No its not. I've got the book remember.
Didn't know how well you looked over the text.
Not if it become a long attritional conflict in the Low Countries.
Given how unlikely that is since we know how the battles were shaping up even with the weaker forces used IOTL, plus of course the 12th army having some panzers to exploit the Ardennes even before the major change post-Mechelin which would likely force a retreat out of the Lowlands anyway, it is irrelevant to the discussion.
There's no guarantee but its bloody unlikely Italy will enter the conflict unless the Germans are clearly winning. They might do something like an attack on Yugoslavia or Greece while they think everybody else is too occupied to intervene.
If the Allies are pushed out of the Lowlands it will look like the Germans are clearly winning the head to head bash up.
No way that the Italians would do that when the situation in the West was so uncertain; Italy needed to keep its powder dry in the event intervention would be on the table. Though invading Yugoslavia was discussed until April once it was clear Germany was going to attack Mussolini opted to wait to see how events played out. Even if there isn't a clear winner in the campaign Mussolini could order intervention to tip the scales and get even more goodies at the expected peace deal. IOTL events moved more quickly that Mussolini could act so he very well could have been willing to enter sooner, but didn't have the chance since the Germans won so quickly. Also Italy was furious at Britain for the blockade that impacted their imports, so that could very well tip intervention as well.
en.wikipedia.org
On 1 March, the British announced that they would block all coal exports from Rotterdam to Italy.
[25][26] Italian coal was one of the most discussed issues in diplomatic circles in the spring of 1940. In April Britain began strengthening their
Mediterranean Fleet to enforce the blockade. Despite French misgivings, Britain rejected concessions to Italy so as not to "create an impression of weakness".
[27] Germany supplied Italy with about one million tons of coal a month beginning in the spring of 1940, an amount that even exceeded Mussolini's demand of August 1939 that Italy receive six million tons of coal for its first twelve months of war.
[28]
On 26 May, Mussolini informed
Marshals Pietro Badoglio, chief of the Supreme General Staff, and
Italo Balbo that he intended to join the German war against Britain and France, so to be able to sit at the peace table "when the world is to be apportioned" following an Axis victory. The two marshals unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Mussolini that this was not a wise course of action, arguing that the Italian military was unprepared, divisions were not up to strength, troops lacked equipment, the empire was equally unprepared, and the merchant fleet was scattered across the globe.
[38][c] On 5 June, Mussolini told Badoglio, "I only need a few thousand dead so that I can sit at the peace conference as a man who has fought".
[41]
Historically Germany got huge amounts of loot from France as well as foodstuff and forced labourers. I have even seen it suggested here that Germany would refuse to sign a peace with France so that could continue even if they came to terms with Britain. Either you or HL can't remember off hand.
Because of the speed of the OTL German victory there was little impact on infrastructure and Germany made France pay huge amounts for the forces that were based in France. One figure I saw was that it was equivalent to the cost of an army of occupation ~18M strong IIRC.
Sure, but it took a while to get all that sorted and that was only really useful for Barbarossa. It was not necessary to beat France or launch the Battle of Britain. Plans were at that time for a long war in the west without any loot being available, so as it was the people doing the planning thought they had what they needed to defeat the Allies with just what they had before the invasion and trade with the Soviets; Stalin only cut shipments once Germany won out of fear that his plan to let the Germans and Allies wear each other out in a long war had failed; here he'd keep supplying Germany if the fighting continued to ensure the imperialists were weakened.
I assume that is HL, because I can't recall saying that. I doubt that it would be true if Britain quit, since France would likely quit at the same time to avoid exactly that horrible possibility.
Oh there was a major impact on infrastructure due to the intensity of the bombing campaign. There is a reason French reserves had so much trouble moving around behind the lines and in fact dissolved in the face of bombing attacks. "Phoenix Rising" by Hooton is about the history of the Luftwaffe from 1918-1940 and covers the period between the French campaign and Battle of Britain and notes how much work had to be done to restore infrastructure to even be able to sustain aircraft in the north of France and of course the advance into the rest of France in June. Since France had a lot of developed infrastructure but the impacted region was relatively small rapid repairs were possible.
Again you're not wrong that Germany did exploit France for a lot of stuff, but the occupation took time to set up and the majority of the looting came in several months into the occupation and the bulk IIRC only in 1941. So again, more important for Barbarossa than an extended campaign in the west.
Because Britain's own production exceeded that of Germany and Italy in many cases. You don't get US sells counted in British production in any book I've seen.
You said that
"Britain is going insolvent by 1941. " - talking about a scenario where France doesn't fall.
then
"after June 1940 because Britain then got all of France's orders and the full focus of US industry, but that simply meant that rapid boost depleted British coffers by 1941. " - As you pointed out not only did Britain have a much greater need for material due to the sudden crisis but it, probably unwisely, took on all the French orders. This obviously increased the stress on Britain's fiscal resources.
Do the numbers in the books you've seen actually break down the difference? I've read quite a bit on the BoB and they don't differentiate between total number of aircraft and total number produced exclusively in Britain. Britain only exceeded Germany in a few categories due to purchases of completed war planes (including French orders), machine tools, and raw materials as well as focusing output on things like fighter planes. In fact other than fighters I'm not sure what Britain actually exceeded Germany in producing in 1940. It is the reverse to the situation in 1944 when Germany outproduced Britain in total aircraft due to focusing on fighters while the Brits focused on bombers.
I said Britain was insolvent by 1941 IOTL; that is relevant to a situation where France doesn't fall because Britain is going to have to spend a lot more to sustain an army in the field AND a major air force as well with US purchases. Rather than simply taking over French orders for aircraft IOTL it will be demand for army materials instead. Heavy purchasing was going to happen given the WW1 experience of how spending only increased exponentially after the ground battles escalated. If anything the quick defeat simply extended British financial reserves, as they then could focus on a less costly more limited type of combat.
They may have shown some limitations because of concern about uprisings or the need for extractions for conquered territories but there was no moral restraint as that was totally alien to the Nazi mentality.
Agree to disagree on that. After all they used massive restraint throughout the war and it was generally the Allies and Soviets to escalated things. City bombing was started by the British not the Nazis. What bombing of cities they did in 1939-40 were of legal targets which were defended by military units. Contrary to the BS the Poles have pushed Weilun had reports of Polish troops in the town, which was why it was bombed; the intel could have been faulty of course, that happens in war all the time, but it was targeted not for terror, but for military purposes. Same with Guernica incidentally. Rotterdam and Warsaw were both defended by ground troops when they were bombed. Hitler forbade bombing British cities until the RAF had raided Berlin several times in 1940. The one incident the Luftwaffe had been involved in in August was due to a single bomber bombing the wrong target by accident.
Later on take for example the situation of the Jews. Mass murder of Jews didn't start until Barbarossa and even then only after the partisan war started, as the Einsatzgruppen orders to start killing Jews only came on the 8th of July, more than two weeks into the war and initially only targeting Jewish men of fighting age and only specifically said 'treat them as partisans' as it was claimed that they were disproportionately involved in guerrilla activities. Remember this is after the NKVD prison massacres that killed around 100,000 people in a matter of days in prisons the Germans overran, the Red Army massacring/mutilating prisoners and the dead from the beginning of the war (well documented by their war crimes bureau, I've seen the reports and pictures...quite gruesome stuff),
Stalin announcing/ordering the formation of guerrilla warfare units behind German lines in a radio address on July 3rd, and various other things (one example: burning or taking all the food and farm equipment to leave their own civilians with nothing to eat or be able to plant for next season). The Soviets fought a dirty war from the very beginning that radicalized German forces and even the Nazis were shocked by what they encountered, which we know from captured reports. They got radicalized by the war just the same as everyone else as we can see by the escalating atrocities on both sides.
You don't have to take my word for it either, Timothy Snyder wrote a book called "Bloodlands" which discussed how both the Soviets and Nazis escalated their crimes as they played off of each other. Well reviewed book BTW:
en.wikipedia.org
He specifically points out how Soviet partisans made the suffering of the civilian population much worse due to targeting them, anyone who supported the Germans, and let civilians bear the brunt of the Nazi 'anti-partisan' measures, which generally meant extreme force as the attacks escalated. Soviet strategy was to radicalize civilians to prevent them from cooperating with the Germans, which meant ensuring they suffered as much as possible.
None of this is to say the Nazis didn't do horrible stuff, but the Allied propagandistic narrative of the war is simply not accurate; as they say the victors write the history of the war and they really tried to blame everything on Nazi awfulness and mentality, but very conveniently left out their own role in escalating everything to new heights of awfulness. About the only taboo both sides refused to break was the use of chemical weapons.
They wanted most of the people in the east dead anyway. Ditto with their lack of concern for the Dutch as the allies advanced towards Germany in 1944.
That is what the Allies claimed after the war, that doesn't actually hold up to the documents in question.
In the case of the Dutch remember the Germans were the ones who negotiated with the Allies to avoid a famine disaster; they did the same thing in Greece in 1941 despite the British being willing to let 100s of thousands starve until Turkey of all people stepped in to help. The famine in the Netherlands was more about the bombing and rail strike of the Dutch themselves, trying to help the Allies by paralyzing transport, that prevented food from being moved around. After all it doesn't make sense for the Germans to ask the Allies to paradrop food to civilians if they intended to starve them.
No you argued that the empire produced no military output and I mentioned Canada and India. Don't know why you mentioned food in reference to Canada although it was a source for food supplies that had similar but marginally better logistics than the US.
It seemed you were claiming the military output of Canada and India were sent to Britain, which was largely not the case, especially regarding India. You brought up Canadian food and its importance.
That's your opinion but we will never know how hard the French would have fought without their early collapse and we know how many men Britain mobilized from itself and the empire.
The French fought hard throughout the campaign. They just knew when to quit when because they understood that the Nazis wouldn't treat them barbarically, which they largely didn't throughout the war.
Ok? Sure we know how many men in the empire were mobilized throughout the war, but we need to know how many were actually available and ready to fight in 1940-41, because if they weren't ready to fight in that period then the war in Europe would be over well before they were ready.
The problem was Hitler would have come for France sooner or later.
No no, you have to prove that. So far there is ZERO evidence that that was ever planned.
Probably before he drives east to secure his rear. Its clear from his writings and OTL behaviour he wanted A-L and to avenge the humiliation of 1918. You say that we shouldn't believe what Hitler said in private but I think we should and you similarly have offered no proof that he wouldn't other than that for some reason you seem to desire it.
Ah no. He swore off A-L repeatedly and only took it because France declared war on Germany and then lost; naturally if you win you're going to take something of value much as the Allies did against Germany in WW1 including territory for countries that didn't even fight (Denmark with Schleswig-Holstein). There was no intention to ever fight France unless France attacked Germany first. Which is what happened.
I didn't say you shouldn't believe what Hitler said in private, it is just that fake documents were inserted into the record for use at the Tribunal at Nuremberg; that even came up at the trial when defense pointed out BS documents that even that biased judiciary thought was too blatant and threw out. But even in private Hitler didn't say he intended to invade France. If you have some document that shows that please post it here and we can go over what was actually said and planned.
I don't have to prove he didn't until you prove that he did; you don't have to prove a negative, but you do have to prove a positive claim like you keep making without evidence.
Actually what's been said before is that the general in charge, possibly due to dislike of the government at the time lied to them that full mobilization would be needed. We actually know it wouldn't as orders were that if the French did anything to send forces into the Rhineland the small forces that Germany sent in were to withdraw immediately. So there wouldn't even have been a war let any any 'violation of the "spirit" of Locarno' if France had fulfilled its treaty rights to maintain the demilitarization of the region. Which would have prevented war as Hitler without that wouldn't have dared attack anywhere else.
Full mobilization would have been needed to actually resist the reoccupation, since France needed to send a signal beyond just a handful of forces on hand. Hitler only acted because he knew the French couldn't act:
en.wikipedia.org
At the same time, Neurath received an intelligence report on 10 January 1936 from Gottfried Aschmann, the Chief of the
Auswärtiges Amt's Press Division, who during a visit to Paris in early January 1936 had talked to a minor French politician named Jean Montiny who was a close friend of Premier Laval, who had frankly mentioned that France's economic problems had retarded French military modernization and that France would do nothing if Germany remilitarized the Rhineland.
[62] Neurath did not pass on Aschmann's report to Hitler, but he placed a high value upon it.
[63]
The financial issues started just on the mere threat of war:
en.wikipedia.org
At the same time, in late 1935 to early 1936 France was gripped by a financial crisis, with the French Treasury informing the government that sufficient cash reserves to maintain the value of the franc as currently pegged by the gold standard in regard to the US dollar and the British pound no longer existed, and only a huge foreign loan on the money markets of London and New York could prevent the value of the franc from experiencing a disastrous downfall.[131] Because France was on the verge of elections scheduled for the spring of 1936, devaluation of the franc, which was viewed as abhorrent by large sections of French public opinion, was rejected by the caretaker government of Prime Minister
Albert Sarraut as politically unacceptable.
[131] Investors' fears of a war with Germany were not conducive to raising the necessary loans to stabilize the franc, and the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, by sparking fears of war, worsened the French economic crisis by causing a massive cash flow out of France, with worried investors shifting their savings towards what were felt to be safer foreign markets.[132] The fact that France had defaulted on its World War I debts in 1932 understandably led most investors to conclude that the same would occur if France was involved in another war with Germany,. On March 18, 1936, Wilfrid Baumgartner, the director of the
Mouvement général des fonds (the French equivalent of a permanent under-secretary) reported to the government that France, for all intents and purposes, was bankrupt.
[133] Only by desperate arm-twisting from the major French financial institutions could Baumgartner manage to obtain enough in the way of short-term loans to prevent France from defaulting on its debts and to keeping the value of the franc from sliding too far, in March 1936.
[133] Given the financial crisis, the French government feared that there were insufficient funds to cover the costs of mobilization and that a full-blown war scare caused by mobilization would only exacerbate the financial crisis.
[133] The American historian Zach Shore wrote, "It was not lack of French will to fight in 1936 which permitted Hitler's coup, but rather France's lack of funds, military might, and therefore operational plans to counter German remilitarization".
[134]
It also didn't help that the French government had fallen and only an interim government was in charge:
From the above link:
the government in Paris had just fallen and a caretaker government was in charge
