well.

And this is why, boys and girls, I don't understand such vehement opposition to Russia getting the Straits. Yet another resource sink for Russia to pour - and likely mismanage - its money into.

Plus while it gets them an entrance to the Med they still have to get passed Britain at Malta and Gib going west or the Suez canal going south - or even with possibly Greece in alliance with Britain as a result bases on the Greek islands further constraining the Russians in the event of a clash.

I don't think Russian thinking had reached Breakout Fleet levels yet. IMO at this point in time gaining the Straits had two main objectives - emotional and political, i.e. liberating Constantinople, and commercial - preventing Turkey from closing down Russian maritime commerce.
The military side would had been defensive - prevent the British fleet from entering the Black Sea and capturing the Crimea or Rostov.

A fascist Russia is a possibility,

What fascism? Such a brand of nationalist socialism has not been invented yet. Bruno Mussolini still a Good Comrade of the PSI and in French pay.

 

[ATP]

And this is why, boys and girls, I don't understand such vehement opposition to Russia getting the Straits. Yet another resource sink for Russia to pour - and likely mismanage - its money into.


I don't think Russian thinking had reached Breakout Fleet levels yet. IMO at this point in time gaining the Straits had two main objectives - emotional and political, i.e. liberating Constantinople, and commercial - preventing Turkey from closing down Russian maritime commerce.
The military side would had been defensive - prevent the British fleet from entering the Black Sea and capturing the Crimea or Rostov.


What fascism? Such a brand of nationalist socialism has not been invented yet. Bruno Mussolini still a Good Comrade of the PSI and in French pay.

1.Exactly.Especially,that they saw other orthodox states as vassals who must obey them at best,and provinces at worst.I see fall of panslawizm made all by russian hands.
2.political was important,but emotional even more.Many really belived in third Rome bullshit,and i even read that tsar Mikolaj really belived that if he liberate Haghia Sophia,priest who vanished into its walls when turks come come out and greet him.
3.I always thought that Mussolini was England agent - that is why british secret services help murder him

 

[sillygoose]

I suggested Montenegro because its already a belligerent and while it would be difficult forces and equipment sent there would aid the Serbs. Definitely Greece would be a better option if you could get it to joining the EPs but with the advantage of hindsight while there was strong political support for this the monarch, which had a lot of influence was strongly opposed so unless the French are willing to effectively launch a coup against him - and do it successfully - its a no go.

Certainly Montenegro is better than nothing, but given the risk of offending the Italians in their backyard, the lack of infrastructure, and the threat of the A-H navy (which did surprisingly well in WW1 in the Adriatic, in fact that is where von Trapp made his name as a submarine commander and sank a French armored cruiser).

Also the French didn't do well there IOTL:

Montenegrin campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I was assuming you were referring to post war sharing out of territory. Assuming Germany defeated and in this scenario Russia will probably have taken the bulk of the losses and be weakened then unless they already hold Constantinople how would they gain it if Britain and France opposed the move?

In that case they won't, but I wasn't thinking along those lines necessarily.

I suppose there is a counter argument that under such circumstances Constantinople is a somewhat mixed blessing for Russia as it now has to hold onto a region including a large city with no native Russians there. Especially since they will win the emnity of the Turks and Greeks and probably also Bulgaria as well. Plus while it gets them an entrance to the Med they still have to get passed Britain at Malta and Gib going west or the Suez canal going south - or even with possibly Greece in alliance with Britain as a result bases on the Greek islands further constraining the Russians in the event of a clash.

There is the religious connection, with Russia being Orthodox Christian (so the local Christians would be pretty favorable to them vs. the Ottomans), though expect Russian colonization to make the occupation stick. I'm sure though the strategic benefits would simply cause them to be as nasty and necessary to hold it much like they did against Muslims in Central Asia.

I'd imagine Bulgaria is also pretty well occupied if not made part of 'the Great Russian Empire' assuming the Russians actually win the war. Also part of the Czarist agenda in the Balkans. I highly doubt the Russians give AF about what the Greeks or Turks think. As to the exits being controlled by the British that is true, but then the British cannot control the exit of the fleet into the Mediterranean, which gives the Russians a LOT more say in the Middle East.

Never had any other viewpoint. Its just that some weigh more than others and the people with the most power and influence in Britain were more concerned with the big issues, such as the balance of power in Europe.

Fair enough.

You seem to lack an understanding of events and politics in Britain. There are imperialists, most noticeably in the Tory party as well as people who want to change Britain's tradition of free trade - again largely the Tories. The latter is important because additional territories, as well as being costly to administer and protect provided little additional wealth for Britain while free trade was in control. Its noted that for most nations, even with protectionism in place many colonies costs more to rule than they supplied in economic returns.

So why did the French and British then carve up the Ottoman Empire if it was so costly to maintain? And the Tories not shed them ASAP after LG was out of power?

I'm not saying that 1914 Britain's political leadership were angels - they weren't - but in Britain especially there was a strong opposition, especially in the Liberals, to ruling more territory. This was a major reason why the British empire was as small as it was as it could have been a hell of a lot larger.

How do you explain the acquisition of colonies by the Liberals during the WW1 peace deals?

Technically it was neutral and as the Deutschland case showed the US was quite happy to trade with Germany. Its growing economic ties to the allies and the behaviour of Germany were changing that but it was still a stupid thing to do as it was technically an act of war.

So was the Blacklist and far Blockade, but the US ultimately didn't care because they made money. The Brits did that despite the risk of war with the US. Ultimately it was the era of everyone trying to get away with anything and daring everyone else to do something about it.

Except that the navy and the security it supplied were perceived as very important to Britain, including the bulk of the population and also naval superiority was a matter of prestige. As such the German threat was seen as very real and threatening. The OTL invasion of Belgium helped unify public opinion in favour of war against Germany but there would have been substantial feelings of hostility towards it anyway and especially if it looked like it would be become a lot more powerful due to a clear victory in the war.

To the British government yes. Do you have a source about with polling about what the average person thought? I think you're running into the same problem that pop-histories have when discussing the 'war fever' at the start of WW1: they take media narratives as the unvarnished truth rather than reflections if not outright spokesmen of what the government or a military institution thought.

Once again I'm sure the RN thought exactly as you say as well as some politicians (Grey, Asquith), but I have yet to see anything about social surveys confirming the people were willing to fight before Belgium was invaded; in fact the only views I've seen state that without Belgium being invaded the public had no interest in fighting Germany.

Willingly to War. Public Response to the Outbreak of War | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)

It may surprise us to learn that some sectors of the European public were in favour of the war in 1914. The impact of modern weapons was not well understood and many people in the government, military and civilian population imagined that the conflict would be short. Ultimately the essential...

encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net

The cabinet, however, was badly divided on whether or not to enter the war, and concerned about public reactions: there were major anti-war demonstrations, including one that rallied thousands of people in Trafalgar Square in London in the days preceding the entry into the war. Ultimately, it was the German invasion of Belgium that allowed the cabinet figures in favour of assisting France
...
even the very liberal newspaper The Manchester Guardian rallied to the war effort in response to the invasion of Belgium.

Certainly some in the British public were interested in war with Germany (or in some cases even anyone), but the majority did not appear to think that way until Belgium. Even if Russia were defeated. Besides as you say people were interested in naval issues and the 'naval race' ended in 1912 with an unmitigated British victory. So there wasn't any fear of the German navy.

A fascist Russia is a possibility, as might still be a more militant Germany depending on how the struggle goes to challenge the influence of the junkers and other such groups.

Germany probably wouldn't be more militant given that the German left was growing more popular, the more conservative men were more likely to serve in the army (the army actively kept out the socialist city dwellers) and get killed or maimed in the war, which only enhances left parties electorally after the war, especially if it doesn't go long and require total mobilization.
Everyone was turning on the Junkers pre-war, not just labor. The middle class did not like being kept out of the army leadership (see the German army league lobby group), industrialists hated the agriculture subsidies that prevented trade deals that benefited industry, and of course the urban left were no fans of the nobility who had unfair electoral laws enacted to maintain a lead in parliament.

As we saw IOTL even after defeat there was a sharp turn against militarism in Germany and it took the Great Depression and Hitler's dictatorship to bring it back.

However the problem with rejecting your own arguments is that you weaken them in general discussion.

Not if your interpretation weakens your own later arguments...

One complication of course is that assorted groups are likely to have different interpretations of the impacts of such an eastern expansion and reality can be different again.

Agreed.

As such, especially with imperialist feeling at a peak as it was in some ways - due in part to social darwinism - even if gaining control of very large areas of the former Russian empire actually weaken Germany it could well be perceived otherwise by assorted groups - including for instance many people in Britain, Germany and other nations.

If anything I'd think British imperialists would be happy to see German colonialism turned East instead of infringing on British colonial territories, which was the cause of so much friction pre-war.

If it looks like Germany is winning, after a bitter fight, and is refusing to accept moderate gains then Britain can throw its own hat into the ring in supporting the EPs. Say if Russian was suffering badly and Germany was making demands on France such as assumed in the September programme because it believes France is too weak to stand against it. Especially since Britain, given the ongoing conflict is likely to have boosting its own forces and probably gained known of doctrine and battle tactics through officers assigned to study the war alongside the French forces. [Having a senior moment as the exact term is escaping me but think you know what I mean. ]

Again I highly doubt the British public would support going to war because the British government felt the Czar was getting an unfavorable peace deal. France potentially yes since that could put the German military on the Channel, but not in the east, which would focus the German military away from Britain.

How could Germany even suggest anything like the September programm given that they'd hold no French territory since they turned East? OTL SP was a product of actually holding a lot of France, which is why it mostly talked about territory in the west and only mentioned Poland since that was the only Russian territory Germany held at the time.

If you think the British army would expand and learn in peacetime, you really don't understand how messed up the British army was at the time and how viciously the navy prevented funds from going to them.

The Victoran Army and the Staff College 1854-1914

A pioneering work in British military history, originally published in 1972, this book is both scholarly and entertaining. Although the book concentrates on a single institution, it illuminates a much wider area of social and intellectual change. For the Army the importance of the change was...

www.routledge.com

This book really makes the British general staff look pretty bad and it was only the challenge of actual combat that got the British army to actually reform and modernize.

Its not a question of being pro-Russia, although as in WWII there's probably been a fair amount of press put out about the gallant Russians defending their homelands against the German hordes and references to 1812. Which is a far easier sell than what both Britain and the US did in WWII with the USSR. Its a question of Britain's interest and especially its security. Given the displaced hostility towards Britain and the perceived German gains from a victory plus probably references to other threats to Britain from a single power dominating the continent, going back to 1588 there will be plenty of scope for moblising public opinion for war. Especially if Germany has rejected proposals from Britain for a moderate peace, which will be the view presented by the government in Britain.

Given how disinterested the public was to the Austro-Serb conflict and the great German-English cultural affinity I highly doubt that the public would take Russia's side, especially if Britain was neutral.

WW2 was a very different situation and much easier to sell in WW2 thanks to more pervasive media and years demonizing the Nazis before hand, plus of course the Nazis bombing Britain. Oh and WW1 being only 20 years before.

Eh, I'm not buying that argument. Agree to disagree.

Yes but that could change if the Liberals lost Irish support or were seen to be too pro-'Irish' by the bulk of the British people, although the latter could be fairly insufficient prior to the expected election in 1916. One other factor here could if the Liberals were seen as being too soft on the issue of German successes in the war ongoing on the continent. Which I think could well last into 1916.

I'm not a professionally trained historian and as you may have gathered have collected few new books in recent years. As such I tend not to have marked sources as well compared with what was said. However from numerous sources that the Tories were more radical in things like economic policy, being concerned about a perceived decline in Britain's power and position. Hence they were the primary forces pushing for an end to free trade and to introducing conscription. They were the party pushing for more military spending whereas the Liberals wanted to cut military spending to increase social spending, as they did in their early years and only reluctantly later increased it in the face of the German naval challenge.

Gotcha.

If it was a short war with no great devastation for any power or major territorial changes. However I'm doubtful that would happen. Germany after all is worried that Russia could soon eclipse her so what is the point for Germany of waging a war that costs it a lot but doesn't massively weakened Russia? Especially since Russia not only has much greater manpower but its population is growing a lot faster. As such Russia could afford to lose twice as many casualties as Germany and unless its seriously weakened Germany has possibly delayed things a little but will have to consider another war a few years down the line.

IOTL they were hoping for a quick defeat of France so they could force a peace deal that would humiliate both, but leave neither permanently aggreived since they thought a quick defeat would trigger another revolution in Russia. It is only after the war dragged on that they started thinking about major territorial acquisitions. IIRC that is from the Canadian author Holger Herwig's book on the German/Austro-Hungarian war effort.

In this scenario then while Russia is likely to suffer substantially it being on the defensive is going to make a comparative shift in loss ratios - albeit I take your point that they will be facing a lot more Germans from the start. However with France not looking like collapsing then a withdrawal from the frontier regions is a viable prospect and Germany losses a lot of its advantages once logistics restrict how much firepower it can apply on the front because of the need to move heavy equipment in very large amounts. Plus your likely to see at least some rallying around the motherland in Russia when there's a clear threat as opposed to what looks like increasingly fruitless and costly attacks on German positions. As such I can easily see the war going into 1916 and possibly the front reaching about the Prepeit marshes which are likely to further hinder German potentials. The further back they are pushed the longer both German supply lines and the front.

Actually attacking in the East generally was cheaper than defending for the Germans. They were much more able to fight a mobile war effectively than the Russians (and Austrians) were. Again see 1914 vs. 1915 casualty ratios. Russia just stepped in it in 1914 because they advanced WAY too quickly in East Prussia to try and help France...which actually paid off given the diversion of two vital corps from the West to Prussia after von Prittwitz had his breakdown in August.

When you say withdrawing from the frontier regions, you mean Russia, right? In that case they lose their fortress shield and give up Poland along with a lot of artillery and ammo in the forts. 1915 in 1914. Sure it helps the Russian army save casualties, but it is a massive humiliation for the Czar and already undermines morale in the army, since they are basically admitting they cannot fight the Germans and have to flee before they arrive. So I think just given the natural pride of the Russian army and of the Czar himself that they wouldn't do that unless they were losing badly.

Rally around the flag is going to happen, but once the defeats start racking up, same with the casualties and retreats, then faith in the Czar is going to collapse like IOTL. Sustained defeats did not result in a rally around the flag effect lasting.

The war will be won or lost on morale factors, not losses. See the difference between the Soviet and Czarist casualties and willingness to fight to the bitter end.

Similarly while France, assuming no butterflies, will have the insane plan 17 for frontal assaults but that simply can not last and as OTL France will find alternative ideas and will have less threat and more resources due to not having a lot of their most developed territories occupied.

No doubt, but it would take time to evolve just like IOTL and it will come down to firepower, which is what the French doctrine relied on ultimately, since their infantry offensives, even with innovative tactics, were pretty well defeated with horrific casualties in both 1914-15 except when German leadership's morale cracked at the Marne. Certainly France gains relative to OTL without territorial or civilian population losses, but they have a much more restricted front to attack on and very bad terrain, not to mention a German fortress system to overcome. Oh and much less heavy artillery than the Germans.

As I say I'm not suggesting that the EP without Britain would win, especially given the expected Turkish entry against Russia. [Although I wouldn't consider it totally impossible.] However I think the war will last a lot longer than your expecting, both because I don't think Germany can win a victory as quickly as you suggest nor, for reasons I mentioned above are they likely to be willing to accepted a relatively minor level of victory. A further factor here would be the sunken costs fallacy where having waged such a conflict and suffered heavy losses - even if their opponents suffer more - they will need to demand a clear and big victory to satisfy public opinion. That both powers are more autocratic then the western powers doesn't significantly change that factor.

Steve

Then rather than continuing on in circles, we agree to disagree on that.

 

[sillygoose]

What fascism? Such a brand of nationalist socialism has not been invented yet. Bruno Mussolini still a Good Comrade of the PSI and in French pay.

The Czar was an autocrat with only a very weak Duma to answer to, blended religion with the monarchy, pushed a pan-Slavic racial policy to further foreign policy goals in the Balkans and to divert the internal political ambitions of subject minorities like the Poles.
National Socialism wasn't the origin of Fascism as an ideology either.

Russian Empire - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Prior to the issuance of the October Manifesto, the tsar ruled as an absolute monarch, subject to only two limitations on his authority (both of which were intended to protect the existing system): the Emperor and his consort must both belong to the Russian Orthodox Church, and he must obey the laws of succession (Pauline Laws) established by Paul I. Beyond this, the power of the Russian Autocrat was virtually limitless.

Fascism - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Fascism (/ˈfæʃɪzəm/) is a form of far-right, authoritarian ultranationalism[1][2] characterized by dictatorial power, forcible suppression of opposition, and strong regimentation of society and of the economy,[3] which came to prominence in early 20th-century Europe.[4]

I'm not saying the system of the Russian Empire was 100% in line with later developed fascistic ideology, but it very strongly aligned with more than the basic idea of it before WW1.

 

[Buba]

The Czar was an autocrat with only a very weak Duma to answer to, blended religion with the monarchy, pushed a pan-Slavic racial policy to further foreign policy goals in the Balkans and to divert the internal political ambitions of subject minorities like the Poles.

This description is not that far from e.g. 16th century England ...

 

[stevep]

And this is why, boys and girls, I don't understand such vehement opposition to Russia getting the Straits. Yet another resource sink for Russia to pour - and likely mismanage - its money into.

Because people fear success by a potential opponent even if that may be more fear than actual threat. It would be a resource sink in terms of holding the region and probably a diplomatic disaster but as you say there are significant economic benefits for Russia from owning the straits as you say.

I don't think Russian thinking had reached Breakout Fleet levels yet. IMO at this point in time gaining the Straits had two main objectives - emotional and political, i.e. liberating Constantinople, and commercial - preventing Turkey from closing down Russian maritime commerce.
The military side would had been defensive - prevent the British fleet from entering the Black Sea and capturing the Crimea or Rostov.

True they hadn't approached Germany let alone British naval strength and their probably unlikely to do so for at least a couple of decades. Even ignoring the serious geographical problems Russian sea power would have. However as you say there are significant economic and defensive benefits. I doubt against any decent defences Britain could take either the Crimean or even worse Rostov but if their able to enter the Black Sea they can really screw up Russian activity there.

What fascism? Such a brand of nationalist socialism has not been invented yet. Bruno Mussolini still a Good Comrade of the PSI and in French pay.

Its probably going to emerge somewhere with a right wing ultra-nationalist ideology given the scientific and political developments in recent decades. Could well be called something else if it doesn't start in Italy as OTL as their likely to have a non-Roman example/name to call upon but like the assorted forms of communism its an idea that fits the time and as OTL the two extremes are likely to fertilize each other.

 

[sillygoose]

This description is not that far from e.g. 16th century England ...

True. Feudalism often fits the description.

Edit:
The White Russian movement after WW1 did delve into Fascist ideology:

Ivan Ilyin: A Fashionable Fascist – Riddle Russia

In her recent essay, “In search of Putin's philosopher,” Marlene Laruelle argues it is best to be wary of claims that one thinker or another is responsible for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political strategy. Ever since Putin came to power in 2000, it has been fashionable among...

www.ridl.io

Ivan Ilyin - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

He became the main ideologue of the Russian White movement in emigration and between 1927 and 1930 was a publisher and editor of the Russian-language journal (Russkiy Kolokol, Russian Bell).

In exile, Ivan Ilyin argued that Russia should not be judged by the Communist danger it represented at that time but looked forward to a future in which it would liberate itself with the help of Christian Fascism.[4]

Ilyin was a monarchist. He believed that monarchical consciousness of law corresponds to such values as religious piety and family. His ideal was the monarch who would serve for the good of the country, would not belong to any party and would embody the union of all people, whatever their beliefs are.

 

[ATP]

True. Feudalism often fits the description.

Edit:
The White Russian movement after WW1 did delve into Fascist ideology:

Ivan Ilyin: A Fashionable Fascist – Riddle Russia

In her recent essay, “In search of Putin's philosopher,” Marlene Laruelle argues it is best to be wary of claims that one thinker or another is responsible for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political strategy. Ever since Putin came to power in 2000, it has been fashionable among...

www.ridl.io

Ivan Ilyin - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

1. - 16th century England was not feudal,but police state.With secret police creating "papist plots" so they could have ptetext to murder more catholic and steal their property.

2 and 3 - becouse russians never have feudalism,but slavic state of Moscov/where everybody but tsar was slave/ turned into absolute monarchy.When absolute monarchy stopped working,some turned to fascism,other supported commies.
All becouse they never have freedom,so they could not pursue it.

 

[stevep]

Damn, replied to Bubba but missed your post.

Certainly Montenegro is better than nothing, but given the risk of offending the Italians in their backyard, the lack of infrastructure, and the threat of the A-H navy (which did surprisingly well in WW1 in the Adriatic, in fact that is where von Trapp made his name as a submarine commander and sank a French armored cruiser).

Also the French didn't do well there IOTL:

Montenegrin campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In that case they won't, but I wasn't thinking along those lines necessarily.


There is the religious connection, with Russia being Orthodox Christian (so the local Christians would be pretty favorable to them vs. the Ottomans), though expect Russian colonization to make the occupation stick. I'm sure though the strategic benefits would simply cause them to be as nasty and necessary to hold it much like they did against Muslims in Central Asia.

I'd imagine Bulgaria is also pretty well occupied if not made part of 'the Great Russian Empire' assuming the Russians actually win the war. Also part of the Czarist agenda in the Balkans. I highly doubt the Russians give AF about what the Greeks or Turks think. As to the exits being controlled by the British that is true, but then the British cannot control the exit of the fleet into the Mediterranean, which gives the Russians a LOT more say in the Middle East.



So why did the French and British then carve up the Ottoman Empire if it was so costly to maintain? And the Tories not shed them ASAP after LG was out of power?


How do you explain the acquisition of colonies by the Liberals during the WW1 peace deals?


So was the Blacklist and far Blockade, but the US ultimately didn't care because they made money. The Brits did that despite the risk of war with the US. Ultimately it was the era of everyone trying to get away with anything and daring everyone else to do something about it.


To the British government yes. Do you have a source about with polling about what the average person thought? I think you're running into the same problem that pop-histories have when discussing the 'war fever' at the start of WW1: they take media narratives as the unvarnished truth rather than reflections if not outright spokesmen of what the government or a military institution thought.

Once again I'm sure the RN thought exactly as you say as well as some politicians (Grey, Asquith), but I have yet to see anything about social surveys confirming the people were willing to fight before Belgium was invaded; in fact the only views I've seen state that without Belgium being invaded the public had no interest in fighting Germany.

Willingly to War. Public Response to the Outbreak of War | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)

It may surprise us to learn that some sectors of the European public were in favour of the war in 1914. The impact of modern weapons was not well understood and many people in the government, military and civilian population imagined that the conflict would be short. Ultimately the essential...

encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net

Certainly some in the British public were interested in war with Germany (or in some cases even anyone), but the majority did not appear to think that way until Belgium. Even if Russia were defeated. Besides as you say people were interested in naval issues and the 'naval race' ended in 1912 with an unmitigated British victory. So there wasn't any fear of the German navy.


Germany probably wouldn't be more militant given that the German left was growing more popular, the more conservative men were more likely to serve in the army (the army actively kept out the socialist city dwellers) and get killed or maimed in the war, which only enhances left parties electorally after the war, especially if it doesn't go long and require total mobilization.
Everyone was turning on the Junkers pre-war, not just labor. The middle class did not like being kept out of the army leadership (see the German army league lobby group), industrialists hated the agriculture subsidies that prevented trade deals that benefited industry, and of course the urban left were no fans of the nobility who had unfair electoral laws enacted to maintain a lead in parliament.

As we saw IOTL even after defeat there was a sharp turn against militarism in Germany and it took the Great Depression and Hitler's dictatorship to bring it back.


Not if your interpretation weakens your own later arguments...


Agreed.


If anything I'd think British imperialists would be happy to see German colonialism turned East instead of infringing on British colonial territories, which was the cause of so much friction pre-war.


Again I highly doubt the British public would support going to war because the British government felt the Czar was getting an unfavorable peace deal. France potentially yes since that could put the German military on the Channel, but not in the east, which would focus the German military away from Britain.

How could Germany even suggest anything like the September programm given that they'd hold no French territory since they turned East? OTL SP was a product of actually holding a lot of France, which is why it mostly talked about territory in the west and only mentioned Poland since that was the only Russian territory Germany held at the time.

If you think the British army would expand and learn in peacetime, you really don't understand how messed up the British army was at the time and how viciously the navy prevented funds from going to them.

The Victoran Army and the Staff College 1854-1914

A pioneering work in British military history, originally published in 1972, this book is both scholarly and entertaining. Although the book concentrates on a single institution, it illuminates a much wider area of social and intellectual change. For the Army the importance of the change was...

www.routledge.com

This book really makes the British general staff look pretty bad and it was only the challenge of actual combat that got the British army to actually reform and modernize.


Given how disinterested the public was to the Austro-Serb conflict and the great German-English cultural affinity I highly doubt that the public would take Russia's side, especially if Britain was neutral.

WW2 was a very different situation and much easier to sell in WW2 thanks to more pervasive media and years demonizing the Nazis before hand, plus of course the Nazis bombing Britain. Oh and WW1 being only 20 years before.

Eh, I'm not buying that argument. Agree to disagree.


Gotcha.


IOTL they were hoping for a quick defeat of France so they could force a peace deal that would humiliate both, but leave neither permanently aggreived since they thought a quick defeat would trigger another revolution in Russia. It is only after the war dragged on that they started thinking about major territorial acquisitions. IIRC that is from the Canadian author Holger Herwig's book on the German/Austro-Hungarian war effort.


Actually attacking in the East generally was cheaper than defending for the Germans. They were much more able to fight a mobile war effectively than the Russians (and Austrians) were. Again see 1914 vs. 1915 casualty ratios. Russia just stepped in it in 1914 because they advanced WAY too quickly in East Prussia to try and help France...which actually paid off given the diversion of two vital corps from the West to Prussia after von Prittwitz had his breakdown in August.

When you say withdrawing from the frontier regions, you mean Russia, right? In that case they lose their fortress shield and give up Poland along with a lot of artillery and ammo in the forts. 1915 in 1914. Sure it helps the Russian army save casualties, but it is a massive humiliation for the Czar and already undermines morale in the army, since they are basically admitting they cannot fight the Germans and have to flee before they arrive. So I think just given the natural pride of the Russian army and of the Czar himself that they wouldn't do that unless they were losing badly.

Rally around the flag is going to happen, but once the defeats start racking up, same with the casualties and retreats, then faith in the Czar is going to collapse like IOTL. Sustained defeats did not result in a rally around the flag effect lasting.

The war will be won or lost on morale factors, not losses. See the difference between the Soviet and Czarist casualties and willingness to fight to the bitter end.


No doubt, but it would take time to evolve just like IOTL and it will come down to firepower, which is what the French doctrine relied on ultimately, since their infantry offensives, even with innovative tactics, were pretty well defeated with horrific casualties in both 1914-15 except when German leadership's morale cracked at the Marne. Certainly France gains relative to OTL without territorial or civilian population losses, but they have a much more restricted front to attack on and very bad terrain, not to mention a German fortress system to overcome. Oh and much less heavy artillery than the Germans.


Then rather than continuing on in circles, we agree to disagree on that.

Disagree with a number of your assumptions and conclusions. However as you say we're basically going nowhere.

 

[WolfBear]

If the French hang in there, would they keep focusing all their military energies on Alsace-Lorraine in 1914, 1915, and 1916 even if that stalls? Or would they have an "easterner" faction emerge, supporting employment of colonial and expeditionary forces on a another front like the Balkans to put pressure on a Central Powers flank?

A French Gallipoli, perhaps? And/or a French amphibious landing in Syria and/or Lebanon and then aiming to expand from there? The latter option here could be viewed as a revival of the Frankish Crusader spirit after a break of several centuries!

Or could the French have grueling, hard-win territorial victories in Alsace-Lorraine that turn out to be fatal for France's commitment to the overall war effort and Russian alliance. As in, over the course of slow-moving and sometimes reversing see-saw battles, the French gain back pretty much the entirety of Alsace-Lorraine bite-by-bite over the course of 1914 and 1915 and 1916, and then, rather than press for the Rhineland or Berlin, they signal they are ready to peace out based on the battlefield status quo?

That would depend on what exactly Russia's position on the Eastern Front is going to look like by that point in time and also on what happens to Serbia since Serbia is the reason that Russia originally went to war in 1914 in the first place.

 

[WolfBear]

I think it bears further explanation why the East First/French offensive into Alsace Lorraine would be bad, since I have repeatedly said it now. Terrence M. Holmes, writing in "Not the Schlieffen Plan 1914", explains the situation thusly:

​

If Moltke had followed Schlieffen’s real intentions for the counter-offensive conduct of a two-front war, the first great battle of 1914 would have been fought in Lorraine in the third week of hostilities, on terms much more favourable to Germany than they were at the battle of the Marne. We can reconstruct this alternative scenario because we know exactly what the French chief of staff Joseph Joffre intended to do if the Germans did not invade Belgium.​

​

French war planning was constrained by two political imperatives. In the first place, France was committed by agreement with her Russian ally to launch an ‘all-out and immediate’ attack against Germany as soon as possible after the outbreak of war. Moreover, the French government had resolved not to encroach on Belgian territory unless the Germans did so first. Joffre was therefore obliged to incorporate in his war plans a variant which allowed for a full-scale offensive avoiding Belgian territory altogether, and that would have come into effect in 1914 if the Germans had stayed on the defensive and not entered Belgium. For this eventuality Joffre decided that three of his five armies, comprising some 60 percent of his first-line troops, should invade Lorraine on 14 August, aiming initially to reach the line of the river Saar between Sarrebourg and Saarbrücken (Doughty 2010, 146-8, 155-8, 168). Ominously, that position was flanked at both ends by the German fortresses of Metz and Strasbourg.​

​

Schlieffen had long before outlined how the Germans should exploit a massive French incursion through ‘the relatively narrow space between Metz and Strasbourg’. The aim must not be to push the enemy back to his fortified border. Rather, he had to be engaged on three sides, ‘from Metz, from the Saar and from Strasbourg’, and brought to a standstill there, which would give the Germans an excellent chance of decisive victory by means of envelopment attacks out of Metz and Strasbourg. The ultimate aim of this ‘attack on the enemy’s flank and rear’ would be to surround the French invasion forces and ‘not just defeat them, but lay them low and as far as possible annihilate them’ (Boetticher 1933, 260).​

​

Joffre himself was acutely aware of the perils attending a French offensive in Lorraine. He said that the object would be to rupture the German front, but he conceded that:​

​

"In the course of this operation our forces would be liable to be taken in flank by attacks coming in all probability from both Metz and the region of Molsheim-Strasbourg. By penetrating like a wedge into the midst of the enemy’s lines we would be more or less inviting envelopment (Joffre 1932, 74-5)."​

​

But a German defensive posture in 1914 would have compelled Joffre to embark on that hazardous course of action — that was precisely what he was committed to if the Germans refrained from attacking through Belgium and waited instead for the opportunity to counter-attack. In that event, the war would have started with a great battle of encirclement as soon as the French First, Second and Fourth Armies had completed their short advance into the danger zone between Metz and Strasbourg. Speaking in 1904 of the strategic importance of these fortresses, Schlieffen once again emphasized their role in counter-offensive operations: ‘I do not mean a Metz and Strasbourg that are to be besieged and defended, but rather a Metz and Strasbourg in which armies are assembled and through which they march in order to attack the enemy by surprise’ (Zuber 2004, 160).​

​

In short, 60% of the French Army in August of 1914 was walking into a trap, which they only escaped thanks to the French re-orienting themselves to respond to the German advance through Belgium and into France itself. It would've been a war winning blow from which the French never would've recovered from. An Eastern Front-first strategy will also allow the Germans to build up four armies-42 Divisions-in the East. Serbia thus is likely destroyed by 2nd Army in October, as OTL their severe munition shortages nearly forced the Serbs to surrender anyway.

Likely, the French seek peace in late 1914, with the Russians to follow suit soon after with the Central Powers probably holding Poland up to the Bug river and half of Lithuania, while Serbia has been crushed and occupied.

When the CP has achieved such a crushing victory, why not aim to expand even further in the East in 1915? Advance up to the Daugava-Dnieper Line, for instance? This would give the CPs control of all of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Belarus, and the western half of Ukraine and would also allow the CPs to portray themselves as the liberators of the lion's share of Russia's Jewish population.

 

[WolfBear]

It stands to keep in mind that a relatively quick end of the war - under two years, for example - would also see comparably limited territorial changes as compared to later demands as realized by Brest-Litowsk, for example, as these were a direct result of the terrible losses and deprivations suffered by continued trench warfare and supply shortages. The shorter the war, the more lenient the victors' demands, most likely. France, for example, as the offensive party here, would most likely only be made to suffer diplomatic concessions and monetary/physical reparations rather than suffer territorial losses. In the east, I'm not sure how much direct territory the central powers would gobble up, or if they would not opt for the creation of buffer states plus some limited territories for themselves.

Briey and Longwy and its huge iron ore deposits could be an attractive German annexation in the West. As for the East, it depends on just how much security the Germans are going to want there. The Daugava-Dnieper Line is a good defensive line, for instance. And Yes, the East will have German puppet states and few-to-none direct German annexations. Germany doesn't need any more Poles or Lithuanians, for instance.

 

[WolfBear]

They won't be able to adjust tactics because the Army will be decimated in the course of a single campaign season; we are talking almost their entire 1914-1918 losses compacted into a single campaign season.

But the younger French male cohorts won't be drafted yet, no? So, France could create new armies from its male cohorts who will turn 18 in 1915 and beyond.

 

[History Learner]

But the younger French male cohorts won't be drafted yet, no? So, France could create new armies from its male cohorts who will turn 18 in 1915 and beyond.

Total French casualties in World War I were 1,385,300 dead and missing. Total mobilized French forces in August of 1914 amounted to 3.6 million, of which 60% have just marched into a grand encirclement; that's 2,160,000 million killed, missing, captured and wounded. The French manpower base would've been so gutted that the younger age cohorts are no remedy even if we presume the Germans grant them the breathing space to raise them, instead of taking advantage of the effective demolishment of the French Army to occupy much of the French heartland.

 

[WolfBear]

Total French casualties in World War I were 1,385,300 dead and missing. Total mobilized French forces in August of 1914 amounted to 3.6 million, of which 60% have just marched into a grand encirclement; that's 2,160,000 million killed, missing, captured and wounded. The French manpower base would've been so gutted that the younger age cohorts are no remedy even if we presume the Germans grant them the breathing space to raise them, instead of taking advantage of the effective demolishment of the French Army to occupy much of the French heartland.

You're assuming that none of the French forces are actually going to be capable of breaking out of this extremely massive encirclement, which isn't guaranteed. The Nazis could trap a good part of the French forces but some could potentially manage to break out of this encirclement.

 

[History Learner]

You're assuming that none of the French forces are actually going to be capable of breaking out of this extremely massive encirclement, which isn't guaranteed. The Nazis could trap a good part of the French forces but some could potentially manage to break out of this encirclement.

Probably, but even if 30 or 40% do successfully break out, you've still had the French take all of their historical 1914-1918 casualties in the space of a single campaign season. The French manpower was effectively exhausted in 1918, and now that is their state from 1914 onward.

 

[WolfBear]

Probably, but even if 30 or 40% do successfully break out, you've still had the French take all of their historical 1914-1918 casualties in the space of a single campaign season. The French manpower was effectively exhausted in 1918, and now that is their state from 1914 onward.

Not quite: France suffered 1.7 million dead (or missing, I suppose) in WWI in real life along with 4.3 million wounded (but surviving):

World War I casualties - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Here, there will be 1.7 million French troops dead, captured, or missing, but 1.7 million is still much less than 6.0 million (since 1.7 mil + 4.3 mil = 6.0 mil).

When people talk about real life WWI French casualties, they might sometimes think only about the deaths and forget about those who were wounded but survived.

 

[History Learner]

Not quite: France suffered 1.7 million dead (or missing, I suppose) in WWI in real life along with 4.3 million wounded (but surviving):

World War I casualties - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Here, there will be 1.7 million French troops dead, captured, or missing, but 1.7 million is still much less than 6.0 million (since 1.7 mil + 4.3 mil = 6.0 mil).

When people talk about real life WWI French casualties, they might sometimes think only about the deaths and forget about those who were wounded but survived.

Hence why I only said the missing or the dead. The French have lost, as KIA, MIA or POW, the same level of dead and missing they had historically in the course of the entire war. That means their Pre-War Army has been gutted, giving the Germans plenty of opportunities to exploit the situation but even if they don't every casualty France takes from thereon is in addition to what they historically suffered, which was 4.29% of their entire population dying. This was, however, largely among prime age military males:

Proportionally, all the categories of drafted military men did not suffer the same amount of casualties. Casualties varied depending on a soldier’s exposure to battle fire and the duration that they spent on the front lines. There were also large disparities between different age groups and the different services performed, and the ranks held, by soldiers. Men killed in 1912, 1913, and 1914, were respectively in percentage 27.7, 29.2 and 27.8 percent. Gross figures for each age group of approximately 300,000 dead paid the highest tribute for they made up the bulk of the infantry battalions in 1914 and 1915, the deadliest years of the conflict.​

 

[WolfBear]

Hence why I only said the missing or the dead. The French have lost, as KIA, MIA or POW, the same level of dead and missing they had historically in the course of the entire war. That means their Pre-War Army has been gutted, giving the Germans plenty of opportunities to exploit the situation but even if they don't every casualty France takes from thereon is in addition to what they historically suffered, which was 4.29% of their entire population dying. This was, however, largely among prime age military males:

Proportionally, all the categories of drafted military men did not suffer the same amount of casualties. Casualties varied depending on a soldier’s exposure to battle fire and the duration that they spent on the front lines. There were also large disparities between different age groups and the different services performed, and the ranks held, by soldiers. Men killed in 1912, 1913, and 1914, were respectively in percentage 27.7, 29.2 and 27.8 percent. Gross figures for each age group of approximately 300,000 dead paid the highest tribute for they made up the bulk of the infantry battalions in 1914 and 1915, the deadliest years of the conflict.​

I just want to clarify--are you saying that almost 30% of the total French men who were drafted in 1912, 1913, and 1914 got killed in World War I in real life?