A) - Your ignoring my point about the accuracy of the use of the term manufacturing. Unless your suggesting that India in 1860 is slightly superior industrially to France, the US and Russia and China is twice as powerful?
I didn't consider it relevant to the point I was making. But it might be true because you're ignoring the fact that those countries were immense in terms of size and population relative to the other countries you're talking about. So they very well could have had that much manufacturing capacity, but a very low GDP and not particularly centralized, so it was more like craft production than factory production. And geared toward consumer production, not heavy industry. Given the population differentials then the smaller output of European countries is offset by the fact that they have very small relative populations so LOTS of surplus productive capacity, which then translates into military production on a scale that India and China simply cannot match since their industry, such that it is, is diffuse, craft based, and dedicated to servicing (poorly) consumer demand.
So yes it is an issue of definition of terms, but it is also one of size of industry relative to population size and GDP per capita which tells us more about the capacity to produce military items at the scale needed.
B) - Both allied states outsourced some of their production because they could, i.e. not only did they lack Hitler's obsession with autachy but they had funds for such operations.
Could and had no choice but to do so given the late start of rearmament and domestic production limitations. Just like in WW1. No need to be autarchic or industrialized if you can simply purchase abroad and have no interdicted a. cess to world markets.
In the proposed scenario Britain and France may go bankrupt but its likely to be 43 at the earliest without the collapse of France, Italian entry into the war and the resultant knock on effects. Far more likely, unless Stalin is very generous with his aid that the ramshackled Germany economy will fold 1st. Especially without the massive amount of loot and forced labour it took from its conquests in western Europe and with the relatively light losses it took OTL in France It should be noted that OTL, despite the loss of France and much greater threat to supply lines as well as being under bombardment for the bulk of the next couple of years at least Britain on its own outproduced Germany and Italy in many areas of military production. This is despite Germany in the winter of 1940/41 demobilizing some personnel temporarily to allow skilled manpower to return to the factories to replace losses and build up the forces for the invasion of the USSR. Or again a new wave of loot, forced labour and raw materials they were to gain in the south and east in 41.
Also I shouldn't overlook the impressive production of Canada OTL. Plus Indian resources may not be directly practical for the war against Germany, although it could be with the Med at peace, but it can be used to replace British resources elsewhere in the empire.
Britain is going insolvent by 1941. France will take longer, but that doesn't mean they will be able to support Britain with their extra reserves or that the US would give them L-L so long as France has cash.
Stalin was selling goods, which did effectively nullify the blockaded for the most part, but at the expense of the full weight of German/Axis production being dedicated to the war effort. The loot and labor post-FoF IOTL was helpful in the aftermath of 1940 to prepare for Barbarossa and the long war with Britain+the USSR+the US, but wasn't critical to defeating France, which was much more brittle than Germany in terms of soldiers and labor. Britain too was pretty weak still and if they got stuck in an extended campaign on the continent while Italy joins in then they miss out on all the build up they were able to do with their evacuated armies after June 1940.
As to British out producing Germany...that is only if you include American purchasing as well. Not just in aircraft, but also machine tools and raw materials; the US was acting as a multiplier for the British war effort and the effect was even greater after June 1940 because Britain then got all of France's orders and the full focus of US industry, but that simply meant that rapid boost depleted British coffers by 1941.
You're also missing the other side of the equation; as Germany took more territory they then became responsible for feeding the people and running the economies thanks to the British blockade, so it was a net drain after the initial pillage. Not sure there was much loot to be had in the Balkans given the poverty of those countries, though the raw materials and limited access to labor helped, it also came with a major drain on food and occupation resources, thanks to the partisans.
Canada was helpful, but the US was the bulk of foreign support for Britain. Yes Indian production was used in the Middle East and East Africa, but really no further west until the invasion of Italy and even then only in limited amounts. Most was retained for India proper and later fighting the Japanese.
C) Well your entitled to your opinion but that's just an opinion as is mine. I think that a frontal assault against allied forces, especially with elements also having to fight the Belgians and Dutch, is going to be bloody difficult for the Germans, especially if the allies can set themselves up in any sort of defensive position, especially a river line say. The French not only had more tanks than the Germans but bloody tough ones while the German force was heavily dependent on large numbers of Pz Is and IIs which while their useful in exploiting a gap are going to be very vulnerable against even many infantry units.
Yes some units are probably going to penetrate the Ardennes but those are largely infantry units aren't they so the deep penetration that proved so critical in forcing the allies to break their position in the north is a lot more difficult to maintain. Or if they don't get the air support the drive had OTL they could struggle to bounce the Meuse before reinforcements arrive.
Steve
Given that the frontal assault pushed the Allies back into France in a few weeks even with the under-resourced forces used for that part of the offensive actual history indicates that even the original offensive plan would overload the allies.
BTW here was the original plan (D was the plan as of January before the Mechelin incident and adoption of Manstein's proposal):
And the French/Allied one:
en.wikipedia.org
Note the Gembloux-Givet gap in deploying Allied armies. Looks like the German 12th army with its panzers would be pushing into the gap between the French 9th and 1st armies between Dinat and Givet. Even if only a few mobile divisions that penetration would have pretty outsized operational impact, especially if the Allies can't spare reserves to deal with it.
French tanks ultimately did not matter any more than the Soviet ones did, which were even better than the French ones and they had a LOT more of them. Airpower and training in anti-tank tactics with artillery and FLAK were plenty to deal with both countries' tanks in the initial invasions. Plus the French did base their defense on the Dyle River Line and got pushed off of it.
As to the Ardennes penetration here the simple fact that they'd face very little resistance and push through the relatively open flank means the French have to commit their reserves and then some to stopping them before they flowed around French defenses in the region. Which means the Dyle Line is now without reserves and facing the bulk of German combat power.
For reference the OTL course of events shows the Allied plan went off the rails in Belgium even disregarding the Ardennes operation:
en.wikipedia.org
The Germans quickly established air superiority over Belgium. Having completed thorough
photographic reconnaissance, they destroyed 83 of the 179 aircraft of the
Aeronautique Militaire within the first 24 hours of the invasion. The Belgians flew 77 operational missions but this contributed little to the air campaign. The
Luftwaffe was assured air superiority over the Low Countries.
[111] Because Army Group B's composition had been so weakened compared to the earlier plans, the feint offensive by the 6th Army was in danger of stalling immediately, since the Belgian defences on the Albert Canal position were very strong. The main approach route was blocked by Fort Eben-Emael, a large fortress then generally considered the most modern in Europe, which controlled the junction of the Meuse and the Albert Canal.
[112]
Delay might endanger the outcome of the entire campaign, because it was essential that the main body of Allied troops be engaged before Army Group A established bridgeheads. To overcome this difficulty, the Germans resorted to unconventional means in the
Battle of Fort Eben-Emael. In the early hours of 10 May,
DFS 230 gliders landed on top of the fort and unloaded assault teams that disabled the main gun cupolas with
hollow charges. The bridges over the canal were seized by German paratroopers. The Belgians launched considerable counterattacks which were broken up by the
Luftwaffe. Shocked by a breach in its defences just where they had seemed the strongest, the Belgian Supreme Command withdrew its divisions to the
KW-line five days earlier than planned. Similar operations against the bridges in the Netherlands, at Maastricht, failed. All were blown up by the Dutch and only one railway bridge was taken, which held up the German armour on Dutch territory for a short time.
[113][114].
The BEF and the French First Army were not yet entrenched and the news of the defeat on the Belgian border was unwelcome. The Allies had been convinced Belgian resistance would have given them several weeks to prepare a defensive line at the Gembloux Gap. The XVI
Panzerkorps (General
Erich Hoepner) consisting of the
3rd Panzer Division and the
4th Panzer Division, was launched over the newly captured bridges in the direction of the Gembloux Gap. This seemed to confirm the expectations of the French Supreme Command that the German
Schwerpunkt (point of main effort, centre of gravity) would be at that point.
Gembloux was located between Wavre and Namur, on flat, ideal tank terrain. It was also an unfortified part of the Allied line. To gain time to dig in there,
René Prioux, commanding the Cavalry Corps of the French First Army, sent the 2nd DLM and 3rd DLM towards the German armour at
Hannut, east of Gembloux. They would provide a screen to delay the Germans and allow sufficient time for the First Army to dig in.
[115]
The Belgians crumpled and the Germans were already through the Gembloux gap weeks before the Allies anticipated.
And even the weaker German forces (relative to what they'd have in this scenario) still defeated the French:
The
Battle of Hannut (12–13 May) was the largest tank battle yet fought, with about 1,500
armoured fighting vehicles involved. The French knocked out about 160 German tanks for a loss of 91
Hotchkiss H35 and 30
Somua S35 tanks.
[116] The Germans were left in control of the battlefield after the French made a planned withdrawal and were able to repair many of their knocked-out tanks. The net German loss amounted to 20 tanks of the 3rd Panzer Division and 29 of the 4th Panzer Division.[117] Prioux had achieved a tactical and operational success for the French by fulfilling his objective of delaying the panzer divisions until the First Army had time to arrive and dig in.
[118][119] The German attack had engaged the First Army to the north of Sedan, which was the most important objective that Hoepner had to achieve but had failed to forestall the French advance to the Dyle or to destroy the First Army. On 14 May, having been held up at Hannut, Hoepner attacked again, against orders, in the
Battle of Gembloux. This was the only occasion when German tanks frontally attacked a fortified position during the campaign. The
1st Moroccan Infantry Division repulsed the attack and another 42 tanks of the 4th
Panzer Division were knocked out, 26 being written off. This second French defensive success was nullified by events further south at Sedan.
[120]
IOTL Gembloux was a tactical victory for the French, but then the attacks were just by pinning forces while the bulk of mobile forces pushed through the Ardennes; here the bulk of combat power would be applied at this point to achieve a breakthrough, which means a lot more air support and armored units. Still that OTL limited victory was very costly to the French and there is no reason to expect they'd continue to hold if the fighting stayed in the same sector.
Plus ITTL the attack on the Meuse would still happen, which would either siphon off French reserves to continue resisting in Belgium or allow the German infantry to attack the line, basically unfortified with only 3rd line divisions in place, and push through, just later than historically happened. It is hard to say without wargaming it out what would happen, but it does seem even going by OTL events that the Allies would likely be shoved out of the Lowlands and back into northern France by June and the central front west of the Ardennes would be crumbling during all of this, just more slowly with slower follow up than OTL. Given the results of trying to move operational reserves around behind the lines thanks to the Luftwaffe the Allies wer going to be in a bad position regardless. The question is does Case Red happen in 1940 ITTL, what happens with Allied finances, how does the US react to France not falling, and do the Allies have the stomach for a long bloody war on the ground? IOTL after the Fall of France Britain could fight rather cheaply in terms of lives for several years until the US showed up, much more cheaply overall than in WW1 in fact, which was the big fear of the Allies, having to relive the attrition of 1914-18.