Italy doesn't invade Greece in 1940

[stevep]

Sorry for the delay, I read this and intended to get to it but life got in the way and I forgot.

No problem I was very busy yesterday especially so didn't have time to do much.

Because the Axis ports were much closer to the front than the British ones. Axis logistics don't become an issue until they hit Tobruk and don't capture supplies. I'm not trying to claim logistics aren't a problem for the Axis, so don't claim that I am, if anything you're projecting what you're doing on me, because you've done nothing but pretend logistics did not matter to the British effort, despite me quoting the British official history about how the logistical situation prevented any further advance.

That depends on where the front is. When its about central Libya then your right but when its approaching the Egyptian frontier then their definitely got problems, even at times when Britain doesn't hold Tobruk. I have never denied that logistics aren't a problem for a British advance but just pointing out that the same applies for the Axis. Probably more so in a no Greece invasion scenario since a lot of the Italian forces are going to have limited mobility.

Indeed. Question is whether they could counterattack or would remain static around El Agheila. IIRC though they still requested and got Luftwaffe support to deal with Malta, so I think that would still happen. Question is if they remain or head East for Barbarossa in June.

I would suspect that the Luftwaffe would go east for Barbarossa given it was the apple of Hitler's eye. Especially if Italy - without Greece is flooding western Libya with a lot of ground forces. If they attack their likely to run into the same problems as OTL, although probably having some success at 1st due to the numbers and British logistical problems. However their unlikely to reach as far as with Rommel.

As to the priority issue, I'm not sure where you got that impression given that the only change is Mussolini not invading Greece. That changes nothing about East Africa due to the importance of securing the Red Sea. So just not diversions to Greece, which opens up the question of what is actually kept in Libya and how soon any sort of securing of the ports could take place. Any idea what AAA resources were devoted to Greece and when? That seems to have been a major problem for getting Benghazi operational again and that was the constraint when it came to taking the rest of Libya. Of course with Malta becoming more effective it might be an issue of the British also preferring to take the 'indirect approach' of starving Tripolitania into submission rather than trying to conquer it on the ground...which lasts only so long as the Luftwaffe isn't involved. That might belatedly force the British into action.

The point is that E Africa was a relatively low priority matter. I think part of it was Churchill wanted a political response to the loss of British Somalia which he got irrationally angry about. Yes there were threats to travel through the Red Sea but the Italian forces for attacking them - air and naval were pretty feeble.

On the 2nd point you seem to be in two minds. Your arguing its pretty much impossible for the allies to take Tripoli from Egypt then saying "That might belatedly force the British into action"?? Straving Tripolitania might be the best option if invasion by the ground is logically impossible as any Luftwaffe forces sent there would themselves have to be supplied.

The usual AT stuff yes. Howitzers and artillery still worked, but that was a serious diversion of critical resources away from its intended and necessary role. The Italian situation was of course not limited to that, the Breda LMG was one of the worst MG designs ever fielded by a military, but with Compass it was just as much a supply problem and one of very bad tactics that allowed units to be isolated and starved out. When coupled with the Matilda problem it is hardly surprising that the Italian military fell apart, which is exactly what Graziani warned Mussolini about, but was told to do it anyway because the peace negotiations were "just around the corner".

Not starved out but definitely bad deployments than allowed defending 'forts' to be taken out one at a time. As you say it was a logistics problem that had prevented the Italians from advancing beyond their initial crossing of the Egyptian border. Along with some really crap equipment and the poor co-operation between the Italian services.

Aircraft carriers and drop tanks. That and surprise given the relative lack of German fighters in the region.
Destroyers were good enough even, as the Germans proved later in the war against the Soviets in the Baltic. Certainly the Allies had enough cruisers for longer range work. BBs have the longest reach and heaviest shells, but that isn't necessary to get the desired results. So long as they aren't attacking Brest or Lorient head on.

CVs are very rare in 42 as well as vulnerable, especially the US ones. Wasn't it in 1942 - or possibly 43 that the US was so short the RN leant them one of its CVs? Drop tanks have potential but also performance costs. Plus it would mean overcoming the institutional opposition to them, especially in the US military, see Drop_tank-history. Not to mention the time constrains, i.e. that unless your using continued CAPs over the entire area, which would take a hell of a lot of a/c there will be a reaction time.

For naval support that does expose the units to air attack over extended periods Also possibly raids by light surface units which the Germans had a lot of. Luftwaffe units can be moved fairly quickly, especially when faced by an invasion and don't forget that the plan assumed seizing a bridgehead and then holding it until the following late spring before a breakout so the Germans have literally months to transfer resources to attack that bridgehead. Or failing that building defences against any counter-attack.

Plus given the pressure on the allied navies in 1942 everything was in short supply. Not just CV and BB but also cruisers and escort craft.

Fighting in Libya/Egypt shouldn't tie down anything, but the Eastern Mediterranean fleet which wasn't going to be used outside the region anyway and weren't used IOTL for Torch. There wasn't much back and forth of naval units from Gibraltar to Egypt before Tunisia fell.

It would tie down a good chunk of the British army with battle experience, even more if there is concern about a Soviet collapse which means Britain is trying to build up a force in Iraq as OTL. Also without N Africa and Sicily being secured then most of any forces sent back from Egypt and their equipment is going to have a long haul back via Africa unless your going to send a hell of a lot, with very limited escort capacity, through the Med.

As to the solution for no port...both in Normandy and Sicily more supplies were landed directly on the beach than in any port due to the lack of intact port capture.

Are you including the Muleberries are 'no port landings'? Plus that is when the allies have a lot of amphibious landing experience and vastly more logistical and air power.

Butterflies due to no Greece may well change the entire situation so that there is no Stalingrad. That said I take your point. Still given the fears about what would happen if Russia quit they would risk it anyway, since that was the plan. It was a hail mary move, because without it working the war is effectively over since it would be unwinnable for the Allies alone; as much as I hate on Roosevelt for giving Stalin everything he wanted to the detriment of US interests, he wasn't wrong that without the Soviets the Wallies would have had to make peace since the price for victory would be unacceptable to Americans.

However your thinking solely from the US point of view. Accepting that its unwilling to fight Germany without the Soviets then a largely suicidal assault in the autumn of 42 is a very bad move for Britain as its very likely to lose a lot of what military it has left in a scenario when the US is talking of hanging it out to dry. What's the incentive for the UK here?

Plus if the Soviets still fall and your very confident they will do in this scenario, then its a pointless operation. Since a small bridgehead held in Brittany Normandy is going to be conceded when peace is made with the Nazis.

Attack from the land side. That was exactly what the pre- and post-Dieppe suggestions were and how Cherbourg was taken IOTL. From the land side it is vastly easier and less costly than an amphibious assault on a defended city/port.

So forces inexperienced in amphibious assault are going to land, fight their way through any opposition, regroup and then successfully attack a defended port before enemy reinforcements arrive or the defenders use demolitions, mines etc to prevent the port facilities being used. That's making a fair number of assumptions.

Given how much effort was put into bombing sub pens in 1942 the Allies had overwhelming airpower had they opted to concentrate it.

Actually I think the really big raids by BC were against German towns/cities. However the big point is they were largely night attacks. Can't do this during the day with very limited fighter escort without losses. Plus this is still a hell of a lot less forces, with less experience available than in 44.

Given US AAA resources and the likely diversion of German bombers away from Britain they'd probably have a lot to fortify the captured port with. Artillery would only come into play if the Allies failed to seal off the peninsula. Which is probably why they'd have to suck it up and attack Cotentin since it is so close to Britain for mass air support and ease of bomber operations against transporation and it is easier to quickly attack both sides of the peninsula to seal it off before German reinforcements arrive.

If the US can/will spare enough such resources and it and related men/munitions/etc can be shipped to Britain and then across the channel to the bridgehead. Plus if artillery gets in range its going to have relatively limited effects in protecting the port against them.

North Africa not being cleared is actually a good thing for the Allies, as it forces the Axis to divert vital resources away from Europe.

However the allies have far more important assets to defend there - including control of Suez and the ME against attacks from both the west and possibly the north. Also those forces are a lot harder to transfer to a possible western front that what the Axis have in Italy/Med theatre.

That isn't really as hard as you think, especially so close to Britain. Even when the Germans broke through in Sicily naval gunfire smashed their offensive. Granted that didn't work out as easily in Normandy, but I am talking about a pincer landing on Cotentin with the terrain making it very easy to fire against any attacks against the landing zones as well as having spotting aircraft constantly hovering overhead.

In 42 its still a fair distance from Britain - just noticed not quite as far as your talking about Normandy while I was thinking you were referring to Brittany. Think the problem was the Operation Sledgehammer refers to taking Brest or Cherbourg and I forgot about the 2nd option. That does make distance somewhat less of an issue.

However even the latter is still a fair ask, let alone holding it for several months during the winter and spring. Plus your talking, with relatively weak and inexperienced forces of a double invasion which will hopefully take a port before its disabled.

The landings in the Balkans isn't the issue, it is getting beyond the beachhead due to the terrain. Again see Salonika in WW1. They literally couldn't get out of it until the CPs had literally collapsed. Every effort to push beyond the mountains was smashed and as we saw with Italy WW2 technology didn't change the problems of fighting in mountains even if it were easier to flank by landings on coastlines further north. So I have no doubt the Allies can easily take parts of or the entire nation of Greece but then you have the problem of pushing further north.

I wouldn't claim the German logistics were too restricted to get more reinforcements given that they had 300,000 men in Greece alone in 1944. That was with partisan help directing air strikes and with special operations teams on the ground. All they were ultimately able to achieve was to chew up the German retreat out of Greece thanks to bases in Italy. Without bases in Italy good luck generating sufficient sorties to matter to the logistics situation, especially give that Operation Strangle failed:

Operation Strangle (World War II) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

If you think the Balkan logistics situation was restricted, Italy was vastly easier to concentrate against, especially with two air forces available for the task.

My point wasn't that Germany didn't have forces there. It was that its more difficult for them to get additional forces to the Balkans than to France, Russia or Italy or switch between any one of them due to the logistical and terrain limitations.

Would agree it was far easier for Germany to reinforce and supply its forces in Italy because of the markedly greater railway network there.

You mean after Romania switched sides and the German position in the Balkans had collapsed. They were worried before then, but lacked the means until the Germans were basically out of men to do anything about a Bulgarian defection and the Soviets were racing through Romania.

Yes once Bulgaria realised that invasion was imminent and Germany was losing the war it switched sides before any Red Army units reached it. The same is at least as likely in the event of an allied victory in the Balkans as they would be far less fearful of western than communists occupation.

I'm not sure how that post backs up what you claim. I said invading Sicily or Sardinia would require Tunisian bases. In that quoted post I said that they could run convoys, not assault landing flotillas against Italy, through the Mediterranean if Vichy was still neutral and Libya had been cleared since they could hug the coast and avoid Sardinia and Sicily. There would still be attacks on said convoys as well as losses, but it could be done and wouldn't be much if any worse than losses in the Atlantic.

It seems there was just a misunderstanding of what I meant in the quote.

Yes. However if Vichy is neutral it could be done by hugging the coast just like the Tiger convoys, but minus having to worry about Libya. Malta then could be properly supplied and provide air cover.

Ok sounds like we were somewhat at cross purposed. Partly misunderstanding what you said and also I think the issue is whether the allies could run frequent rather than occasional convoys through the Sicily and Sardinian narrows without a strong air presence. At least when the Axis were opposing this with significant air units in those islands, not to mention possible mine and naval threats. It would be very costly to attempt this as the RN found in its missions to supply Malta.

Malta, without Tunisia in friendly hands is also vulnerable to enemy attacks, both on itself and its supply lines. Its less critical if Libya has been taken but if the Germans especially are determined to attack it by air its still going to be a pig to defend and supply.

Not really an accurate description for the Gazala Line.
Here is what happened IOTL and what is likely to have happened ITTL in 1941:

Battle of Gazala - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The British have reserves to stop Rommel at Gazala and logistics would limit his ability to do more than hold there. Potentially the Italians could do the same if they brought in all they had used for Greece and didn't ask for German help.


He'd have taken back Benghazi, so there would be some supplies coming in from there even with the DAF bombing. Given that he'd likely inflict pretty serious damage if he could advance to the Gazala Line things would likely bog down there for both sides very much like the 1942 Spring situation. Then it is a question of whether we end up seeing a 1941 analogue for the 1942 Battle of Gazala...with either side the potential victor. Rommel's numbers weren't the issue necessarily, since he largely used Italians to hold static positions and the British weren't really adept at coordinated different arms until 1942 and relied on maneuver and Die Gute Quelle:

Black (code) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

https://www.intelligencemuseum.org/assets/pdf/articles/website%20fellers%20in%20cairo.pdf

As well as SigInt:

Radio Kills: Rommel’s 621st Radio Intercept Company | Armchair General Magazine - We Put YOU in Command!

armchairgeneral.com

No way the British fight better at Gazala in 1941 than they did in 1942 and certainly more armor won't help given how abysmal the service rates were for the Crusader tanks:
(the link details the problems of British combined arms as well)

Crusader tank - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Fighting further forward than during Battle Axe or Compass would be only make the situation even worse.

More armour than the little available in spring 41 would help as would having more experience troops rather than largely exhausted units. Not losing the commanding general as they did would have helped considerably as well/

Fair enough. Point was that it could be done if needed.

And if you can afford to pay the costs.

I've got a specialized book on German FLAK and even as early as 1940 the vast investments in civil defense and FLAK defenses/ammo were causing issues for the war economy. It got worse later, but actually not by that much in 1943-44; in that period it was the damage that the bomber campaign inflicted that got worse, not the proportion of German investments in air defense...well that and the worsening of defense crews since the best men ended up in the East or later West/Italian fronts.

In 1941-42 the focus of the strategic bombing campaign by the RAF was German naval bases and sub pens, but they failed to do crippling damage due to the defenses (including sub pens, which weren't conquered until the Grand Slam bomb). Certainly coastal command could have used the bombers, but without the radar tech to go with them they'd have had a hard time being as effective as they were in 1943-44. A lot of what we know today is only in hindsight, since they didn't know their bombing of the sub bases wasn't working nearly as well as they needed. Still until the US coast opened up to Uboats the British basically were winning the Battle of the Atlantic by late Autumn 1941:

Battle of the Atlantic - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The point I'm making is that for Britain, which is far more stretched in the 41-42 period than Germany with what it can loot as well as produce for itself the resources committed to BC was a huge strain. Most nights we were losing more trained men than civilians killed/injured, let alone the relatively few times targets were being hit. A fraction of that effort in areas such as the Battle of the Atlantic would have been far more productively applied. Radar, weapons and tactics definitely improved by 44 but even having a/c in the air would have considerably restricted the U boats by forcing them to dive and move underwater more. [The U boat commander isn't going to know for sure how effective the a/c's weapons are after all]. Where they can attack boats even better or simply give warnings to divert convoys from possible sightings. The key point is that every ship saved not only saves that cargo but also makes it available for future missions.

Yes things became worse after the US and Germany were at war, in large part because the US was unready and unwilling to provide protection for convoys. The war against Japan also strained resources further even with relatively few sinking's by Japanese subs.

 

[Buba]

The point is that E Africa was a relatively low priority matter.

Frankly IMO the E African campaign was a waste of resources. The Italians there are not going anywhere and will never conquer (before running out of fuel and ammunition) anything of relevance.
Once the Regia Marina is sunk and/or port facilities destroyed, the Regia Aeoronautica uses up its gasoline and ordnance stocks, then whole thing can be left to wither on the vine.

 

[sillygoose]

Frankly IMO the E African campaign was a waste of resources. The Italians there are not going anywhere and will never conquer (before running out of fuel and ammunition) anything of relevance.
Once the Regia Marina is sunk and/or port facilities destroyed, the Regia Aeoronautica uses up its gasoline and ordnance stocks, then whole thing can be left to wither on the vine.

Isn't that effectively what happened IOTL?

East African campaign (World War II) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Buba]

Isn't that effectively what happened IOTL?

No.
Look at how many forces the British (mis)used in East Africa.

Order of battle, East African campaign (World War II) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

5 Infantry Divisions!
TBH the three African Divisions were basically rifle armed mobs - see that almost no artillery - but could be used elsewhere as LOC troops or for garrisoning/occupation of quiet sectors like Cyprus, Crete or Palestine. Up to some point the South Africans could not be used north of Kenya, though.
The two Indian Divisions could had been much more useful elsewhere in combat capacity.

 

[sillygoose]

No.
Look at how many forces the British (mis)used in East Africa.

Order of battle, East African campaign (World War II) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

5 Infantry Divisions!
TBH the three African Divisions were basically rifle armed mobs - see that almost no artillery - but could be used elsewhere as LOC troops or for garrisoning/occupation of quiet sectors like Cyprus, Crete or Palestine. Up to some point the South Africans could not be used north of Kenya, though.
The two Indian Divisions could had been much more useful elsewhere in combat capacity.

At what periods though? The Italian ports weren't all secured until May 1941 and as you say the African Rifles were needed as LOC/occupation troops. So really it was only the 2 Indian divisions that were needed given all the other Allied troops involved and the Ethiopian revolt. Logistics meant the Indian divisions couldn't be used offensively in Libya, which was the only real front that was active if Greece isn't on the table. The only other active from was East Africa. Plus without Greece the Brits would have a large reserve to use in Libya/Egypt. In 1941 the Brits lacked the means to invade Italy or France, so they only had really only 1 option for operations. It's either that or Dakar or perhaps Madagascar, but I doubt Britain wanted to provoke Vichy into joining the Axis especially given how Mers el Kebir and Dakar played out OTL.

 

[Buba]

I'm looking at the height of British effort in mid 1941.

The ports can be blasted to bit by British battleships, which the RN had quite a supply of. No need to take them. Sinking the Italian ships and/or denying them facilities and thus leaving them inoperable is enough.
The 4th Indian can be kept in Libya or Egypt.
The 5th Indian can either be sent somewhere or used against Erythrea. Or - GASP twitch, dies - kept in strategic reserve?
The Africans (all three) stay in Kenya, maybe one Division (African African) sent to the Sudan.

In 1941 the Brits lacked the means to invade Italy or France, so they only had really only 1 option for operations. It's either that or Dakar or perhaps Madagascar,

The Churchill school of strategy - we must do something, anything, somewhere, anywhere.

 

[sillygoose]

That depends on where the front is. When its about central Libya then your right but when its approaching the Egyptian frontier then their definitely got problems, even at times when Britain doesn't hold Tobruk. I have never denied that logistics aren't a problem for a British advance but just pointing out that the same applies for the Axis. Probably more so in a no Greece invasion scenario since a lot of the Italian forces are going to have limited mobility.

We were talking about the British continuing their offensive into Tripolitania, so Central Libya was all were were talking about.
You're right about the Egyptian border obviously, but we were never talking about the Axis getting anywhere close to that.
Actually when the Axis took Tobruk their supply issues evaporated, their problem was sustaining the advance into East Egypt. And when did I ever say logistics weren't an issue for the Axis? I have argued consistently that the Gazala Line would be the peak of Rommel's or potentially the Italian's advance without Greece diverting British resources. And only then because of British supply issues supplying positions nearly as far as El Aghiela (they couldn't even reach that far by early 1941 IOTL). With no Greece Italy has a lot more trucks free to devote to North Africa from October 1940 on. Same with aircraft. Plus AFAIK the Malta problem for supply really only started biting in July 1941 and even then only to a limited degree.

I would suspect that the Luftwaffe would go east for Barbarossa given it was the apple of Hitler's eye. Especially if Italy - without Greece is flooding western Libya with a lot of ground forces. If they attack their likely to run into the same problems as OTL, although probably having some success at 1st due to the numbers and British logistical problems. However their unlikely to reach as far as with Rommel.

Agreed.

The point is that E Africa was a relatively low priority matter. I think part of it was Churchill wanted a political response to the loss of British Somalia which he got irrationally angry about. Yes there were threats to travel through the Red Sea but the Italian forces for attacking them - air and naval were pretty feeble.

But they had to be dealt with and Britain needed wins badly as of 1941 for political reasons especially after the Dakar fiasco.

On the 2nd point you seem to be in two minds. Your arguing its pretty much impossible for the allies to take Tripoli from Egypt then saying "That might belatedly force the British into action"?? Straving Tripolitania might be the best option if invasion by the ground is logically impossible as any Luftwaffe forces sent there would themselves have to be supplied.

I said the Luftwaffe showing up would belatedly force the British into doing something rather than waiting to starve out the Italians since Malta, the key piece in that strategy, would be effectively neutralized as it was in early 1941 IOTL. Luftwaffe forces would be in Sicily per OTL, not North Africa. AFAIK that is where they attack Benghazi from what it was in British hands. I was saying that the British might think they could defeat the Italians on the cheap via a starvation strategy, the Luftwaffe attacking Malta effectively defeats that strategy, and the British then have to devote as much as they possibly can to doing something in Libya at that point, not sure what exactly given the lack of resources. Maybe they strip a bunch of stuff out of the Middle East to make it feasible?

Not starved out but definitely bad deployments than allowed defending 'forts' to be taken out one at a time. As you say it was a logistics problem that had prevented the Italians from advancing beyond their initial crossing of the Egyptian border. Along with some really crap equipment and the poor co-operation between the Italian services.

They were locked into place due to being starved of supplies for advancing to the limits of what they were capable:

Italian invasion of Egypt - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Repair works began on the coast road, renamed Via della Vittoria from Bardia and construction of a water pipe begun, which were not expected to be ready before mid-December, after which the advance would be resumed as far as Matruh.[37]

Mussolini wrote on 26 October

Forty days after the capture of Sidi Barrani I ask myself the question, to whom has this long halt been any use—to us or to the enemy? I do not hesitate to answer, it has been of much use, indeed, more to the enemy…. It is time to ask whether you feel you wish to continue to command.[41]

and two days later, on 28 October, the Italians invaded Greece, beginning the Greco-Italian War. Graziani was allowed to continue planning at a leisurely pace and an Italian advance to Matruh was scheduled for mid-December.[41]

Operation Compass - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

After recapturing Fort Capuzzo, the Italians advanced approximately 95 km (59 mi) in three days and on 16 September, the advance stopped at Maktila, 16 km (10 mi) beyond Sidi Barrani. The Italians dug in and awaited reinforcements and supplies along the Via della Vittoria, an extension of the Litoranea Balbo (Via Balbia) being built from the frontier. Five fortified camps were built around Sidi Barrani from Maktila, 24 km (15 mi) east along the coast, south to Tummar East, Tummar West and Nibeiwa and Sofafi on the escarpment to the south-west.[12]

The water situation was vital:

Battle of Sidi Barrani

Lua error in Module:Location_map at line 510: Unable to find the specified location map definition: "Module:Location map/data/Egypt" does not exist. The Battle of Sidi Barrani was the opening battle of Operation Compass, the first big British attack of the Western Desert Campaign. Sidi Barrani...

military.wikia.org

In 1940, British military forces had the terminus of the Egyptian state railway, road and the port of Mersa Matruh (Matruh) 320 kilometres (200 mi) west of Alexandria, as a base. A water pipeline was begun along the railway and sources of water surveyed. Wells were dug but most filled with salt water and in 1939, the main sources of fresh water were Roman aqueducts at Mersa Matruh and Maaten Baggush.[8]

Matruh was 190 kilometres (120 mi) east of the Libyan border. From the border, there was no water at Sollum, for 80 kilometres (50 mi) east of Sollum to Sidi Barrani, there was only a poor road, which meant that an invader would have to move through a waterless and trackless desert to reach the main British force.[9]

Starving was the wrong word, the issue was thirst.

CVs are very rare in 42 as well as vulnerable, especially the US ones. Wasn't it in 1942 - or possibly 43 that the US was so short the RN leant them one of its CVs? Drop tanks have potential but also performance costs. Plus it would mean overcoming the institutional opposition to them, especially in the US military, see Drop_tank-history. Not to mention the time constrains, i.e. that unless your using continued CAPs over the entire area, which would take a hell of a lot of a/c there will be a reaction time.

RN+US carriers should have been enough combined with drop tank equipped RAF fighters from Britain; the bombers already had the range, since they were bombing Brest quite often. Here is a list:

United States Atlantic Fleet Organization 1942

United States Atlantic Fleet Organization - 1942 CinCLantFile A2-11/A3-1/FF13(1) (0175) UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET U.S.S. CONSTELLATION, (Flagship) CONFIDENTIAL Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I., January 29, 1942.

www.history.navy.mil

AIRCRAFT, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
(CV4) RANGER Flagship

4 VM Flag Unit

CARRIER DIVISION THREE
(CV4) RANGER (F)

(CV7) WASP

(2) (CV8) HORNET

(AVG1) LONG ISLAND

Britain had drop tanks, so it is for them to use from their island, the US would use their carriers until they could get a land base.

Britain+the US had a larger air force by far than what the Luftwaffe had in Western Europe at the time.

For naval support that does expose the units to air attack over extended periods Also possibly raids by light surface units which the Germans had a lot of. Luftwaffe units can be moved fairly quickly, especially when faced by an invasion and don't forget that the plan assumed seizing a bridgehead and then holding it until the following late spring before a breakout so the Germans have literally months to transfer resources to attack that bridgehead. Or failing that building defences against any counter-attack.

Allied fleet escorts were more than enough to prevent any German surface ship or uboat to get close. The Luftwaffe could redeploy quickly, but they'd show up after the landings had already stuck. Plus with Cotentin as the objective they'd be able to maintain a lot of air cover and seal the Channel pretty easily given the resources they'd be able to concentrate in the area.

The breakout would be pretty nasty for sure, but attrition favors the Allies so long as Stalin is still in the war.

Plus given the pressure on the allied navies in 1942 everything was in short supply. Not just CV and BB but also cruisers and escort craft.

How did they launch Torch then? The resources were there.

It would tie down a good chunk of the British army with battle experience, even more if there is concern about a Soviet collapse which means Britain is trying to build up a force in Iraq as OTL. Also without N Africa and Sicily being secured then most of any forces sent back from Egypt and their equipment is going to have a long haul back via Africa unless your going to send a hell of a lot, with very limited escort capacity, through the Med.

What else would it be doing? Fighting is what armies are for in wartime. Taking the fight to the Germans is what they're supposed to be doing. Who said anything about using any of the forces in the Middle East? They had a bunch in Britain sitting around doing nothing until Torch.

Are you including the Muleberries are 'no port landings'? Plus that is when the allies have a lot of amphibious landing experience and vastly more logistical and air power.

Yes, including the Mulberries as ports. They didn't in 1943 when they invaded Sicily and did just fine.

However your thinking solely from the US point of view. Accepting that its unwilling to fight Germany without the Soviets then a largely suicidal assault in the autumn of 42 is a very bad move for Britain as its very likely to lose a lot of what military it has left in a scenario when the US is talking of hanging it out to dry. What's the incentive for the UK here?

Plus if the Soviets still fall and your very confident they will do in this scenario, then its a pointless operation. Since a small bridgehead held in Brittany Normandy is going to be conceded when peace is made with the Nazis.

How so? Britain was equally unwilling to fight it out without Stalin paying the blood price.
Britain was largely held out to dry IOTL and Churchill was willing to puppetize Britain anyway. What was the incentive for the British IOTL to fight out the war? Hundreds of thousands of casualties, loss of the empire, economic vassalization to the US, then having to fight the Cold War, etc. Britain and France would have been better off letting Germany and the Soviets fight it out and let them have Poland; after all they did sellout Poland to Stalin IOTL.

As to the second part, yes without Stalin in the war by late 1942 there would be no reason to even invade Europe, since it would be too costly to try. They'd clear North Africa and then negotiate. I mentioned Britanny because that was what was talked about for Sledgehammer IOTL in case Stalin quit. Granted though that was probably an eventuality that wouldn't come to pass if Stalin was already out or would be soon.

So forces inexperienced in amphibious assault are going to land, fight their way through any opposition, regroup and then successfully attack a defended port before enemy reinforcements arrive or the defenders use demolitions, mines etc to prevent the port facilities being used. That's making a fair number of assumptions.

Just like in Torch, Sicily, and Normandy. Not really an assumption when that was what happened IOTL repeatedly.

Actually I think the really big raids by BC were against German towns/cities. However the big point is they were largely night attacks. Can't do this during the day with very limited fighter escort without losses. Plus this is still a hell of a lot less forces, with less experience available than in 44.

There were only a few in 1942, the big raids were in 1943-45. Most of the bombing in 1941-42 was of France or maybe Hamburg and Kiel. The British did do day raids a lot in 1941-42, the Circuses and Rhubrarbs. And yes they did take heavy losses:

Circus offensive - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Here were the major daylight raids:

Royal Air Force daylight raids, 1940–1944 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

If the US can/will spare enough such resources and it and related men/munitions/etc can be shipped to Britain and then across the channel to the bridgehead. Plus if artillery gets in range its going to have relatively limited effects in protecting the port against them.

Given the superiority of US artillery over everyone else it will be able to counter anything the Germans are able to throw against it assuming the Soviets are in the war. The US obviously could given what was poured into Torch/Tunisia.

However the allies have far more important assets to defend there - including control of Suez and the ME against attacks from both the west and possibly the north. Also those forces are a lot harder to transfer to a possible western front that what the Axis have in Italy/Med theatre.

Where from the north?
And do you really think there was ever a real risk of the Suez or Egypt falling? You have brought up Axis supply problems IOTL in Egypt. Who ever said anything about transferring them to France, especially if they are to defend the Suez and tie down the Axis in North Africa?

In 42 its still a fair distance from Britain - just noticed not quite as far as your talking about Normandy while I was thinking you were referring to Brittany. Think the problem was the Operation Sledgehammer refers to taking Brest or Cherbourg and I forgot about the 2nd option. That does make distance somewhat less of an issue.

However even the latter is still a fair ask, let alone holding it for several months during the winter and spring. Plus your talking, with relatively weak and inexperienced forces of a double invasion which will hopefully take a port before its disabled.

Both Brittany and Cotentin were discussed in OTL plans, Britanny if in November 1942, Cotentin in 1943. Also note Normandy and Cotentin are not one and the same, but adjacent areas. Personally I think they had no choice but to do Cotentin due to the ability to support it via the air and logistically. Brittany was discussed IOTL due to US shipping being easier there and not having to worry about threats in the Channel as well as cutting off Uboat bases more easily.

BTW the Uboat issue and the invasion of France earlier are major considerations as well since bombing was ineffective and in 1942 the Battle of the Atlantic was not going great.

Not sure why holding it would be an issue given the presence of the fleets and NGF, not to mention air superiority from Britain. The US Mediterranean air forces ended up being something like 2000 aircraft not counting replacements, so that plus the 8th air force would be a vast boost to the already large RAF. Bombing of French rail systems would be very doable with a focused USAAF+RAF campaign. IOTL the only reason it wasn't more effective was dispersed efforts. Concentration early gives early results. Certainly dispersing German resources in the Mediterranean made it less costly initially, but it took much longer to bring the Germans down as a result. Concentration earlier allows for attrition to wear down the Germans faster, which in the long run is actually quite a bit cheaper when they cannot replace losses fast enough.

Cherbourg was disabled IOTL without causing significant problems to the Allied forces since they could rely on beach supply drops. Besides they repaired the port in a month.

My point wasn't that Germany didn't have forces there. It was that its more difficult for them to get additional forces to the Balkans than to France, Russia or Italy or switch between any one of them due to the logistical and terrain limitations.

I'd argue that getting them into Italy was just as hard given that most of Italian transportation at that time was coastal shipping, much like in Britain; when forced to rely on rail it overwhelmed the system. Part of the reason IOTL for the Italian partisans was the collapse of civilian supplies due to prioritizing of military movements and supplies.

In the Balkans the issue is not early as bad as you make it out to be, plus without having Italian air bases where are Allied bombers going to interdict the rail system from? If it replaces Italy as the main front then not only do the Italians still fight, which takes pressure off of the Germans, but then all the German resources that went into Italy can go into the Balkans instead; if they lose Greece early on then that saves the Germans from having to garrison that and supply 300,000 men there plus the civilians. Instead the Allies have to sustain Greece and really only have Salonika to project out of given the rail lines heading north. Italy was worse getting supplies and troops into because the only major route into the country was the Brenner Pass, a single choke point. There were multiple rail and river routes into the Balkans from Germany and her allies.

Would agree it was far easier for Germany to reinforce and supply its forces in Italy because of the markedly greater railway network there.

What greater network? The Italians relied on coastal shipping mostly and there was the aforementioned Brenner choke point to get supplies and men into and out of Italy for Germany.

Yes once Bulgaria realised that invasion was imminent and Germany was losing the war it switched sides before any Red Army units reached it. The same is at least as likely in the event of an allied victory in the Balkans as they would be far less fearful of western than communists occupation.

Only after Romania switched sides and defeated German attempts to coup the government like in Hungary and the Russians were on their way to Bulgaria. They didn't before that point.
While you're right about the fearfulness, you do have to remember that the Bulgarian resistance at that point was mainly the communists. Plus the Allies would have to look like they were about to break out of Salonika and the Germans wouldn't be in Bulgaria in force, which if the Allies were in the region you can bet that they'd have Hungary or Italian level control over the country.

Ok sounds like we were somewhat at cross purposed. Partly misunderstanding what you said and also I think the issue is whether the allies could run frequent rather than occasional convoys through the Sicily and Sardinian narrows without a strong air presence. At least when the Axis were opposing this with significant air units in those islands, not to mention possible mine and naval threats. It would be very costly to attempt this as the RN found in its missions to supply Malta.

Without having to worry about attack from North Africa the convoys could skirt much of that and violate Vichy waters as both sides did regularly. Costly yes, but not Malta costly. More like late 1941 Atlantic costly. Sustainable, but unpleasant. That is assuming they do as much as possible to avoid Axis bases.

Malta, without Tunisia in friendly hands is also vulnerable to enemy attacks, both on itself and its supply lines. Its less critical if Libya has been taken but if the Germans especially are determined to attack it by air its still going to be a pig to defend and supply.

If Libya is in Allied hands Malta is basically safe since supplies can come a direction that the Axis cannot easily deal with. A big part of the problem IOTL was with Libyan bases the convoys had to run the gauntlet. Certainly it would be costly to defend, but it would be even more so to attack. See the later 1942 attacks on it after the September replenishment.

More armour than the little available in spring 41 would help as would having more experience troops rather than largely exhausted units. Not losing the commanding general as they did would have helped considerably as well/

More armor isn't going to help if most of it is inoperable due to lack of steady supply, non-desertized models, a shitty design like the Crusader was until they upgraded it in 1942, and having to drive them from Egypt to Libya. The equipment is likely to be just as much a problem as IOTL. What commander general? Gott? He was lost in 1942.

And if you can afford to pay the costs.

They could in terms of men and material, question is more about the political cost. Of course if they don't then they might lose the war.

The point I'm making is that for Britain, which is far more stretched in the 41-42 period than Germany with what it can loot as well as produce for itself the resources committed to BC was a huge strain.

Huh? That would be news to the Germans after Barbarossa. Plus are you forgetting about Lend-Lease that started in 1941 and how prior the Brits spent themselves into bankruptcy buying everything the US would sell? Britain had huge resources and a very wealthy friend.

Most nights we were losing more trained men than civilians killed/injured, let alone the relatively few times targets were being hit. A fraction of that effort in areas such as the Battle of the Atlantic would have been far more productively applied. Radar, weapons and tactics definitely improved by 44 but even having a/c in the air would have considerably restricted the U boats by forcing them to dive and move underwater more. [The U boat commander isn't going to know for sure how effective the a/c's weapons are after all]. Where they can attack boats even better or simply give warnings to divert convoys from possible sightings. The key point is that every ship saved not only saves that cargo but also makes it available for future missions.

Until 1942 that is. Also without the proper tech aircraft couldn't necessarily easily see uboats in the Atlantic. We can debate forever about this though, it is hard to say for sure about what would have actually worked; in an ATL would could be saying that giving the resources to BC would have been better.

Yes things became worse after the US and Germany were at war, in large part because the US was unready and unwilling to provide protection for convoys. The war against Japan also strained resources further even with relatively few sinking's by Japanese subs.

Until about June 1942 given the threat of Japanese naval action. But are you really going to argue that Japanese entry was worse for Allied resources than Barbarossa/the Eastern Front were for Axis ones?

 

[sillygoose]

I'm looking at the height of British effort in mid 1941.

The ports can be blasted to bit by British battleships, which the RN had quite a supply of. No need to take them. Sinking the Italian ships and/or denying them facilities and thus leaving them inoperable is enough.
The 4th Indian can be kept in Libya or Egypt.
The 5th Indian can either be sent somewhere or used against Erythrea. Or - GASP twitch, dies - kept in strategic reserve?
The Africans (all three) stay in Kenya, maybe one Division (African African) sent to the Sudan.

The Churchill school of strategy - we must do something, anything, somewhere, anywhere.

Full circle back to Churchill still going for it because he liked his action.

 

[stevep]

We were talking about the British continuing their offensive into Tripolitania, so Central Libya was all were were talking about.
You're right about the Egyptian border obviously, but we were never talking about the Axis getting anywhere close to that.
Actually when the Axis took Tobruk their supply issues evaporated, their problem was sustaining the advance into East Egypt. And when did I ever say logistics weren't an issue for the Axis? I have argued consistently that the Gazala Line would be the peak of Rommel's or potentially the Italian's advance without Greece diverting British resources. And only then because of British supply issues supplying positions nearly as far as El Aghiela (they couldn't even reach that far by early 1941 IOTL). With no Greece Italy has a lot more trucks free to devote to North Africa from October 1940 on. Same with aircraft. Plus AFAIK the Malta problem for supply really only started biting in July 1941 and even then only to a limited degree.

We're been talking all over the desert war. Including Rommels initial successes and mentions of the later battles of El Alamein.

Additional trucks will only have a limited bonus for the Italians as they need to be shipped to N Africa and supplied and maintained down there. As well as the fuel they would themselves consume carrying cargoes to the front, especially El Aghiela or further east.

As far as I'm aware while the forces were strained, especially after the cross mountain move to intercept the Italian retreat from Benghazi, the primary role in stopping the advance was that forces were ordered to Greece and that took priority with resources.

But they had to be dealt with and Britain needed wins badly as of 1941 for political reasons especially after the Dakar fiasco.

As Buba pointed out they don't need to be dealt with by invasions by ground forces. Which also need more logistical support when in action or simply being transported.

I said the Luftwaffe showing up would belatedly force the British into doing something rather than waiting to starve out the Italians since Malta, the key piece in that strategy, would be effectively neutralized as it was in early 1941 IOTL. Luftwaffe forces would be in Sicily per OTL, not North Africa. AFAIK that is where they attack Benghazi from what it was in British hands. I was saying that the British might think they could defeat the Italians on the cheap via a starvation strategy, the Luftwaffe attacking Malta effectively defeats that strategy, and the British then have to devote as much as they possibly can to doing something in Libya at that point, not sure what exactly given the lack of resources. Maybe they strip a bunch of stuff out of the Middle East to make it feasible?

Actually while Malta is useful it also needs support and supply on its own and is vulnerable until at least Libya and preferably Tunisia is also friendly. A starvation route would also need actions way south of that, especially if/when Britain can establish bases in the Benghazi region.

They were locked into place due to being starved of supplies for advancing to the limits of what they were capable:

Italian invasion of Egypt - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Operation Compass - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The water situation was vital:

Battle of Sidi Barrani

Lua error in Module:Location_map at line 510: Unable to find the specified location map definition: "Module:Location map/data/Egypt" does not exist. The Battle of Sidi Barrani was the opening battle of Operation Compass, the first big British attack of the Western Desert Campaign. Sidi Barrani...

military.wikia.org

Starving was the wrong word, the issue was thirst.

The position eastwards was dictated by supply yes. The fact they seperated their forces such that the forts couldn't support each other was a military error.

RN+US carriers should have been enough combined with drop tank equipped RAF fighters from Britain; the bombers already had the range, since they were bombing Brest quite often. Here is a list:

United States Atlantic Fleet Organization 1942

United States Atlantic Fleet Organization - 1942 CinCLantFile A2-11/A3-1/FF13(1) (0175) UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET U.S.S. CONSTELLATION, (Flagship) CONFIDENTIAL Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I., January 29, 1942.

www.history.navy.mil

That mentions 4CV.
Ranger - an early experimental model that was largely unprotected which is one reason why it stayed in the Atlantic as the USN wanted to keep it well away from combat and it was largely used for ferry runs, including to Malta.
Wasp - Was in the Atlantic but transferred to the Pacific in June 42 to replace losses after Coral Sea and Midway and was itself sunk 15-9-42 by a Japanese sub while supporting the Guadalcanal operation.
Hornet - Hornet was also sent to the Pacific, even earlier and took part in the Doolittle Raid and Midway and she was also lost in the S Pacific on 27-10-42
Long Island - Was a light carrier built on a CL hull, and like the others above went to the Pacific in early 42.

Ditto that a number of the other ships in the list were quickly transferred to the Pacific.

Basically what operations are the US going to give up to enable a sizeable force to be concentrated off either Brittany or Normandy during the autumn/winter of 1942? Prior to Coral Sea and Midway the Japanese forces are still very powerful and abandoning the Pacific and Far East to them would do a hell of a lot of damage to the allied position. After Midway - assuming things went as well for the USN as OTL - they could abandon the Solomon's campaign to ship units to the Pacific.

Furthermore those CVs, still operating older a/c in some cases have limited loiter capacity due to their need to carry munitions and two types of fuel as well as being vulnerable to sub and air attack. The newer RN I class are a lot harder to sink but have even less a/c and can still be disabled for quite a period. Your likely to lose at least a number of those craft from a short operation let alone if their trying to support the lodgement for a longer period.

Not to mention an attack that late in the year is going to be risky due to the weather. Don't forget that D Day was delayed for a day due to the weather and its a lot worse and allied forces are a lot weaker and less capable in 42. CV could be unable to operate in bad weather let alone the issues for a landing.

Even if you get the most favourable situation, say the Cotentin peninsula down to Corentan that's a pocket about 20 miles east west by 20-25 north south. Which as you say is assuming attacks from both flanks and the western one is going to come under attack form the heavily fortified Channel Islands. This is going to be vulnerable as are supplies to it let alone building up forces for a break-out. You can establish airfields there but as with Malta their going to be vulnerable to sudden attacks while anything within artillery range of the German positions is going to be pounded.

Britain had drop tanks, so it is for them to use from their island, the US would use their carriers until they could get a land base.

The US CV force, even if say they stripped everywhere else to get say 6CV aren't going to have enough a/c for long to support landings or even cover their own forces.

Britain+the US had a larger air force by far than what the Luftwaffe had in Western Europe at the time.

Because Britain was the main production centre and homeland of the UK so a hell of a lot was held there against another possible BoB as well as the building up of BC. Germany isn't seriously expecting any landing OTL, although they might be more aware with a big build up of forces. However they have a lot more a/c they could move in quickly. Expect that the allies would still have enough to outnumber the Germans but its not going to be anything like as easy as in 44 and the allies are going to have a considerable range disadvantage compared to the defenders for the vast majority of their units.

Allied fleet escorts were more than enough to prevent any German surface ship or uboat to get close. The Luftwaffe could redeploy quickly, but they'd show up after the landings had already stuck. Plus with Cotentin as the objective they'd be able to maintain a lot of air cover and seal the Channel pretty easily given the resources they'd be able to concentrate in the area.

As I say maintaining a continued CAP across most of the day is going to be a considerable burden from S England due to the range issue. Allied fleet escorts were struggling at this time to maintain the Atlantic lifeline so I'm doubtful that many can be spared to support forces operating off Cotentin. Also see Granville_raid for how small fast surface units can cause havoc of their own. Let alone what the U boats can do if just one or two sneak into attacking either a big allied ship or supply convoy.

The breakout would be pretty nasty for sure, but attrition favors the Allies so long as Stalin is still in the war.

If things lasted that long. Especially since the Germans would have a lot more troops available than OTL.

How did they launch Torch then? The resources were there.

The Vichy French forces had been largely isolated and lacking supplies let alone new equipment for 1-2 years, with no coastal defences or expectation of attack. Only in one case I believe - on the Atlantic coast of Morocco did they actually fight briefly. Plus most of the landings were in the Med which made the operations a lot easier - much calmer waters and minimal tides.

What else would it be doing? Fighting is what armies are for in wartime. Taking the fight to the Germans is what they're supposed to be doing. Who said anything about using any of the forces in the Middle East? They had a bunch in Britain sitting around doing nothing until Torch.

If your dropping into the "something must be done" mentality even if it isn't something smart. That worked just fine for the Romans at Cannae. Fighting is what armies are for in wartime IF its wise to use them.

If you don't use forces from the ME, as OTL in Sicily and Italy then you have zero forces with battle experience, other than possibly some heavily diluted veterans from the Dunkirk evacuation. Its going to be bad enough with virtually no experience of amphibious invasions, no specialised equipment and a markedly less material edge than 1944.

Those forces were defending Britain against an invasion, training and frequently having units sent abroad as well as just sitting there. You could say the same with at least as much justification about the US forces that sat in the UK in 43-44 until D Day.

Yes, including the Mulberries as ports. They didn't in 1943 when they invaded Sicily and did just fine.

Again a small number of Germans and a largely demoralised Italian force as well as having air support from N Africa - against a much weaker German one - and with some experience gained from Torch. Plus again its in the Med. We lost one Mulberry in Normandy OTL and also the ability to land supplies on the beaches. The channel is prone to storms, especially in the autumn and winter.

How so? Britain was equally unwilling to fight it out without Stalin paying the blood price.
Britain was largely held out to dry IOTL and Churchill was willing to puppetize Britain anyway. What was the incentive for the British IOTL to fight out the war? Hundreds of thousands of casualties, loss of the empire, economic vassalization to the US, then having to fight the Cold War, etc. Britain and France would have been better off letting Germany and the Soviets fight it out and let them have Poland; after all they did sellout Poland to Stalin IOTL.

Pardon? Britain continued to fight on after June 40 simply because they knew that Hitler's word was worthless and there was no way he would give the sort of territorial guarantees that would have made Britain less vulnerable. Plus we know the danger of a single great power dominating the continent, even if its not as bad-shot insane as the Nazis.

Yes being puppetised by the US was a burden, especially given the economic costs they extracted. Also the losses of the war. However we maintained basic human rights and self-government which wouldn't have been the case otherwise.

Ironic given your belief that the Germans could easily stomp an unsupported Soviets and become a massive economic and industrial power that your suggesting the allies let Germany do that unopposed. Wouldn't given much chance for French or British independence after that.

Neither France or Britain had much say in the selling of Poland in 1945.

As to the second part, yes without Stalin in the war by late 1942 there would be no reason to even invade Europe, since it would be too costly to try. They'd clear North Africa and then negotiate. I mentioned Brittany because that was what was talked about for Sledgehammer IOTL in case Stalin quit. Granted though that was probably an eventuality that wouldn't come to pass if Stalin was already out or would be soon.

You keep suggesting this but what concessions would you be planning to make? It takes two to make peace, just as with war. Hitler is riding high, his Japanese allies are still looking strong and now the Americans he views with contempt are asking for peace terms?

Just like in Torch, Sicily, and Normandy. Not really an assumption when that was what happened IOTL repeatedly.

There were only a few in 1942, the big raids were in 1943-45. Most of the bombing in 1941-42 was of France or maybe Hamburg and Kiel. The British did do day raids a lot in 1941-42, the Circuses and Rhubrarbs. And yes they did take heavy losses:

Circus offensive - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Here were the major daylight raids:

Royal Air Force daylight raids, 1940–1944 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I think I understand. You're talking about the relatively few daylight raids, other than the idiotic circuses and rhubarbs rather than the vast majority of BC operations which were at night and against targets away from the coasts.

Given the superiority of US artillery over everyone else it will be able to counter anything the Germans are able to throw against it assuming the Soviets are in the war. The US obviously could given what was poured into Torch/Tunisia.

What superiority? In 44-45 yes but here its still building up forces largely from scratch. There's no actual combat experience and the force is operating in a small lodgement at the end of a very long and vulnerable supply line.

Where from the north?
And do you really think there was ever a real risk of the Suez or Egypt falling? You have brought up Axis supply problems IOTL in Egypt. Who ever said anything about transferring them to France, especially if they are to defend the Suez and tie down the Axis in North Africa?

If the Soviets lost the northern Caucusas then even if it doesn't collapse totally there is a threat from the north. The Germans have very strained logistics but IIRC we're already discussed this already as your argued that no defence of the Caucasus position would be possible. Hence there's a clear threat from the north.

Its unlikely that Rommel could break into Egypt but I'm reluctant to rule things out as impossible and it was a fear/belief [whether your allied or Axis] OTL. Some of those forces would be invaluable for giving some experienced troops for such a desperate operation as is being proposed.

Both Brittany and Cotentin were discussed in OTL plans, Britanny if in November 1942, Cotentin in 1943. Also note Normandy and Cotentin are not one and the same, but adjacent areas. Personally I think they had no choice but to do Cotentin due to the ability to support it via the air and logistically. Brittany was discussed IOTL due to US shipping being easier there and not having to worry about threats in the Channel as well as cutting off Uboat bases more easily.

I know Cotentin is part of Normandy. Its easier to support than Brittany but still a huge task for an 42 invasion.

BTW the Uboat issue and the invasion of France earlier are major considerations as well since bombing was ineffective and in 1942 the Battle of the Atlantic was not going great.

The last is another reason why such an operation is a bloody huge risk. Everything is on a fragile supply line across the Atlantic even before it then has to be shipped from Britain into the lodgement.

Not sure why holding it would be an issue given the presence of the fleets and NGF, not to mention air superiority from Britain. The US Mediterranean air forces ended up being something like 2000 aircraft not counting replacements, so that plus the 8th air force would be a vast boost to the already large RAF. Bombing of French rail systems would be very doable with a focused USAAF+RAF campaign. IOTL the only reason it wasn't more effective was dispersed efforts. Concentration early gives early results. Certainly dispersing German resources in the Mediterranean made it less costly initially, but it took much longer to bring the Germans down as a result. Concentration earlier allows for attrition to wear down the Germans faster, which in the long run is actually quite a bit cheaper when they cannot replace losses fast enough.

Again your assuming that allied naval forces can operate off an hostile shore for months at a time and that air superiority can be both won and maintained. Both of which I'm doubtful in late 42 for the reasons mentioned.

Bombing of the French railway systems took something like 4-6 months OTL with much larger and more experienced forces than would be available here. Plus unless it starts pretty much from mid42 - at which point very few USAAF units are in Britain - there's not going to be a lot of time. Your going to have a huge political task with both BC and the USAAF bomber barons persuading them to abandon the strategic bombing campaign totally to concentrate on bashing the German ground forces - and the territory their on for the rest of the war. - Unless your talking of tactical forces only with would be even less effective without the heavies.

Cherbourg was disabled IOTL without causing significant problems to the Allied forces since they could rely on beach supply drops. Besides they repaired the port in a month.

They partially repaired it OTL within a month then another month to get it into full operation. This assumes that Hitler prevents it being properly defended as OTL and the greater Axis forces that would quickly be available don't distract too much to attacks on the city/port. Again I point out as well that the allies don't have anything like the massive superiority in air and naval strength they would have in 42, even if they somehow made peace with Japan to free up forces from the Pacific and Far East.

I'd argue that getting them into Italy was just as hard given that most of Italian transportation at that time was coastal shipping, much like in Britain; when forced to rely on rail it overwhelmed the system. Part of the reason IOTL for the Italian partisans was the collapse of civilian supplies due to prioritizing of military movements and supplies.

Actually wrong about Britain as it had a much deeper railway network at the time. It was worked to exhaustion and frequent air attacks, especially in early years caused problems as did the loss of much coastal capacity in the south and west.

Even so Italy is better off for supplying German reinforcements in the south than the Balkans albeit markedly weaker than supplying reinforcements to N France.

In the Balkans the issue is not early as bad as you make it out to be, plus without having Italian air bases where are Allied bombers going to interdict the rail system from? If it replaces Italy as the main front then not only do the Italians still fight, which takes pressure off of the Germans, but then all the German resources that went into Italy can go into the Balkans instead; if they lose Greece early on then that saves the Germans from having to garrison that and supply 300,000 men there plus the civilians. Instead the Allies have to sustain Greece and really only have Salonika to project out of given the rail lines heading north. Italy was worse getting supplies and troops into because the only major route into the country was the Brenner Pass, a single choke point. There were multiple rail and river routes into the Balkans from Germany and her allies.

You have a point in that without S Italy its vastly more difficult to get the necessary sort of air superiority over the southern Balkans. As you say both routes have a single basic chock point, close to their 'base'.

The only real river route into the Balkans is the Danube, which is an allied advantage when seeking to gain territory south of it as its easier to restrict German movements and supplies into the region. Once Bulgaria is secured then its quite probable that the allies can persuade Turkey to allow passage of the straits which makes it even easier to get supplies to the region. Again based on the idea that N Africa and at least Sicily and Sardinia are allied controlled.

Only after Romania switched sides and defeated German attempts to coup the government like in Hungary and the Russians were on their way to Bulgaria. They didn't before that point.
While you're right about the fearfulness, you do have to remember that the Bulgarian resistance at that point was mainly the communists. Plus the Allies would have to look like they were about to break out of Salonika and the Germans wouldn't be in Bulgaria in force, which if the Allies were in the region you can bet that they'd have Hungary or Italian level control over the country.

The latter would assume that they could get such forces there and maintain them in the face of allied air superiority.

Without having to worry about attack from North Africa the convoys could skirt much of that and violate Vichy waters as both sides did regularly. Costly yes, but not Malta costly. More like late 1941 Atlantic costly. Sustainable, but unpleasant. That is assuming they do as much as possible to avoid Axis bases.

They didn't have to worry about attacks from N Africa, at least to any degree. There were insufficient forces in Libya with anti-shipping capacity to make a difference. The reason why the allies, with very rare exceptions, possibly only a couple of cases of specialist military convoys, didn't push convoys through the Med were the Italian islands and the resulting narrows. You can't avoid Axis bases unless you have your own land based air nearby to pound them. Coupled with possible further attacks from German bases in Crete. It would be Malta costly as it would be covering exactly the same waters but more so as it extended further into the eastern Med.

If Libya is in Allied hands Malta is basically safe since supplies can come a direction that the Axis cannot easily deal with. A big part of the problem IOTL was with Libyan bases the convoys had to run the gauntlet. Certainly it would be costly to defend, but it would be even more so to attack. See the later 1942 attacks on it after the September replenishment.

This assumes that the supplies come from Egypt, either directly from there or say by coastal shipping up to Tripoli then escorted convoys to Malta. Which of course means those supplies have to come around the Cape, or from India say for some materials. The gauntlet was from the north, where ships were blocked from going further south by N Africa until you pass Tunisia. That's the basic fact your overlooking.

Attacking Malta by air or by an invasion attempt would be a lot more difficult once its properly supplied and defended. However if the Axis have been driven from N Africa - even if Vichy France is still in existence - then its probably less likely to be attacked as its lost most of its strategic importance with no Axis supply lines to Libya to interdict.

More armor isn't going to help if most of it is inoperable due to lack of steady supply, non-desertized models, a shitty design like the Crusader was until they upgraded it in 1942, and having to drive them from Egypt to Libya. The equipment is likely to be just as much a problem as IOTL. What commander general? Gott? He was lost in 1942.

Which is why it would be useful both reducing the damage on the 7th Armed if the cross country move could be avoided and then rebuilding the unit if everything that can be spared isn't being sent to Greece.

No I was talking about Richard_O'Connor, the commander during Compass.

They could in terms of men and material, question is more about the political cost. Of course if they don't then they might lose the war.

No the question is largely in terms of naval cost. A lot of warships were lost or damaged by convoys to Malta as well as sometimes most of the merchants. If your trying to push convoys through the Med say on a monthly basis then you quickly run out of RN forces in the area and there aren't many more elsewhere to add to them.

Huh? That would be news to the Germans after Barbarossa. Plus are you forgetting about Lend-Lease that started in 1941 and how prior the Brits spent themselves into bankruptcy buying everything the US would sell? Britain had huge resources and a very wealthy friend.

Not really. Germany was a fairly large continental state with a much larger empire of conquered or puppetised territory much of which it was looting massively. Britain was a relatively small island that needed to import a hell of a lot to survive let alone make war and that supply line was under heavy attack, as was Britain itself at times still. It needed to rebuild its army after Dunkirk and massively expand it as well as fighting on multiple fronts on land and sea.

As you point out Britain was bankrupt from early 1941 having had to do repeated garage sells at bargain prices to fed the US who then let us have stuff on credit which in many cases we would have to pay back later and with marked restrictions on Britain's foreign trade. [Which were irrelevant to a degree as Britain was committing so much to the war that it wasn't in a position to export much even without those restrictions.

Until 1942 that is. Also without the proper tech aircraft couldn't necessarily easily see uboats in the Atlantic. We can debate forever about this though, it is hard to say for sure about what would have actually worked; in an ATL would could be saying that giving the resources to BC would have been better.

Part of the problem with the centimeter radar was that again BC was hogging it as much as it could. Plus if they can't find U boats in daylight in the Atlantic how are they going to find them at night in the channel while trying to defend shipping to your landing?

Plus I repeat I'm not talking about diverting all the resources that BC consumed to the Battle of the Atlantic. A relatively small proportion would have closed the air gap earlier even if they would be less effective without the tactics and weaponry of 43-45. You would still have had a basis for a strategic bomber force being developed - but with some thought rather than it being the be all and end all of the RAF pretty much - and for other investments.

Until about June 1942 given the threat of Japanese naval action. But are you really going to argue that Japanese entry was worse for Allied resources than Barbarossa/the Eastern Front were for Axis ones?

Definitely in the short term. Germany was using its army [and allies] which it couldn't really use much elsewhere and similarly with the air force as attacks on Britain had failed. Also while the German system was grossly inefficient in the medium/long term they gained huge further assets to loot, including slaves. Later on as they failed to complete their conquest it became an increasingly drain but as late as Nov 42 when they failed two crisis, the encirclement of 6th Army at Stalingrad and the allied victory at 2nd El Alamein and Torch landings they were able to commit substantial forces to both. Not enough in either case to succeed but it made for a markedly tougher fight.

For Britain 1940 was followed by further problems in Libya, Greece, across the ME and in the Atlantic as well as the decision to aid the Soviets which imposed further costs. Then the Japanese attack costs us a lot more men and resources, especially from Malaya and Burma and required commitments to defend India, supply lines in the Indian Ocean and what we could to aid Australia.

Afterwards things got better but Britain was always staggering from crisis to crisis due to the numerous challenges we had to face.