Two alternate history questions based on avoiding the 1940 Fall of France

Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. It's from the 1980s, and I think more modern research has supplanted it, but it's useful for a basic primer; case in point is that it is now known in 1940 Germany had a larger machine tool (and more modern!) stock than the United States for example.
So theoretical capacity, not necessarily actual when you factor in access to raw materials and workers. Plus Germany's machine tools were more general purpose than the high capacity specialized stuff the US had.
 
So theoretical capacity, not necessarily actual when you factor in access to raw materials and workers. Plus Germany's machine tools were more general purpose than the high capacity specialized stuff the US had.

He actually uses both, with this being the one factoring in workers and raw materials (Warmaking potential); he also has a straight up comparison of raw productive data from 1938 too.
 
The Allies had all the choice in the matter in going to war; we have the British leadership in private even admitting the proposals put forward by the Germans were, in the words of Chamberlain himself "attractive". As for your other arguments:

A) You're right, they don't have the same depth because they're vastly stronger relative to 1914 in economics. By 1936-two years before any annexations-Germany's war capacity already exceeded the Anglo-French combined.
B) The French do not have a better position, their industrial heartland is the front line and they have demographics that have yet to recover from World War I. As for that excellent strategy, remind us who won in 1940?
C) Germany is not weaker, by any real material factor and I'm not mis-quoting Tooze; I'm saying Tooze is wrong entirely. Even then, I don't think you're quoting him correctly in terms of your own argument, because even he makes the case they could switch to a peace economy in Mid-1939. If they were living off solely loot, as you describe, how exactly is that possible?

If they don't go to war to defend Poland then their diplomatic influence is zero. Very important if your a democratic state seeking to influence neutrals.

a) Wrong. Their stronger in military might, due to their massive over-expansion of their military and the doctrine edge that wasn't clear at the time. Even so they still at the time lacked economic strength in depth.

b) Your ignoring what I said. Read it again. If they don't do the sickle cut the Germans are probably going to get bogged down in Belgium with a bloody frontal battle. That's a lot better than the situation for the allies in 1914, when the Germans were able to overrun Belgium and much of France because the French were throwing the bulk of their forces against German fortifications and suffering huge losses as a result.

c) Yes he did say that but that would require actually moving to a peace economy. I.e. you demoblize the bulk of the army and stop the vast majority of the military investment so that people and money can be spent on products that can be sold to cover the massive internal debts.
 
Yeah, under the "war making" aegis, which factors in things like access to raw materials, labor force, etc. Table 30 on Page 330 shows manufacturing output as a tie between the Anglo-French and Germans by 1938. By 1940 the Germans have Bohemia, all of Silesia, Danzig and most of the industrially relevant areas of Poland.

You might be interested in this article:


Here's how this article's author accesses the comprehensive military power of Germany, Britain, and France in 1940:

The series conveniently extends down to 1940 for the major combatant powers.
Here it is for 1940…

USA 0.35
USSR 1.02
China 0.11
France 1.09
Germany 1.88
UK 0.83
Japan 0.35
India 0.02

…and 1945:

USA 9.19
USSR 4.48
China 0.32
France 0.00
Germany 4.04
UK 2.22
Japan 1.29
India 0.11
Looks highly plausible, even if I do say so myself.

I don't get the 0.00 figure for France in 1945, though. But otherwise it looks plausible for both 1940 and 1945.

This other article by the same author might also be of interest to you:

 
If they don't go to war to defend Poland then their diplomatic influence is zero. Very important if your a democratic state seeking to influence neutrals.

a) Wrong. Their stronger in military might, due to their massive over-expansion of their military and the doctrine edge that wasn't clear at the time. Even so they still at the time lacked economic strength in depth.

b) Your ignoring what I said. Read it again. If they don't do the sickle cut the Germans are probably going to get bogged down in Belgium with a bloody frontal battle. That's a lot better than the situation for the allies in 1914, when the Germans were able to overrun Belgium and much of France because the French were throwing the bulk of their forces against German fortifications and suffering huge losses as a result.

c) Yes he did say that but that would require actually moving to a peace economy. I.e. you demoblize the bulk of the army and stop the vast majority of the military investment so that people and money can be spent on products that can be sold to cover the massive internal debts.

Just like not going to war over Czechoslovakia in 1938 at Munich or over the occupation in early 1939 lead to a collapse of Anglo-French influence in Eastern Europe? There is absolutely no evidence, whatsoever, to back up this assertion.

A) Completely and utterly true, as I've already shown upthread by linking to Paul Kennedy's work. By 1938 Germany already rivaled the Anglo-French combined, and by 1940 definitely had the advantage as a result of the annexations. What happens when a bigger economy with a stronger starting military, as you claim, goes to war with another country?

B) I read what you said, the problem is its not based in reality and I immediately have to question your perceptions/general knowledge when you make claims like the majority of the French Army attacking German fortifications; that never happened because of the events in Belgium. Hell, I've already pointed out to you in the past that the German Army occupied Briey-Longwy by August 4, 1914 before Belgium had even come close to fully being overrun; that's the majority of French iron ore lost in the first week, before any of the events you cite.

C) In which case the claim the Germans were running solely off loot, as you assert, falls apart; it cannot be driven solely by loot but capable of reforming itself. Even here, you are either mischaracterizing the argument put forth or you haven't read the source because the demobilization of much of the army is not even suggested, rather the scale of the ongoing buildup be restricted. Likewise too for the idea the Germans weren't also increasing living standards at the time.
 
Just like not going to war over Czechoslovakia in 1938 at Munich or over the occupation in early 1939 lead to a collapse of Anglo-French influence in Eastern Europe? There is absolutely no evidence, whatsoever, to back up this assertion.

A) Completely and utterly true, as I've already shown upthread by linking to Paul Kennedy's work. By 1938 Germany already rivaled the Anglo-French combined, and by 1940 definitely had the advantage as a result of the annexations. What happens when a bigger economy with a stronger starting military, as you claim, goes to war with another country?

B) I read what you said, the problem is its not based in reality and I immediately have to question your perceptions/general knowledge when you make claims like the majority of the French Army attacking German fortifications; that never happened because of the events in Belgium. Hell, I've already pointed out to you in the past that the German Army occupied Briey-Longwy by August 4, 1914 before Belgium had even come close to fully being overrun; that's the majority of French iron ore lost in the first week, before any of the events you cite.

C) In which case the claim the Germans were running solely off loot, as you assert, falls apart; it cannot be driven solely by loot but capable of reforming itself. Even here, you are either mischaracterizing the argument put forth or you haven't read the source because the demobilization of much of the army is not even suggested, rather the scale of the ongoing buildup be restricted. Likewise too for the idea the Germans weren't also increasing living standards at the time.

Your welcome to your delusions. I'll stick to the history.
 

Except those links often say different things to what you wish. I have both Tooze's book and Kennedy's but your misreading them as your mispresenting what I say. I point out again that without the sickle cut the Germans, running head on into the main allied strength are going to suffer heavily and almost certainly be stopped somewhere in Belgium.

I was a bit out of order with my last statement but I was just fed up with your refusal to accept any information that contradicts your desires.
 
Except those links often say different things to what you wish. I have both Tooze's book and Kennedy's but your misreading them as your mispresenting what I say. I point out again that without the sickle cut the Germans, running head on into the main allied strength are going to suffer heavily and almost certainly be stopped somewhere in Belgium.

I was a bit out of order with my last statement but I was just fed up with your refusal to accept any information that contradicts your desires.

Thankfully for my case, all the information presented supports my case and I helpfully provided you a direct PDF copy to Kennedy's book so that you can cite exactly what I am misrepresenting as you claim; as a reminder, it's Table 30 on Page 330. You have not cited anything because we both know I'm not misrepresenting anything.

Table 30 shows that, by production output, Germany had already tied with the Anglo-French in 1938. If you feel this doesn't account for manpower and resources, that's okay, Kennedy also has a numerical value for that in the form of "Total Warmaking Potential". In this too, we find that by 1937 German had equaled the Anglo-French. By 1940, however, Germany had annexed the industry and populations of Czechia and most of Poland to itself, greatly expanding is labor pool and adding the major industrial resources of Bohemia (Skoda, for example) to its own totals. Thus, the economic balance had shifted to it. You've already conceded the Germans had the better military in 1940, so what happens when you have a larger economy and military in a conflict?

If you feel I am misrepresenting anything, you have a digital copy of Kennedy's book now and I was the one in the past who gave you your copy of Tooze. Cite it, directly, where it contradicts what I'm saying here.
 
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If you feel I am misrepresenting anything, you have a digital copy of Kennedy's book now and I was the one in the past who gave you your copy of Tooze. Cite it, directly, where it contradicts what I'm saying here.

Not sure about Kennedy's work, but Tooze's work can also be found on LibGen.
 
Not sure about Kennedy's work, but Tooze's work can also be found on LibGen.

That's not necessary as I have hard copies of both as I said before. I don't know why he said I have a digital copy of Kennedy's?

The issue is interpretation of data. For instance as I've noted before in assorted places the definition of manufacturing seems odd in that according to some of Kennedy's tables India and China are industrial giants until ~1870. See Table 6 on page 149 where for 1860, with Britain probably at its pinnacle of relative economic power having 19.9% and China with 19.7%. At the same date India [including OTL Pakistan/Bangladesh ] has 8.6% which exceeds France [7.9%], US [7.2%] and Russia [7.0%]. I doubt if anyone would argue that China would be a match in a fight for France, Russia or Britain as events at the time showed.

Also while Germany has annexed Bohemia and much of Poland by 1940 Britain and France have - in part due to their response to Germany's insane rearmament rate - dug themselves out of depression so their own economy has probably seen distinct increased. Not to mention this excludes their empires and the the British case the Dominions.

Plus this distracts from what is the main point HK is avoiding. If instead of the sickle cut the Germans are making a frontal assault against the main allied forces who are expecting them there then its not going to be a walk over and the Germans could well lose heavily and be held somewhere in Belgium.
 
That's not necessary as I have hard copies of both as I said before. I don't know why he said I have a digital copy of Kennedy's?

The issue is interpretation of data. For instance as I've noted before in assorted places the definition of manufacturing seems odd in that according to some of Kennedy's tables India and China are industrial giants until ~1870. See Table 6 on page 149 where for 1860, with Britain probably at its pinnacle of relative economic power having 19.9% and China with 19.7%. At the same date India [including OTL Pakistan/Bangladesh ] has 8.6% which exceeds France [7.9%], US [7.2%] and Russia [7.0%]. I doubt if anyone would argue that China would be a match in a fight for France, Russia or Britain as events at the time showed.

Also while Germany has annexed Bohemia and much of Poland by 1940 Britain and France have - in part due to their response to Germany's insane rearmament rate - dug themselves out of depression so their own economy has probably seen distinct increased. Not to mention this excludes their empires and the the British case the Dominions.

Plus this distracts from what is the main point HK is avoiding. If instead of the sickle cut the Germans are making a frontal assault against the main allied forces who are expecting them there then its not going to be a walk over and the Germans could well lose heavily and be held somewhere in Belgium.

Who is HK? Did you mean HL, as in History Learner?
 
Also while Germany has annexed Bohemia and much of Poland by 1940 Britain and France have - in part due to their response to Germany's insane rearmament rate - dug themselves out of depression so their own economy has probably seen distinct increased. Not to mention this excludes their empires and the the British case the Dominions.
Both outsourced production since they hadn't set up factories in time. They just purchased from the US to the point that the British were bankrupt by 1941. The French were waiting on orders and were going to buy much more, but they lost before that could happen. Also don't forget France was particularly in trouble due to demographics, so mobilization really reduced the labor force and consequently industrial potential.

The Empire weren't exactly manufacturing hubs other than India, but that was too far away to really matter to the European theater.

Plus this distracts from what is the main point HK is avoiding. If instead of the sickle cut the Germans are making a frontal assault against the main allied forces who are expecting them there then its not going to be a walk over and the Germans could well lose heavily and be held somewhere in Belgium.
Given that the bulk of the heavy hitting German force avoided the Lowlands historically, same with the air force, we cannot actually infer this from the historical relative stalemate in Belgium since the bulk of German combat power wasn't applied there. The Germans would certainly lose more heavily than IOTL and get a less strategically explosive result, but they could easily throw the Allies back to France during that summer campaign season if they plowed their strength into Belgium. Of course even ITTL some elements would go through the Ardennes, as that was also in the pre-Manstein plan. The 12th, 16th, and portions of the 4th army were to go through the Ardennes region.
 
Both outsourced production since they hadn't set up factories in time. They just purchased from the US to the point that the British were bankrupt by 1941. The French were waiting on orders and were going to buy much more, but they lost before that could happen. Also don't forget France was particularly in trouble due to demographics, so mobilization really reduced the labor force and consequently industrial potential.

The Empire weren't exactly manufacturing hubs other than India, but that was too far away to really matter to the European theater.


Given that the bulk of the heavy hitting German force avoided the Lowlands historically, same with the air force, we cannot actually infer this from the historical relative stalemate in Belgium since the bulk of German combat power wasn't applied there. The Germans would certainly lose more heavily than IOTL and get a less strategically explosive result, but they could easily throw the Allies back to France during that summer campaign season if they plowed their strength into Belgium. Of course even ITTL some elements would go through the Ardennes, as that was also in the pre-Manstein plan. The 12th, 16th, and portions of the 4th army were to go through the Ardennes region.

A) - Your ignoring my point about the accuracy of the use of the term manufacturing. Unless your suggesting that India in 1860 is slightly superior industrially to France, the US and Russia and China is twice as powerful?

B) - Both allied states outsourced some of their production because they could, i.e. not only did they lack Hitler's obsession with autachy but they had funds for such operations.

In the proposed scenario Britain and France may go bankrupt but its likely to be 43 at the earliest without the collapse of France, Italian entry into the war and the resultant knock on effects. Far more likely, unless Stalin is very generous with his aid that the ramshackled Germany economy will fold 1st. Especially without the massive amount of loot and forced labour it took from its conquests in western Europe and with the relatively light losses it took OTL in France It should be noted that OTL, despite the loss of France and much greater threat to supply lines as well as being under bombardment for the bulk of the next couple of years at least Britain on its own outproduced Germany and Italy in many areas of military production. This is despite Germany in the winter of 1940/41 demobilizing some personnel temporarily to allow skilled manpower to return to the factories to replace losses and build up the forces for the invasion of the USSR. Or again a new wave of loot, forced labour and raw materials they were to gain in the south and east in 41.

Also I shouldn't overlook the impressive production of Canada OTL. Plus Indian resources may not be directly practical for the war against Germany, although it could be with the Med at peace, but it can be used to replace British resources elsewhere in the empire.

C) Well your entitled to your opinion but that's just an opinion as is mine. I think that a frontal assault against allied forces, especially with elements also having to fight the Belgians and Dutch, is going to be bloody difficult for the Germans, especially if the allies can set themselves up in any sort of defensive position, especially a river line say. The French not only had more tanks than the Germans but bloody tough ones while the German force was heavily dependent on large numbers of Pz Is and IIs which while their useful in exploiting a gap are going to be very vulnerable against even many infantry units.

Yes some units are probably going to penetrate the Ardennes but those are largely infantry units aren't they so the deep penetration that proved so critical in forcing the allies to break their position in the north is a lot more difficult to maintain. Or if they don't get the air support the drive had OTL they could struggle to bounce the Meuse before reinforcements arrive.

Steve
 
A) - Your ignoring my point about the accuracy of the use of the term manufacturing. Unless your suggesting that India in 1860 is slightly superior industrially to France, the US and Russia and China is twice as powerful?
I didn't consider it relevant to the point I was making. But it might be true because you're ignoring the fact that those countries were immense in terms of size and population relative to the other countries you're talking about. So they very well could have had that much manufacturing capacity, but a very low GDP and not particularly centralized, so it was more like craft production than factory production. And geared toward consumer production, not heavy industry. Given the population differentials then the smaller output of European countries is offset by the fact that they have very small relative populations so LOTS of surplus productive capacity, which then translates into military production on a scale that India and China simply cannot match since their industry, such that it is, is diffuse, craft based, and dedicated to servicing (poorly) consumer demand.

So yes it is an issue of definition of terms, but it is also one of size of industry relative to population size and GDP per capita which tells us more about the capacity to produce military items at the scale needed.

B) - Both allied states outsourced some of their production because they could, i.e. not only did they lack Hitler's obsession with autachy but they had funds for such operations.
Could and had no choice but to do so given the late start of rearmament and domestic production limitations. Just like in WW1. No need to be autarchic or industrialized if you can simply purchase abroad and have no interdicted a. cess to world markets.

In the proposed scenario Britain and France may go bankrupt but its likely to be 43 at the earliest without the collapse of France, Italian entry into the war and the resultant knock on effects. Far more likely, unless Stalin is very generous with his aid that the ramshackled Germany economy will fold 1st. Especially without the massive amount of loot and forced labour it took from its conquests in western Europe and with the relatively light losses it took OTL in France It should be noted that OTL, despite the loss of France and much greater threat to supply lines as well as being under bombardment for the bulk of the next couple of years at least Britain on its own outproduced Germany and Italy in many areas of military production. This is despite Germany in the winter of 1940/41 demobilizing some personnel temporarily to allow skilled manpower to return to the factories to replace losses and build up the forces for the invasion of the USSR. Or again a new wave of loot, forced labour and raw materials they were to gain in the south and east in 41.

Also I shouldn't overlook the impressive production of Canada OTL. Plus Indian resources may not be directly practical for the war against Germany, although it could be with the Med at peace, but it can be used to replace British resources elsewhere in the empire.
Britain is going insolvent by 1941. France will take longer, but that doesn't mean they will be able to support Britain with their extra reserves or that the US would give them L-L so long as France has cash.

Stalin was selling goods, which did effectively nullify the blockaded for the most part, but at the expense of the full weight of German/Axis production being dedicated to the war effort. The loot and labor post-FoF IOTL was helpful in the aftermath of 1940 to prepare for Barbarossa and the long war with Britain+the USSR+the US, but wasn't critical to defeating France, which was much more brittle than Germany in terms of soldiers and labor. Britain too was pretty weak still and if they got stuck in an extended campaign on the continent while Italy joins in then they miss out on all the build up they were able to do with their evacuated armies after June 1940.

As to British out producing Germany...that is only if you include American purchasing as well. Not just in aircraft, but also machine tools and raw materials; the US was acting as a multiplier for the British war effort and the effect was even greater after June 1940 because Britain then got all of France's orders and the full focus of US industry, but that simply meant that rapid boost depleted British coffers by 1941.

You're also missing the other side of the equation; as Germany took more territory they then became responsible for feeding the people and running the economies thanks to the British blockade, so it was a net drain after the initial pillage. Not sure there was much loot to be had in the Balkans given the poverty of those countries, though the raw materials and limited access to labor helped, it also came with a major drain on food and occupation resources, thanks to the partisans.

Canada was helpful, but the US was the bulk of foreign support for Britain. Yes Indian production was used in the Middle East and East Africa, but really no further west until the invasion of Italy and even then only in limited amounts. Most was retained for India proper and later fighting the Japanese.

C) Well your entitled to your opinion but that's just an opinion as is mine. I think that a frontal assault against allied forces, especially with elements also having to fight the Belgians and Dutch, is going to be bloody difficult for the Germans, especially if the allies can set themselves up in any sort of defensive position, especially a river line say. The French not only had more tanks than the Germans but bloody tough ones while the German force was heavily dependent on large numbers of Pz Is and IIs which while their useful in exploiting a gap are going to be very vulnerable against even many infantry units.

Yes some units are probably going to penetrate the Ardennes but those are largely infantry units aren't they so the deep penetration that proved so critical in forcing the allies to break their position in the north is a lot more difficult to maintain. Or if they don't get the air support the drive had OTL they could struggle to bounce the Meuse before reinforcements arrive.

Steve
Given that the frontal assault pushed the Allies back into France in a few weeks even with the under-resourced forces used for that part of the offensive actual history indicates that even the original offensive plan would overload the allies.
BTW here was the original plan (D was the plan as of January before the Mechelin incident and adoption of Manstein's proposal):
Evolution_of_Plan_Yellow.PNG


And the French/Allied one:
Dyle-Breda_Plan_Eng.svg


Note the Gembloux-Givet gap in deploying Allied armies. Looks like the German 12th army with its panzers would be pushing into the gap between the French 9th and 1st armies between Dinat and Givet. Even if only a few mobile divisions that penetration would have pretty outsized operational impact, especially if the Allies can't spare reserves to deal with it.

French tanks ultimately did not matter any more than the Soviet ones did, which were even better than the French ones and they had a LOT more of them. Airpower and training in anti-tank tactics with artillery and FLAK were plenty to deal with both countries' tanks in the initial invasions. Plus the French did base their defense on the Dyle River Line and got pushed off of it.

As to the Ardennes penetration here the simple fact that they'd face very little resistance and push through the relatively open flank means the French have to commit their reserves and then some to stopping them before they flowed around French defenses in the region. Which means the Dyle Line is now without reserves and facing the bulk of German combat power.

For reference the OTL course of events shows the Allied plan went off the rails in Belgium even disregarding the Ardennes operation:
The Germans quickly established air superiority over Belgium. Having completed thorough photographic reconnaissance, they destroyed 83 of the 179 aircraft of the Aeronautique Militaire within the first 24 hours of the invasion. The Belgians flew 77 operational missions but this contributed little to the air campaign. The Luftwaffe was assured air superiority over the Low Countries.[111] Because Army Group B's composition had been so weakened compared to the earlier plans, the feint offensive by the 6th Army was in danger of stalling immediately, since the Belgian defences on the Albert Canal position were very strong. The main approach route was blocked by Fort Eben-Emael, a large fortress then generally considered the most modern in Europe, which controlled the junction of the Meuse and the Albert Canal.[112]

Delay might endanger the outcome of the entire campaign, because it was essential that the main body of Allied troops be engaged before Army Group A established bridgeheads. To overcome this difficulty, the Germans resorted to unconventional means in the Battle of Fort Eben-Emael. In the early hours of 10 May, DFS 230 gliders landed on top of the fort and unloaded assault teams that disabled the main gun cupolas with hollow charges. The bridges over the canal were seized by German paratroopers. The Belgians launched considerable counterattacks which were broken up by the Luftwaffe. Shocked by a breach in its defences just where they had seemed the strongest, the Belgian Supreme Command withdrew its divisions to the KW-line five days earlier than planned. Similar operations against the bridges in the Netherlands, at Maastricht, failed. All were blown up by the Dutch and only one railway bridge was taken, which held up the German armour on Dutch territory for a short time.[113][114].
The BEF and the French First Army were not yet entrenched and the news of the defeat on the Belgian border was unwelcome. The Allies had been convinced Belgian resistance would have given them several weeks to prepare a defensive line at the Gembloux Gap. The XVI Panzerkorps (General Erich Hoepner) consisting of the 3rd Panzer Division and the 4th Panzer Division, was launched over the newly captured bridges in the direction of the Gembloux Gap. This seemed to confirm the expectations of the French Supreme Command that the German Schwerpunkt (point of main effort, centre of gravity) would be at that point. Gembloux was located between Wavre and Namur, on flat, ideal tank terrain. It was also an unfortified part of the Allied line. To gain time to dig in there, René Prioux, commanding the Cavalry Corps of the French First Army, sent the 2nd DLM and 3rd DLM towards the German armour at Hannut, east of Gembloux. They would provide a screen to delay the Germans and allow sufficient time for the First Army to dig in.[115]
The Belgians crumpled and the Germans were already through the Gembloux gap weeks before the Allies anticipated.
And even the weaker German forces (relative to what they'd have in this scenario) still defeated the French:
The Battle of Hannut (12–13 May) was the largest tank battle yet fought, with about 1,500 armoured fighting vehicles involved. The French knocked out about 160 German tanks for a loss of 91 Hotchkiss H35 and 30 Somua S35 tanks.[116] The Germans were left in control of the battlefield after the French made a planned withdrawal and were able to repair many of their knocked-out tanks. The net German loss amounted to 20 tanks of the 3rd Panzer Division and 29 of the 4th Panzer Division.[117] Prioux had achieved a tactical and operational success for the French by fulfilling his objective of delaying the panzer divisions until the First Army had time to arrive and dig in.[118][119] The German attack had engaged the First Army to the north of Sedan, which was the most important objective that Hoepner had to achieve but had failed to forestall the French advance to the Dyle or to destroy the First Army. On 14 May, having been held up at Hannut, Hoepner attacked again, against orders, in the Battle of Gembloux. This was the only occasion when German tanks frontally attacked a fortified position during the campaign. The 1st Moroccan Infantry Division repulsed the attack and another 42 tanks of the 4th Panzer Division were knocked out, 26 being written off. This second French defensive success was nullified by events further south at Sedan.[120]
IOTL Gembloux was a tactical victory for the French, but then the attacks were just by pinning forces while the bulk of mobile forces pushed through the Ardennes; here the bulk of combat power would be applied at this point to achieve a breakthrough, which means a lot more air support and armored units. Still that OTL limited victory was very costly to the French and there is no reason to expect they'd continue to hold if the fighting stayed in the same sector.

Plus ITTL the attack on the Meuse would still happen, which would either siphon off French reserves to continue resisting in Belgium or allow the German infantry to attack the line, basically unfortified with only 3rd line divisions in place, and push through, just later than historically happened. It is hard to say without wargaming it out what would happen, but it does seem even going by OTL events that the Allies would likely be shoved out of the Lowlands and back into northern France by June and the central front west of the Ardennes would be crumbling during all of this, just more slowly with slower follow up than OTL. Given the results of trying to move operational reserves around behind the lines thanks to the Luftwaffe the Allies wer going to be in a bad position regardless. The question is does Case Red happen in 1940 ITTL, what happens with Allied finances, how does the US react to France not falling, and do the Allies have the stomach for a long bloody war on the ground? IOTL after the Fall of France Britain could fight rather cheaply in terms of lives for several years until the US showed up, much more cheaply overall than in WW1 in fact, which was the big fear of the Allies, having to relive the attrition of 1914-18.
 
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That's not necessary as I have hard copies of both as I said before. I don't know why he said I have a digital copy of Kennedy's?

The issue is interpretation of data. For instance as I've noted before in assorted places the definition of manufacturing seems odd in that according to some of Kennedy's tables India and China are industrial giants until ~1870. See Table 6 on page 149 where for 1860, with Britain probably at its pinnacle of relative economic power having 19.9% and China with 19.7%. At the same date India [including OTL Pakistan/Bangladesh ] has 8.6% which exceeds France [7.9%], US [7.2%] and Russia [7.0%]. I doubt if anyone would argue that China would be a match in a fight for France, Russia or Britain as events at the time showed.

Also while Germany has annexed Bohemia and much of Poland by 1940 Britain and France have - in part due to their response to Germany's insane rearmament rate - dug themselves out of depression so their own economy has probably seen distinct increased. Not to mention this excludes their empires and the the British case the Dominions.

Plus this distracts from what is the main point HK is avoiding. If instead of the sickle cut the Germans are making a frontal assault against the main allied forces who are expecting them there then its not going to be a walk over and the Germans could well lose heavily and be held somewhere in Belgium.

I said I had given you your PDF copy of Tooze in the past, but I have also in this very thread-twice now-posted a link for a digital copy of Kennedy's book. At this point you're either being deliberately obtuse or you effectively admitted here you're not actually reading posts, which explains why you keep getting so much wrong. @sillygoose has already covered most of it, but I'd like to address your argument about the Anglo-French industrial capacity. In short, they didn't increase substantially and we know this from looking at their stocks of machine tools as well as productivity. You're confusing mobilization of resources and excess capacity as somehow meaning their economies-and thus industrial output-grew.

To get an idea of what I mean, if France in 1937 was devoting 10% of its resources to military production and this by 1940 had shifted to 60%, does that mean its economy had grew? No, it means it has simply re-directed resources. The only way its industrial output would grow is to either become more productive with the inputs or to expand the base stock of factories/machine tools. Neither happened, based on the data, so no, getting ready for war didn't mean the UK and France saw their industrial standing grow.
 
I didn't consider it relevant to the point I was making. But it might be true because you're ignoring the fact that those countries were immense in terms of size and population relative to the other countries you're talking about. So they very well could have had that much manufacturing capacity, but a very low GDP and not particularly centralized, so it was more like craft production than factory production. And geared toward consumer production, not heavy industry. Given the population differentials then the smaller output of European countries is offset by the fact that they have very small relative populations so LOTS of surplus productive capacity, which then translates into military production on a scale that India and China simply cannot match since their industry, such that it is, is diffuse, craft based, and dedicated to servicing (poorly) consumer demand.

So yes it is an issue of definition of terms, but it is also one of size of industry relative to population size and GDP per capita which tells us more about the capacity to produce military items at the scale needed.

That could well be the case but without a clear definition of the term we don't know for sure. Similarly with the situation in 1939 although the industrial strength of the assorted powers there are much closer in their level of development there.

Could and had no choice but to do so given the late start of rearmament and domestic production limitations. Just like in WW1. No need to be autarchic or industrialized if you can simply purchase abroad and have no interdicted a. cess to world markets.

The fact is they had the ability to do so because they had the reserves and assets which Germany lacked.

Britain is going insolvent by 1941. France will take longer, but that doesn't mean they will be able to support Britain with their extra reserves or that the US would give them L-L so long as France has cash.

Which is a dubious assumption given the different scenario proposed here. Britain faces far less need to accelerate production as OTL as well as losing far less in terms of shipping and associated goods and not needing to cover the Med as well. Its far more likely Germany runs dry 1st.

Stalin was selling goods, which did effectively nullify the blockaded for the most part, but at the expense of the full weight of German/Axis production being dedicated to the war effort. The loot and labor post-FoF IOTL was helpful in the aftermath of 1940 to prepare for Barbarossa and the long war with Britain+the USSR+the US, but wasn't critical to defeating France, which was much more brittle than Germany in terms of soldiers and labor. Britain too was pretty weak still and if they got stuck in an extended campaign on the continent while Italy joins in then they miss out on all the build up they were able to do with their evacuated armies after June 1940.

The key point is that if Germany doesn't defeat France it doesn't have that loot.

As to British out producing Germany...that is only if you include American purchasing as well. Not just in aircraft, but also machine tools and raw materials; the US was acting as a multiplier for the British war effort and the effect was even greater after June 1940 because Britain then got all of France's orders and the full focus of US industry, but that simply meant that rapid boost depleted British coffers by 1941.

I think you will find that is wrong. Plus the last part contradicts your statement above.

You're also missing the other side of the equation; as Germany took more territory they then became responsible for feeding the people and running the economies thanks to the British blockade, so it was a net drain after the initial pillage. Not sure there was much loot to be had in the Balkans given the poverty of those countries, though the raw materials and limited access to labor helped, it also came with a major drain on food and occupation resources, thanks to the partisans.

Since they were quite happy to starve many of those populations that wasn't a great issue to the Germans.


Canada was helpful, but the US was the bulk of foreign support for Britain. Yes Indian production was used in the Middle East and East Africa, but really no further west until the invasion of Italy and even then only in limited amounts. Most was retained for India proper and later fighting the Japanese.

Which is beside the point being made. The argument was that Canada made no marked contribution.

Given that the frontal assault pushed the Allies back into France in a few weeks even with the under-resourced forces used for that part of the offensive actual history indicates that even the original offensive plan would overload the allies.
BTW here was the original plan (D was the plan as of January before the Mechelin incident and adoption of Manstein's proposal):
Evolution_of_Plan_Yellow.PNG


And the French/Allied one:
Dyle-Breda_Plan_Eng.svg


Note the Gembloux-Givet gap in deploying Allied armies. Looks like the German 12th army with its panzers would be pushing into the gap between the French 9th and 1st armies between Dinat and Givet. Even if only a few mobile divisions that penetration would have pretty outsized operational impact, especially if the Allies can't spare reserves to deal with it.

I wasn't aware there was that northern gap and that could be an issue.

French tanks ultimately did not matter any more than the Soviet ones did, which were even better than the French ones and they had a LOT more of them. Airpower and training in anti-tank tactics with artillery and FLAK were plenty to deal with both countries' tanks in the initial invasions. Plus the French did base their defense on the Dyle River Line and got pushed off of it.

As to the Ardennes penetration here the simple fact that they'd face very little resistance and push through the relatively open flank means the French have to commit their reserves and then some to stopping them before they flowed around French defenses in the region. Which means the Dyle Line is now without reserves and facing the bulk of German combat power.

For reference the OTL course of events shows the Allied plan went off the rails in Belgium even disregarding the Ardennes operation:


The Belgians crumpled and the Germans were already through the Gembloux gap weeks before the Allies anticipated.
And even the weaker German forces (relative to what they'd have in this scenario) still defeated the French:

IOTL Gembloux was a tactical victory for the French, but then the attacks were just by pinning forces while the bulk of mobile forces pushed through the Ardennes; here the bulk of combat power would be applied at this point to achieve a breakthrough, which means a lot more air support and armored units. Still that OTL limited victory was very costly to the French and there is no reason to expect they'd continue to hold if the fighting stayed in the same sector.

As you pointed out the Germans took heavier casualties but rectified that because they managed to secure the battlefield. If they don't it goes the other way. The northern gap you mention above could be critical here if it forces the OTL retreat that the allies had to do because of the breakthrough at Sedan but if not the allies could be bloody difficult to push from that river line.

Plus ITTL the attack on the Meuse would still happen, which would either siphon off French reserves to continue resisting in Belgium or allow the German infantry to attack the line, basically unfortified with only 3rd line divisions in place, and push through, just later than historically happened. It is hard to say without wargaming it out what would happen, but it does seem even going by OTL events that the Allies would likely be shoved out of the Lowlands and back into northern France by June and the central front west of the Ardennes would be crumbling during all of this, just more slowly with slower follow up than OTL. Given the results of trying to move operational reserves around behind the lines thanks to the Luftwaffe the Allies wer going to be in a bad position regardless. The question is does Case Red happen in 1940 ITTL, what happens with Allied finances, how does the US react to France not falling, and do the Allies have the stomach for a long bloody war on the ground? IOTL after the Fall of France Britain could fight rather cheaply in terms of lives for several years until the US showed up, much more cheaply overall than in WW1 in fact, which was the big fear of the Allies, having to relive the attrition of 1914-18.

They might push through before reinforcements arrive but they might not. As you say there's no reliable way of telling. Especially if the crucial air support is concentrated on the main front.

If the Germans are held or even manage a slow advance into NE France then its going to be a lot costlier for both sides in terms of non-POW casualties. The allies have the advantage of greater overall resources, espeiclaly including the dominions and two empires. There was concern on both sides about another attritional losses which is a major reason why the allies made the mistake of waiting so long before standing up to Hitler. However their public feeling is up to it now while its not clear whether it is in Germany prior to the OTL spectacular successes in France.
 

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