After 7 months of brutal, grinding fighting Russia have (probably) managed to occupy a small town of (previously) 10,000 people which represents one of the two supply paths to the equally strategically insignificant Bakhmut. Slightly backpedalling on the lofty ambitions of taking Kyiv and Odessa some had 10 months ago, huh?
Not at all, given both the Pentagon and the AFU General Staff state they have both the desire and capability to get to those points, still. What your analysis, if it can be termed that, lacks is any sort of knowledge of the situation, both in strategic terms but also in looking at local transportation networks. Allow me to educate you, as I so often do in this thread:
They've presumably done this with those forces you said had happily and safely withdrawn from fighting in the north, and then south, to focus on "more important" areas in the east? Or I guess the other options are that you were wrong about how intact those retreating forces are, or that they all just wandered off and did nothing much at all for 4-8 months. Since the Russians certainly don't seem to have made any advances elsewhere in that time frame. So I guess we can assume that this is the absolute best Russia can achieve with full concentration of their forces.
Or, better yet, we can dismiss this entire paragraph as the baseless drivel it is.
The re-deployed forces from the Kiev and Sumy axis in April went on to capture the Severodonetsk area by July, rather than wandering around aimlessly as you contend. By that point, and with the following Ukrainian counter-offensives, they had become over-extended, and thus started the mobilization. As both the Estonian Defense Intelligence chief and AFU Commander in Chief publicly stated in December, it was a success; further reinforcing their point has been the complete halting of Ukrainian momentum and now the re-taking of the strategic initiative as shown by the Russian victory in Soledar.
Rather than that being the absolute best of what the Russians can achieve, if you could be bothered to do so, you might find it worthwhile to review how both the AFU General Staff, British MoD and others concede Russian offensive action on other axis is highly likely. Right now as we speak, for instance, dozens of Russian bombers are being used in what is likely one of the heaviest strikes in the war, the Black Sea fleet has started its biggest sortie in months and AFU General Staff has noted serious build ups of Russian forces along multiple sectors of their border.
Oh, and also by throwing warm bodies at the problem. Prisoners, conscripts and the rag tag remains of their previous units. Though perhaps this slow rate of advance works to their favour. If they can just maintain it at this rate, then they'll have enough time between now and taking Kyiv to breed a brand new generation, put them through school, reform their lousy training systems and conscript them.
Which makes it all the more embarrassing the casualty rates around Bakhmut favor the Russians, doesn't? As of the last public statement of Western officials, the overall casualty rate of the war according to them was 1:1, which most make for a rather terrifying prospect for the AFU given the The Economist interview in December revealed they had 700,000 men total under arms, with 200,000 of those combat fighters as compared to a reserve of 1.5 million they speculated upon the Russians, not counting those already mobilized or under arms. That's a decisive manpower advantage and, again, your propaganda line falls flat when compared to even JCS Chair saying casualty exchange has been even so far.
Beyond that, however, you would also be encouraged to look at the conclusions CSIS has found with regards to material:
Not enough men, not enough quality and not enough material. Russian advantages in all categories spells out ultimate victory, as I said months ago.
www.russiamatters.org
www.themoscowtimes.com
www.theguardian.com
thehill.com
americanmilitarynews.com
www.mediaite.com
