History Western Civilization, Rome and Cyclical History

we seem to very much be an anthesis of Evolution we tend to shoot ourselves in the foot as much as we excel and prosper.

This is a bit of a tangent, but I'd like to point out that you seem to be relying on the incorrect pop-cultural idea of "evolution". In reality, it's much "worse" than you think: we don't shoot ourselves in the foot as much as we excel and prosper, but rather we shoot ourselves in the foot far more often than we excel and prosper.

And that's not "the anthesis of evolution". That is evolution. That's how evolution works. Evolution means everything that can be tried is tried, and then only the (few) things that work result in success. Evolution is a randomised trial-and-error process.

We see this reflected in human behaviour and in history as well. Just as the saying goes: the first thing we can learn by studying history is that humanity doesn't learn from history. But since humans are self-aware, and simple biological processes are not, we might do a bit better than completely random selection. But that's a big maybe.

(Fortunately, when it comes to God's patience, I understand His capacity for that to be infinite.)


That wasn't quite what I was thinking.

I was thinking, "The moment you can read and write a brain, you can also edit it." Being able to make people think something, being able to simply re-write what a person thinks? Added, anybody plugged in is likely searchable as well....


If the majority is plugged in, then no rebellion can happen from those drones.


It's not certain to happen like that. But, if it does.....

I think that would similarly affect the outcomes of macro-historical analysis, at least if applied on a significant scale. As I mentioned: individual behaviour can't be accurately predicted. Only the average human behaviour, as examplified by large masses. Which means that if an individual (or a small group of indviduals) can... "mind-control"... large masses, they'd be replacing the average behaviour of said masses with their own individual decisions.

That would make predictive modelling nigh-impossible.

(Isaac Asimov introduced this notion in his Foundation series, where the models of "psycho-history" -- as he termed it -- cease to be relevant when a mutant appears who can psychically mind-control vast numbers of people.)
 
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This is a bit of a tangent, but I'd like to point out that you seem to be relying on the incorrect pop-cultural idea of "evolution". In reality, it's much "worse" than you think: we don't shoot ourselves in the foot as much as we excel and prosper, but rather we shoot ourselves in the foot far more often than we excel and prosper.

And that's not "the anthesis of evolution". That is evolution. That's how evolution works. Evolution means everything that can be tried is tried, and then only the (few) things that work result in success. Evolution is a randomised trial-and-error process.

We see this reflected in human behaviour and in history as well. Just as the saying goes: the first thing we can learn by studying history is that humanity doesn't learn from history. But since humans are self-aware, and simple biological processes are not, we might do a bit better than completely random selection. But that's a big maybe.

(Fortunately, when it comes to God's patience, I understand His capacity for that to be infinite

I think it depends on how you define working. Even taking evolution account animal kingdom behavior has been pretty consistent since inspection (especially if you believe in creationism)

Humanity, on the other hand can't seem to find a consistent form of pack building to that last more than a few centuries. About the only consistency is that they tend to ping pong between 3 major forms.

Cults of personality: "gods," cult leaders and kings

Mob rule: democracy

Oligarchies: priesthoods, republics, Nobility, corporateocracies ect,

So long as the spice continues to flow, nobody really bats an eye but none of these forms of tribe building have really shown to be able to weather a famine, disaster or fall into decedents

The cults of personality fall as soon as the head dies, or his successor falls into decadents

The mob quickly resorts to infighting


The oligarchy soon falls into decadence and rots.

And when the above happens any progress made is undone and the situation is made worse

1 step forward 3 steps back.

Autonomy (rights, property ect) is only respected so long as the prosperity flows the moment that ends, it's essentially a race to who can loot and pillage the most., 9/10 it's the people with the highest intrigue. Why kill people when you can convince them to kill themselves for you?
 
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Lots to reply to, so bypassing some of the “sub-discussions” and replying to @Skallagrim selectively, since he either makes points that I either agree with or consider to be answered in sufficient detail already:



You'll note that I reference Classical High Culture quite often. Speaking of "Rome" is short-hand. We're talking about a High Culture that includes the Hellenic polities, and grew to encircle the Mediterranean. Rome was not part of Greece, and "a sea away". Qin was a frontier marcher state separated from the Chinese heartland by mountains. Carthage, the equivalent of this for the Canaanite High Culture, was also "a sea away" from Phoenicia.

The scale, now, is greater. Certainly. Just as the Classical world-system was greater in scale than the Egyptian world-system, which was after all far older. When we reference the exaples I have mentioned here, there is nothing to indicate that scale "changes the rules". Same things keep happening. Just... larger.

Indeed, much greater.

Now, personally, I’d say that in the case of the West, the scale has ballooned so much, that we should expect the “swings” and overall intensity of our own cycle to be more ferocious and destructive than that of previous High Cultures.

I mentioned it to you and @CastilloVerde in private once, but to reiterate and expand upon it: One analogy you posited that really stuck with me was thinking of the macro-historical model as a mathematical formula. You plug in certain inputs and get certain outputs, with the underlying relationship between how the variables get plugged in and manipulated remaining consistent, no matter the exact results. So, say we start with a (really simplistic and made-up) formula of 5x, and our x is 5, our output is 25. But if we crank x up to 10 and plug it into 5x again, we’ll get 50.

Fair enough, but what if we get an unusually large input, like 100? Well, same underlying process applies, but as soon as we plug it into 5x, we get a rather (and indeed, an atypically) large output.

Here’s the thing: We’re the 100!

So, the Romans, the Qin, the Assyrians, and the other High Cultures you mentioned? Their inputs were in the single (or at most, low double) digits, being pre-industrial societies for whom daily life moved much slower and for whom the status of Universal Empire could be satiated by claiming domain over their own backyards — which, impressive as they were for the time, weren’t truly universal or consequential on a global scale, beyond the legacies they created that “successor cultures” picked up on long after their lifetime. (e.g.: The West inheriting much from Rome, which was then spread to the “Non-West” by proxy of Western domination.)

By contrast, the West — with its global reach, its universalist ideals, and its more “economically minded” brand of ideological cultism — is the first High Culture to have triple-digit inputs, as the thousands of years between the extant High Cultures and this budding one have given the world a long time to progress leaps and bounds ahead of where it was in Caesar’s, Qin Shi Huangdi’s, or Ashurnisirpal II’s time.

I’m not saying we’ve outgrown human nature or transcended the rules of the current Scarcity Paradigm — far from it. What I am saying is that the scale on which things happen now is such, that from a macro-historical perspective, the details are sufficiently different to make the West stand out for precisely that reason. At the very least, I expect we’ll see some new spins on the same fundamental tendencies and archetypes that stick out, rather than “rehashing” of old ones dropped into a Modern context.

Regarding outright warfare: I've already argued that the situation we're in lends itself to a conflict more akin to a "civilisation-wide civil war", and that such a conflict is less likely to invite the use of weapons of mass destruction on a large scale. It defeats the purpose of the participants. They don't want to destroy, they all want to rule.

As I said: Caesar didn't want to burn Rome, and a future counterpart in a similar position would (for the exact same reasons) not wish to nuke Washington or New York.

Per the above, I’m not so sure we should treat previous “Caesars” as the be-all, end-all of what all “Caesar” figures — past, present, and future — could be like.

To repeat my previous comparison, it’d have been wrong for the “proto-macrohistorians” of Republican Rome to cast Julius Caesar as a toga-bearing, Latin-speaking expy of Qin Shi Huangdi, and I expect the same will also prove true for us. Same for learned Chinese observers to predict that Qin would’ve been just another Ashurnisirpal II in all but name and era, as — like Caesar himself — these various incarnations introduced new, culture-specific takes on the transitional tyrant who caps off the “Age of Cultists” and helps midwife the “Universal Empire”.

Seen in that light, I believe the Western High Culture will bring yet another variant of “Caesar” to the table that we haven’t seen before, one who — going by the kinds of extremes we Modernists have proven ourselves capable of, from Capitalism lifting billions out of poverty in the best of times, to industrialized extermination of millions of “undesirables” in the very worst — could very well rise to power against a backdrop of turmoil and carnage that makes the Warring States Period look like juvenile horseplay.

Moreover, while I hate to invoke Godwin’s Law again, there have been instances of the worst possible candidate — no matter how improbable or easily dismissed they were at first — coming to power and taking the world by storm. Case in point: Hitler having a borderline ASB profile of luck, charisma, irrational gambling, and genocidal insanity that no one saw coming until it actually happened, fighting a multi-front war and expending huge swaths of Germany’s resources on exterminating undesirables when it made little strategic sense to do so and all that. Indeed, even among the Major Leagues of 20th Century Despots, Hitler was still exceptionally bad, so our “Caesar” figure being to his predecessors what Hitler was to his rival dictators or the regimes (e.g., the Ottomans and Armenian Genocide) who inspired him? Honestly, I wouldn’t rule that out.

Even ignoring that and dialing down my own take on Neo-Caesar to the level of a Qin Shi Huangdi or Ashurnisirpal II expy… well, what about Neo-Antony who seizes power in Neo-Caesar’s stead? I may be the most anti-expy guy here, but I’d be remiss not to point out how Antony briefly took power in Rome after Caesar’s assassination and gave Octavian a hard time before the latter eventually won. What’s worse is that we may not even have to wait that long for Neo-Antony to ascend, if more contemporary examples of the especially cutthroat protégé surpassing the already-ruthless mentor early on — namely, Hitler supplanting Anton Drexler as the Nazi Messiah or Stalin succeeding VI Lenin as Head of the USSR — offer glimpses of what a “different” take on a transitional tyrant could look like. Maybe I should convert my fictional Neo-Caesar into more of a Neo-Antony who ascends after the latter’s “early demise”, now that I think about it… :unsure:

It's possible. @Zyobot often raises the same scenario of a "world war III" being the potential equivalent of Caesar's Civil War.

Personally, I have doubts, because the underlying pressures (conflict within society come to dominate) do lend themselves to precisely the civil war kind of outcome. And civil wars are fought differently than international wars. The goals aren't the same. You don't want to reduce to a cinder that which you intend to own.

Caesar, after all, didn't march on Rome to burn it down. And however radical some of her ideas may have been, Hatshepsut razed no cities or temples. Even such brutal tyrants as Ashurnasirpal II or Qin Shi Huangdi never sought to burn the world to the ground. They sought to re-make it, yes. But not to destroy it.

That’s where I stood initially, yes.

More recently, I’m cooking up an outline in which our “Mithridatic Wars” (i.e., the War in Turkey you've proposed) mushrooms into World War III as the desperate Globalists — having become more panicked, desperate, and unhinged with each passing generation leading up to the 2070s or 2080s — finally resort to total war against the “Non-West” as a last-resort means of clinging to power, razing their Eastern rivals, and forcibly depopulating the Earth like their forebears have been planning for decades. Frankly, if Klaus Schwab and the other globalist oligarchs who take certain themes of the Georgia Guidestones way too seriously are that conspiratorial and power-drunk already, then I see no reason for the last of their successors to be any better.

Naturally, this is the straw that breaks the camel’s back as World War III between the West and East (and their proxies, of course) bleeds the former dry, segueing into a “War Across the West” much like how the Great War catalyzed revolution in Russia — making Neo-Caesar something of an arch-reactionary Lenin to the Globalists’ Nicholas II. And perhaps, Neo-Antony a supremely monstrous Stalin that takes his mentor’s purging and scourging to whole new levels shortly after seizing power. Not quite what happened in Rome, China, or Assyria, perhaps, but given how the details have time and again swerved in some crazy directions… well, I’m quite sure the worst possible man for the job will once again come to power and unleash Year Zero across the Western World.

But at the heart of it all, I think the fundamental difference between your expectations and mine is that I think your version of Neo-Caesar — and in fact, most of the key figures you see arising and the decisions they make — is a tad too rational in his aims and methods. That is, I don’t think your prognosis necessarily factors in human stupidity enough, because regardless of whether it makes economic or strategic sense to act in ways that are “politically wise” (if still exceptionally brutal and destructive), there’ll no doubt be a slew of gamblers, fanatics, and total loons who go well beyond “mere” ruthlessness and straight into batshit-crazy territory that wield way more power than they should. I already mentioned the possibility of Neo-Caesar taking after Hitler (in the sense of being a mad Gary Stu of Evil), but let’s also not forget the warlords and “petty dictators” in the margins who’d probably fire off nukes as soon as the nuclear powers (namely Russia, though perhaps also France, the UK, and definitely the US) descend into civilization-wide civil war. Never mind the various lieutenants the top dogs surround themselves with, ranging from the loony Himmler and fanatical Goebbels in the case of Hitler, to horribly sadistic NKVD chiefs like Genrikh Yagoda and Nikolai Yezhov in the case of Stalin — and on, and on, and on. :oops:



Anyway, that's all I've got for now. There were a few other points I wanted to elaborate on (such as Neo-Augustus founding a pan-Western mercantile league instead of an outright Principate), but I'm tired and have probably written enough for one night.

Even now, I'm not fully accustomed to composing extended replies or essay-length rebuttals, so forgive me if there's a bit of a lull between now and my next 1,000-or-more-word response down the line. :p
 
Normal bankers would not do such thing.
Have you looked around lately? Normal bankers frequently back 'communists' to cause destruction to rivals.
Anything that truly makes us "post-human" would take the "human" out of "human nature" (as we know it), which would invalidate the observations of macro-history to a significant extent. Similarly, true artificial intelligence being unleashed -- or, for that matter, intelligent extra-terrestrials arriving with anything constituting a 'significant presence' -- would similarly force us to fundamentally reconsider our previous conclusions.

After all, history will no longer operate by the same rules, if it stops being (exclusively) human history.
That wasn't quite what I was thinking.

I was thinking, "The moment you can read and write a brain, you can also edit it." Being able to make people think something, being able to simply re-write what a person thinks? Added, anybody plugged in is likely searchable as well....


If the majority is plugged in, then no rebellion can happen from those drones.


It's not certain to happen like that. But, if it does.....
I think that would similarly affect the outcomes of macro-historical analysis, at least if applied on a significant scale. As I mentioned: individual behaviour can't be accurately predicted. Only the average human behaviour, as examplified by large masses. Which means that if an individual (or a small group of indviduals) can... "mind-control"... large masses, they'd be replacing the average behaviour of said masses with their own individual decisions.

That would make predictive modelling nigh-impossible.

(Isaac Asimov introduced this notion in his Foundation series, where the models of "psycho-history" -- as he termed it -- cease to be relevant when a mutant appears who can psychically mind-control vast numbers of people.)
There are two ways in which technology threatens to unleash something entirely new upon the world and permanently upset macrohistory as it's been so far.

Total automation:
The ruling classes supplant the human working classes with robots. Human labor is rendered worthless meaning that nonviolent protest (strikes) are pointless and violent resistance can be crushed by endless hordes of autonomously-manufactured killdrones. Originally created by capitalism pursuing cheaper labor substitutes by automating everything until the only remaining social classes are 'idle rich robotics company execuative' and 'unemployed and unemployable'.

Transhumanism-backed hydraulic empire: Everyone gets cybernetic or genetic modification so that they literally cannot revolt, either because their minds are now incapable of conceiving of the concept or because they'll die if the ruling classes stop supplying ketracel white. Originally created by capitalism making transhumanism economically mandatory for the lower classes as a prerequisite for employment, if transhuman workers are objectively more capable and therefore profitable for their bosses, getting augmented will become the new bare minimum standard.

Oddly enough, I could imagine either case causing the new Caesar figure everyone's discussing, with their starting out as an unusually foresighted glowie who saw the writing on the wall and realized that unless something changed, their bosses would very shortly no longer require them and who had firsthand experience at overthrowing goverments and access to blackmail material/political connections.
 
Have you looked around lately? Normal bankers frequently back 'communists' to cause destruction to rivals.



There are two ways in which technology threatens to unleash something entirely new upon the world and permanently upset macrohistory as it's been so far.

Total automation: The ruling classes supplant the human working classes with robots. Human labor is rendered worthless meaning that nonviolent protest (strikes) are pointless and violent resistance can be crushed by endless hordes of autonomously-manufactured killdrones. Originally created by capitalism pursuing cheaper labor substitutes by automating everything until the only remaining social classes are 'idle rich robotics company execuative' and 'unemployed and unemployable'.

Transhumanism-backed hydraulic empire: Everyone gets cybernetic or genetic modification so that they literally cannot revolt, either because their minds are now incapable of conceiving of the concept or because they'll die if the ruling classes stop supplying ketracel white. Originally created by capitalism making transhumanism economically mandatory for the lower classes as a prerequisite for employment, if transhuman workers are objectively more capable and therefore profitable for their bosses, getting augmented will become the new bare minimum standard.

Oddly enough, I could imagine either case causing the new Caesar figure everyone's discussing, with their starting out as an unusually foresighted glowie who saw the writing on the wall and realized that unless something changed, their bosses would very shortly no longer require them and who had firsthand experience at overthrowing goverments and access to blackmail material/political connections.
I said normal bankers,not current BANKSTERS.
And you are right,some smart leftist military or secret police dude would do that.
 
Now, personally, I’d say that in the case of the West, the scale has ballooned so much, that we should expect the “swings” and overall intensity of our own cycle to be more ferocious and destructive than that of previous High Cultures.

Your assumption is that an increase in scale cause an increase in both instability (greater swings) and intensity. I see no evidence of this. Variations in scale, when it comes to historical civilisations, have not demonstrated this pattern at all. Indeed, whether a civilisation shows greater "swings", or whether the degree of violence inherent in its periods of unrest, seems exclusively linked to the cultural characteristics of the civilisation. Not to its scale.

Our own back-drop ("The West", or "Christendom") seems fairly humane by most standards, although I personally discern a pattern where our desire for mastery -- and "ordering the world" -- leads to bursts of excessive intensity. These correspond to cultural uncertainty; periods in which we're not sure of our identity. Once "everything is sitting well in order", we return to our relatively humane stand-by and are more inclined towards placid attitudes than most other cultures. (This is why we oppose torture and slavery -- both quite unique sentiments! -- but also produce Robespierre and Hitler... in times of culture-wide turmoil.)

To be fair, "Modernity" is indeed a (if not the) period of turmoil. So, by our very "Faustian" nature, we are not yet free of the devil. This, however, does not automatically imply what you seem to think it implies. Just because there's a Hitler in the world, it's not yet a consequence of this that all civilisation becomes "Hitlerian". We'll see how it turns out, but as I've sais before: my old mentor was an optimist. You, on the other hand, fairly consistently insist on a "glass entirely empty".

I find myself in the middle. The glass is half empty, which means that it's by definition also half full. I feel that you focus only on the dark side of the Faustian character of our civilisation, which does not provide the full picture.


I mentioned it to you and @CastilloVerde in private once, but to reiterate and expand upon it: One analogy you posited that really stuck with me was thinking of the macro-historical model as a mathematical formula. You plug in certain inputs and get certain outputs, with the underlying relationship between how the variables get plugged in and manipulated remaining consistent, no matter the exact results. So, say we start with a (really simplistic and made-up) formula of 5x, and our x is 5, our output is 25. But if we crank x up to 10 and plug it into 5x again, we’ll get 50.

Fair enough, but what if we get an unusually large input, like 100? Well, same underlying process applies, but as soon as we plug it into 5x, we get a rather (and indeed, an atypically) large output.

Here’s the thing: We’re the 100!

So, the Romans, the Qin, the Assyrians, and the other High Cultures you mentioned? Their inputs were in the single (or at most, low double) digits, being pre-industrial societies for whom daily life moved much slower and for whom the status of Universal Empire could be satiated by claiming domain over their own backyards — which, impressive as they were for the time, weren’t truly universal or consequential on a global scale, beyond the legacies they created that “successor cultures” picked up on long after their lifetime. (e.g.: The West inheriting much from Rome, which was then spread to the “Non-West” by proxy of Western domination.)

By contrast, the West — with its global reach, its universalist ideals, and its more “economically minded” brand of ideological cultism — is the first High Culture to have triple-digit inputs, as the thousands of years between the extant High Cultures and this budding one have given the world a long time to progress leaps and bounds ahead of where it was in Caesar’s, Qin Shi Huangdi’s, or Ashurnisirpal II’s time.

That is an interpretation of the metaphor that I didn't really intend. The idea I was trying to convey was more that human nature is fairly constant (which I liken to a fixed equation) but that the instantiations of that nature (e.g. the different expressions of unique cultures) are like variables that differ every time. Which leads to different... well, values.

Which is why history doesn't repeat, but does rhyme, as it were.

The idea of "bigger numbers means bigger escalations" is not one I find altogether convincing, as I've outlined above. There's no evidence for such a trend. Instability has thus far not been seen to increase with scale. If the argument is that our scale is so much bigger that a previously unobserved effect might be at play... well, I can't rule that out, although our civilisational history thus far doesn't seem to support it.

And if such an effect exists... who says it tends in the direction you posit? Have you considered the (similarly hypothetical) notion that an increase in scale might actually increase stability and reduce the risk of sudden "swings"? I'm not saying that's the case; I'm just saying there's just as much (or rather: as little) evidence for that hypothesis as there is for yours. So for now, we may consider it to be equally probable.


I’m not saying we’ve outgrown human nature or transcended the rules of the current Scarcity Paradigm — far from it. What I am saying is that the scale on which things happen now is such, that from a macro-historical perspective, the details are sufficiently different to make the West stand out for precisely that reason. At the very least, I expect we’ll see some new spins on the same fundamental tendencies and archetypes that stick out, rather than “rehashing” of old ones dropped into a Modern context.

I find we stand out as much as any civilisation stands out from any other. Certainly, we are uniquely ourselves, so the way things have played out (and will continue to play out) reflects that. But that has always been the case, for everyone.


Per the above, I’m not so sure we should treat previous “Caesars” as the be-all, end-all of what all “Caesar” figures — past, present, and future — could be like.

To repeat my previous comparison, it’d have been wrong for the “proto-macrohistorians” of Republican Rome to cast Julius Caesar as a toga-bearing, Latin-speaking expy of Qin Shi Huangdi, and I expect the same will also prove true for us. Same for learned Chinese observers to predict that Qin would’ve been just another Ashurnisirpal II in all but name and era, as — like Caesar himself — these various incarnations introduced new, culture-specific takes on the transitional tyrant who caps off the “Age of Cultists” and helps midwife the “Universal Empire”.

Seen in that light, I believe the Western High Culture will bring yet another variant of “Caesar” to the table that we haven’t seen before, one who — going by the kinds of extremes we Modernists have proven ourselves capable of, from Capitalism lifting billions out of poverty in the best of times, to industrialized extermination of millions of “undesirables” in the very worst — could very well rise to power against a backdrop of turmoil and carnage that makes the Warring States Period look like juvenile horseplay.

When it comes to intensity overall, the death toll of our "Modernity" thus far (proportional to the total population) is much more modest than what we see in the Warring States Period of China. Which isn't strange, considering that it was the extreme outlier in that regard.

This doesn't mean the concluding phase for us can't be a total nightmare. After all, Egypt's equivalent had a really crappy start, then a more average record for the duration, and culminated in the least violent conclusion of all known civilisations. Not even a civil war, but a palace coup to remove a too-rigid transition tyrant. (One who didn't even have any substantial number of people buried alive or anything of the sort, at that!)

China, by contrast, had a very mild beginning (just a lot of scheming by the ambitious), but it escalated into total carnage.


Moreover, while I hate to invoke Godwin’s Law again, there have been instances of the worst possible candidate — no matter how improbable or easily dismissed they were at first — coming to power and taking the world by storm. Case in point: Hitler having a borderline ASB profile of luck, charisma, irrational gambling, and genocidal insanity that no one saw coming until it actually happened, fighting a multi-front war and expending huge swaths of Germany’s resources on exterminating undesirables when it made little strategic sense to do so and all that. Indeed, even among the Major Leagues of 20th Century Despots, Hitler was still exceptionally bad, so our “Caesar” figure being to his predecessors what Hitler was to his rival dictators or the regimes (e.g., the Ottomans and Armenian Genocide) who inspired him? Honestly, I wouldn’t rule that out.

Thus, going by what I wrote above, these things fluctuate. A very extreme beginning is not a guarantee of an extreme conclusion. If we go by the overall track record of the West, I'm inclined to expect an unusally high degree of ideological fervour. That does lend itself to atrocities. On the other hand, it also lends itself to specific types of atrocities. It's not a guarantee of the kind of outcome you've suggested.

The bottom line, for me, is that history is the product of human nature. And in our case specifically, the product of the nature of "Western man". While it is within that nature to produce a Robespierre or a Hitler, that is not (nearly) the entirety of that nature. If you try to extrapolate a civilisational history from just one facet of a civilisation's identity, you're not going to get an accurate picture.

Imagine if you gave a computer or an alien with no other knowledge all possible information on Robespierre and Hitler and all other tyrants and all their atrocities in all of our history... and then asked it to fill in the blanks. It would outline an imaginary nightmare-history that would in no way reflect real history.

For the same reason, I think that this method is unlikely to produce an accurate outline of the future. The whole point of macro-history is to look at the big picture, taken as a whole.



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Oddly enough, I could imagine either case causing the new Caesar figure everyone's discussing

"And suddenly, for no reason at all, the Butlerian Jihad was unleashed."

I have serious doubts about AI having that much of an effect within the next few decades, because-- well, mostly because what we have right now is 100% fake AI, and not actually capable of consciousness. To make real AI, all current developments are useless, and you'd need to start over from the beginning. (Basically, the current efforts are like making highly realistic-looking but 100% artifical trees made of some type of plastic, and somehow thinking they'll grow roots and become real trees. Nope, not gonna work.)

However, this does seem like a really cool sci-fi take. I'd read that book. And of course, you can skip objections regarding plausibility by just carrying the concept over to the "next cycle", and have the issue of real AI be the core of the "culture wars" of a future civilisation. But of course, then you're kind of just writing the back-story to Dune. (Not that this is a bad thing, because Brian and Kevin didn't do a good job anyway. And it's fitting, because Frank Herbert was evidently aware of macro-historical theory. The way he writes about stagnation within systems is straight out of Toynbee.)
 
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Your assumption is that an increase in scale cause an increase in both instability (greater swings) and intensity. I see no evidence of this. Variations in scale, when it comes to historical civilisations, have not demonstrated this pattern at all. Indeed, whether a civilisation shows greater "swings", or whether the degree of violence inherent in its periods of unrest, seems exclusively linked to the cultural characteristics of the civilisation. Not to its scale.

Our own back-drop ("The West", or "Christendom") seems fairly humane by most standards, although I personally discern a pattern where our desire for mastery -- and "ordering the world" -- leads to bursts of excessive intensity. These correspond to cultural uncertainty; periods in which we're not sure of our identity. Once "everything is sitting well in order", we return to our relatively humane stand-by and are more inclined towards placid attitudes than most other cultures. (This is why we oppose torture and slavery -- both quite unique sentiments! -- but also produce Robespierre and Hitler... in times of culture-wide turmoil.)

To be fair, "Modernity" is indeed a (if not the) period of turmoil. So, by our very "Faustian" nature, we are not yet free of the devil. This, however, does not automatically imply what you seem to think it implies. Just because there's a Hitler in the world, it's not yet a consequence of this that all civilisation becomes "Hitlerian". We'll see how it turns out, but as I've sais before: my old mentor was an optimist. You, on the other hand, fairly consistently insist on a "glass entirely empty".

I find myself in the middle. The glass is half empty, which means that it's by definition also half full. I feel that you focus only on the dark side of the Faustian character of our civilisation, which does not provide the full picture.
Personally, I would say that differences tend to be not in the overall evil, but rather in amplitude.

Basically, if we take Middle Ages, they had pretty much constant violence... but that violence was relatively low-key. As we move further and further into modernity, violence becomes far more destructive, but also much rarer as society simply cannot handle such scale on a constant basis.

The ultimate expression of this trend would be the last colonial conflict of European history - two World Wars, which really are just one conflict stretched over three decades - which, upon their conclusion, produced a relatively peaceful period.

Look also at other cultures. Mongols killed so many people that you could trace that through CO2 emissions - but their violence was comparatively short-lived. Roman Empire also acted in bursts of fairly intense violence.

All of this however is a consequence not of scale, but rather of socioeconomic conditions.
 
Personally, I would say that differences tend to be not in the overall evil, but rather in amplitude.

Basically, if we take Middle Ages, they had pretty much constant violence... but that violence was relatively low-key. As we move further and further into modernity, violence becomes far more destructive, but also much rarer as society simply cannot handle such scale on a constant basis.

The ultimate expression of this trend would be the last colonial conflict of European history - two World Wars, which really are just one conflict stretched over three decades - which, upon their conclusion, produced a relatively peaceful period.

Look also at other cultures. Mongols killed so many people that you could trace that through CO2 emissions - but their violence was comparatively short-lived. Roman Empire also acted in bursts of fairly intense violence.

All of this however is a consequence not of scale, but rather of socioeconomic conditions.

honestly when you put it that way I rather live in modernity. One loud bang by followed by a period of piece. if I can survive that initaial wave I'm golden. A time of constant violence however, low-key or not is essentially a game of Russian roulette. all it takes is one bullet and there are a lot more chambers.
 
Will try and circle back to the comments @Skallagrim wrote on scale (as well as The West’s more “Faustian” tendencies), but to digress a bit: Surely, I can’t be the only one wondering how it’d be to live like The Watcher from Marvel’s What If…? series, given all the talk on macro-history and such?

That is, a nigh-omnipotent immortal who simply sits back and watches history — both OTL and the infinite ATLs that branch off with every divergence — unfold with a “God’s-eye view” that none of us fallible, squishy, all-too-mortal humans have. Could certainly be a “lonely” existence, yes, as well as one fraught with temptations to interfere, should you grow too attached to certain people or places that catch your eye. Of course, maybe that’s taking the analogy too far, though in any case, I can still imagine the TL you interfere in splitting in two by creating one where you interfered and another where you didn’t. Maybe even multiple variants of the former where your timing was different or your newly-made ATL selves took different approaches to interfering, which is even more head-spinning to think about. o_O
 
Imagine if you gave a computer or an alien with no other knowledge all possible information on Robespierre and Hitler and all other tyrants and all their atrocities in all of our history... and then asked it to fill in the blanks. It would outline an imaginary nightmare-history that would in no way reflect real history.
Problem here is that All Possible Information about Robespierre and Adolf would include millions of pages of context about what lead to these people, giving a much clearer view of Humanity tbh.
 
And you are right,some smart leftist military or secret police dude would do that.
It's only logical. Where could someone meeting the following requirements be found:
  • Able to incite others to political violence without being caught and punished for it. That's basically half the glowie day job.
  • Knows the identities of massive numbers of potential dissidents, from the surveillance state's own records.
  • May have useful blackmail material on authority figures.
  • Has firsthand experience overthrowing goverments. The other half of glowie work.
  • Is a sociopathic bastard with demonstrably no concern for their oath to serve the country's inhabitants and obey the law.
In other words, the glowies.

Plus, even if I'm wrong, I know someone's reading this and if their boss knew this, it might make them less trustworthy.
I have serious doubts about AI having that much of an effect within the next few decades, because-- well, mostly because what we have right now is 100% fake AI, and not actually capable of consciousness. To make real AI, all current developments are useless, and you'd need to start over from the beginning. (Basically, the current efforts are like making highly realistic-looking but 100% artifical trees made of some type of plastic, and somehow thinking they'll grow roots and become real trees. Nope, not gonna work.)
Not really seeing it. AI is getting scarily good, scarily fast. There's no logical reason why any computational process possible in a processor made from biology couldn't eventually be replicated in a mechanical medium. At worst, build a system emulator by simulating all the electrical and biochemical interactions in an organic brain. I'm not sure how long it'll be until we have AGI, but I see no reason why it shouldn't be possible to eventually build it.

Plus, it isn't my opinion on the matter that counts. Apparently the oligarchs think it's possible and are acting accordingly and even if they turn out to be wrong and their automation-cracy collapses, we're still fucked.
 
Not really seeing it. AI is getting scarily good, scarily fast.

Current AI isn't getting scarily good at all-- at least, not at the things you suggested it would be used for. Current AI, as I mentioned, isn't AI at all. It's missing the 'I'. It's a simulacrum that has no consciousness. It can't produce consistency due to that. So, for instance, it can answer questions based on a data-set. But have you seen what happens when you ask it to write a single scene for a film script? Most of the time, total nonsense comes out. If you try for anything long-form, it just spews out gibberish, because it has no mind and cannot produce a consistent narrative.

Likewise for visual media. It can produce images based on data-sets, but these often have utterly weird nonsense elements. As in: a picture of a mediaeval town has things that look like buildings at first glance, but which make no geometric sense. Because the damn thing doesn't even understand what a building is. And again, forget about consistency. Ask it to produce a series of images of a person walking down a street, from different perspectives. It won't produce the same street twice... nor the same person!

These limitations apply to all processes. Current "AI" isn't capable of thinking, and nothing about it could possibly allow it to start thinking. It's about as likely to become true AI as the infamous goat simulator is to become a real flesh-and-blood goat. That's why I'm pointing out that for the purposes you mentioned, current "AI" is simply a dead end.


There's no logical reason why any computational process possible in a processor made from biology couldn't eventually be replicated in a mechanical medium. At worst, build a system emulator by simulating all the electrical and biochemical interactions in an organic brain. I'm not sure how long it'll be until we have AGI, but I see no reason why it shouldn't be possible to eventually build it.

You're reacting as if I claimed that true AI is always impossible, but that's not what I said.

I wrote: "I have serious doubts about AI having that much of an effect within the next few decades. (...) To make real AI, all current developments are useless, and you'd need to start over from the beginning."

And then you go on to describe... how we could start over from the beginning.

You propose and interesting method of actually achieving true AI. It could plausibly work, but I still don't see realistic perspectives for it to become relevant within the next few decades. Sequencing the human genome took decades. Simulating all the electrical and biochemical interactions in an organic brain is a considerably more daunting task. And that's assuming that doing so would yield results (as opposed to, say, revealing that there's more to consciousness than we've grasped thus far, and that there are additional steps required that we haven't even imagined yet.)


Plus, it isn't my opinion on the matter that counts. Apparently the oligarchs think it's possible and are acting accordingly and even if they turn out to be wrong and their automation-cracy collapses, we're still fucked.

If they try it and it fails, that's no worse than any other alternative. Look at Chile, where Allende already tried to go down this road. (He wanted to solve the calculation problem by feeding all data into a super-computer. It didn't work out.) If we go down a path like that, and get a super-Pinochet who rids us of the morons who put their faith in "AI" to save their retarded socio-economic system, I'll consider that a pretty happy outcome. Far better than some other alternatives.
 
Okay, that's a clever caveat, but it's rather missing the point I was making. And quite deliberately so, I imagine! ;)
Fair, Lmao. But still, any study of these individuals in depth does show that they are in fact, disrupters who disrupted the essential events of there days and should give the Ailens enough of a hint that their is more here.
 
honestly when you put it that way I rather live in modernity. One loud bang by followed by a period of piece. if I can survive that initaial wave I'm golden. A time of constant violence however, low-key or not is essentially a game of Russian roulette. all it takes is one bullet and there are a lot more chambers.
On the flip side, when the violence does happen, you are far more likely to die.

Also, there are areas - such as much of the Third World, as well as the ethnically diverse areas in the First World (London, Paris, New York etc.) - where average person is far more likely to be killed horribly than average person was likely to be killed in the Middle Ages. In fact, in some areas a civilian is more likely to be shot and die than a soldier in Second World War was.

So all and all, I'm not seeing much benefit. Or rather, there are benefits, but the modern society and modern mentality are doing their level best to negate all the advantages of the modern world.
 
In terms of macro history, and Skallagrim you are free to chuckle about this, but I’ve somewhat perceived a pattern with England’s history that is almost entirely separate from the High Culture thesis of Spengler et al.

There appears to be cycles of roughly four hundred years in my country’s history, where a great challenge arises and the system, on the verge of destruction, adapts and becomes stronger. It begins (perhaps. You could jump back another four hundred years before that to the arrival of the Saxons) in the 9th century with the Viking Invasions and the rise of Wessex, where England is truly born.

Four centuries later you have Magna Carta, the Baronial Revolts, William the Marshal, and Edward I, who address the grievances of the crown’s subjects whilst crushing the rebellious barons and cementing royal power.

Four hundred years after that, you have the car crash that is the 17th century and the Stuart dynasty; the Civil War, Restoration, and Glorious Revolution, where I think our political system finishes formulating itself.

And what’s seventeen plus four?

Twenty-one.

In this epoch of mass immigration, ruinously expensive social programs, and out of touch government and society crippled by faulty dogma, England is about to hit its next massive, earth shaking, upheaval. Let’s hope we don’t have the seventeenth century all over again, because ending up under Olly Cromwell two: Electric Boogaloo’s boot does not sound desirable.

I know, it isn’t neat, it is a shower thought after all. But history certainly seems to rhyme.
 
In terms of macro history, and Skallagrim you are free to chuckle about this, but I’ve somewhat perceived a pattern with England’s history that is almost entirely separate from the High Culture thesis of Spengler et al.

There appears to be cycles of roughly four hundred years in my country’s history, where a great challenge arises and the system, on the verge of destruction, adapts and becomes stronger. It begins (perhaps. You could jump back another four hundred years before that to the arrival of the Saxons) in the 9th century with the Viking Invasions and the rise of Wessex, where England is truly born.

Four centuries later you have Magna Carta, the Baronial Revolts, William the Marshal, and Edward I, who address the grievances of the crown’s subjects whilst crushing the rebellious barons and cementing royal power.

Four hundred years after that, you have the car crash that is the 17th century and the Stuart dynasty; the Civil War, Restoration, and Glorious Revolution, where I think our political system finishes formulating itself.

And what’s seventeen plus four?

Twenty-one.

In this epoch of mass immigration, ruinously expensive social programs, and out of touch government and society crippled by faulty dogma, England is about to hit its next massive, earth shaking, upheaval. Let’s hope we don’t have the seventeenth century all over again, because ending up under Olly Cromwell two: Electric Boogaloo’s boot does not sound desirable.

I know, it isn’t neat, it is a shower thought after all. But history certainly seems to rhyme.

Cromwell mart two might be the lesser of two evils when I look at your current government.
 
In terms of macro history, and Skallagrim you are free to chuckle about this, but I’ve somewhat perceived a pattern with England’s history that is almost entirely separate from the High Culture thesis of Spengler et al.

There appears to be cycles of roughly four hundred years in my country’s history, where a great challenge arises and the system, on the verge of destruction, adapts and becomes stronger. It begins (perhaps. You could jump back another four hundred years before that to the arrival of the Saxons) in the 9th century with the Viking Invasions and the rise of Wessex, where England is truly born.

Four centuries later you have Magna Carta, the Baronial Revolts, William the Marshal, and Edward I, who address the grievances of the crown’s subjects whilst crushing the rebellious barons and cementing royal power.

Four hundred years after that, you have the car crash that is the 17th century and the Stuart dynasty; the Civil War, Restoration, and Glorious Revolution, where I think our political system finishes formulating itself.

And what’s seventeen plus four?

Twenty-one.

In this epoch of mass immigration, ruinously expensive social programs, and out of touch government and society crippled by faulty dogma, England is about to hit its next massive, earth shaking, upheaval. Let’s hope we don’t have the seventeenth century all over again, because ending up under Olly Cromwell two: Electric Boogaloo’s boot does not sound desirable.

I know, it isn’t neat, it is a shower thought after all. But history certainly seems to rhyme.

One might wonder if "island cultures" such as those of the British and Japanese isles -- being certainly entangled within the civilisational fabric that is mostly formed on the continent, but also by their very definition apart -- have identifiable "reactions" to this situation, in their cultural histories. It could be an interesting thing that just happened to occur in England (and later, by definition, Britain) but it might plausibly be a broader effect that could then also be observed elsewhere.

I've previously noted potential similarities in English and Japanese history:


"(...) my thinking here rests on the rough estimation (which fits, as far as chronology goes, at least) of pre-Roman Britain being vaguely "analogous" to Japan in the Jomon period. This casts the arrival of Roman influence as being akin to the emergence of the Yayoi period in Japan. (It is now generally understood that the Yayoi people were formed around a nexus of migrating groups from the Korean peninsula.)

We might take that further, and liken the influx of ethnic Han migrants during the Kofun period as being at last a bit similar to the Anglo-Saxons? Sure, it's more credible to liken the Kofun period to Sub-Roman Britain, and the Kofun-era migrants didn't shape Japan to the extent that the Anglo-Saxons altered the fate of Britain... but there are at least some similarities. Likewise, the consolidation of the central monarchy during the subsequent Asuka period can be seen as similar to Alfred's consolidation of royal power in England, ending the divisions of the Heptarchy. Indeed, even the introduction of Buddhism in this era can be seen as very much like the introduction of Christianity into Anglo-Saxon England
."


Being no expert in early Japanese history, I've refrained from sweeping statements on the matter. Investigating Japanese history is still on my to-do list. This observation of yours adds something else to look out for in the process. (Although it may not yield results: my tentative hypothesis is that Japan is akin to a "road not taken" for Britain; that road having been easier to take due to Japan's greater geographical isolation.)
 
On the flip side, when the violence does happen, you are far more likely to die.

Also, there are areas - such as much of the Third World, as well as the ethnically diverse areas in the First World (London, Paris, New York etc.) - where average person is far more likely to be killed horribly than average person was likely to be killed in the Middle Ages. In fact, in some areas a civilian is more likely to be shot and die than a soldier in Second World War was.

So all and all, I'm not seeing much benefit. Or rather, there are benefits, but the modern society and modern mentality are doing their level best to negate all the advantages of the modern world.

Ok first of all cities have always been "Great places for trade, horrible places to live in" there have been writings saying that all the way back to biblical times, if people don't realize that by now I don't know what to tell them. There is also diseases like Plague, Dysentery, and even pneumonia all of which we killers back then that most people don't really think about much now due to antibiotics and water treatment plants. Also, look at deaths related to birth difficulties (Something so common it's the reason why life expectancy was considered so low.)

and I'm sorry. but if war does come to my town. I have a wheelchair and a car,. I can flee. The same scenario happens in the middle ages? I'm doomed. So pardon me if I don't look at the days of yore with the sort of romanticism others do. Heaven for them would be Punishment for me unless I had a fundamentally different body.
 
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In terms of macro history, and Skallagrim you are free to chuckle about this, but I’ve somewhat perceived a pattern with England’s history that is almost entirely separate from the High Culture thesis of Spengler et al.

There appears to be cycles of roughly four hundred years in my country’s history, where a great challenge arises and the system, on the verge of destruction, adapts and becomes stronger. It begins (perhaps. You could jump back another four hundred years before that to the arrival of the Saxons) in the 9th century with the Viking Invasions and the rise of Wessex, where England is truly born.

Four centuries later you have Magna Carta, the Baronial Revolts, William the Marshal, and Edward I, who address the grievances of the crown’s subjects whilst crushing the rebellious barons and cementing royal power.

Four hundred years after that, you have the car crash that is the 17th century and the Stuart dynasty; the Civil War, Restoration, and Glorious Revolution, where I think our political system finishes formulating itself.

And what’s seventeen plus four?

Twenty-one.

In this epoch of mass immigration, ruinously expensive social programs, and out of touch government and society crippled by faulty dogma, England is about to hit its next massive, earth shaking, upheaval. Let’s hope we don’t have the seventeenth century all over again, because ending up under Olly Cromwell two: Electric Boogaloo’s boot does not sound desirable.

I know, it isn’t neat, it is a shower thought after all. But history certainly seems to rhyme.

I don't like your culture for the most part and I will make fun of the royal family southpark style so long as there is ammo. But for your sake I hope things get better.
 

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