My post morten so far is that there was two main mistakes on the part of ANSDF specific to this campaign season that, had they been avoided, would've delayed the end and probably would've allowed the Northern Alliance 2.0 to consist of more than just Panjshir in the aftermath.
1. In May they didn’t pull back around the cities like we suggested in favor of trying to defend everything. Large numbers of ANA and ANP were destroyed in the opening phases in rural areas or small towns/cities because of this. This was a political decision because Kabul didn’t want to be seen as surrendering ground without a fight.
2. They were obsessed with trying for a “Jalalabad moment”, which is a reference to the 1988 battle where the DRA effectively smashed the Muj and allowed for the DRA to outlive the collapse of the USSR. They tried to turn Lashkar Gah into this and thus over-committed Commandos and air assets here which the Taliban used to keep them fixed in place while using their own resources to target other areas; Kandahar City, the Northern Offensive and maybe even Herat all fell as a result. Lashkar Gah had no strategic value because the Taliban literally controlled everything else in Helmand and the city had been in danger of falling since 2017; Trump did a mini surge back then to stave off the inevitable. The resources would’ve been better used if Lashkar Gah had been abandoned (and KC too after Spin Boldak fell).
With all the resources used elsewhere, it's likely Dostum and Atta could've won the fight around Mazar and thus enabled GIRoA to clear out the Taliban in the Northeast before the pitched fight for Kabul began. After that, the lines probably would've looked like a replay of the 1990s: