Where do you get minor from that? Being able to actually achieve breakthroughs through defended areas would be a huge game changer. Being able to achieve breakthroughs is the kind of thing that can force Russia terms, rather than a slap fight hoping someone gives up, or bleeds to death from paper cuts.
Eh, on a long enough time scale most things are pretty convertible. Domestically building a million cars if nothing else consumes at least a million tons of vehicle grade steel and commits 100,000s of workers who clearly at least show up for work and produce something to a task which isn't directly connected to the war effort.
Even if it wasn't short term committable to tank production (but given soviet tank production at the exact same facilities, of the exact same models, I doubt those factories don't have room to increase production if you threw 10,000 or so extra factory workers at the problem, especially after a 6-12 month ramp up) the auto production could be quickly transferred to other war needs.
Mortars, military cars, and various drone, both surface and airborne, probably are pretty transferable tech. Diverting 100,000 of those civilian car engines into drone power packs would probably be relatively easy switch over. Cash going overseas to buy cars from China, which seems to be something like half of Russian new cars consumption, is even easier to see how it could be more directly put to use in the war effort.
Russia seems to be importing some 60,000 cars from China each month, at a cost of over a $1 billion a month. Even dedicating that amount of hard currency/trade balance to get even 60,000 more drones from China, which probably cost less than 60,000 cars, is probably a big boost to drone numbers, unless I'm way out of date on how many are in use. Or any number of other things it would be valuable to buy from China.
The fact Russia seems to have prioritized increasing civilian car manufacturing and replacement of civilian imports, rather than dedicating to some increase in War production, certainly says something. What exactly probably won't be completely clear until after the fact, whether it talks to a position of strength on Russia's part (they're not desperately sacrificing civilian standards to increase military strength because they don't think they need to) or weakness (Russia can't convert civilian economy to military, either because the state is not popular enough to enforce such sacrifices, or is too incompetent to do it, even if the Russians think they need it).
