Italy doesn't invade Greece in 1940

1 - Italy might invade Yugoslavia instead. Maybe yes, maybe not.
2 - no invasion of Greece means that Churchil does not fuck up the war in Italian Libya. The never to be overhyped by British explaining their defeats with "he so genius, innit?" Rommel&friends gets kicked into the sea in 2Q41. Convoys to Malta then can slink along the North African coast and finally sail due north to the island from Tripoli, under air cover all the way.
3 - Cross-Mediterranean convoys are still tricky, the part between Algiers and Malta being exciting :)
4 - with no Italo-Greek war AND if no Yugo-Italian war, then London does not orchestrate the coup in Yugoslavia which led to its invasion and occupation by the Axis. The hundreds of thousands of Yugoslav civilians murdered as a result of that British "success" are alive. Then again, you never know, Churchill might still do it ...
5 - troops and materiel lost in Greece and in North African campaigns are available for Far East ...
6 - ... or maybe kept in Egypt for invasion of "soft underbelly of Europe" ...
7 - after Pearl Harbor Churchil can send a full Brigade to garrison the Falklands against a Japanese invasion, and not a reinforced battalion like in OTL
 
1 - Italy might invade Yugoslavia instead. Maybe yes, maybe not.
Why would they? And how could they given that they didn't even have enough to invade Greece by themselves?

2 - no invasion of Greece means that Churchil does not fuck up the war in Italian Libya. The never to be overhyped by British explaining their defeats with "he so genius, innit?" Rommel&friends gets kicked into the sea in 2Q41. Convoys to Malta then can slink along the North African coast and finally sail due north to the island from Tripoli, under air cover all the way.
With what logistics? Even with fresh forces the British logistics in Libya were extremely strained and that more than the state of the troops is what enabled Rommel to blitz them.
Attempts by the British to re-open Benghazi were frustrated by lack of transport, poor weather and from early February, Luftwaffe bombing and mining of the harbour. The attacks led the British to abandon attempts to use it to receive supplies and to evacuate the Italian stores and equipment captured during Operation Compass. Lack of transport made it impossible to supply a garrison west of El Agheila, which was the most favourable position for a defensive line and restricted the 2nd Armoured Division to movement between supply dumps, reducing its limited mobility further.

(Neame also discovered that he had to rely on the local telephone system staffed by Italian operators.)[28]

In early March, the 9th Australian Division began to relieve the 6th Australian Division at Mersa Brega for Operation Lustre, which demonstrated the difficulty of tactical moves with insufficient transport. On 20 March, the Australians were withdrawn north of Benghazi to Tocra, near Er Regima for ease of supply and the 2nd Armoured Division took over.[29]

Tobruk was gradually replacing Sollum as the sea-head for supplies, though the discharge of ships was hampered by heavy weather, sandstorms, and Italian air attacks. On the night of February 4th the German Air Force joined in by mining the harbour; the next day a petrol ship struck a mine, caught fire, and set alight an ammunition ship. This was a serious turn of events, as the two minesweepers were under repair. Owing to bad weather the force detailed to clear Benghazi harbour could not sail from Tobruk until February 12th, and no sooner had it arrived than the Luftwaffe began to make regular attacks on Benghazi. The Army's slender resources did not allow of a reasonable anti-aircraft defence to be provided here in addition to Tobruk, and this fact coupled with the shortage of small ships made it impossible for Admiral Cunningham to accept the commitment of building up Benghazi as an advanced base; all that he could undertake was to send an occasional small convoy there, perhaps once a fortnight. The first supply convoy of four ships arrived on the 17th but was so heavily attacked that it could not be unloaded and had to return to Tobruk.
The upshot was that the possession of Benghazi did almost nothing to relieve the Army's long overland haul from Tobruk, which to the farthest post, El Agheila, was as much as 450 miles by the coastal road.

The German aircraft did not, however, confine themselves to the persistent bombing and mining of Benghazi. They also attacked lorry convoys, airfields, and the troops in the forward area, though not without loss to themselves. As the intervention of the Germans in this theatre was soon to be attended by a violent reversal of fortunes, it is pertinent to see how it came about.
This was before the diversion of resources to Greece too.

So even if other forces had been available the lack of supply was crippling and that if anything was what led to the diversion of resources away from Libya, since until Benghazi was repaired and operational no further advance was possible. Same thing happened in 1943 when the British chased Rommel west.

4 - with no Italo-Greek war AND if no Yugo-Italian war, then London does not orchestrate the coup in Yugoslavia which led to its invasion and occupation by the Axis. The hundreds of thousands of Yugoslav civilians murdered as a result of that British "success" are alive. Then again, you never know, Churchill might still do it ...
From what I've been able to find the British didn't orchestrate it as much as support it. Incidentally same with the Soviets.

5 - troops and materiel lost in Greece and in North African campaigns are available for Far East ...
At least some of it.

6 - ... or maybe kept in Egypt for invasion of "soft underbelly of Europe" ...
Do you think Britain really had the strength to invade Italy alone? The US forces were pretty instrumental in making that possible IOTL.

7 - after Pearl Harbor Churchil can send a full Brigade to garrison the Falklands against a Japanese invasion, and not a reinforced battalion like in OTL
Falklands? That was off the coast of Argentina in the Atlantic and AFAIK never even threatened by anyone.
 
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Why would they? And how could they given that they didn't even have enough to invade Greece by themselves?
Why - Impero Romano and all that. Italy had been bankrolling Croatian patriots for almost two decades by this point.
Expand Alabania (Italian controled). Resurrect Montenegro. Grab more of Dalmatia (it wuz Venetian, like honest!)
What with? - never underestimate human stupidity.

This was before the diversion of resources to Greece too.
True. But with no diversion of resources the British are much stronger.
OK - I overestimated the speed of British build up. Nevertheless by the end of 1941 Tripolitania should be captured.

Do you think Britain really had the strength to invade Italy alone?
No, not Italy itself. But the forces would be employed on the "capture an island here, raid a peninsula here ... death by a thousand cuts" endeavours which had served Britain so well in XVIIIth century wars. This is Churchill's (and not only his) mindset. He'd also keep those troops in the Med to land them in Greece and cause switch of allegiance of Balkan regimes and thus "strike at Germany".
See British attacks on such vital targets as Van Mayen - or was it Bear? - Island in the Norwegian Sea.
Falklands? That was off the coast of Argentina in the Atlantic and AFAIK never even threatened by anyone.
Convince Churchill of that ... attacking islands in the middle of nowhere but with unquestionably some Great Stategic Value is exactly down his alley ...
 
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Why - Impero Romano and all that. Italy had been bankrolling Croatian patriots for almost two decades by this point.
Expand Alabania (Italian controled). Resurrect Montenegro. Grab more of Dalmatia (it wuz Venetian, like honest!)
What with? - never underestimate human stupidity.
I kinda wanted to argue that point, but then this is Mussolini, so I concede that the potential exists, though I'd imagine even 1940 Italy would be a bit more cautious to line up allies given how much bigger Yugoslavia was than Greece.

True. But with no diversion of resources the British are much stronger.
OK - I overestimated the speed of British build up. Nevertheless by the end of 1941 Tripolitania should be captured.
Stronger doesn't necessarily mean much without supplies. Certainly fresh forces/equipment would have done better, but without supplies they could simply end up consumed by Rommel all the same.

If they delayed until mid-1941 to invade they'd be preempted by Rommel like IOTL and even if not the Axis held the easily defensible ground that the British logistically could not even advance to. They'd really have to invest in major defenses for Benghazi to ever make it useful or they'd simply be stuck in Cyrencia at the end of 450km supply lines by road. Given that tactically it took them until late 1942 to be able to match Rommel's forces (and the Italians too once they reformed post-1940 defeats...which made them actually quite a bit more formidable than commonly presented) I just don't see them being able to take Libya even best case scenario in 1941. Saving forces from Greece though likely would mean that Rommel cannot advance into Egypt, which paradoxically is actually worse for the British in the long run given that they were able to crush Rommel in the most favorable circumstances that would not have existed in Libya.

No, not Italy itself. But the forces would be employed on the "capture an island here, raid a peninsula here ... death by a thousand cuts" endeavours which had served Britain so well in XVIIIth century wars. This is Churchill's (and not only his) mindset. He'd also keep those troops in the Med to land them in Greece and cause switch of allegiance of Balkan regimes and thus "strike at Germany".
See British attacks on such vital targets as Van Mayen - or was it Bear? - Island in the Norwegian Sea.
Oh, then yes, since they were planning on clearing out the Dodacanese IOTL. Of course they were going to use forces that got sent to Greece, so ironically we could end up seeing some of the forces you expect to remain in Libya instead being sent to invade Italian islands in the Aegean or finishing off Italian East Africa sooner.

If Churchill holds back forces to invade Greece anyway, than OTL North Africa campaign plays out and Britain takes the international political hit for invading a neutral while then potentially getting sucked into a war against Greece.

Convince Churchill of that ... attacking islands in the middle of nowhere but with unquestionably some Great Stategic Value is exactly down his alley ...
But Britain already owns the Falklands and the Japanese nor Germans ever really threatened it in WW2.

Now using those forces to invade Norwegian islands might be up his alley.
 
I feel like the Italians would benefit a fair bit, though I'm not sure how significantly. The important standout dates for me are that Mussolini decided to invade Albania in like October of 1940 and Operation Compass where the British destroyed the 10th Italian Army in Cyrenaica, started in December of 1940.

The common point brought up, including in the YouTube World War Two series is that Albanian deployments took up five times as many men as North Africa at the same time, which in my humble opinion, doesn't matter as much. You can only support so many troops, even poorly equipped Italian garrison troops, in North Africa with a set amount of logistics. But what logistics was used to support the Greco-Italian War?

Screenshot_2021-08-27_2.01.47_PM.png


Over five times as much merchant shipping took the short jaunt to Albania then to North Africa during the brief period of time between the start of the Greco-Italian War and the the beginning of Operation Compass and that includes twice as many vehicles (in tonnage), just as much fuel (for such a small and mountainous region such as Albania) and over two times as many arms. PLUS in addition to that, they were dropping large amounts of lira into increasing and improving the crappy Albanian infrastructure to support their military in the mountains including expansion of the Albanian port facilities, which were grossly underdeveloped, as well the roads and bridges and warehouses and airfields etc etc etc. All of this investment could've been allocated to North Africa. To the ports of Tripoli and Benghazi and so forth.

And in manpower, there was a diversion of five divisions to opening up the Albanian campaign instead of deploying to North Africa. But more important would've been all of the trucks/lorries, artillery and pack animals and merchant shipping and fuel that could've sustained the Italians in December of 1940... and maybe the redeployment of the Centauro Armored Division from twiddling about in Albania and actually shipping it down to Libya where it might matter. One of the problems of Operation Compass was that the Italians stood and fought (perhaps poorly but they didn't lack bravery) but utterly lacked any anti-tank capability. There's stories of howitzers firing at Matilda tanks at thirty yards range to negligible effect.

More tanks would've helped. It might've not changed the balance on its own... but in addition to more tanks, more artillery, and more trucks and pack animals and merchant shipping you also have over four hundred aircraft, including a fair number of fighters and sixty medium bombers.

There's also the fact that Italian aggression helped put more pressure on Yugoslavia and Greece to shift towards the Allied side. They both had phases or periods of being friendly (or intimidated perhaps) by the Axis' expanding power but at least for Greece, Italy invading them placed Greece firmly in the Allied camp. Now the casualties Germany and the Axis forces spent in the Balkans Campaign was minor and though its debatable, it didn't seem to delay Barbarossa. But occupying the Balkans did tie up hundreds of thousands of Italian and German and other Axis troops. If Greece (and Yugoslavia) didn't have to be forcibly occupied, that would free up a lot more troops for other fronts.

Also Italy would be less of a laughingstock and seen as obviously playing second fiddle to Nazi Germany as well. Because lol... they almost lost Albania to them. Can't live that down.
 
Italians stood and fought (perhaps poorly but they didn't lack bravery) but utterly lacked any anti-tank capability. There's stories of howitzers firing at Matilda tanks at thirty yards range to negligible effect.
There is anti-tank capability, and there is anti-Matilda capability.
The 47/32 was fully capable against cruiser tanks, but not against the Matilda. The same applies to all 37-45mm AT guns fielded in 1940/41.
The Skoda 100mm howitzer might simply had not been issued an AP round. I'm fairly certain that another user of this ordnance, Poland, did not. The Matilda being imprevious to HE shells detonating against its armour is not that surprising - that's one of the design specifications for an infantry support tank, after all :)
I'm fairly sure that HEAT rounds, efeto pronto in Italian, were issued later than Compass.

Italy not invading Greece indeed would had benefited overall, but I'm not certain if it could had supported more troops in NA without expanding Benghazi and Tripolis first. Which you indeed point out were lacking.

Good point about no need for Axis to garrison hostile Balkans. Although IIRC Germans stepped in a larger way only after Italian capitulation.
 
I feel like the Italians would benefit a fair bit, though I'm not sure how significantly. The important standout dates for me are that Mussolini decided to invade Albania in like October of 1940 and Operation Compass where the British destroyed the 10th Italian Army in Cyrenaica, started in December of 1940.

The common point brought up, including in the YouTube World War Two series is that Albanian deployments took up five times as many men as North Africa at the same time, which in my humble opinion, doesn't matter as much. You can only support so many troops, even poorly equipped Italian garrison troops, in North Africa with a set amount of logistics. But what logistics was used to support the Greco-Italian War?

Screenshot_2021-08-27_2.01.47_PM.png


Over five times as much merchant shipping took the short jaunt to Albania then to North Africa during the brief period of time between the start of the Greco-Italian War and the the beginning of Operation Compass and that includes twice as many vehicles (in tonnage), just as much fuel (for such a small and mountainous region such as Albania) and over two times as many arms. PLUS in addition to that, they were dropping large amounts of lira into increasing and improving the crappy Albanian infrastructure to support their military in the mountains including expansion of the Albanian port facilities, which were grossly underdeveloped, as well the roads and bridges and warehouses and airfields etc etc etc. All of this investment could've been allocated to North Africa. To the ports of Tripoli and Benghazi and so forth.

And in manpower, there was a diversion of five divisions to opening up the Albanian campaign instead of deploying to North Africa. But more important would've been all of the trucks/lorries, artillery and pack animals and merchant shipping and fuel that could've sustained the Italians in December of 1940... and maybe the redeployment of the Centauro Armored Division from twiddling about in Albania and actually shipping it down to Libya where it might matter. One of the problems of Operation Compass was that the Italians stood and fought (perhaps poorly but they didn't lack bravery) but utterly lacked any anti-tank capability. There's stories of howitzers firing at Matilda tanks at thirty yards range to negligible effect.

More tanks would've helped. It might've not changed the balance on its own... but in addition to more tanks, more artillery, and more trucks and pack animals and merchant shipping you also have over four hundred aircraft, including a fair number of fighters and sixty medium bombers.

There's also the fact that Italian aggression helped put more pressure on Yugoslavia and Greece to shift towards the Allied side. They both had phases or periods of being friendly (or intimidated perhaps) by the Axis' expanding power but at least for Greece, Italy invading them placed Greece firmly in the Allied camp. Now the casualties Germany and the Axis forces spent in the Balkans Campaign was minor and though its debatable, it didn't seem to delay Barbarossa. But occupying the Balkans did tie up hundreds of thousands of Italian and German and other Axis troops. If Greece (and Yugoslavia) didn't have to be forcibly occupied, that would free up a lot more troops for other fronts.

Also Italy would be less of a laughingstock and seen as obviously playing second fiddle to Nazi Germany as well. Because lol... they almost lost Albania to them. Can't live that down.

To be fair the ships used to move things and people across the Adriatic did not need to be nearly as robust as the ones that moved across the Mediterranean, so could rely on coastal shipping, which was not useful for North Africa supply lines except for moving things from one port to another along the Libyan coast. The chart you used, while extremely interesting, does hide that in just raw numbers. That said having more coastal shipping to move supplies as close to the front as possible would have been very helpful rather than having to move it by road from Benghazi or Tobruk. Both ports were pretty substantial at the time; their later lack of capacity was related to war damage from 1940-42.

Good point about the divisions, but to be fair the armored division would have had to be 'desert-ized' or face major breakdowns in action due to sand/dust. Rommel had the same problem at first.
The aircraft though would have been very helpful at a critical period for the Italians.
 
Another thing about the tonnage figures - turn around times.
One ship with (ass pull) 5000 tonne capacity could make the Brindisi-Valona trip (another ass pull figure) ten times in the same period it would had taken it to go from Naples to Benghazi and back.
 
Details on Italian merchant shipping:
As of June 1940, the Italian merchant fleet comprised 786 ships with a gross tonnage exceeding 500 tons, for a total of 3,318,129 tons, and about 200 ships between 100 and 500 tons. As many as 212 ships, amounting to 1,216,637 tons, were stranded out of the Mediterranean when Italy declared war, and almost all of them were consequently captured or sunk by the enemy.

Between 10 June 1940 and 8 September 1943, the fleet gained 204 ships - newly constructed or captured - amounting to 818,619 tons; but 460 ships, amounting to 1,700,096 tons, were lost.

As of 8 September, 324 ships for 1,247,092 tons were still serving; after the armistice, they were mostly captured by the Germans (and then sunk) or self-destroyed to avoid capture.
The amount of capital lost was immense, not only in terms of quantity but also quality: many ships were new and excellent vessels along with thousands of brave sailors were lost at sea. 3,100 seamen died on merchant ships registered as auxiliary naval vessels, 3,257 men belonging to the crews of requisitioned and non requisitioned ships lost their lives, 537 perished as POW's; a total of 7,164 were lost out of 25,000 registered sea-going personnel.

Italian ports were destroyed, and it took years to remove the wrecks and rebuild them; even coastal shipping, once flourishing, had to restart from scratch. This notwithstanding, it is fair to recall that merchant ships in wartime performed their tasks in exemplary fashion, delivering nearly all their war cargoes to their proper destination: out of 4,199,375 tons of goods embarked, only 449,225 tons failed to reach their destination, i.e. about 10.5%.

The number of embarked soldiers was 1,266,172, and 23,443 were lost at sea, i.e. 2%: many in absolute terms, of course, but few in relation to the efforts expended.
In light of these numbers, one can unquestionably state that the Merchant Marine amply deserved the Gold Medal for Military Valor awarded to its flag by the President of the Republic, Luigi Einaudi, with his decree of 11 April 1951.
 
Very interesting data, especially on the war cargo losses.
So much about "Malta like totally cut off poow leedle Rommel from supply so he no canna capture New Dehli".
 
Very interesting data, especially on the war cargo losses.
So much about "Malta like totally cut off poow leedle Rommel from supply so he no canna capture New Dehli".
Again context is important. Losses aren't the only factor it is also a function of how much shipping was scared off or forced to divert which meant that even though losses were low supplies were not arriving either on time or returned back to port. Increased turn around time and aborts was a very big problem. In part it was a function of lack of escort vessels as well and in some periods even lack of material to even send. Also you have to considered what periods supplies were actually arriving or not; the last 4 months of 1941 were especially bad for shipping in terms of supplies actually arriving to North Africa due to Malta, but the arrival of the 2nd Air Fleet in 1942 then nearly forced Malta to surrender in September. Lots of nuance in issues like shipping and Malta.
 
Interesting discussion guys. I think the big question might be:
If he doesn't attack Greece - why not as the reason for that would make a difference to events - does he go for Yugoslavia instead as Buba suggested. Its physically bigger true but that might not deter El Duce especially since it can be attacked from both north and south and also is far more politically fragile than Greece.

a) If so the allies definitely benefit, barring unusual butterflies. Italy still consumes a lot of resources, possibly more than OTL, but probably wins eventually. However due to the geographical position its impractical to send any substantial British forces to Yugoslavia so Britain saves a fair amount of forces.

Difficult to say what would happen with N Africa. Possibly the best chance for an early allied victory might have been if the 4th Indian division had been kept in Libya after the early stages of the Compass offensive rather than sent south to help out on Italian East Africa. That was a primary cause of a delay before the offensive resumed and its possible a drive on Tripoli might have worked, possibly in part using Rommel's later method of relying on capturing supplies and equipment from the enemy, especially since this early you might not have time before Mussolini is willing to admit he needs German aid and Hitler agrees to send something. If not then possibly things develop as OTL with the see saw in the desert but without the losses in Greece giving the allies a useful boost. Possibly even with them present and without the wear and tear of the OTL 2nd stage plus the costly distraction in Greece Rommel's initial offensive fails as well.

In this case, if Libya is clear up by summer/early autumn 41 and assuming Churchill doesn't find a way to tie them up elsewhere this could be a huge difference to the Japanese offensive in the winter of 41-42. Especially since Australia will be putting on pressure for some of its units, which will likely now have combat experience, at least to be returned east locations like Malaya could be a lot tougher nuts for the Japanese to crack. A failure in that and hence attacks into Sumatra and possibly Java would greatly change the war in the east, especially since it would probably mean Burma doesn't fall either leaving the Burma road open.

Whether or not this happens the total situation in the Med is a lot better for the allies. Malta is a lot easier to resupply and also probably far less of a target to the Axis as it no longer has great strategic importance so the hugely costly operations to supply it are greatly simplified. This in turn also gives a significant naval and merchant shipping boost.

Once the US is at war then whether Operation Torch still goes ahead I don't know, although it would be a lot easier here with British forces in Tripoli. Might not be thought necessary however unless sat Hitler is seeking to reopen the campaign by pressurising Vichy to allow Axis access to Tunisia. However the options to start invading Italy or at least the islands [Sicily. Sardinia and possibly Corsica] is open although more difficult without Tunisia in allied hands.

If Libya isn't cleared a lot depends on what happens but the allies should anyway be better off without the losses, military, naval and other from the Greece campaign. Libya will still be a sore along with supplying Malta so a lot would depend on the circumstances.

b) If Mussolini doesn't attack Yugoslavia either then that in theory allows for markedly more forces in Libya. However this means a lot of effort shipping them over and then supplying them. All those extra lorries for instance are only worthwhile while they have the fuel and spare parts to keep them operating and unless their able to ship a lot via coastal shipping the long distance from Tripoli to the front will quickly see diminishing returns applying. As such you could see at least the 1st stage of Operation Compass occur simply because most of any additional forces Italy sends are still in the west of the colony and 10th Army is still largely destroyed as OTL.

Here you may still see an additional division or two and possibly some armour, air and naval units additionally sent east as the tensions with Japan grow. However they have less chance to make a massive difference.

This is similar to a) but without Libya being cleared by the allies with distance causing a stalemate in the region albeit probably less mobile as under those circumstances Mussolini is unlikely to call for aid from Germany. The allies have more forces available but so will Italy.

That is largely from the allied point of view. Looking at it from the Axis then they avoid the OTL invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece - unless Mussolini still invades Yugoslavia and then gets stuck and needs German aid. This frees up a few more German forces for the invasion of the USSR and possibly more Italians if Mussolini decides to send more. The attack is unlikely to start any earlier as the primary condition for the OTL date seems to have been the bad weather and resulting flooding but there could be a few more German divisions available. A lot would depend on whether as a result either side make different decisions and if so whether those are for good or ill for their respective sides.

Anyway initial thoughts.
 
No diversion of 12th Army to the Balkans means Army Group South effectively destroys Southwestern Front in Western Ukraine in the opening days of the attack. This also prevents the derailing of Barbarossa around Smolensk, allowing for the capture of Leningrad, Moscow and most of Ukraine in the August-September timeframe. Winter counter-offensives on the Soviet end will either be non-existent or so diminished as to be brushed aside easily as the Germans did for the most part historically until December (Soviet attacks in November were disasters). The only saving move would be for the Soviets to completely deplete the Far East of resources, which basically invites the Kwantung Army in as a result and cut off the Pacific Lend Lease route. In essence, a slow death or a fast one depending on their choices.

With the Soviets knocked out in the 1942 or 1943 timeframe, the Western Allies will elect to make peace even if the U.S. is in because that was the conclusion of American planning.
 
Interesting discussion guys. I think the big question might be:
If he doesn't attack Greece - why not as the reason for that would make a difference to events - does he go for Yugoslavia instead as Buba suggested. Its physically bigger true but that might not deter El Duce especially since it can be attacked from both north and south and also is far more politically fragile than Greece.
Yugoslavia had more than double the population of Greece too. Politically fragile yes, but perhaps not to Italy given that Italy was considered the traditional enemy of the Southern Slavs. In fact in WW1 when possible Southern Slavic troops were used on the Italian Front where they were willing to fight than against other Slavic nations.

a) If so the allies definitely benefit, barring unusual butterflies. Italy still consumes a lot of resources, possibly more than OTL, but probably wins eventually. However due to the geographical position its impractical to send any substantial British forces to Yugoslavia so Britain saves a fair amount of forces.
Assuming Italy goes it alone then yes, but generally speaking they'd be able to take the border region next to Italy pretty easily and likely pull Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria in pretty rapidly once they bogged down.

Difficult to say what would happen with N Africa. Possibly the best chance for an early allied victory might have been if the 4th Indian division had been kept in Libya after the early stages of the Compass offensive rather than sent south to help out on Italian East Africa. That was a primary cause of a delay before the offensive resumed and its possible a drive on Tripoli might have worked, possibly in part using Rommel's later method of relying on capturing supplies and equipment from the enemy, especially since this early you might not have time before Mussolini is willing to admit he needs German aid and Hitler agrees to send something. If not then possibly things develop as OTL with the see saw in the desert but without the losses in Greece giving the allies a useful boost. Possibly even with them present and without the wear and tear of the OTL 2nd stage plus the costly distraction in Greece Rommel's initial offensive fails as well.
Again, per the British official history of the campaign that I quoted above logistics was the issue not necessarily lack of troops. Certainly fresh troops with fresh equipment would have done better but there is only so much that could be done with a lack of supplies in the desert. Captured Italian stuff didn't seem to help.

Also captured Italian and potentially German supplies don't really help with ammo and generally speaking most captured equipment wasn't weapons it was non-combat equipment like trucks to haul supplies and men. And once again the Brits captured a lot of Italian supplies and equipment in Libya IOTL, but they still gassed out logistically before El Agheila (sp?).
Given that the Germans intervened before the Brits started pulling out troops I doubt even without Greece that the Brits would be able to move more quickly than they did historically given the logistical constraints. Kind of hard to attack with British methods without their logistical methods being sorted beforehand (IOTL Compass actually kicked off with building up supply dumps in no-man's-land before the offensive, which is not possible as of February 1941 given the inoperability of Benghazi and Tobruk being 450km away).

Now that said with fresh British/CW troops and equipment it is unlikely that Rommel could advance to Tobruk, let alone the Egyptian border, which sets up a Gazala situation.

Whether or not this happens the total situation in the Med is a lot better for the allies. Malta is a lot easier to resupply and also probably far less of a target to the Axis as it no longer has great strategic importance so the hugely costly operations to supply it are greatly simplified. This in turn also gives a significant naval and merchant shipping boost.
Assuming the Brits hold Benghazi. Malta remained a major target until it was isolated from supply because of how dangerous it was when supplied properly. See the Battle of the Mediterranean in 1941.

Once the US is at war then whether Operation Torch still goes ahead I don't know, although it would be a lot easier here with British forces in Tripoli. Might not be thought necessary however unless sat Hitler is seeking to reopen the campaign by pressurising Vichy to allow Axis access to Tunisia. However the options to start invading Italy or at least the islands [Sicily. Sardinia and possibly Corsica] is open although more difficult without Tunisia in allied hands.
If the Brits clear Libya before then there is no reason to invade North Africa. The US probably gets its way with Operation Roundhammer. Hitler had no interest in trying for Tunisia until after the Allies invaded; he was pretty serious about the peace treaty with Vichy until then because of how many troops it would take to deal with. No way the US allows themselves to be sucked in to the Mediterranean without North Africa still active, as that campaign was mainly to reopen the region to shipping and free up massive amounts of tonnage via a shorter route.

If Libya isn't cleared a lot depends on what happens but the allies should anyway be better off without the losses, military, naval and other from the Greece campaign. Libya will still be a sore along with supplying Malta so a lot would depend on the circumstances.
Agreed.

b) If Mussolini doesn't attack Yugoslavia either then that in theory allows for markedly more forces in Libya. However this means a lot of effort shipping them over and then supplying them. All those extra lorries for instance are only worthwhile while they have the fuel and spare parts to keep them operating and unless their able to ship a lot via coastal shipping the long distance from Tripoli to the front will quickly see diminishing returns applying. As such you could see at least the 1st stage of Operation Compass occur simply because most of any additional forces Italy sends are still in the west of the colony and 10th Army is still largely destroyed as OTL.
Agreed.

Here you may still see an additional division or two and possibly some armour, air and naval units additionally sent east as the tensions with Japan grow. However they have less chance to make a massive difference.
Singapore was a pretty close run thing IOTL.

This is similar to a) but without Libya being cleared by the allies with distance causing a stalemate in the region albeit probably less mobile as under those circumstances Mussolini is unlikely to call for aid from Germany. The allies have more forces available but so will Italy.
Benny the Muss already did once Tobruk fell in January.

That is largely from the allied point of view. Looking at it from the Axis then they avoid the OTL invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece - unless Mussolini still invades Yugoslavia and then gets stuck and needs German aid. This frees up a few more German forces for the invasion of the USSR and possibly more Italians if Mussolini decides to send more. The attack is unlikely to start any earlier as the primary condition for the OTL date seems to have been the bad weather and resulting flooding but there could be a few more German divisions available. A lot would depend on whether as a result either side make different decisions and if so whether those are for good or ill for their respective sides.
From what I remember the invasion of Russia could start about 14 days earlier, so probably 10-12 if they can predict it reasonably accurately. Just enough to make a difference. Without Greece forces would be available much sooner and with considerably less wear and tear. As HL said the 12th army would also be available, with potentially big impacts on the fighting in Ukraine.

Without Greece it is likely that Malta is invaded via air both by Germany and Italy (Italian paratroops were used in Greece and North Africa in 1940-41) coupled with a sea invasion as well. Plus X Fliegerkorps isn't diverted, which seriously screws up Malta's supply lines. The island only staged its OTL revival starting in May 1941 when the German invasion of Greece required that air unit to leave Sicily and leave it to the Italians to deal with (which obviously didn't work out).

So without Crete as an option and North Africa being a going concern Malta might well fall in May 1941.
 
If british take Libia - They would have troops to hold Singapoore. But - It OTL Japaneese attacked british which have numerical advantage,and still won.So,maybe those reinforcments would manage to lost,too.
They lost in the air - but not becouse Japan have big advantage/most of their fighters was obsolate Ki 27/ ,but becouse Churchill send 400 modern fighters to soviets.
Which he could do again.
So,England could manage lost no matter what.

Yugoslavia conqest is another thing.Germans would be no delayed,and take Moscow.With important railway hub.It mean war end in 1942 or 1943.
Unless...Adolf the idiot manage to fuck it anyway.In OTL he was sending tanks from one front to another,and as a result failed to take both Leningrad and Moscow.
Let assume,that he switched tanks again from Moscow to Leningrad.And later to Crimea and Caucasus.Leningrad and Crimea would fall in 1941,but Moscow not.Germany still lost war.
Althought,if Turkey join in 1942,they could end as soviet colony after 1945,just like Poland.
 
Yugoslavia had more than double the population of Greece too. Politically fragile yes, but perhaps not to Italy given that Italy was considered the traditional enemy of the Southern Slavs. In fact in WW1 when possible Southern Slavic troops were used on the Italian Front where they were willing to fight than against other Slavic nations.

Assuming Italy goes it alone then yes, but generally speaking they'd be able to take the border region next to Italy pretty easily and likely pull Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria in pretty rapidly once they bogged down.

Yugoslavia was a mess at this time period with a lot in the north, especially Croats but also possibly Slovaks and others not too friendly to the Serbian monarchy. Also later the Muslims especially supplied forces for Germany. Mind you if the Italians do get bogged down then their likely to pull in other nations that want a slice of the Yugoslav pie and if that fails then Germany.

Again, per the British official history of the campaign that I quoted above logistics was the issue not necessarily lack of troops. Certainly fresh troops with fresh equipment would have done better but there is only so much that could be done with a lack of supplies in the desert. Captured Italian stuff didn't seem to help.

Also captured Italian and potentially German supplies don't really help with ammo and generally speaking most captured equipment wasn't weapons it was non-combat equipment like trucks to haul supplies and men. And once again the Brits captured a lot of Italian supplies and equipment in Libya IOTL, but they still gassed out logistically before El Agheila (sp?).
Given that the Germans intervened before the Brits started pulling out troops I doubt even without Greece that the Brits would be able to move more quickly than they did historically given the logistical constraints. Kind of hard to attack with British methods without their logistical methods being sorted beforehand (IOTL Compass actually kicked off with building up supply dumps in no-man's-land before the offensive, which is not possible as of February 1941 given the inoperability of Benghazi and Tobruk being 450km away).

Now that said with fresh British/CW troops and equipment it is unlikely that Rommel could advance to Tobruk, let alone the Egyptian border, which sets up a Gazala situation.

Logistics is the big issue of course but given the defeat inflicted on the Italian 10th Army Italian morale might have been fragile enough that something could have been done if there had been enough initiative there and Churchill hadn't withdrawn forces for other fronts.

The 1st unit, the 4th Indian was withdrawn from 11th Dec for operation in E Africa and further operations were delayed about a month while its replacement, the 6th Australian was brought up to the front and acclimatized. This was way before any German forces arrived and if things had been pushed forward immediately then the cross desert advance to cut off the retreat from Benghazi, which totally screwed the vehicles involved might possibly have been avoided. Coupled with the withdrawal of other forces as they were sent to Greece this meant that when Rommel made his initial attack he met only relatively weak opposition. Also it helped that he was breaching orders to operate defensively around Tripoli so gained surprise as Ultra readings meant he wasn't expected.

I agree its a long shot but possibly with some amphibious operations to supply forces or land units behind enemy forces its possibly that Hitler might have decided to give up Libya as another Italian failure.


Assuming the Brits hold Benghazi. Malta remained a major target until it was isolated from supply because of how dangerous it was when supplied properly. See the Battle of the Mediterranean in 1941.

True

If the Brits clear Libya before then there is no reason to invade North Africa. The US probably gets its way with Operation Roundhammer. Hitler had no interest in trying for Tunisia until after the Allies invaded; he was pretty serious about the peace treaty with Vichy until then because of how many troops it would take to deal with. No way the US allows themselves to be sucked in to the Mediterranean without North Africa still active, as that campaign was mainly to reopen the region to shipping and free up massive amounts of tonnage via a shorter route.

I think you mean Operation_Sledgehammer, which was the plan the US pushed for late 42, with a suggested follow up in 43 from the occupation of Germany IIRC. This was never really a practical idea without a lot more forces and most of all experience in amphibious assaults, air support, trained forces etc. Even a landing in 43 would have been a very high risk operation. Ignoring again the fact that until pretty much summer 41 the Battle for the Atlantic was still bitterly contested and supplying the forces for such an invasion would be a big issue.

I was thinking that without Tunisia landings in say Sicily or Sardinia would have been distinctly tougher due to lack of ground based air support. Without the landings in Italy an invasion of France is going to be a hell of a lot tougher even assuming no changes in the east since Germany will have more forces available, unless their been tied up in the war against Russia.


Singapore was a pretty close run thing IOTL.

I have heard suggestions that when Percivell informed the Japanese commander he wished to discuss surrender terms they thought he was talking about a Japanese surrender before they were so short of supplies.;) If the forces there had been reinforced by some experience units with modern equipment or even some officers decide to properly train their men for actions in the region things could have been a hell of a lot different.

It needs mainly army and land based air forces, both in Malaya, which is actually more important than just Singapore and to be able to support the Dutch in Java without which Sumatra will fall and Malaya is indefensible. However hold those territories and Japan is gravely weakened and the war in the Far East could end earlier. [Although ironically this could be more costly for the allies if it requires an invasion of Japan!].


Benny the Muss already did once Tobruk fell in January.

Which is why speed is the essence. However if the British advance is also faster that could come earlier.


From what I remember the invasion of Russia could start about 14 days earlier, so probably 10-12 if they can predict it reasonably accurately. Just enough to make a difference. Without Greece forces would be available much sooner and with considerably less wear and tear. As HL said the 12th army would also be available, with potentially big impacts on the fighting in Ukraine.

It can have an impact although how much is unclear. There are still some rivers to cross which could delay matters. Plus without the fighting in Greece even Stalin might finally accept that the massive build up of Axis forces at his borders have hostile intent. ;)

Without Greece it is likely that Malta is invaded via air both by Germany and Italy (Italian paratroops were used in Greece and North Africa in 1940-41) coupled with a sea invasion as well. Plus X Fliegerkorps isn't diverted, which seriously screws up Malta's supply lines. The island only staged its OTL revival starting in May 1941 when the German invasion of Greece required that air unit to leave Sicily and leave it to the Italians to deal with (which obviously didn't work out).

So without Crete as an option and North Africa being a going concern Malta might well fall in May 1941.

Its a possibility although, if we're assuming that Libya doesn't fall and that Italy has more forces to pump into it - if neither Greece or Yugoslavia get attack - possibly no German intervention in the Med at least for a while. After all it was only to rescue the mess Mussolini was making and fascist prestige that Hitler was willing to respond at all, assuming Benny even asks for aid in this scenario.

If Malta does fall then we probably find out how important it actually was for attacking Axis supplies. Have seen it suggested not greatly so as the sheer distance from the only really capable harbour at Tripoli to the front was so great. It would be a morale loss for Britain but might save a lot of ships and other resources spent on the assorted efforts to supply the island.

Steve
 
Yugoslavia was a mess at this time period with a lot in the north, especially Croats but also possibly Slovaks and others not too friendly to the Serbian monarchy. Also later the Muslims especially supplied forces for Germany. Mind you if the Italians do get bogged down then their likely to pull in other nations that want a slice of the Yugoslav pie and if that fails then Germany.
Sure, but anti-Serb monarchy doesn't mean pro-Italian, especially when it means Italy annexing Trieste and the border region.

Logistics is the big issue of course but given the defeat inflicted on the Italian 10th Army Italian morale might have been fragile enough that something could have been done if there had been enough initiative there and Churchill hadn't withdrawn forces for other fronts.
If you read the quotes and article it was not simply a matter of Italian morale, since they basically had no forces left after Beda Fomm. The Brits couldn't keep going for lack of fuel and ammo, not to mention water and food.
Again it was not the lack of forces per the British themselves, though clearly the lack of fresh divisions did enable the serious defeat inflicted by Rommel (and why he attacked before his forces all arrived).

The 1st unit, the 4th Indian was withdrawn from 11th Dec for operation in E Africa and further operations were delayed about a month while its replacement, the 6th Australian was brought up to the front and acclimatized. This was way before any German forces arrived and if things had been pushed forward immediately then the cross desert advance to cut off the retreat from Benghazi, which totally screwed the vehicles involved might possibly have been avoided. Coupled with the withdrawal of other forces as they were sent to Greece this meant that when Rommel made his initial attack he met only relatively weak opposition. Also it helped that he was breaching orders to operate defensively around Tripoli so gained surprise as Ultra readings meant he wasn't expected.
So no change ITTL given that the East African campaign was still ongoing. If anything given the logistics the Brits just shift all their Greece forces to East Africa to wrap that up before November 1941.

Not sure what you mean about the cross desert advance might be avoided. The British did that at Beda Fomm and then starved of supplies due to the lack of use of Benghazi. More fresh forces simply fall into the same problem and perhaps then are able to retreat better, but are still worn down by lack of water, food, ammo, and fuel. Rommel gonna Rommel regardless.

I agree its a long shot but possibly with some amphibious operations to supply forces or land units behind enemy forces its possibly that Hitler might have decided to give up Libya as another Italian failure.
Given the lack of resources at the time, which the book I cited mentions as so bad that zero AAA could be provided to stop Axis bombing of Benghazi, there is unlikely to be such resources even considering the cancelled Greek operation. Part of the reason British forces had such a problem in Greece was the lack of resources to properly sustain them; the Crete defensive operation picked up more later on as I recall.

I think you mean Operation_Sledgehammer, which was the plan the US pushed for late 42, with a suggested follow up in 43 from the occupation of Germany IIRC. This was never really a practical idea without a lot more forces and most of all experience in amphibious assaults, air support, trained forces etc. Even a landing in 43 would have been a very high risk operation. Ignoring again the fact that until pretty much summer 41 the Battle for the Atlantic was still bitterly contested and supplying the forces for such an invasion would be a big issue.
No I meant Roundhammer. It was a combo of operations Sledgehammer and Roundup slated for summer 1943 after the first two were deemed impractical. It was actually not a bad plan and could have worked.

Might be higher risk, but what other option did they have considering that the US only did Torch due to how bad the situation in North Africa was.

I was thinking that without Tunisia landings in say Sicily or Sardinia would have been distinctly tougher due to lack of ground based air support. Without the landings in Italy an invasion of France is going to be a hell of a lot tougher even assuming no changes in the east since Germany will have more forces available, unless their been tied up in the war against Russia.
Yes. Russia might actually fall with the invasion able to start at least 10 days earlier and with more forces. The use of the airborne division (and just as important the air transport arm) is at issue, because if employed in the Mediterranean it would mean the fall of Malta ITTL or if used in the East could well mean the fall of Leningrad in July. So by 1942-43 the entire war could be radically different.

I have heard suggestions that when Percivell informed the Japanese commander he wished to discuss surrender terms they thought he was talking about a Japanese surrender before they were so short of supplies.;) If the forces there had been reinforced by some experience units with modern equipment or even some officers decide to properly train their men for actions in the region things could have been a hell of a lot different.
Indeed.

It needs mainly army and land based air forces, both in Malaya, which is actually more important than just Singapore and to be able to support the Dutch in Java without which Sumatra will fall and Malaya is indefensible. However hold those territories and Japan is gravely weakened and the war in the Far East could end earlier. [Although ironically this could be more costly for the allies if it requires an invasion of Japan!].
Yes, though a less deep Japanese advance would save them a lot of resources. Success had its logistical consequences. Plus it would save millions of Bengalis who wouldn't starve due to the loss of rice production of Burma.
Agreed about the invasion of Japan, my grandfather was to have been part of that.

Which is why speed is the essence. However if the British advance is also faster that could come earlier.
I don't know how it could have been faster than OTL. The Jock columns were pretty reckless as it was and were very lucky the Italians were so demoralized by Beda Fomm. Plus then again the logistics issues.

It can have an impact although how much is unclear. There are still some rivers to cross which could delay matters. Plus without the fighting in Greece even Stalin might finally accept that the massive build up of Axis forces at his borders have hostile intent. ;)
Nah, the invasion of Yugoslavia convinced him the build up was to do with that plus of course there were the direct letters from Hitler that assured him they were there for other reasons as well as various deception operations that had an impact:

Not sure what rivers you were referring to, they were back to normal size two weeks before the invasion; the Greek invasion did delay moving the necessary divisions back into place, plus of course resulted in the British sinking the majority of the panzers of the 2nd and 5th panzer divisions as they tried to ship out of Greece back to Italy. So they only were refitted and ready in September and only showed up in combat IOTL in October as part of Typhoon.

Its a possibility although, if we're assuming that Libya doesn't fall and that Italy has more forces to pump into it - if neither Greece or Yugoslavia get attack - possibly no German intervention in the Med at least for a while. After all it was only to rescue the mess Mussolini was making and fascist prestige that Hitler was willing to respond at all, assuming Benny even asks for aid in this scenario.
Could well be. No Rommel in Africa and more Italian armored divisions instead and perhaps a stalemate at El Agheila. Though the Luftwaffe might be requested to help with Malta since that could be fatal to the Italian effort in Libya.

If Malta does fall then we probably find out how important it actually was for attacking Axis supplies. Have seen it suggested not greatly so as the sheer distance from the only really capable harbour at Tripoli to the front was so great. It would be a morale loss for Britain but might save a lot of ships and other resources spent on the assorted efforts to supply the island.
Certainly the British would save resources without Malta, but thanks to ULTRA they understood how important it was, which is why they spent insane resources defending it. It was also a massive resource sink for the Axis too even disregarding the convoy issue.
 
Bit short on time so could miss points. Apologies in advance.

Sure, but anti-Serb monarchy doesn't mean pro-Italian, especially when it means Italy annexing Trieste and the border region.

Yes but it does mean their not that supportive of Belgrade and many did side with the Axis occupation.


If you read the quotes and article it was not simply a matter of Italian morale, since they basically had no forces left after Beda Fomm. The Brits couldn't keep going for lack of fuel and ammo, not to mention water and food.
Again it was not the lack of forces per the British themselves, though clearly the lack of fresh divisions did enable the serious defeat inflicted by Rommel (and why he attacked before his forces all arrived).

The delay after the 1st battle of the borders was due to the transfer of the 4th Indian and the transfer of forces to Greece meant the army in the western desert was weakened prior to Rommel's initial attack.

So no change ITTL given that the East African campaign was still ongoing. If anything given the logistics the Brits just shift all their Greece forces to East Africa to wrap that up before November 1941.

Not really. Even if that had happened, which was substantially more than what was sent to E Africa OTL its unlikely that a large proportion of that force's manpower and even more of its equipment would have been lost. Not to mention the naval losses covering the evacuation of Greece and then the attempt to defend Crete.

Not sure what you mean about the cross desert advance might be avoided. The British did that at Beda Fomm and then starved of supplies due to the lack of use of Benghazi. More fresh forces simply fall into the same problem and perhaps then are able to retreat better, but are still worn down by lack of water, food, ammo, and fuel. Rommel gonna Rommel regardless.

The Beda Fomm advance was what I meant. The advance through the rough terrain did considerable damage to the forces equipment and given the higher priority given to Greece a lot of that wasn't made up before Rommel's attack.


Given the lack of resources at the time, which the book I cited mentions as so bad that zero AAA could be provided to stop Axis bombing of Benghazi, there is unlikely to be such resources even considering the cancelled Greek operation. Part of the reason British forces had such a problem in Greece was the lack of resources to properly sustain them; the Crete defensive operation picked up more later on as I recall.

That is definitely a problem along with all the equipment and men lost. There was no real time to pick things up in Crete as the campaign there was so short.

No I meant Roundhammer. It was a combo of operations Sledgehammer and Roundup slated for summer 1943 after the first two were deemed impractical. It was actually not a bad plan and could have worked.

Never heard of that before. It would have been very risky given the lack of experience of a lot of the forces, not just the US ones and the worse strategic position without N Africa being cleared and Italy largely removed from the war.

Might be higher risk, but what other option did they have considering that the US only did Torch due to how bad the situation in North Africa was.

Operations where they could be more easily supported and Germany would have struggled more to send aid such as in Italy and the Balkans. ;)

Yes. Russia might actually fall with the invasion able to start at least 10 days earlier and with more forces. The use of the airborne division (and just as important the air transport arm) is at issue, because if employed in the Mediterranean it would mean the fall of Malta ITTL or if used in the East could well mean the fall of Leningrad in July. So by 1942-43 the entire war could be radically different.

Its a possibility.


Yes, though a less deep Japanese advance would save them a lot of resources. Success had its logistical consequences. Plus it would save millions of Bengalis who wouldn't starve due to the loss of rice production of Burma.
Agreed about the invasion of Japan, my grandfather was to have been part of that.

Agree about the last two points. Without the resources of the south Japan has a lost less assets to play with. Plus keeping Burma means a lot more supplies reach China. Japan has easier access to a Guadalcanal type campaign somewhere in the DEI says but its still a losing attrictional war once the allies get their act together.


I don't know how it could have been faster than OTL. The Jock columns were pretty reckless as it was and were very lucky the Italians were so demoralized by Beda Fomm. Plus then again the logistics issues.

Logistics is the big issue but possibly being able to hit the Italians harder earlier and before German aid could apply might have helped.

Nah, the invasion of Yugoslavia convinced him the build up was to do with that plus of course there were the direct letters from Hitler that assured him they were there for other reasons as well as various deception operations that had an impact:

Not sure what you mean here? If there's no invasion then there's no excuse for the massive military build up on the Soviet border.

Not sure what rivers you were referring to, they were back to normal size two weeks before the invasion; the Greek invasion did delay moving the necessary divisions back into place, plus of course resulted in the British sinking the majority of the panzers of the 2nd and 5th panzer divisions as they tried to ship out of Greece back to Italy. So they only were refitted and ready in September and only showed up in combat IOTL in October as part of Typhoon.

The rivers are still there and OTL IIRC the southern part of the front didn't collapse until after the massive encirclement at Kiev?


Could well be. No Rommel in Africa and more Italian armored divisions instead and perhaps a stalemate at El Agheila. Though the Luftwaffe might be requested to help with Malta since that could be fatal to the Italian effort in Libya.

Possibly.

Certainly the British would save resources without Malta, but thanks to ULTRA they understood how important it was, which is why they spent insane resources defending it. It was also a massive resource sink for the Axis too even disregarding the convoy issue.

It was seen as very important although as we're said there are arguments on that. It was also politically very important. I think relatively less Axis resources were involved, largely Italian, than British and allied.
 
1 - Triest and Istria were Italian since 1920
2 - most historians quoted on boards like this support the view that the operations i9n the Balkans had no impact on Barbarossa launch date. In an invasion of such scale the lack of a few divisions recovering from Yugoslavia/Greece is irrelevant.
 

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