History Western Civilization, Rome and Cyclical History

[ATP]

Given that we’ve spoken of High Cultures, failed High Cultures, destroyed High Cultures, could’ve been High Cultures, what about High Cultures yet to be? Because I note there is a part of the world that has yet to make its attempt at that for reasons not entirely its own fault.

I think “African Charlemagne“ has been mentioned in the past, but on further thought one is quite overcome by the sheer power such a man would wield. He who could make himself master of Sub-Saharan Africa will make himself of Saharan Africa.

And he who makes himself master of all Africa, may make himself master of the world. The peoples of Africa are hardy and resilient, sitting on untapped unimaginable wealth. The makings of a mighty empire indeed sits somewhere beneath all the poverty and desperation.

There is such possibiity - but current Empires,which control Africa,like China and USA,must fall first.
Becouse they would kill any Charlemagne there.

 

[Cherico]

There is such possibiity - but current Empires,which control Africa,like China and USA,must fall first.
Becouse they would kill any Charlemagne there.

America and China are both going to spend much of the next century dealing with internal issues.

 

[ATP]

America and China are both going to spend much of the next century dealing with internal issues.

True - but,then you have muslims.Arabs really belive that blacks are underhumans,and would try enslave them again - nobody except weirdos like me remember,that they created African slave trade,Europe only take over it after 1500.

But,if they repell them,i see Charlemagne there.Maybe he even made Crusade to liberate remnants of european from muslim yoke?

 

[Marduk]

Given that we’ve spoken of High Cultures, failed High Cultures, destroyed High Cultures, could’ve been High Cultures, what about High Cultures yet to be? Because I note there is a part of the world that has yet to make its attempt at that for reasons not entirely its own fault.

I think “African Charlemagne“ has been mentioned in the past, but on further thought one is quite overcome by the sheer power such a man would wield. He who could make himself master of Sub-Saharan Africa will make himself of Saharan Africa.

And he who makes himself master of all Africa, may make himself master of the world. The peoples of Africa are hardy and resilient, sitting on untapped unimaginable wealth. The makings of a mighty empire indeed sits somewhere beneath all the poverty and desperation.

Due to the logistical and infrastructural technology required, by the time he was done the resources would be no longer untapped. The sheer nastiness of African inland terrain is one of major reasons keeping major powers from being set up there, by locals or colonizers alike, and so far no locals have had the means to set up a coastal empire like the European empires did.

 

[Skallagrim]

Following on from could have been High Cultures, would Carthage/Phoenicia count as such?

There is much more to be said (for instance, regarding my view that Hannibal was roughly the Carthaginian equivalent of Gaius Marius); and I do have lots of notes on that. But not immediately at hand. I'll see if I can dig it up.

Before addressing anything regarding a potential African Charlemagne and subsequent African High Culture, I'd like to post the more extensive follow-up to my previous comments on the matter of the Canaanite/Carthaginian High Culture. It's taken a bit, but I've been sorting my notes on that; the result is reproduced below.



To begin with, Phoenicia (and the Canaanite Levant more broadly) can be very difficult to pin down properly. I've already posited the thesis that Carthage of the "Rome" to Canaan, which is in turn the "Greece" to Carthage-- but this macro-historical relation between the Levantines and the Carthaginians may not be immediately clear to all observers. Indeed, there are a few elements that can sow confusion.

Let's recognise that the Carthaginians, certainly, didn't view themselves as divorced from their ancestral Leventine motherland. They distinctly saw themselves as part of the same civilisation. The Phoenicians called themselves Kena'ani, meaning "Canaanites". The Romans describe the Punic peoples calling themselves (as he Romans render it) Chanani, also meaning "Canaanites". Quite plausibly, Chanani is literally just a Roman rendition of Kena'ani. At any rate, the Carthaginian endonym is without question a direct cognate of the Phoenician endonym, which strongly implies a direct continuity as far as self-identification goes.

In the relationship between Carthage and Phoenicia, and in their degree of cultural continuity, I see evidence of them being separate expressions of (i.e. different countries within) one single High Culture. A Canaanite High Culture. Insofar as a separate "Punic" culture and language existed, I view these more along the lines of the differences between American culture and European culture(s), as well as the way that America and England are "divided by a common language". (American English obviously being a bit different from British English.)

So, in my view, there are good reasons to think that Carthage is not a separate culture unto itself, but rather part of a greater "Canaanite culture". This brings me to the notion that Carthage was to Phoenicia as Rome was to the Greeks, as Qin was to the old Han states, and as America is to Europe. This would certainly fit well with the thesis of Carthage being a contender for establishing a Universal Empire.

Thus, when we view the history of Carthage, we see a colonial state that outgrew its origins and won political independence. Indeed, we readily find the equivalent of a prominent Washington-esque founder figure in the person of Mago I. (Or in any case, I feel that the Magonids should be viewed as analogous to the Founding Fathers of the USA: an elite that drives the state towards independence and sets it up for future greatness.) Carthage as the "frontier state destined for great things" within the context of a comprehensive "Canaanite High Culture" is ultimately the most convincing model I've been able to put together. The general timeline of events certainly fits well enough!

Consider the following: in our own High Culture, we have Charlemagne in AD 800 and we may expect our "Marius" around AD 2060, yielding a span of 1260 years, or something thereabouts. Likewise, the actual Marius of Classical civilisation was at the height of his power in 86 BC, and Agamemnon fought the Trojan War c. 1200 BC, which yields a span of roughly 1114 years. Now, our Carthaginian "candidate-Marius", Hannibal Barca, reached his political apex in 200 BC. The Phoenicians, and indeed all the assorted Canaanite peoples, first rose to prominence around 1500 BC -- which again seems to be about where you'd expect that to occur. The timing for our supposed "Canaanite High Culture" getting started, it seems, is right. (On a scale of this length, the difference between the three mentioned lengths of time is well within any reasonable margin you might care to apply.)

Another point of analogy: the Americas began being colonised around AD 1500, or some 700 years after Charlemagne. Carthage was established in 814 BC, or some 700 years after the emergence of Phoenicia. That, too, evidences remarkably similar timing. Furthermore, American independence was declared in AD 1776, or some 276 years after settlement of the New World began. Carthage achieved its own independence in 550 BC, or some 264 after it was established. Once again, that's very close. Finally, from American independence under the aegis of Washington to (the expected aegis of) the "American Marius", we have to count a stretch of some 284 years. From Carthaginian independence under the aegis of Mago I to the aegis of Hannibal, we may count 280 years. Once more: nearly identical intervals within the framework of macro-historical analysis.

This leads me to the conclusion that Carthage was indeed an example of the typical marcher state that eventually rises to absolute dominance over the entire cultural sphere. And that Hannibal was generally analogous to Marius, which in turn means that Hamilcar was more-or-less analogous to the Gracchi.



As far as Carthage is concerned, I'm fairly satisfied with that conclusion. It is on the Phoenician side of things that all my questions linger.

First of all, I find no evidence for a clear "Canaanite Charlemagne" (somewhere around 1500 BC), nor a "Canaanite Napoleon" (rising to power somewhere in the decades following 550 BC). These are the types of striking figures that you really can't miss. And it's not that I don't know enough about the region's history: these figures just aren't there. This certainly stands out as not just unusual, but outright bizarre. It calls the entire thesis that I've constructed here into question. I've got a tentative explanation. Whether that holds up will have to be determined by further investigation.

My thinking revolves around the fact that the Canaanite nations -- meaning: those peoples inhabiting the ancient Levant -- spent most of their history under the overlordship of a succession of foreign empires. I theorise that this has uniquely shaped their cultural modes, and that the famous mercantile nature of the Canaanite peoples developed as a survival mechanism under these circumstances. They lived at the cosmopolitan cross-road of empires, and there they assumed the role of the ever-useful international merchant class. This allowed them to survive as a coherent cultural entity, even under protracted foreign rule.

I'm pretty sure about that notion. I think that this can also explain the "eccentricities" of their culture and history. Specifically: because they consciously developed a mercantile culture, and because they were almost always under foreign governance, they didn't develop a tradition of native empire-building, and therefore the otherwise oh-so-typical "conqueror figures" are mostly absent from their history. It also stands out, that as soon as soon as temporary independence is achieved in the region, more centralised state-building and ambitious kingship appear immediately.

Likewise, Carthage was obviously not subject to foreign overlordship, although it was a product of Canaanite mercantile culture and surely did retain its characteristics (as did Canaanite states in the Levant, even during periods of independence). Carthage was also initially subjected to the native population of its environment, having to pay rent for the privilege of existing there as a colony. (We see that once Phoenicia's power declined, Carthage was freed of political limitations, and soon began to conquer, under the Magonids. The rent was soon abolished, and indeed, the former "landlords" were vassalised to Carthage!)

Let's attempt a brief overview of Canaanite history. The (proto-)Canaanite tribes emerged in the Bronze Age, were fairly disorganised and for a long time certainly "pre-cultural" (in the macro-historical sense), and were culturally influenced by the East Semitic powers of Mesopotamia-- which emerged as he Akkadian-Assyrian-Babylonian High Culture. The Levantine peoples essentially existed on the fringe of the Mesopotamian cultural area, and were connected to that trade network. In this, an early orientation towards mercantile ventures evidently emerged already. This was only bolstered by the fact that the region was contested by other Bronze Age High Cultures, including most famously the Hittites and the Egyptians.

Around 1500 BC (but in reality through a quite gradual process), the Canaanite peoples coalesced into distinct nations, which were organised as coalitions of city-states. There were no opportunities for empire-building, so the emerging Canaanite polities leaned into the role of trade-oriented middle-men, often aiming for autonomy within a frame-work of vassalage to whoever was dominant in the region. This was a highly effective strategy, which procured great wealth, and which allowed them -- though not independence and empire, then at least the ability to form a distinct cultural identity outside of an imperial conception.

In this context, we see the formation of the (direct ancestors of) the Phoenicians, the Israelites, the Ammonites, the Moabites, the Edomites and the Philistines. There were some more minor nations, but these were ultimately absorbed by the others. Thus, we see the group of nations that formed the Canaanite cultural complex. No sooner had these emerged from pre-cultural nebulosity into a more concrete sense of cultural distinctiveness, or the New Kingdom of Egypt (a.k.a. their Principate) marched in and asserted control. Some Canaanites handled this better than others. The Israelites seem to have attempted resistance, which got a lot of them carried off as slaves. (Their descendants eventually made it back; for a depiction of that event, I highly recommend the historical documentary The Prince of Egypt. )

It's possible that the harsh Egyptian treatment of some of the Levantines had to do with the fact that a whole bunch of the barbarian interlopers called Hyksos had entered into Egypt via the Levant, and at least some of them seem to have actually been Leventines (and maybe proto-Canaanites). The Hyksos period was indeed the Egyptian "time of troubles", which culminated in the establishment of the New Kingdom. Which then exacted historic vengeance upon the Levantines...? I consider that a plausible explanation, although it's hard to prove concretely.

Anyway, the Phoenicians in particular were the most most mercantile of the Canaanites, and also situated a bit further North, and they escaped any Egyptian desire for vengeance. (Their strategy of "No worries, we'll join your empire voluntarily, no force required -- hey, want to buy some cool ships?" seems to have been a smashing success.) Egyptian sources from the 1490s BC decribe the Phoenicians as the Fenekhu, a word that came to mean "Carpenters". The Phoenicians/Fenekhu were famous for using the massive cedar forests of the region, mainly for ship-building. The Phoenicians, were soon to become the most economically prosperous of all their peers of Canaanite stock, and their city-states were soon described as "favoured cities" by the Egyptians. In fact... Egyptian rule quite directly co-incides with the Phoenician rise to prominence.

So once again, we see the Canaanite/Phoenician modus vivendi in action: they not only survive by operating as "favoured clients" within a cosmopolitan empire... they actively use that empire (which is essentially a large economic zone that offers baked-in military security) to thrive.

Then, however, comes the so-called Bronze Age collapse-- which I've explained before as a series of events that led to the collapse of various major powers in the region. Egypt has to partially withdraw from the region, and the encroachment from Anatolia ends altogether. It is Phoenicia in particular that now emerges as an independent entity during the twelfth century BC. As I mentioned, sovereign state-building ensues almost at once, and the Phoenicians now employ their mercantile expeditions to serve their own ends. A wave of mercantile colonialism follows. Tyre (the mother-city of future Carthage) becomes the most prominent city, and ultimately Priest-King Ithobaal I (r. 879 BC - 847 BC) unites Phoenicia under his authority--

And promptly gets screwed over as the Neo-Assyrians invade. The Phoenician mostly manage to set up the same "client cities" arrangement as they had with the Egyptians, and history continues. Colonisation, as we know, also continues, because the Assyrians had no power projection over the Med anyway, so they didn't care what the Phoenicians were doing over yonder. Just so long as they paid enough tribute!

As we know, the Assyrian domination was followed by Babylonian domination, which was followed by Persian domination, which was followed by Hellenistic domination, which was followed by Roman domination. The latter two periods really eroded the Canaanite cultural identity. Their religious traditions got sort of merged into a cosmopolitan Greco-Roman system, and then everything got taken over by Christianity during the later Roman period, and that really was the end of even the last vestiges of any Canaanite identity. (And needless to say, their Western colonies were conquered by Rome, and their culture was also comprehensively erased from history.)

However...

There's one other thing of major consequence that we should discuss. Because when Egyptian power in the Levant collapsed (first partially, freeing Phoenicia, and then entirely, also freeing the Southern Levant), we also see the emergence of another newly-minted, sovereign and independent Canaanite kingdom. Because the Egyptians stayed around longer in their region, and because they had less wealth at their avail, it took a bit longer to get going, but the United Monarchy of Israel was established under Saul, c. 1037 BC, and thereafter achieved its greatest extent under David.

As we know, this United Monarchy split into two states (Samaria in the North and Judah in the South) c. 930 BC. But that's not what's really important here. The important thing is that these Israelites have certainly made a mark on history by introducing a tradition of monotheism that is (a-historically) called "Abrahamic". The truth is that the Israelite evolution towards monotheism was very slow and gradual. Indeed, the two Israelite states seem to have had two different "main gods". In Samaria, they considered El their national deity, and in Judah, it was the more obscure Yahweh. In both cases, these gods were considered the "first among the gods", but certainly not to the exclusion of other gods.

Soon enough, however, a religious syncretism emerged, and Yahweh and El were conflated, and became considered as always having been one and the same. During that same period, "Yahwism" emerged-- meaning the religious insistence on Yahweh as by far the most important deity, to the detriment of the older Canaanite gods. It is in that context that the Israelites began to separate, culturally, from their neighbours, e.g. the Phoenicians.

Remember Ithobaal I of Phoenicia? Yeah, he had a daughter. Jezebel. If that name has negative associations, that's because of the developments I just described. Because Jezebel was married to King Ahab of the Samarian Kingdom, who ruled c.  871 BC - c. 852 BC. A period of time that falls entirely within the life of the prophet Elijah. Who was one of the major players in the push for "Yahwism". And Jezebel, being from Phoenicia, upheld the faith of her father, i.e. the traditional Canaanite religion. So she became known in Jewish scripture as an evil vixen. This is all indicative of building tension.

In the following century, Yahwism took on more extreme forms, moving towards a tendency of exclusively worshipping Yahweh. Involved in this process was the prophet Hosea, who lived in the 8th century BC. At this point, the Israelite religion fully separated from the Canaanite religion. Macro-historically, I am inclined to identify this as analogous to the Protestant Reformation. Which makes Hosea a counterpart to Martin Luther. (As far as the chronology goes, this fits. In the timeline as I've outlined it above, 794 BC would be roughly equivalent to AD 1520.) However, this turned into a Reformation on steroids, quite possibly helped along by the fact that during the Neo-Assyrian period, the Israelites held greater autonomy than the Phoenicians. The Israelites were purely clients of the empire, and largely independent. In this turbulent period, the already mounting division between the Israelites and the Phoenicians appears to have become unusually... final.

In effect, the Israelites culturally seceded from the Canaanite High Culture, and became a wholly separate culture. And then they were conquered by the Babylonians, who ill-treated them. But this seems to have hardened the Israelite resolve, and solidified their evolution towards uncompromising monotheism.

The Jews, obviously, still exist. The cultural modes of survival of the ancient Canaanites (existing as culturally cohesive groups within foreign civilisations) have been retained by them. But unlike all the other Canaanites, they have also persisted in a diasporic existence; and have returned home to the Levant in the most recent of times; and have re-established their sovereign state-- the ultimate life expectancy of which undertaking remains to be determined. Whether they are to be viewed as a High Culture, or as some unique historical phenomenon, is hard to say definitively. Both Spengler and Toynbee looked upon the Jews as a "fossil"; a sort of calcified remnant. But neither man had seen the true implications of national revival, manifeted by Zionism. The Jewish ethnos does not seem, at present, to be particularly lacking in vitality. Depending on how we interpret certain things, they may be seen as the last surviving remnant of the Levantine culture. It can also be argued that they are a unique offshoot of that cultural complex, and thus no longer representative of its "main" lineage, which must then be supposed to have died with Carthage.

Regardless, they exist, and their heritage is evident. The Levantines and their Carthaginian off-shoot culture were known to be highly mercantile; and this persists to the point that the only surviving branch of the Levantine cultural complex -- the Jewish people -- is even today still associated with the archetype, and stereotype, of "the merchant". But that is not the key to their lineage or their survival. The Canaanite High Culture, in my estimation, marked itself out as special by surviving through adaptation. And in this manner, the Jews have survived also. Their main trait is not that they are well-disposed to thrive as merchants; their main trait is that they survive.

So by virtue of that well-honed skill, and by some twist of fate -- one might even venture to call it divine providence -- this stubborn, monotheistic off-shoot of the Canaanite High Culture has survived all the hardships and has returned to its native soil. And there we see their defining cultural characteristic again: coming back from foreign captivity and exile really is something they're very good at.

Good for them. Whatever remains of the Canaanite High Culture-- it lives in them now.

 

[Skallagrim]

An addendum to the above, though somewhat beyond the strict scrope of @Lord Sovereign's question:


We can imagine, without great difficulty, a scenario in which the Canaanite High Culture is perpetuated in a more straight-forward manner. I refer, of course, to the age-old scenario in which Hannibal emerges triumphant from his daring contest with Rome's finest. This is by no means easy to engineer, because even so capable a commander faces the nigh-insurmountable when taking on Rome. Yet it's not fully impossible to lay out this sequence of events, either.

The issue lies in fundamental cultural attitudes. As we've observed, the mercantile approach was certainly predominant in the Levantine Semetic cultural complex. The Phoenicians were the big boys back in the day. And the Carthaginians, too, differed from both the Greeks and Romans in that they were famous for being highly accomplished merchants. Their mentality reflects this. But when we look at the Carthaginian approach to economic warfare with Rome, this cultural background actually bit them in the ass. Carthage didn't adequately respond to the Roman way of doing things, because they just didn't get that way of thinking. They looked at the bottom line, and they were often demonstrably averse to risky long-term investments with no demonstrable commercial justification. Hannibal repeatedly asked for more support, but the Carthaginian leadership was too worried about throwing money down the hole, so they refused to give him more backing.

Meanwhile, Rome wasn't economic in its thinking at all. Beyond the purely practical, "future profits" barely registered as a motivating factor. This was a people willing to face hunger, in necessary for years, in the name of training more soldiers at the expense of working all the fields. "Who cares about the economy? We need armies, to kick Hannibal's ass! So what if we're hungry for a few years? When this is over, he'll be crushed. And one day, we'll take the fight to Carthage. Then we'll remember the hungry years."

The thing is... Hannibal was more in tune with the Romans than most of the Carthaginian leadership. The Barcids represented a new, more militaristic faction within Carthaginian society. And thus, if Hannibal had achieved a definitive military victory over Rome, that would have had consequences for the governance and future of Carthage, too. As I have noted, Hannibal is rather like the "Carthaginian Marius".

Note that Marius famously won foreign wars as well. That's part of what made him so dangerous to his political opponents: he was essentially the biggest Chad in Rome. The same would be true for Hannibal in Carthage. The elite would want him dead or otherwise side-lined, ASAP. In so small part because the Barcid triumph in this conflict would give Hannibal enormous support... and the enduring loyalty of the vetarans. This would quickly enable him, if given even the slightest chance, to enact a re-organisation to make the state a bit more militaristic. And thus, to harm the interests of the traditional elites.

(So, we might venture to say that their hesitance to give him adequate support was perhaps more than just penny-pnching, but also a reslt of the fact that him winning was almost as dangerous to them as him losing...)

But suppose that he does win. No doubt, the Carthaginian elite would stab him in the back-- but as we know, his political successors would almost certainly be victorious a few decades later. For a time, the old elites would side-line the Barcids just as they side-lined the Marian faction. I assume the Barcids would maintain a stronghold in Iberia, and that the traditional elites would hold onto power by throwing money at the problem. But this would be expensive for them, while encouraging a certain... piratical approach among the agents of the Barcid faction. Eventually, this would set the stage for a successor to Hannibal's leadership role to emerge later on, and defeat the established elites. That would be the emergence of Carthaginian Caesarism, then.

The resulting Carthaginian hegemony would not be like Rome, but it would have more of a militarist attitude than Carthage previously possessed. That would be a prerequisite for success in even establishing a hegemony. POssibly presented outwardly as a voluntary association, but in practice very much dominated by the central power that is Carthage. My main thought is that overall, rather than an Empire per se, Carthage would form more of an economic sphere of domination. Far less in the way of direct annexations than Rome preferred. After all, even with Barcid-style reforms enacted, Carthage would never be Rome. I think the notion that Carthage could or would have taken anything quite like Rome's imperialist spot in history is laughable. They didn't have the cultural mores for that, nor the man-power.

Furthermore, the East would be Greek (under Macedonian hegemony, most probably; due to the triumpg of their erstwhile ally, Philippos V). So Carthaginian ambitions would tend more towards the Western regions-- going both North into Europe and South along the African coast.

Essentially, they'd rule the Western Med, and dominate allied/vassalised polities further afield. Certainly Gaul. They'd see the Rhine as a trade artery, not as a border; they'd tie the Germans into their trade network, too, although these would be independent allies. Their policy to prevent raiding would be hire the most closely-allied Germans as mercenaries who would guard the borders. ("Foederati", but ages ahead of schedule.) I suspect Britain, too, would become a trade partner. Perhaps the fringes of their network would extend as far North as Denmark and environs.

In the South, they'd go along the coast of the Western Sahara, founding trade emporia, and eventially linking up with the Sub-Saharan statelets of West Africa. These, too, would be outside their control, but within their economic interaction sphere. A source of goods and of valuable fighting-men.

As a whole, you can see that the orientation of a Carthaginian "empire" would be North-South, instead of East-West. It would also be far looser, and there would be less of an "Imperial legacy" after it falls. But the economic ties would remain, being by then firmly established. This implies that you'd have trade between Britain and West Africa (for instance) and all points between from a very early point.

This provides us with an outline where Carthage lives on (the the expense of Rome), and perpetuates the Canaanite High Culture in a more direct line. It is allowed, in this scenario, the fulfill its own phase of universal empire (although carried out in its own way), and to live out its natural lifespan to the end. An interesting side-effect is that the "Classical" High Culture is thereby rstricted to its own "Old World" (without Rome around in the West) in the East; but the Canaanite High Culture will most probaly be restricted purely to its "New World" in the West. The latter because the Greek hegemony in the East will probably suffocate Levantine culture altogether. Excepting the Jews, this happened in OTL, after all. And that was under the Romans, who were by and large pretty tolerant. The Greeks had their own issues with Jews...

Remember: the Canaanites (being also a Mediterranean culture) are like a "sister civilisation" to the Greco-Romans. They grew up side by side, so to speak, and the civilisations are roughly(!) the same age. Their development is largely comparably. The Canaanites are slightly older, as a defined culture, but not that much in fact. So, the "turmoil era" for the Canaanites -- and specifically for Carthage -- partly overlaps that of the Classical culture (i.e. the Hellenistic Period). Now note that this is also a period of religious upheaval. Among the Jews as well! (Note all the wild brands of zealotry and messianism during the period.)

As I mentioned, the Est is Hellenistic here, and the Greeks had their issues with the Jews. Indeed, the Hellenistic relation with the Jews was, ah... up-and-down. I think the Greeks would respond to Jewish religious turmoil rather more poorly than the Romans did. (Compared to many other historic examples, the Roman response was... rather tame, all things considered.) With the Jewish religious tensions reaching a boiling point (as they did under Rome, but I think it'd happen earlier under Greek rule), I could see things going very badly. Mass bloodshed badly. Which might then cause a diaspora of Jews to Wet, outside of the Greek realm.

What I'm imagining here is an exodus of Jews to the Carthaginian world-system. A Carthaginian world-system in its Principate, which is prime soil for new(ly arrived) religious traditions to take root. That process is messy, sure, but it eventually bears fruit.

Jews settling in Carthage would soon make it a welcoming destination for yet more Jews. This brand of Judaism, escaping the heavy-handed Greek response to religious uphavals, might of course be be messianic. Or otherwise quite divergent from traditional Judaism. But regardless: just as Rome eventually embraced Christianity, Carthage might turn to (ATL) Judaism.

Even after Carthage falls, strains of that religion might well be passed on throughout its economic interaction sphere. Who knows what might come of that, ages hence?

 

[Skallagrim]

Now. On to matter of "African Charlemagne".

Given that we’ve spoken of High Cultures, failed High Cultures, destroyed High Cultures, could’ve been High Cultures, what about High Cultures yet to be? Because I note there is a part of the world that has yet to make its attempt at that for reasons not entirely its own fault.

I think “African Charlemagne“ has been mentioned in the past, but on further thought one is quite overcome by the sheer power such a man would wield. He who could make himself master of Sub-Saharan Africa will make himself of Saharan Africa.

And he who makes himself master of all Africa, may make himself master of the world. The peoples of Africa are hardy and resilient, sitting on untapped unimaginable wealth. The makings of a mighty empire indeed sits somewhere beneath all the poverty and desperation.

There are some considerations to be kept in mind.

1) Presently, Africa is a mess. It's a bit of a meme that most "modernist" future histories have Nigeria as a superpower and whatnot, but let me tell you: they're deluding themselves. Discounting the North of Africa as part of the Islamic World for a moment (which has its own issues, as previously discussed at some length), I can say with quite some confidence that Africa will not get its act together on anything resembling short notice. Remarks about current Empires having to fall first are beside the point here (although still true). The fact is: even if nobody got in their way whatsoever, they'd still need centuries.

2) Africa does have a demographic boom that's currently still ongoing, as things get less poor. If that trend continues, then regardless of Africa's culture, its people will just flood the world. Since they have no High Culture to perpetuate, that would generally be bad. It would mean that the entire would becomes Africa. In every way.

3) But that will not happen, because the trend cannot continue. All increases in real African wealth are based on international trade with more developed parts of the world. As the global system goes down the crapper, Africa's economy will go off a cliff. Cue mass dying. I mean that literally: a vast number of Africans kept out of poverty due to globalism will starve, and faster than they can even flee to safer regions. Furthermore, as the West faces increased difficulties, so-called "development help" will evaporate, too. This "help" most often doesn't really help development at all (and in fact retards it), but it keeps massive numbers of Africans alive. Once that goes: more near-instant mass dying.

4) The conclusion of the above point is that by the end of this century, Africa will have done very well indeed if a quarter of its current population is still alive. I don't subscribe to such optimistic estimates, however. The complete dependency of Sub-Saharan Africa on trade and goodwill from the developed world can hardly be overstated. If the world falls into real chaos, even just for a decade or so, Africa simply faces a rapid mass extinction of its human populace. (And under such circumstances, any refugees to Europe will be gunned down, not welcomed.)

5) I've not yet mentioned disease, most of which is only kept under control though constant, active Western affort. If that falls away, yet more mass dying ensues. In short: my estimation is that due to Western interventionism and other involvement being "interrupted" by the course of events during this century, about 90% of Africa's population will die. It happens to be the case that the resulting numbers are much closer to the natural carrying capacity of a largely undeveloped continent. The population numbers can thereafter increase again if improvements to African societies (and their social and physical infrastructure) are first made.

6) As far as improvements go: Africa presently has no infrastructure to speak of. What the Europeans built, they have allowed to rust away at best. In more cases, they've stripped it apart to sell for scrap. (And this goes both for colonial-era works and for all products of "development aid".) That needs to be addressed, and that will take time.

7) Africa does have a vast reserve of natural resources, though.

8) The above two points mean that Africans themselves, post-collapse, will not likely be in charge. Expect extensive neo-colonialism, without much of a pretense of being anything else.

9) As previously discussed, China has ambitions in what is now Asiatic Russia. They will be able to derive resources from those parts, which are much closer to home. Furthermore, logistics demand that other (pseudo-)colonial ventures should also be closer to home. Basically: I expect South-East Asia to become China's back yard. China's current strategy of buying up far-flung holdings is purely geared towards a globalist economy, and will become untenable (and counterproductive) in a world after modernity (in which most societies will likely forbid foreigners from owning property anyway). This means that China is unlikely to play a major role in Africa at that stage.

10) India, however, is also on the rise. India is also far more developed than Africa, and its great mass of poverty-stricken people is in many ways an irritating burden. A leftover from before the country's rapid ascendancy. This means that a collapse of the globalist system and the resulting death-by-starvation of the poorest may in fact be... a rather welcome development. As previously argued, I expect any varguely cynical government to exploit chaos and disontent by turning it against the muslim populace. Basically: "kill the muslims and redistribute whatever they have" as the solution to the crisis.

11) The above will, in my estimation, result in India becoming the world's Number Three, after the West and China. For this reason, Indian colonialism in East Africa is quite realistic.

12) Because actually controlling Africa and successfully exploiting its resources makes you a very powerful player on the world stage, the West will never just let anyone else have it. Additionally, while the American-led West could focus on turning South America into a colonial region, I consider that less likely. I think it's more probable that friendly regimes are kept in power there, while the West re-initiates direct colonialism in Africa.

13) Once the West truly declines, and the American Empire collapses, I think that Africa could be to America what Germania was to Rome. Once a peripheral backwater used for exploitation, then a source for sturdy semi-civilised auxiliaries, and ultimately the breeding ground for new conqueror-kings. And then, at last, we might see the African Charlemagne.


(So, in essence: a very grim future in the short term, with the prospects of magnificent glories in the far future.)

 

[Blasterbot]

Do you think that the hypothetical Carthaginian world system would have stayed mostly focused on the Mediterranean or moved along the African coasts/ looked southward? setting up trade posts along the coasts to let local tribes trade. considering how mercantile they were I think they would have likely aimed more for trade and resource access.

 

[Skallagrim]

Do you think that the hypothetical Carthaginian world system would have stayed mostly focused on the Mediterranean or moved along the African coasts/ looked southward? setting up trade posts along the coasts to let local tribes trade. considering how mercantile they were I think they would have likely aimed more for trade and resource access.

North-South axis, for sure.

Greeks are to the East, blocking direct access to the Indian Ocean. And Carthage was already trading with Britain for tin, and carrying out voyages along the African coast. Further ventures along that axis make too much sense to ignore.

It would be a very fascinating interaction sphere, that's for certain. Lots of contacts that were established only quite a bit later in OTL would become a reality far, far "ahead of schedule".

The great focus on navigation and sea-trade, as well as the fact that Atlantic currents and storms can carry ships from the North-West of Africa to North-Eastern Brazil, might also entail a much earlier discovery of the Americas. That would be interesting!

All of this is speculative, of course, but it's good to consider how a different cultural history would have lasting ramifications all over the world. Not just the kind of things you'd immediately think of, either.

 

[Poe]

North-South axis, for sure.

Greeks are to the East, blocking direct access to the Indian Ocean. And Carthage was already trading with Britain for tin, and carrying out voyages along the African coast. Further ventures along that axis make too much sense to ignore.

It would be a very fascinating interaction sphere, that's for certain. Lots of contacts that were established only quite a bit later in OTL would become a reality far, far "ahead of schedule".

The great focus on navigation and sea-trade, as well as the fact that Atlantic currents and storms can carry ships from the North-West of Africa to North-Eastern Brazil, might also entail a much earlier discovery of the Americas. That would be interesting!

All of this is speculative, of course, but it's good to consider how a different cultural history would have lasting ramifications all over the world. Not just the kind of things you'd immediately think of, either.

No idea why you think this. Historically Carthage made trips into Africa and around the coast and cared little for what it found. There's a reason why Rome didn't expand out past the mediterranean in any significant way and it's because technology wasn't there to have long range trade routes around Africa for another thousand or so years.

 

[Skallagrim]

No idea why you think this. Historically Carthage made trips into Africa and around the coast and cared little for what it found. There's a reason why Rome didn't expand out past the mediterranean in any significant way and it's because technology wasn't there to have long range trade routes around Africa for another thousand or so years.

Carthage extensively used auxiliary forces. The issues with non-interest in Africa "further South" is that the societies there had fuck-all to offer.

However, with imperialism (of any kind) comes an inherent need for man-power. And we might observe that Sub-Saharan Africa's main historical export in OTL was... people. In OTL, as slaves, once that became opportune. In the scenario I posit, as cheap fighting-men, which will be expedient much earlier. Particularly, this becomes attractive once the peoples in the actual 'empire' gain citizenship. You can no longer use the "citizenship for service" deal that's traditional. So you need ever more auxiliaries from the barbarian fringe.

Hence, the foederati of Rome. But for a naval power based in Carthage, African men are simply much easier to gather up and transport to where they need them. (Going down the coast is not very difficult; it's oceanic travel that's really difficult without proper navigational tools.)

So there we go.

 

[ATP]

Before addressing anything regarding a potential African Charlemagne and subsequent African High Culture, I'd like to post the more extensive follow-up to my previous comments on the matter of the Canaanite/Carthaginian High Culture. It's taken a bit, but I've been sorting my notes on that; the result is reproduced below.



To begin with, Phoenicia (and the Canaanite Levant more broadly) can be very difficult to pin down properly. I've already posited the thesis that Carthage of the "Rome" to Canaan, which is in turn the "Greece" to Carthage-- but this macro-historical relation between the Levantines and the Carthaginians may not be immediately clear to all observers. Indeed, there are a few elements that can sow confusion.

Let's recognise that the Carthaginians, certainly, didn't view themselves as divorced from their ancestral Leventine motherland. They distinctly saw themselves as part of the same civilisation. The Phoenicians called themselves Kena'ani, meaning "Canaanites". The Romans describe the Punic peoples calling themselves (as he Romans render it) Chanani, also meaning "Canaanites". Quite plausibly, Chanani is literally just a Roman rendition of Kena'ani. At any rate, the Carthaginian endonym is without question a direct cognate of the Phoenician endonym, which strongly implies a direct continuity as far as self-identification goes.

In the relationship between Carthage and Phoenicia, and in their degree of cultural continuity, I see evidence of them being separate expressions of (i.e. different countries within) one single High Culture. A Canaanite High Culture. Insofar as a separate "Punic" culture and language existed, I view these more along the lines of the differences between American culture and European culture(s), as well as the way that America and England are "divided by a common language". (American English obviously being a bit different from British English.)

So, in my view, there are good reasons to think that Carthage is not a separate culture unto itself, but rather part of a greater "Canaanite culture". This brings me to the notion that Carthage was to Phoenicia as Rome was to the Greeks, as Qin was to the old Han states, and as America is to Europe. This would certainly fit well with the thesis of Carthage being a contender for establishing a Universal Empire.

Thus, when we view the history of Carthage, we see a colonial state that outgrew its origins and won political independence. Indeed, we readily find the equivalent of a prominent Washington-esque founder figure in the person of Mago I. (Or in any case, I feel that the Magonids should be viewed as analogous to the Founding Fathers of the USA: an elite that drives the state towards independence and sets it up for future greatness.) Carthage as the "frontier state destined for great things" within the context of a comprehensive "Canaanite High Culture" is ultimately the most convincing model I've been able to put together. The general timeline of events certainly fits well enough!

Consider the following: in our own High Culture, we have Charlemagne in AD 800 and we may expect our "Marius" around AD 2060, yielding a span of 1260 years, or something thereabouts. Likewise, the actual Marius of Classical civilisation was at the height of his power in 86 BC, and Agamemnon fought the Trojan War c. 1200 BC, which yields a span of roughly 1114 years. Now, our Carthaginian "candidate-Marius", Hannibal Barca, reached his political apex in 200 BC. The Phoenicians, and indeed all the assorted Canaanite peoples, first rose to prominence around 1500 BC -- which again seems to be about where you'd expect that to occur. The timing for our supposed "Canaanite High Culture" getting started, it seems, is right. (On a scale of this length, the difference between the three mentioned lengths of time is well within any reasonable margin you might care to apply.)

Another point of analogy: the Americas began being colonised around AD 1500, or some 700 years after Charlemagne. Carthage was established in 814 BC, or some 700 years after the emergence of Phoenicia. That, too, evidences remarkably similar timing. Furthermore, American independence was declared in AD 1776, or some 276 years after settlement of the New World began. Carthage achieved its own independence in 550 BC, or some 264 after it was established. Once again, that's very close. Finally, from American independence under the aegis of Washington to (the expected aegis of) the "American Marius", we have to count a stretch of some 284 years. From Carthaginian independence under the aegis of Mago I to the aegis of Hannibal, we may count 280 years. Once more: nearly identical intervals within the framework of macro-historical analysis.

This leads me to the conclusion that Carthage was indeed an example of the typical marcher state that eventually rises to absolute dominance over the entire cultural sphere. And that Hannibal was generally analogous to Marius, which in turn means that Hamilcar was more-or-less analogous to the Gracchi.



As far as Carthage is concerned, I'm fairly satisfied with that conclusion. It is on the Phoenician side of things that all my questions linger.

First of all, I find no evidence for a clear "Canaanite Charlemagne" (somewhere around 1500 BC), nor a "Canaanite Napoleon" (rising to power somewhere in the decades following 550 BC). These are the types of striking figures that you really can't miss. And it's not that I don't know enough about the region's history: these figures just aren't there. This certainly stands out as not just unusual, but outright bizarre. It calls the entire thesis that I've constructed here into question. I've got a tentative explanation. Whether that holds up will have to be determined by further investigation.

My thinking revolves around the fact that the Canaanite nations -- meaning: those peoples inhabiting the ancient Levant -- spent most of their history under the overlordship of a succession of foreign empires. I theorise that this has uniquely shaped their cultural modes, and that the famous mercantile nature of the Canaanite peoples developed as a survival mechanism under these circumstances. They lived at the cosmopolitan cross-road of empires, and there they assumed the role of the ever-useful international merchant class. This allowed them to survive as a coherent cultural entity, even under protracted foreign rule.

I'm pretty sure about that notion. I think that this can also explain the "eccentricities" of their culture and history. Specifically: because they consciously developed a mercantile culture, and because they were almost always under foreign governance, they didn't develop a tradition of native empire-building, and therefore the otherwise oh-so-typical "conqueror figures" are mostly absent from their history. It also stands out, that as soon as soon as temporary independence is achieved in the region, more centralised state-building and ambitious kingship appear immediately.

Likewise, Carthage was obviously not subject to foreign overlordship, although it was a product of Canaanite mercantile culture and surely did retain its characteristics (as did Canaanite states in the Levant, even during periods of independence). Carthage was also initially subjected to the native population of its environment, having to pay rent for the privilege of existing there as a colony. (We see that once Phoenicia's power declined, Carthage was freed of political limitations, and soon began to conquer, under the Magonids. The rent was soon abolished, and indeed, the former "landlords" were vassalised to Carthage!)

Let's attempt a brief overview of Canaanite history. The (proto-)Canaanite tribes emerged in the Bronze Age, were fairly disorganised and for a long time certainly "pre-cultural" (in the macro-historical sense), and were culturally influenced by the East Semitic powers of Mesopotamia-- which emerged as he Akkadian-Assyrian-Babylonian High Culture. The Levantine peoples essentially existed on the fringe of the Mesopotamian cultural area, and were connected to that trade network. In this, an early orientation towards mercantile ventures evidently emerged already. This was only bolstered by the fact that the region was contested by other Bronze Age High Cultures, including most famously the Hittites and the Egyptians.

Around 1500 BC (but in reality through a quite gradual process), the Canaanite peoples coalesced into distinct nations, which were organised as coalitions of city-states. There were no opportunities for empire-building, so the emerging Canaanite polities leaned into the role of trade-oriented middle-men, often aiming for autonomy within a frame-work of vassalage to whoever was dominant in the region. This was a highly effective strategy, which procured great wealth, and which allowed them -- though not independence and empire, then at least the ability to form a distinct cultural identity outside of an imperial conception.

In this context, we see the formation of the (direct ancestors of) the Phoenicians, the Israelites, the Ammonites, the Moabites, the Edomites and the Philistines. There were some more minor nations, but these were ultimately absorbed by the others. Thus, we see the group of nations that formed the Canaanite cultural complex. No sooner had these emerged from pre-cultural nebulosity into a more concrete sense of cultural distinctiveness, or the New Kingdom of Egypt (a.k.a. their Principate) marched in and asserted control. Some Canaanites handled this better than others. The Israelites seem to have attempted resistance, which got a lot of them carried off as slaves. (Their descendants eventually made it back; for a depiction of that event, I highly recommend the historical documentary The Prince of Egypt. )

It's possible that the harsh Egyptian treatment of some of the Levantines had to do with the fact that a whole bunch of the barbarian interlopers called Hyksos had entered into Egypt via the Levant, and at least some of them seem to have actually been Leventines (and maybe proto-Canaanites). The Hyksos period was indeed the Egyptian "time of troubles", which culminated in the establishment of the New Kingdom. Which then exacted historic vengeance upon the Levantines...? I consider that a plausible explanation, although it's hard to prove concretely.

Anyway, the Phoenicians in particular were the most most mercantile of the Canaanites, and also situated a bit further North, and they escaped any Egyptian desire for vengeance. (Their strategy of "No worries, we'll join your empire voluntarily, no force required -- hey, want to buy some cool ships?" seems to have been a smashing success.) Egyptian sources from the 1490s BC decribe the Phoenicians as the Fenekhu, a word that came to mean "Carpenters". The Phoenicians/Fenekhu were famous for using the massive cedar forests of the region, mainly for ship-building. The Phoenicians, were soon to become the most economically prosperous of all their peers of Canaanite stock, and their city-states were soon described as "favoured cities" by the Egyptians. In fact... Egyptian rule quite directly co-incides with the Phoenician rise to prominence.

So once again, we see the Canaanite/Phoenician modus vivendi in action: they not only survive by operating as "favoured clients" within a cosmopolitan empire... they actively use that empire (which is essentially a large economic zone that offers baked-in military security) to thrive.

Then, however, comes the so-called Bronze Age collapse-- which I've explained before as a series of events that led to the collapse of various major powers in the region. Egypt has to partially withdraw from the region, and the encroachment from Anatolia ends altogether. It is Phoenicia in particular that now emerges as an independent entity during the twelfth century BC. As I mentioned, sovereign state-building ensues almost at once, and the Phoenicians now employ their mercantile expeditions to serve their own ends. A wave of mercantile colonialism follows. Tyre (the mother-city of future Carthage) becomes the most prominent city, and ultimately Priest-King Ithobaal I (r. 879 BC - 847 BC) unites Phoenicia under his authority--

And promptly gets screwed over as the Neo-Assyrians invade. The Phoenician mostly manage to set up the same "client cities" arrangement as they had with the Egyptians, and history continues. Colonisation, as we know, also continues, because the Assyrians had no power projection over the Med anyway, so they didn't care what the Phoenicians were doing over yonder. Just so long as they paid enough tribute!

As we know, the Assyrian domination was followed by Babylonian domination, which was followed by Persian domination, which was followed by Hellenistic domination, which was followed by Roman domination. The latter two periods really eroded the Canaanite cultural identity. Their religious traditions got sort of merged into a cosmopolitan Greco-Roman system, and then everything got taken over by Christianity during the later Roman period, and that really was the end of even the last vestiges of any Canaanite identity. (And needless to say, their Western colonies were conquered by Rome, and their culture was also comprehensively erased from history.)

However...

There's one other thing of major consequence that we should discuss. Because when Egyptian power in the Levant collapsed (first partially, freeing Phoenicia, and then entirely, also freeing the Southern Levant), we also see the emergence of another newly-minted, sovereign and independent Canaanite kingdom. Because the Egyptians stayed around longer in their region, and because they had less wealth at their avail, it took a bit longer to get going, but the United Monarchy of Israel was established under Saul, c. 1037 BC, and thereafter achieved its greatest extent under David.

As we know, this United Monarchy split into two states (Samaria in the North and Judah in the South) c. 930 BC. But that's not what's really important here. The important thing is that these Israelites have certainly made a mark on history by introducing a tradition of monotheism that is (a-historically) called "Abrahamic". The truth is that the Israelite evolution towards monotheism was very slow and gradual. Indeed, the two Israelite states seem to have had two different "main gods". In Samaria, they considered El their national deity, and in Judah, it was the more obscure Yahweh. In both cases, these gods were considered the "first among the gods", but certainly not to the exclusion of other gods.

Soon enough, however, a religious syncretism emerged, and Yahweh and El were conflated, and became considered as always having been one and the same. During that same period, "Yahwism" emerged-- meaning the religious insistence on Yahweh as by far the most important deity, to the detriment of the older Canaanite gods. It is in that context that the Israelites began to separate, culturally, from their neighbours, e.g. the Phoenicians.

Remember Ithobaal I of Phoenicia? Yeah, he had a daughter. Jezebel. If that name has negative associations, that's because of the developments I just described. Because Jezebel was married to King Ahab of the Samarian Kingdom, who ruled c.  871 BC - c. 852 BC. A period of time that falls entirely within the life of the prophet Elijah. Who was one of the major players in the push for "Yahwism". And Jezebel, being from Phoenicia, upheld the faith of her father, i.e. the traditional Canaanite religion. So she became known in Jewish scripture as an evil vixen. This is all indicative of building tension.

In the following century, Yahwism took on more extreme forms, moving towards a tendency of exclusively worshipping Yahweh. Involved in this process was the prophet Hosea, who lived in the 8th century BC. At this point, the Israelite religion fully separated from the Canaanite religion. Macro-historically, I am inclined to identify this as analogous to the Protestant Reformation. Which makes Hosea a counterpart to Martin Luther. (As far as the chronology goes, this fits. In the timeline as I've outlined it above, 794 BC would be roughly equivalent to AD 1520.) However, this turned into a Reformation on steroids, quite possibly helped along by the fact that during the Neo-Assyrian period, the Israelites held greater autonomy than the Phoenicians. The Israelites were purely clients of the empire, and largely independent. In this turbulent period, the already mounting division between the Israelites and the Phoenicians appears to have become unusually... final.

In effect, the Israelites culturally seceded from the Canaanite High Culture, and became a wholly separate culture. And then they were conquered by the Babylonians, who ill-treated them. But this seems to have hardened the Israelite resolve, and solidified their evolution towards uncompromising monotheism.

The Jews, obviously, still exist. The cultural modes of survival of the ancient Canaanites (existing as culturally cohesive groups within foreign civilisations) have been retained by them. But unlike all the other Canaanites, they have also persisted in a diasporic existence; and have returned home to the Levant in the most recent of times; and have re-established their sovereign state-- the ultimate life expectancy of which undertaking remains to be determined. Whether they are to be viewed as a High Culture, or as some unique historical phenomenon, is hard to say definitively. Both Spengler and Toynbee looked upon the Jews as a "fossil"; a sort of calcified remnant. But neither man had seen the true implications of national revival, manifeted by Zionism. The Jewish ethnos does not seem, at present, to be particularly lacking in vitality. Depending on how we interpret certain things, they may be seen as the last surviving remnant of the Levantine culture. It can also be argued that they are a unique offshoot of that cultural complex, and thus no longer representative of its "main" lineage, which must then be supposed to have died with Carthage.

Regardless, they exist, and their heritage is evident. The Levantines and their Carthaginian off-shoot culture were known to be highly mercantile; and this persists to the point that the only surviving branch of the Levantine cultural complex -- the Jewish people -- is even today still associated with the archetype, and stereotype, of "the merchant". But that is not the key to their lineage or their survival. The Canaanite High Culture, in my estimation, marked itself out as special by surviving through adaptation. And in this manner, the Jews have survived also. Their main trait is not that they are well-disposed to thrive as merchants; their main trait is that they survive.

So by virtue of that well-honed skill, and by some twist of fate -- one might even venture to call it divine providence -- this stubborn, monotheistic off-shoot of the Canaanite High Culture has survived all the hardships and has returned to its native soil. And there we see their defining cultural characteristic again: coming back from foreign captivity and exile really is something they're very good at.

Good for them. Whatever remains of the Canaanite High Culture-- it lives in them now.

Mostly agree/there was Kingdom of Izrael,not Samaria/ ,but,aside from that -

1. there was interesting forgotten 500-years war between phoenicians/later Carthage/ and greeks allied with Tharsis.

Tharsis was old city in Spain,and initially,when they were winning,greek sailed there and even had cities in Spain.

War started about 770BC,after 500BC Tharsis was destroyed by Carthage so thoroughly,that we even do not knew when it was,just like all greek cities in Spain.

Later it become kind of draw,till Rome come and made peace - conqering greeks and destroing Carhage.


2.Phoenicians certainly get to Britain,and probably to Americas.Greek mentined land to the West with locals with red skins,and that phoenicians were there before them.

They were capable of sailing araound Africa,too - sailors who did it for Egyptian pharaoh Naho/600BC/ was were phoenicians.

They probable knew about Baltic and amber there,too.

If i were better writer,i would wrote about surviving Tarshis,or,even better,Tarshis survivors running to Americas,South Africa,Baltic - or all those places.

Interesting,how it would change world?


P.S i read,that 90% of Lebannon people is still descendents of phoenicians,and most palestinians descendents of caananities.
Possible - culture replace other cultures,but rarely popuations.Usually only elites get destroyed.

 

[gral]

North-South axis, for sure.

Greeks are to the East, blocking direct access to the Indian Ocean. And Carthage was already trading with Britain for tin, and carrying out voyages along the African coast. Further ventures along that axis make too much sense to ignore.

It would be a very fascinating interaction sphere, that's for certain. Lots of contacts that were established only quite a bit later in OTL would become a reality far, far "ahead of schedule".

The great focus on navigation and sea-trade, as well as the fact that Atlantic currents and storms can carry ships from the North-West of Africa to North-Eastern Brazil, might also entail a much earlier discovery of the Americas. That would be interesting!

All of this is speculative, of course, but it's good to consider how a different cultural history would have lasting ramifications all over the world. Not just the kind of things you'd immediately think of, either.

Who could replace Rome as the state in the nation on the edges of the cultural Greek sphere that eventually dominates it?

Pontus? Parthia or some other hellenized Central Asian people(although Parthia would quickly tie itself to Persian culture)? The Indo-Greeks?

 

[Lord Sovereign]

A thing I have come to mull over, in these turns of civilisations, is that the eighth and ninth centuries present a somewhat unique moment which really impacted how the West would turn out.

As has been stated, Charlemagne is the founder king of a new (ish) Europe. Yet even in his own time he brushes up against the remnant of an older Europe (one that came before even the Romans), and as I understand he worried about those strange pagans in their dragon headed longships. Not too long after he dies of course, the Viking incursions become ever larger and more vicious with more than a few young kingdoms diminished by them or outright destroyed.

Of course the Northmen eventually become part of this new Christian European sphere, but the impact this last hurrah of old pagan Europe had shook the foundations of the world. Had the Vikings never set sail in their longships, how different would the world be?

 

[Poe]

A thing I have come to mull over, in these turns of civilisations, is that the eighth and ninth centuries present a somewhat unique moment which really impacted how the West would turn out.

As has been stated, Charlemagne is the founder king of a new (ish) Europe. Yet even in his own time he brushes up against the remnant of an older Europe (one that came before even the Romans), and as I understand he worried about those strange pagans in their dragon headed longships. Not too long after he dies of course, the Viking incursions become ever larger and more vicious with more than a few young kingdoms diminished by them or outright destroyed.

Of course the Northmen eventually become part of this new Christian European sphere, but the impact this last hurrah of old pagan Europe had shook the foundations of the world. Had the Vikings never set sail in their longships, how different would the world be?

The world would look completely different. England, for one, would likely never have united as a single kingdom and wouldn't have had the largest tax base in Europe to boot. France is kind of similar, the normans wouldn't have existed as a powerful fiefdom loyal to the king so who knows if centralization would have happened there. On the other end Russia was founded by vikings and for awhile had them as it's ruling aristocracy. All of these countries may have still came into existence, France and Russia almost certainly, but the actual formation would have been way different and there's no good way to tell how that looks.

It may actually result in better conditions for Germany (and perhaps Poland) with that in mind, without strong powers surrounding it there may not have been anyone to pit the different princes against each other and whittle the nation down into it's historic condition.

 

[Skallagrim]

Who could replace Rome as the state in the nation on the edges of the cultural Greek sphere that eventually dominates it?

Pontus? Parthia or some other hellenized Central Asian people(although Parthia would quickly tie itself to Persian culture)? The Indo-Greeks?

I've suggested Pontos as part of an alternate history scenario, based on the Mithridatic performance versus Rome. Parthia is wel outside this cultural sphere, to be sure, and the Indo-Greeks are too far removed to effectively wield such influence.

With the POD of a Carthaginian victory under Hannibal's military leadership, a concurrent Macedonian victory for Philippos V is a given. The essential struggle for Hellenistic hegemony, outside of Rome's entry into the whole affair, was between the Antigonids (Macedon) and the Seleukids (Persia). The Ptolemaic dynasty of Egypt may safely be ruled out as a contender at this stage. The Seleukids were intially the stronger party, but with a decisive victory under his belt, Philippos V secures hegemony over the Greek heartland for the Antigonid dynasty. Meanwhile, the Seleukids have significant unrest to look forward to. All the Antigonids have to do is outlast them. The Seleukids end up as a Syrian rump state, and then Macedon can pounce. (Having already gobbled up Egypt and its substantial resources, as soon as the Seleukid power began to wane.)

I figure that this pits the Mithridatic kings against the encroaching Macedonian hegemony, for the same reason they fought Rome in OTL. The interesting thing is that it's a more even fight. The Macedonian hegemony has not been that long in the making, will presumably be a bit more ad hoc, and will contain quite a few more quarrelsome dissedents within its own confines-- who may be enticed to the side of Mithridates. (After all: Rome was uniquely good at absorbing peoples, whereas the Greek states had a long, long history of grudges. I have no doubt that if Macedon faces a real enemy, those among the other Greek peoples that are most burdened by the Macedonian yoke will take the opportunity to stab the Antigonids in the back.)

It's conceivable, then, that Pontos will be like the 'Qin' to Macedon's 'Chu'. More coherently organised, more devoted to militarism, less burdened by all sorts on internal unrest. Of course, if Pontos (like Qin) manages a victory, it'll be similarly short-lived. The Greeks will soon discover that Mithridatic rule, far from offering a liberation, is actually far more intrusive than Antigonid rule had been. So the Pontic dynasty's reign will not be long for this world. Presumably to be replaced with a more "traditional" dynastic restoration centred on the old Greek heartland (cf. the Han dynasty).

As far as the extent of the "Greek world-system" goes, I'm sure they won't be able to vanquish Carthage to the West (and they prbably won't want to try), so the space that was in OTL occupied by the Western Roman Empire is off-limits for the Greeks. Meanwhile, to the East, there is Parthia. Barring some likely-to-fail Alexander re-enacting, I consider this beyond their reach, too. In the South, more successful colonisation along the Red Sea is an option. (Augustus tried it in OTL, but couldn't get the logistics to work out properly. The Greek heartland is closer by, so it might be more feasible for them.) Of course, overland expansion through Egypt has a definitive Southern border in the form of the Sudd, so you're not getting past Sudan. (And even that is implausible, beyond a few expeditions, because logistics by land are even more difficult than those over the sea.)

My expectation is that the main thrust of Hellenic expansion will be North and North-East. They'll pacify the Balkans up to the Danube, cnsolidate their holdings on the Crimean peninsula, and push to annex or vassalise Armenia and the Caucasian regions South of the main mountain range.

 

[Bacle]

To quote someone from elsewhere on this topic.

"That's one of the reasons why I don't care much for predictions based on history. Yes, history rhymes with itself but we're writing some pretty damn new verses to this poem."

Rome fanboys keep talking yourself in circles and pretending that 'historical cycles' all that matter, and not the tech or society of the times being massively different from Rome.

Edit: Rome fanboys want the certainty of historical cycles, and do not want to admit no one has any real idea where the fuck society is going.

It's BCE aged cope.

Edit: This is not a civility violation, it's just breaking up a harmful echochamber.

 

[Skallagrim]

To quote someone from elsewhere on this topic.

"That's one of the reasons why I don't care much for predictions based on history. Yes, history rhymes with itself but we're writing some pretty damn new verses to this poem."

Rome fanboys keep talking yourself in circles and pretending that 'historical cycles' all that matter, and not the tech or society of the times being massively different from Rome.

Edit: Rome fanboys want the certainty of historical cycles, and do not want to admit no one has any real idea where the fuck society is going.

It's BCE aged cope.

Fuck off, Bacle.

We know you don't like this topic. Go shit up some other thread if you have nothing to contribute. As I always say: you never see me in thread on topics I don't like or don't find engaging. It's just bad form to shit up threads with zero content bitching.

 

[Bacle]

Fuck off, Bacle.

We know you don't like this topic. Go shit up some other thread if you have nothing to contribute. As I always say: you never see me in thread on topics I don't like or don't find engaging. It's just bad form to shit up threads with zero content bitching.

This topic is a farce that does no one in society, no matter their politics, any good.

Rome fanboys don't like when people point out that you cannot use Rome as an effective predictive model for the modern world or any modern nation.

And I can very much come into this thread with tons of info and points to show how the 'cyclical history' obsession has actively hurt Right wing parties across the world, by giving them false expectations and false hopes.

You just want people who will indulge in Rome fanboyism and not hear anything pointing out why that's dumb.

 

[Skallagrim]

This topic is a farce that does no one in society, no matter their politics, any good.

Rome fanboys don't like when people point out that you cannot use Rome as an effective predictive model for the modern world or any modern nation.

And I can very much come into this thread with tons of info and points to show how the 'cyclical history' obsession has actively hurt Right wing parties across the world, by giving them false expectations and false hopes.

You just want people who will indulge in Rome fanboyism and not hear anything pointing out why that's dumb.

No, you want to be a whiny bitch because you have a stick up your ass about certain things. Don't make it other people's problem. Feel free to start a "cyclical history is dumb" thread. I'll be sure not to bother you there.

This thread is for discussing the subject itself, not for bitching about it because you hate it.