Italy doesn't invade Greece in 1940

[sillygoose]

1 - Triest and Istria were Italian since 1920

I misremembered the region, turns out it was Ljubljana:

Province of Ljubljana - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Trieste and Istria were were the Slovenes and Croats were deported after Italian annexation in the 1920s:

Julian March - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Seems the Slovenes and Croats had a resistance movement in that area from the 1920s right up until 1941:

TIGR - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

2 - most historians quoted on boards like this support the view that the operations i9n the Balkans had no impact on Barbarossa launch date. In an invasion of such scale the lack of a few divisions recovering from Yugoslavia/Greece is irrelevant.

Those historians don't know the basic facts then, which isn't surprising given the state of pop history. For one thing two of the best panzer divisions losing their equipment and being out of action for several months, the diversion of the 12th army entirely, massive aircraft losses in Greece, several divisions locked down in occupation in Greece or shattered by losses (paratroops), wear and tear on equipment, etc. all played major roles in Barbarossa being delayed. VIII Fliegerkorps, Richthofen's unit, which was instrumental in supporting Army Group Center, was worn out and not even fully in place on June 22nd due to the Crete operation, all of which had an impact. The late thaw was a factor, but as stated before the US army monograph on the Balkan campaign stated that cleared up by the 10th of June at the latest.

PART FIVE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CAMPAIGNS IN THE BALKANS AND

history.army.mil

Even before the German victories in Yugoslavia and Greece had been fully achieved, some of the units had to be redeployed to Germany to be refitted in time for Operation BARBAROSSA. Some of the corps headquarters, GHQ units, and, above all, the mechanized divisions committed in the Yugoslav campaign were indispensable for the start of the invasion of Russia. In some instances units were stopped in mid-action and redeployed to the zone of interior. Because of the poor roads and defective railways in the Balkans, these movements interfered with the smooth execution of the military operations.

Actually, only part of the delay was caused by the campaigns in the Balkans. Operation BARBAROSSA could not possibly have started on 15 May because spring came late in 1941. As late as the beginning of June the Polish-Russian river valleys were still flooded and partly impassable as a result of exceptionally heavy rains

Since a date wasn't given I assumed June 10th to be safe, but technically this could actually mean it was clear enough to invade on June 5th or earlier.
However in terms of the disruptions of the Balkan operations:

As early as 27 March Hitler estimated that the campaign against Yugoslavia would delay the invasion by about four weeks. This estimate was based on the diversion of forces for the assembly against Yugoslavia. Headquarters staffs, divisions, and GHQ units that were on the way to the concentration areas for Operation BARBAROSSA or whose departure was imminent had to be diverted. Those units had to be replaced by others whose departure was delayed because they were not ready for commitment. However, of the two corps headquarters and nine divisions that were diverted to the Yugoslav campaign, all but three infantry divisions were replaced from the Army High Command reserves by the time Operation BARBAROSSA got under way.

Another factor considered in calculating the delay was that all. units, in particular the armored and motorized infantry divisions, would have to be refitted after the Balkan campaigns. This rehabilitation, which was estimated to take a minimum of three weeks for the mobile Units, had to be performed within Germany in the vicinity of major repair shops and spare parts depots.

So assuming that it is 4 weeks delay due to only the Yugoslav invasion then that puts us at June 12th, which per the above quote would mean they could go ahead on that date and gain and extra 10 days of decent weather before the rains hit in October. That would be enough to take Moscow assuming all else remained the same. Given that an earlier invasion would be better prepared against a less prepared Soviet force if anything the invasion would do considerably better. There is History Learner's scenario with the 12th army and one that could happen around Leningrad with the air transport arm and 7th fallschirmjager available.

Edit:

https://history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-21/cmhPub_104-21.pdf

starting page 27 they talk about the role of the 12th army.

Bit short on time so could miss points. Apologies in advance.

No worries.

Yes but it does mean their not that supportive of Belgrade and many did side with the Axis occupation.

With the Germans an everyone else involved. As I cited above the Slovenes and Croats, the exact groups Italy would need against the Serbs, actually had a resistance group since the 1920s due to the Italian deportations of their people in areas gained in the Julian March. Plus the Italian occupation of the province of Ljubljana generated considerable resistance.

IOTL the Germans were the ones able to pick apart Yugoslavia for a variety of reasons:

Invasion of Yugoslavia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Reasons the Italians wouldn't likely be able to replicate.

The delay after the 1st battle of the borders was due to the transfer of the 4th Indian and the transfer of forces to Greece meant the army in the western desert was weakened prior to Rommel's initial attack.

The delay was due to logistics being unable to sustain the advance. Rommel's offensive was a separate issue after the transfers out were complete. Certainly Rommel wouldn't do as well if there were no diversion of forces, but that doesn't mean the British could sustain their advance.

Not really. Even if that had happened, which was substantially more than what was sent to E Africa OTL its unlikely that a large proportion of that force's manpower and even more of its equipment would have been lost. Not to mention the naval losses covering the evacuation of Greece and then the attempt to defend Crete.

Oh, I meant no change in the sense of the Indian divisions being dispatched and not available in Libya. I didn't assume casualties for the British would be anywhere near as large as in Greece with more forces, if anything overall probably a savings over OTL's East African campaign due to more forces wrapping that campaign up sooner. Which would mean more British forces for North Africa sooner. Considerably more than OTL.

The Beda Fomm advance was what I meant. The advance through the rough terrain did considerable damage to the forces equipment and given the higher priority given to Greece a lot of that wasn't made up before Rommel's attack.

Beda Fomm is going to happen to matter what, it is just a question of whether that equipment gets replaced in time before Rommel attacks.

That is definitely a problem along with all the equipment and men lost. There was no real time to pick things up in Crete as the campaign there was so short.

My reference to Crete was that the AAA that they had their was in part Greek, but also later arriving gear that wouldn't have been available before Rommel attacked to help defend Benghazi.

Never heard of that before. It would have been very risky given the lack of experience of a lot of the forces, not just the US ones and the worse strategic position without N Africa being cleared and Italy largely removed from the war.

True, but the US commanders were dead set on it. FDR eventually sided with Churchill, but IIRC it was Rommel's invasion of Egypt that ultimately decided the issue for him, plus of course the need to support Stalin ASAP to keep him in the war.
Assuming it went ahead yes it would have been much worse than the historical Normandy invasion.

Operations where they could be more easily supported and Germany would have struggled more to send aid such as in Italy and the Balkans.

Sending aid to Italy wasn't a problem and until you can deal with the Aegean and Italy the Balkans is out.

Agree about the last two points. Without the resources of the south Japan has a lost less assets to play with. Plus keeping Burma means a lot more supplies reach China. Japan has easier access to a Guadalcanal type campaign somewhere in the DEI says but its still a losing attrictional war once the allies get their act together.

How many of those resources did they actually get though? From what I can find due to transportation shortages and the damage to the DEI oil fields and loss of Japanese engineers in a sub attack they were really only able to use resources locally, not back in Japan.

Yes without a doubt the Burma road being open helps the Chinese quite a lot, though I'm not sure what that actually translates to in the field. How soon could the Allies actually sustain a fight around the DEI though? They'd certainly have to hold Malaya for that to be an option.

Logistics is the big issue but possibly being able to hit the Italians harder earlier and before German aid could apply might have helped.

Again, how without fuel and ammo?

Not sure what you mean here? If there's no invasion then there's no excuse for the massive military build up on the Soviet border.

There still would be the invasion of Yugoslavia. Even if Italy were to invade early it is highly unlikely they'd be able to take it down on their own given that the couldn't even do that with the much smaller Greece (with less than half the population).

The rivers are still there and OTL IIRC the southern part of the front didn't collapse until after the massive encirclement at Kiev?

The Uman pocket happened west of the Dniepr, so the border forces were chased down there; the Kiev forces were largely the 2nd echelon and only had time to fully mobilize due to the delay caused by the 12th army not being available to pincer forces at the border, so they were able to slip away until Uman.

Check HL's post about the 12th army that was diverted to Greece, that should explain the situation in Ukraine. The rivers are still there, but only the Dniepr was a significant obstacle.

It was seen as very important although as we're said there are arguments on that. It was also politically very important. I think relatively less Axis resources were involved, largely Italian, than British and allied.

Proportionally the Axis resources committed where considerably higher as the UK+US had a lot more to invest.

 

[stevep]

With the Germans an everyone else involved. As I cited above the Slovenes and Croats, the exact groups Italy would need against the Serbs, actually had a resistance group since the 1920s due to the Italian deportations of their people in areas gained in the Julian March. Plus the Italian occupation of the province of Ljubljana generated considerable resistance.

IOTL the Germans were the ones able to pick apart Yugoslavia for a variety of reasons:

Invasion of Yugoslavia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Reasons the Italians wouldn't likely be able to replicate.

What things are you thinking of particularly? I know they had a far more effective air force and armour than the Italians but the basic flaws in Yugoslav, with gross shortages of supplies and equipment and the internal political conflicts already existed.

The delay was due to logistics being unable to sustain the advance. Rommel's offensive was a separate issue after the transfers out were complete. Certainly Rommel wouldn't do as well if there were no diversion of forces, but that doesn't mean the British could sustain their advance.

The withdrawal of about half the combat force and its replacement by a new unit unacclimatised to the region was definitely a factor.

Oh, I meant no change in the sense of the Indian divisions being dispatched and not available in Libya. I didn't assume casualties for the British would be anywhere near as large as in Greece with more forces, if anything overall probably a savings over OTL's East African campaign due to more forces wrapping that campaign up sooner. Which would mean more British forces for North Africa sooner. Considerably more than OTL.

OK

Beda Fomm is going to happen to matter what, it is just a question of whether that equipment gets replaced in time before Rommel attacks.

That depends on whether its necessary for a cross country advance through very rough terrain to cut off the retreating Italians or where they can be mopped up from the rear. With the advantage that Britain had that its forces were totally motorised the latter should also have been a possibility in different circumstances.

True, but the US commanders were dead set on it. FDR eventually sided with Churchill, but IIRC it was Rommel's invasion of Egypt that ultimately decided the issue for him, plus of course the need to support Stalin ASAP to keep him in the war.
Assuming it went ahead yes it would have been much worse than the historical Normandy invasion.

I know the initial 42 plans were pushed by FDR for political reasons although can see the US army fully on-line by 43. However were there the forces available in 43? I know there weren't in 42. Especially with the Axis in N Africa which ties down a lot of British forces.

I do recall reading that part of the reason why Torch went ahead was because once the US accepted that an invasion of France in 42 was impossible they wanted to be seen to be doing something against the Germans, especially to mollify Stalin.

Sending aid to Italy wasn't a problem and until you can deal with the Aegean and Italy the Balkans is out.

The Agean is no great problem by 43 if the US is willing to support operations there. Sicily and other areas more difficult to take without Tunisia but may be possible. Would probably go for Sardinia 1st through. Remember as well that Operation Mincemeat succeeded in part because Hitler at least expected the primary attack would go against Greece.

How many of those resources did they actually get though? From what I can find due to transportation shortages and the damage to the DEI oil fields and loss of Japanese engineers in a sub attack they were really only able to use resources locally, not back in Japan.

Yes without a doubt the Burma road being open helps the Chinese quite a lot, though I'm not sure what that actually translates to in the field. How soon could the Allies actually sustain a fight around the DEI though? They'd certainly have to hold Malaya for that to be an option.

Quite a lot early on as the allies had relatively little to intercept them. British subs had been drawn into the Med battle - which might be another big advantage once N Africa was cleared and the US had their torpedo problems.

Later on it was more serious but that was one reason why much of the IJN fleet relocated to Singapore, to be near to the fuel supplies that couldn't reliably be shipped back to Japan.

Again, how without fuel and ammo?

Well with a weaker resource base the Axis got to El Alemein in 42.

Proportionally the Axis resources committed where considerably higher as the UK+US had a lot more to invest.

From late 42 onward yes but before that definitely the drain on British/Commonwealth resources and the RN especially was very heavy.

 

[sillygoose]

What things are you thinking of particularly? I know they had a far more effective air force and armour than the Italians but the basic flaws in Yugoslav, with gross shortages of supplies and equipment and the internal political conflicts already existed.

In every way. Starting with politically the Italians were at a massive disadvantage due to their actions in the Julian March, the Slovene-Croat resistance to Italy after the deportations, and the Italian annexationist plans. They went in to the conflict without allies within Yugoslavia, while Germany, having been kicked out of any territory in the region and having a large ethnic minority in country, plus relatively favorable relationships with the Croats and IIRC Slovenes in part due to how the Italians and Serbs had treated them and the only nearby great power that could get them independence, was viewed much more favorably. Plus given that the Serb officer class had been the ones to initiate the revolt against the alliance with Germany naturally that meant their internal foes would side with the enemy of the Serb leadership; enemy of my enemy is my friend type thinking.

Militarily in every conceivable way the Germans were superior to the Italians at this time. The Italians of course later caught up to a point once they started correcting their deficiencies in training/doctrine/leadership and learning from working with the Germans, but that would only come later.

The Yugoslavs were a much more powerful enemy than the Greeks despite all their deficiencies and unlike the Germans the Italians didn't have the support of the Croats and Slovenes against Belgrade.

The withdrawal of about half the combat force and its replacement by a new unit unacclimatised to the region was definitely a factor.

Leaving worn out units in place would have been worse. It was more about replacing the worn out equipment as well, but the logistical issue of having to supply the advance from Tobruk, 450km away from the front, meant any further advance even to more defensible ground wasn't possible until Benghazi was opened.

That depends on whether its necessary for a cross country advance through very rough terrain to cut off the retreating Italians or where they can be mopped up from the rear. With the advantage that Britain had that its forces were totally motorised the latter should also have been a possibility in different circumstances.

They were mopped up from the rear thanks to the cross desert advance; if they didn't do that then the Italians escape to link up with their forces and reinforcements further west and the British then are facing many more Italians than they would otherwise have faced, plus they don't capture all that Italian equipment and supplies.

How could they possibly have mopped them up from the rear without cutting off their retreat?

I know the initial 42 plans were pushed by FDR for political reasons although can see the US army fully on-line by 43. However were there the forces available in 43? I know there weren't in 42. Especially with the Axis in N Africa which ties down a lot of British forces.

Yes, the forces were available in 1942 if the Pacific advance wasn't launched at the same time; the issue was shipping not lack of forces. Sure quality of training would have been an issue as we saw in the opening battles of Tunisia, though in that case it was just as much a problem of advance too far too fast and meeting the more experienced Germans and Italians close to their supply centers and air bases.

In 1943 they were certainly there, as Italy was successfully invaded by a massive force. The big issue there was the Allied forces were far too timid and let the Germans get away; had they not done that Italy could have fallen MUCH sooner. The 8th army wasn't necessary for the invasion of France in 1943; the British 1st army was ready to go and with another US army they would have had enough to accomplish Roundhammer, which was a pincering of the Cotentin Peninsula and opening of Cherbourg first before they could build up and eventually go for a breakout. Yes casualties would be heavy, but it would bring the Germans to battle much sooner and let the Allied material advantage, especially in naval gunfire support as well as proximity to British air fields, play out. Attrition was inevitable and tying down large German reserves in France in 1943 while the Soviets launched their summer offensives would have put a heavy strain on the Germans. It comes at an opportunity cost, though on balance it might save casualties relative to the Mediterranean strategy, especially if the eventual defeat of the Axis in France prompted Italy to switch sides and collapsed Axis positions all over the Mediterranean overnight. Assuming all went well that is.

At worst they just have an analogue of the Italian campaign in France, but now much closer to their main bases and production centers.

I do recall reading that part of the reason why Torch went ahead was because once the US accepted that an invasion of France in 42 was impossible they wanted to be seen to be doing something against the Germans, especially to mollify Stalin.

Impossible at the same time as the Pacific operations, but Torch could have been launched against Britanny instead if desired in November 1942. FDR decided based on pressure by Churchill and Roosevelt's feeling that the political side of things was most important; plus it looked like an easy victory to land behind Rommel's forces while he was pinned down in Egypt. It was not thought that the Axis could make a stand like that in Tunisia.

The Agean is no great problem by 43 if the US is willing to support operations there. Sicily and other areas more difficult to take without Tunisia but may be possible. Would probably go for Sardinia 1st through. Remember as well that Operation Mincemeat succeeded in part because Hitler at least expected the primary attack would go against Greece.

The historical Aegean campaign says otherwise; remember that without the alternative, that is operations against North Africa/Italy then the landings in the Aegean would meet a LOT more Axis resources. That's not to say it couldn't be done, but the cost would be pretty heavy, much heavier than the historical operations and then that only gets you into Greece, which is easily cut off while Italy is still a major flank threat. The Balkan option is a worse version of Italy and despite what Churchill thought Turkey wasn't going to join in an help, nor were the Bulgarians going to switch sides that quickly and easily.

As to Sicily trying to invade without land based airpower to help it not a good idea, especially without the attrition imposed on the Axis in Tunisia first. OTL Sicily saw the Germans and Italians so badly worn down that the average Italian division was reduced to 1/4th the effectiveness of an Allied division due to equipment and trained manpower losses. For the Germans they were down to 1/2 the effectiveness for the same reason.

Sardinia was IIRC one of the options for direct attack instead of North Africa, but again the same issues apply, but not quite as badly, though Axis Sicilian bases would be able to support forces in Sardinia.

Mincemeat was overblown and I can actually find little reference to support claims of the diversion of Axis resources to Greece; forces that were sent were more to deal with the increasing partisan problem and unreliability of the Italians after the North African defeat. British wishful thinking.

Well with a weaker resource base the Axis got to El Alemein in 42.

The British in 1941 are not as good as Rommel's forces...see 1941 as an example; despite overwhelming forces the British got kicked back to Egypt and if not for Malta might have been defeated in Egypt in 1941.

From late 42 onward yes but before that definitely the drain on British/Commonwealth resources and the RN especially was very heavy.

Where else were the CW/British fighting in 1941? They had resources to burn compared to the Axis, who were fighting a life and death struggle with 70% of their total resources in Russia. In fact the diversion of 2nd air fleet away from Moscow in November 1941 left AG-Center with only 8 operational aircraft to support them by December, just in time for the Soviet counteroffensive. 2nd air fleet was sent to the Mediterranean to bomb Malta in January 1942 after refitting in November-December 1941 in Germany.

 

[bintananth]

Two major issues the Axis would have when to trying send larger forces to North Africa than they historically did:

Port Capacity: they didn't have enough to fully supply the troops they did send historically ... hence Rommel's reliance on captured supplies.

Protecting the ships going to and from those ports. IIRC, Italy managed to complete a mere seven new destroyers between their DOW and surrender. Those are the bread-and-butter of escort duty and each one Italy lost was effectively irreplaceable (Japan and Germany weren't much better in this regard).

On the Eastern Front: Barbarossa not being delayed probably does not change much of anything. The Axis would have advanced a bit further due to the extra two weeks of offensives.

They'd have been just as poorly prepared for the Russian Winter ... if not in worse shape due to an extra two-three weeks of offensive wear-and-tear plus supply lines even longer than the overstretched ones they already faced.

Remember: Axis logistical planning sucked on a good day and far too frequently amounted "eh, we'll manage, somehow".

 

[BlackDragon98]

Protecting the ships going to and from those ports. IIRC, Italy managed to complete a mere seven new destroyers between their DOW and surrender. Those are the bread-and-butter of escort duty and each one Italy lost was effectively irreplaceable (Japan and Germany weren't much better in this regard).

On the subject of the Regia Marina . . .

One of the worst Italian decisions was not to withdraw the entire Red Sea Flotilla back to the Med (around the Cape of course because the Suez is closed after 1939).

7 destroyers, 5 MAS boats, 8 modern submarines, a decently armed sub tender, 2 gunboats, 2 torpedo boats, a minelayer, two good (purpose built) auxiliary cruisers and a hospital ship.

All eventually sunk, destroyed, or captured over the course of the East African Campaign with little tangible effect against the British. Only 4 sub made it to Bordeaux after they fled the port of Massawa when shit hit the fan.

What a waste.

 

[bintananth]

On the subject of the Regia Marina . . .

One of the worst Italian decisions was not to withdraw the entire Red Sea Flotilla back to the Med (around the Cape of course because the Suez is closed after 1939).

7 destroyers, 5 MAS boats, 8 modern submarines, a decently armed sub tender, 2 gunboats, 2 torpedo boats, a minelayer, two good (purpose built) auxiliary cruisers and a hospital ship.

All eventually sunk, destroyed, or captured over the course of the East African Campaign with little tangible effect against the British. Only 4 sub made it to Bordeaux after they fled the port of Massawa when shit hit the fan.

What a waste.

That's not quite as bad as the Italian reluctance to adopt radar, sonar, and rockets. The Italian powers-that-were thought they were expensive novelty toys of little value despite Italy having an early lead on both radar and rocketry*.

The Brits, OTOH, went "Those are neat. Please sir, can I have some more?"

* John D. Clark's book Ignition! mentions some pre-WWII Italian rocket research that was pretty sophisticated for its time.

 

[stevep]

In every way. Starting with politically the Italians were at a massive disadvantage due to their actions in the Julian March, the Slovene-Croat resistance to Italy after the deportations, and the Italian annexationist plans. They went in to the conflict without allies within Yugoslavia, while Germany, having been kicked out of any territory in the region and having a large ethnic minority in country, plus relatively favorable relationships with the Croats and IIRC Slovenes in part due to how the Italians and Serbs had treated them and the only nearby great power that could get them independence, was viewed much more favorably. Plus given that the Serb officer class had been the ones to initiate the revolt against the alliance with Germany naturally that meant their internal foes would side with the enemy of the Serb leadership; enemy of my enemy is my friend type thinking.

Militarily in every conceivable way the Germans were superior to the Italians at this time. The Italians of course later caught up to a point once they started correcting their deficiencies in training/doctrine/leadership and learning from working with the Germans, but that would only come later.

The Yugoslavs were a much more powerful enemy than the Greeks despite all their deficiencies and unlike the Germans the Italians didn't have the support of the Croats and Slovenes against Belgrade.

Yet they did have contacts with the Croatian fascists especially and there was deep resentment of Serbian domination of the state in many areas. I agree that Germany was much strong but could see Mussolini being confident he could take out Yugoslavia just as he was about Greece.

Leaving worn out units in place would have been worse. It was more about replacing the worn out equipment as well, but the logistical issue of having to supply the advance from Tobruk, 450km away from the front, meant any further advance even to more defensible ground wasn't possible until Benghazi was opened.

Except that the unit wasn't worn out, hence its withdrawal to fight in E Africa. Leaving worn out units in place was pretty much what Britain did after the final stages including Beda Fomm had occcurred. Not what I'm talking about after the initial border battles. After all the British did advance to take Benghazi.

They were mopped up from the rear thanks to the cross desert advance; if they didn't do that then the Italians escape to link up with their forces and reinforcements further west and the British then are facing many more Italians than they would otherwise have faced, plus they don't capture all that Italian equipment and supplies.

How could they possibly have mopped them up from the rear without cutting off their retreat?

As I said the British forces were fully motorised while many of the Italians weren't. Which also has the advantage of controlling the battle field so while Italian motoerised units may escape in part anything that is caught up or breaks down during the retreat won't.

Yes, the forces were available in 1942 if the Pacific advance wasn't launched at the same time; the issue was shipping not lack of forces. Sure quality of training would have been an issue as we saw in the opening battles of Tunisia, though in that case it was just as much a problem of advance too far too fast and meeting the more experienced Germans and Italians close to their supply centers and air bases.

Actually I don't think they were. The US deployed relatively few ground units to the Pacific in this period and Britain, which was expected to carry the majority of the burden would have been heavily outnumbered. See Operation_Sledgehammer for details. Plus as the link says there simply wasn't the air support and experience at amphibious landings as well as the experience of many of the units. Nor a secure supply line to Britain at this stage.

In 1943 they were certainly there, as Italy was successfully invaded by a massive force. The big issue there was the Allied forces were far too timid and let the Germans get away; had they not done that Italy could have fallen MUCH sooner. The 8th army wasn't necessary for the invasion of France in 1943; the British 1st army was ready to go and with another US army they would have had enough to accomplish Roundhammer, which was a pincering of the Cotentin Peninsula and opening of Cherbourg first before they could build up and eventually go for a breakout. Yes casualties would be heavy, but it would bring the Germans to battle much sooner and let the Allied material advantage, especially in naval gunfire support as well as proximity to British air fields, play out. Attrition was inevitable and tying down large German reserves in France in 1943 while the Soviets launched their summer offensives would have put a heavy strain on the Germans. It comes at an opportunity cost, though on balance it might save casualties relative to the Mediterranean strategy, especially if the eventual defeat of the Axis in France prompted Italy to switch sides and collapsed Axis positions all over the Mediterranean overnight. Assuming all went well that is.

At worst they just have an analogue of the Italian campaign in France, but now much closer to their main bases and production centers.


Impossible at the same time as the Pacific operations, but Torch could have been launched against Britanny instead if desired in November 1942. FDR decided based on pressure by Churchill and Roosevelt's feeling that the political side of things was most important; plus it looked like an easy victory to land behind Rommel's forces while he was pinned down in Egypt. It was not thought that the Axis could make a stand like that in Tunisia.

I don't know if the allied forces were too timid as the terrain favoured the defender and a lot of the German forces especially were mobile but more could have been done both in early 43 and later to have sped things up.

The down side of a 43 invasion of France without the clearing of N Africa and Italy is that the Axis have a hell of a lot more forces available. Plus British units will be tied up in Egypt if only in defence of the country. Coupled with while forces and resources are considerably greater than in 42 their still markedly less than what was available in 44.

The big issue in the Axis making a stand was not only the rapid response by Germany, which however possibly came at a heavy cost in the east, but also that the US was too cautious in objecting to British plans for landings further east. That could have doomed Rommel and his forces a lot quicker, although it would have meant a much smaller force being captured as the Germans wouldn't have sent the OTL reinforcements.

The historical Aegean campaign says otherwise; remember that without the alternative, that is operations against North Africa/Italy then the landings in the Aegean would meet a LOT more Axis resources. That's not to say it couldn't be done, but the cost would be pretty heavy, much heavier than the historical operations and then that only gets you into Greece, which is easily cut off while Italy is still a major flank threat. The Balkan option is a worse version of Italy and despite what Churchill thought Turkey wasn't going to join in an help, nor were the Bulgarians going to switch sides that quickly and easily.

I did say if the US was willing to support rather than opposing the operation. Plus the limited logistics of the region means its more difficult for Germany to reinforce and supply a fighting force there while the partisans in both Yugoslavia and Greece further complicate the Axis position.

Also Greek opens up a wider front, rather than the narrow one supplied by Italy, which is further restricted by the central mountain range. Not sure whether Bulgaria would be that hard to swing if it looked like the allies were winning as they switched to the Soviets pretty quickly, despite the much greater social and political differences. Quite possibly Romania would have at least wanted to follow if the alternative was Soviet occupation. Agree that Churchill was too optimistic about the Turks joining the conflict although if they could be swung in earlier than they did OTL it would have eased L-L to the Soviets.

As to Sicily trying to invade without land based airpower to help it not a good idea, especially without the attrition imposed on the Axis in Tunisia first. OTL Sicily saw the Germans and Italians so badly worn down that the average Italian division was reduced to 1/4th the effectiveness of an Allied division due to equipment and trained manpower losses. For the Germans they were down to 1/2 the effectiveness for the same reason.

Sardinia was IIRC one of the options for direct attack instead of North Africa, but again the same issues apply, but not quite as badly, though Axis Sicilian bases would be able to support forces in Sardinia.

Mincemeat was overblown and I can actually find little reference to support claims of the diversion of Axis resources to Greece; forces that were sent were more to deal with the increasing partisan problem and unreliability of the Italians after the North African defeat. British wishful thinking.

That;s why I wonder if the allies, if Libya had somehow been cleared earlier - and I agree its a bloody tough one - might still have gone for something like Torch to get French N Africa.

The British in 1941 are not as good as Rommel's forces...see 1941 as an example; despite overwhelming forces the British got kicked back to Egypt and if not for Malta might have been defeated in Egypt in 1941.

Are you thinking of 42 rather than 41? The initial forces as well as being caught by surprise were pretty run down and had suffered from priority going to Greece. Plus losing O'Connor so earlier was a definite blow, both in terms of experience and morale. It was in 42 that the Axis inflicted more serious defeats, in part again because attention had been switched east to the Japanese threat - with the advance to the El Alemien choke point.

Where else were the CW/British fighting in 1941? They had resources to burn compared to the Axis, who were fighting a life and death struggle with 70% of their total resources in Russia. In fact the diversion of 2nd air fleet away from Moscow in November 1941 left AG-Center with only 8 operational aircraft to support them by December, just in time for the Soviet counteroffensive. 2nd air fleet was sent to the Mediterranean to bomb Malta in January 1942 after refitting in November-December 1941 in Germany.

I was referring to 42-43 when Britain was occupied on multiple fronts. Even if 41 the pressure in the Atlantic and de-facto closing of the Med meant that relatively little strength could be sent to N Africa quickly. Not helped by Churchill's obsession with the strategic bomber campaign which in the early years at least was a huge resource sink when those resources could have been used far more profitably elsewhere.

 

[sillygoose]

Two major issues the Axis would have when to trying send larger forces to North Africa than they historically did:

Port Capacity: they didn't have enough to fully supply the troops they did send historically ... hence Rommel's reliance on captured supplies.

Though that was claimed by van Creveld it is not actually borne out when researching what was actually delivered; IIRC he claims several ports only had certain capacities which limited the Axis to less than 100,000 tons per month, yet in June of 1941 and 1942 they received far in excess of this amount despite Benghazi and Tobruk, not to mention smaller parts like Derna, being out of use to the Axis at those times. Rommel relied on captured supplies because they were closer to the front than what was coming in, same as the British did.

Protecting the ships going to and from those ports. IIRC, Italy managed to complete a mere seven new destroyers between their DOW and surrender. Those are the bread-and-butter of escort duty and each one Italy lost was effectively irreplaceable (Japan and Germany weren't much better in this regard).

This is very true and a big issue they had, however the lack of escorts for North Africa was also a function of the navy being also used to escort the supply ships to Greece and all the small islands they held as well as Crete. So without the Greek campaign the Italians would have freed up a lot of extra escorts that were employed otherwise in the Aegean-Italy supply routes, not to mention Albania and ports along the Adriatic to sustain occupation troops in Yugoslavia (though given how they controlled the Adriatic they could use smaller vessels for that which weren't able to traverse the Mediterranean).

On the Eastern Front: Barbarossa not being delayed probably does not change much of anything. The Axis would have advanced a bit further due to the extra two weeks of offensives.

In fact it does; the Battle of Moscow was decided by the mud in early October. A 10 day head start actually holds off the mud during the vital period of advance which would allow German troops to skirt Soviet defenses by actually being able to go off road and around the defenses focused on the roads, while the supply trucks don't bog down in the mud which strangled the advance by late October. If you want a source detailing that operation the Typhoon volume of David Stahel's books has an excellent series of maps and day to day breakdown of operations which do show pretty conclusively it was the ground conditions that let the Soviet defenders hold.

They'd have been just as poorly prepared for the Russian Winter ... if not in worse shape due to an extra two-three weeks of offensive wear-and-tear plus supply lines even longer than the overstretched ones they already faced.

The winter largely wouldn't matter if they took Moscow in October, which they would have done with a 10 day head start on the OTL TL.
The length of the supply lines weren't an issue necessarily, it was the road/ground conditions in the mud which prevented the trucks from bringing up supplies at the vital period in October.

Remember: Axis logistical planning sucked on a good day and far too frequently amounted "eh, we'll manage, somehow".

That's a myth borne out of the willingness of Axis commanders being willing to risk cutting lose from normal supply operations in pursuit of operational objectives. That is after all how they managed to take Singapore with a weaker force than the defender and how they inflicted over 5 million casualties on the Soviets in less than 6 months in 1941 for a fraction of the losses, which incidentally denied the Soviets around 40 million citizens and their labor as well as over 40% of their economy and pushed them into starvation conditions. So outrunning supply lines can be a risk well worth it given the strategic gains. No way that Germany could have lasted nearly so long in the war or gotten nearly so close to winning were it not for their willingness to take risks like that.

Had it not been for Hitler's poor strategic choices it might have won them the war.

Yet they did have contacts with the Croatian fascists especially and there was deep resentment of Serbian domination of the state in many areas. I agree that Germany was much strong but could see Mussolini being confident he could take out Yugoslavia just as he was about Greece.

Do you have a source about their pre-war contacts and how it aided them during the invasion? I'm aware of Italian-Croat relations after Yugoslavia was conquered, but not before. AFAIK the Croats only worked with the Italians after they got an occupation zone in 'independent' Croatia. While you're 100% right about the Croat resentment of Serb domination, AFAIK that didn't matter to Italian operations until after the campaign was won and it was the Germans who really worked with them to pick apart the Yugoslav army.

You could well be right about Mussolini and Yugoslavia, but given the difference in power between the two states even Mussolini wouldn't be so confident of going it alone there.

Except that the unit wasn't worn out, hence its withdrawal to fight in E Africa. Leaving worn out units in place was pretty much what Britain did after the final stages including Beda Fomm had occcurred. Not what I'm talking about after the initial border battles. After all the British did advance to take Benghazi.

Ok, so it looks like we're repeatedly miscommunicating on this. Can you make a list of British divisions in place by February 1941 so we can keep straight which ones we're talking about?
From what I've seen the 'worn out' part was more the equipment than anything, but any unit that had been attacking, even if refilled to full strength in manpower, was still tired from attack operations over thousands of kilometers.

As I said the British forces were fully motorised while many of the Italians weren't. Which also has the advantage of controlling the battle field so while Italian motoerised units may escape in part anything that is caught up or breaks down during the retreat won't.

Sure. At Beda Fomm the British cut off the Italian mechanized units which were quite powerful and important:

Battle of Beda Fomm - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Casualties
At the Battle of Beda Fomm, the British took about 25,000 prisoners, over 100 tanks (many still operational), 216 guns and 1,500 wheeled vehicles.[52]

Having to face those, an entire mechanized corps worth, after they had regrouped and either coordinated with the new Italian armored corps sent to support them or with Rommel would completely offset any gains the British would make by avoiding Greece.

Only a few thousand men of the 10th Army had escaped the disaster in Cyrenaica but the 5th Army had four divisions in Tripolitania and the Italians reinforced the Sirte, Tmed Hassan and Buerat strongholds from Italy, which brought the total of Italian soldiers in Tripolitania to about 150,000 men.[50] The Italian forces in Libya experienced a "renaissance" during 1941, when the 132nd Armoured Division "Ariete", the 102nd Motorised Division "Trento", and the 101st Motorised Division "Trieste" arrived along with better equipment. Italian anti-tank units performed well during Operation Brevity, Operation Battleaxe and the "Ariete" Division defeated the 2nd Armoured Brigade at Bir el Gubi on 19 November, during Operation Crusader.[51]

Given just the Italian historical reinforcements (another mechanized corps worth) plus what was in Tripolitania the Italians had more than enough to stop any further British advance with any divisions sent to Greece even had logistics not been a problem for the British. The British were very smart to wipe out the psychologically beaten Italians at Beda Fomm before they could regroup, get reinforced, and get back into action once they were set to fight again.

BTW British commanders were against further offensive operations even without Greece:

The defeat of the 10th Army appeared to mean that the British could hold Cyrenaica with fewer ships, men and aircraft, as long as the offensive was terminated. The Navy and RAF commanders were against another offensive, having supported two land campaigns, supplied Malta and protected Egypt from the growing threat from the Luftwaffe.

Actually I don't think they were. The US deployed relatively few ground units to the Pacific in this period and Britain, which was expected to carry the majority of the burden would have been heavily outnumbered. See Operation_Sledgehammer for details. Plus as the link says there simply wasn't the air support and experience at amphibious landings as well as the experience of many of the units. Nor a secure supply line to Britain at this stage.

See the Guadalcanal campaign (my grandfather was there) among others:

Guadalcanal campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

New Guinea campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Solomon Islands campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Plus don't forget Midway and all the resources spent there.

The OTL Sledgehammer plan assumed the Pacific offensive happened at the same time. So without that they'd have had an entire US army plus naval support to launch it if they wanted. Politically that was a non-starter though given US priorities.

However if you look at what was actually available for Torch IOTL in November there were more US divisions deployed than what the Sledgehammer plan claimed:

Operation Torch - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

There were 6 US divisions I could find that participated in 1942.

I don't know if the allied forces were too timid as the terrain favoured the defender and a lot of the German forces especially were mobile but more could have been done both in early 43 and later to have sped things up.

The Brits didn't want to take the casualties. They did anyway in Normandy and Italy (and Tunisia).

The down side of a 43 invasion of France without the clearing of N Africa and Italy is that the Axis have a hell of a lot more forces available. Plus British units will be tied up in Egypt if only in defence of the country. Coupled with while forces and resources are considerably greater than in 42 their still markedly less than what was available in 44.

That is true, though with the fighting in North Africa the Italians would be entirely tied down and Rommel's guys still likely stuck there. Don't forget too that with Germany likely doing better in the East the Allies might be forced to invade France anyway to help Stalin out ASAP, as was the original contingency plan. It might have been necessary to suck it up and take the losses or risk Stalin going under and the war being effectively over as a result. Because then the longer you wait once the Soviets are out the more veteran German divisions show up.

The big issue in the Axis making a stand was not only the rapid response by Germany, which however possibly came at a heavy cost in the east, but also that the US was too cautious in objecting to British plans for landings further east. That could have doomed Rommel and his forces a lot quicker, although it would have meant a much smaller force being captured as the Germans wouldn't have sent the OTL reinforcements.

Maybe, though given how the Axis reacted far more quickly than anticipated and the proximity of Axis air units in Sicily and Sardinia, not to mention OTL French resistance, the Allies could have ended up in a really bad situation that ended much worse than their repulse in Tunisia IOTL. Also if you're right that a more eastern landing works and the Axis bails on North Africa much more quickly, then invading Italy in 1943 is impossible due to how many forces they'd have, including several thousand aircraft not lost in Tunisia.

I did say if the US was willing to support rather than opposing the operation. Plus the limited logistics of the region means its more difficult for Germany to reinforce and supply a fighting force there while the partisans in both Yugoslavia and Greece further complicate the Axis position.

If no Italian campaign then think about all that the Germans poured in there IOTL, but now the Italians are able to help them. The partisans are f-ed because now Yugoslavia would be flooded with all the troops needed to ensure supplies kept up because they would know exactly the problems that would be caused by what you describe. Remember too that terrain and logistics are a two way problem. Good luck attacking south to north out of Greece.

Also Greek opens up a wider front, rather than the narrow one supplied by Italy, which is further restricted by the central mountain range. Not sure whether Bulgaria would be that hard to swing if it looked like the allies were winning as they switched to the Soviets pretty quickly, despite the much greater social and political differences. Quite possibly Romania would have at least wanted to follow if the alternative was Soviet occupation. Agree that Churchill was too optimistic about the Turks joining the conflict although if they could be swung in earlier than they did OTL it would have eased L-L to the Soviets.

See Greek terrain and what is beyond. There is a reason Salonika became an open air prison in WW1.
No way the Allies win quickly and easily enough to influence Bulgaria, especially with the Germans, Romanians, and Hungarians so nearby. IOTL they only switched once the Soviets had boots on the ground in their country, same with Romania, and only after German forces were decisively beaten.

1943 is too soon, they could really only pull that off in 1944 when the Soviets show up, but then could the Soviets do that as quickly if the Allies have been stuck grinding away in Greece instead of Italy and the Axis reinforcing the Balkans decisively?

That;s why I wonder if the allies, if Libya had somehow been cleared earlier - and I agree its a bloody tough one - might still have gone for something like Torch to get French N Africa.

Doubtful since it really added nothing on its own. If the Mediterranean is open to shipping and Vichy is neutral it would be a huge waste of resources when Stalin was playing hardball for help.

Are you thinking of 42 rather than 41? The initial forces as well as being caught by surprise were pretty run down and had suffered from priority going to Greece. Plus losing O'Connor so earlier was a definite blow, both in terms of experience and morale. It was in 42 that the Axis inflicted more serious defeats, in part again because attention had been switched east to the Japanese threat - with the advance to the El Alemien choke point.

Nope, 1941. It was Malta that cut off supplies so badly in the 2nd half of the year that Rommel was stuck in eastern Libya; had Malta been out of the picture from June on (which is when over 125,000 tons of supplies were delivered which were quickly cut in half in the following months with a nadir of about 30,000 by October-December). Without Malta then Rommel can supply a proper assault on Tobruk which it could have survived, and then given the weakness and poor performance of the 8th army at that point they'd have been rolled over in the Autumn/Winter. In fact they very nearly lost the OTL Crusader offensive when German forces disregarded intel about British supply dumbs that they passed within miles of. Had those been taken not only would the 8th army have lost probably two corps but also given Rommel enough to assault Tobruk with and then there'd be no stopping him in Egypt as he'd have enough supplies to keep going both from Tobruk and what was/would be taken from the 8th.

In 1942 the defeats were due to the bouncing of Tobruk (Gazala would have been an analogue for how the British would have defended in 1941 had they not gone to Greece BTW) and so many British forces being lost a la what nearly happened during Crusader. That could have happened in 1941, especially with no Beda Fomm.

I was referring to 42-43 when Britain was occupied on multiple fronts. Even if 41 the pressure in the Atlantic and de-facto closing of the Med meant that relatively little strength could be sent to N Africa quickly. Not helped by Churchill's obsession with the strategic bomber campaign which in the early years at least was a huge resource sink when those resources could have been used far more profitably elsewhere.

In 1941 there were the Tiger Convoys that went from Gibraltar to Egypt. They enabled Crusader IIRC.
The strategic bomber offensive is a whole other argument and one I'd say actually wasn't wasted given how many German resources were occupied fighting against it even in 1941. More than the British invested in the bomber offensive IIRC, which when coupled with the costs of Barbarossa were pretty draining of Axis resources.

 

[ATP]

Two major issues the Axis would have when to trying send larger forces to North Africa than they historically did:

Port Capacity: they didn't have enough to fully supply the troops they did send historically ... hence Rommel's reliance on captured supplies.

Protecting the ships going to and from those ports. IIRC, Italy managed to complete a mere seven new destroyers between their DOW and surrender. Those are the bread-and-butter of escort duty and each one Italy lost was effectively irreplaceable (Japan and Germany weren't much better in this regard).

On the Eastern Front: Barbarossa not being delayed probably does not change much of anything. The Axis would have advanced a bit further due to the extra two weeks of offensives.

They'd have been just as poorly prepared for the Russian Winter ... if not in worse shape due to an extra two-three weeks of offensive wear-and-tear plus supply lines even longer than the overstretched ones they already faced.

Remember: Axis logistical planning sucked on a good day and far too frequently amounted "eh, we'll manage, somehow".

All true.Italy could support at best 10-12 dyvisions in Africa,and their dyvisions from the start had 6 battalions,not 9.

About Barbarossa - in OTL they were stopped 30km from Moscov,which mean,that they would lost it if they attack there.With railroad hub it means war lost in 1942-43.
But,Adolf the idiot could send them to Leningrad or Crimea,in that case soviets would lost it in 1941,but still lost war.
Althought,they would push further and soviets would occupy less.Free Hungary and Czech in that case.Poland is still fucked.
Unless Turkey join germans in 1942 - they would still lost,but much later.
Poland would be free then,but Turkey - not.

 

[stevep]

Though that was claimed by van Creveld it is not actually borne out when researching what was actually delivered; IIRC he claims several ports only had certain capacities which limited the Axis to less than 100,000 tons per month, yet in June of 1941 and 1942 they received far in excess of this amount despite Benghazi and Tobruk, not to mention smaller parts like Derna, being out of use to the Axis at those times. Rommel relied on captured supplies because they were closer to the front than what was coming in, same as the British did.

Well that differs from most sources I've read. Plus of course supplies arriving at Tripoli still have to be moved by road or coastal shipping to the front which is a long way away.

This is very true and a big issue they had, however the lack of escorts for North Africa was also a function of the navy being also used to escort the supply ships to Greece and all the small islands they held as well as Crete. So without the Greek campaign the Italians would have freed up a lot of extra escorts that were employed otherwise in the Aegean-Italy supply routes, not to mention Albania and ports along the Adriatic to sustain occupation troops in Yugoslavia (though given how they controlled the Adriatic they could use smaller vessels for that which weren't able to traverse the Mediterranean).

Did they actually need much in the way of escorts here after the fall of Crete? Its very much an Axis pool until 44 with air superiority and small boats being enough to transfer supplies to island garrisons.


In fact it does; the Battle of Moscow was decided by the mud in early October. A 10 day head start actually holds off the mud during the vital period of advance which would allow German troops to skirt Soviet defenses by actually being able to go off road and around the defenses focused on the roads, while the supply trucks don't bog down in the mud which strangled the advance by late October. If you want a source detailing that operation the Typhoon volume of David Stahel's books has an excellent series of maps and day to day breakdown of operations which do show pretty conclusively it was the ground conditions that let the Soviet defenders hold.


The winter largely wouldn't matter if they took Moscow in October, which they would have done with a 10 day head start on the OTL TL.
The length of the supply lines weren't an issue necessarily, it was the road/ground conditions in the mud which prevented the trucks from bringing up supplies at the vital period in October.


That's a myth borne out of the willingness of Axis commanders being willing to risk cutting lose from normal supply operations in pursuit of operational objectives. That is after all how they managed to take Singapore with a weaker force than the defender and how they inflicted over 5 million casualties on the Soviets in less than 6 months in 1941 for a fraction of the losses, which incidentally denied the Soviets around 40 million citizens and their labor as well as over 40% of their economy and pushed them into starvation conditions. So outrunning supply lines can be a risk well worth it given the strategic gains. No way that Germany could have lasted nearly so long in the war or gotten nearly so close to winning were it not for their willingness to take risks like that.

Had it not been for Hitler's poor strategic choices it might have won them the war.

That's an opinion but it still depends on at least as much going right for the Germans as OTL. They have to deal with huge distances and wear and tear on forces as well. Also the mud is still going to occur and if they bypass the defenses on the roads and reach the outskirts of Moscow their going to find their logistics screwed when their busy trying to fight their way into the city, or trying a very ambitious encirclement possibly?

Do you have a source about their pre-war contacts and how it aided them during the invasion? I'm aware of Italian-Croat relations after Yugoslavia was conquered, but not before. AFAIK the Croats only worked with the Italians after they got an occupation zone in 'independent' Croatia. While you're 100% right about the Croat resentment of Serb domination, AFAIK that didn't matter to Italian operations until after the campaign was won and it was the Germans who really worked with them to pick apart the Yugoslav army.

You could well be right about Mussolini and Yugoslavia, but given the difference in power between the two states even Mussolini wouldn't be so confident of going it alone there.

I didn't say it helped them during the invasion but they had contacts with the Croatian fascists prior to the invasion although broken at one point. See Ante_Pavelic and Ustase-Ideology, especially the paras:

Mussolini's support of the Ustaše was based on pragmatic considerations, such as maximizing Italian influence in the Balkans and the Adriatic. After 1937, with the weakening of French influence in Europe following Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland and with the rise of a quasi-fascist government in Yugoslavia under Milan Stojadinović, Mussolini abandoned support for the Ustaše from 1937 to 1939 and sought to improve relations with Yugoslavia, fearing that continued hostility towards Yugoslavia would result in Yugoslavia entering Germany's sphere of influence.[32]

The collapse of the quasi-fascist Stojadinović regime resulted in Italy restoring its support for the Ustaše, whose aim was to create an independent Croatia in personal union with Italy.[32] However, distrust of the Ustaše grew. Mussolini's son-in-law and Italian foreign minister Count Galeazzo Ciano noted in his diary that "The Duce is indignant with Pavelić, because he claims that the Croats are descendants of the Goths. This will have the effect of bringing them into the German orbit".[33]

Although I do note they disagree on when and why Italy briefly dropped support for the moment.

Especially given Yugoslavia's ethnic problems and Mussolini's ego I wouldn't rely on him not considering Italy could take out Yugoslavia. Although the main issue would probably be until the coup against the regent on the issue of joining the Axis Yugoslavia looked fairly secure in the German camp, which would have put it off limits.

Ok, so it looks like we're repeatedly miscommunicating on this. Can you make a list of British divisions in place by February 1941 so we can keep straight which ones we're talking about?
From what I've seen the 'worn out' part was more the equipment than anything, but any unit that had been attacking, even if refilled to full strength in manpower, was still tired from attack operations over thousands of kilometers.

Having a quick look at one of my books, John Ellis's WWII Data Book it suggests that forces in Egypt [plus occupied Libya] were:
Feb 41 2 Arm Div [7th and 1st] 2 Inf Div [6th & 7th Aus divs] - Plus TTL 4th Ind div
Mar 41 - 2 Arm div - possibly less one Arm brig sent to Greece? 2 Inf - 9th Aus replaced 6th Aus which was sent to Greece
Apr 41 - 2 Arm div [minus losses from Rommel's attack from late March - with 7th Aus div replaced by 70th Inf and the return of the 4th Ind div.

Also for Greece it reports the primary ground forces were the 6th Aus div, 2NZ div and 1 Arm brigade.

For Crete from wiki the Commonwealth forces were 2NZ div, 14th Inf Brig and 19th Aus Brig plus a couple of impromptu forces.

As such assuming that 4th Indian wasn't sent south and no battle for Greece then there are several division size units available that weren't OTL. How many could have operated as far west as Benghazi or further would be difficult to say.

Sure. At Beda Fomm the British cut off the Italian mechanized units which were quite powerful and important:

Having to face those, an entire mechanized corps worth, after they had regrouped and either coordinated with the new Italian armored corps sent to support them or with Rommel would completely offset any gains the British would make by avoiding Greece.


Given just the Italian historical reinforcements (another mechanized corps worth) plus what was in Tripolitania the Italians had more than enough to stop any further British advance with any divisions sent to Greece even had logistics not been a problem for the British. The British were very smart to wipe out the psychologically beaten Italians at Beda Fomm before they could regroup, get reinforced, and get back into action once they were set to fight again.

BTW British commanders were against further offensive operations even without Greece:

Might be the case although how quickly would Italian morale recover and also would they gain better equipment?

See the Guadalcanal campaign (my grandfather was there) among others:

Guadalcanal campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

New Guinea campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Solomon Islands campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Plus don't forget Midway and all the resources spent there.

Those are largely naval and marine forces which would

The OTL Sledgehammer plan assumed the Pacific offensive happened at the same time. So without that they'd have had an entire US army plus naval support to launch it if they wanted. Politically that was a non-starter though given US priorities.

However if you look at what was actually available for Torch IOTL in November there were more US divisions deployed than what the Sledgehammer plan claimed:

Operation Torch - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

There were 6 US divisions I could find that participated in 1942.

The forces in the Pacific in mid-late 42 are largely naval and marine forces which as you say would be politically impossible for the US to commit to the European theatre and I wouldn't fancy the chances of the navy operating for long under German air control in support of such operations.

It notes in the Operation_Sledgehammer_plan that Britain could land only 6 Inf Divs at most and the US had only 2-3 divs available. Since as Dieppe showed taking a port would be very difficult and the invaders would be facing both much larger German forces - it predicts 25-30 divs as well as German air superiority then successfully holding a bridgehead during the winter then extending it - if it survived that long - would be hugely difficult and costly. Even with the forces reported for Torch, and some of them came directly from the US which might be where the discrpency occurs in terms of numbers their going to face a huge tasks even if they manage to seize a port. [Coming directly from the US are the men, after several days of voyage going to be that prepared and organised for going into a major contested assault rather than landing almost unopposed on beaches in N Africa?]

The Brits didn't want to take the casualties. They did anyway in Normandy and Italy (and Tunisia).

Actually the problem was the US with its fixation on the Pacific and N France which meant that they were determined to move forces from Italy and also promise amphibious capacity wasn't available.

That is true, though with the fighting in North Africa the Italians would be entirely tied down and Rommel's guys still likely stuck there. Don't forget too that with Germany likely doing better in the East the Allies might be forced to invade France anyway to help Stalin out ASAP, as was the original contingency plan. It might have been necessary to suck it up and take the losses or risk Stalin going under and the war being effectively over as a result. Because then the longer you wait once the Soviets are out the more veteran German divisions show up.

That assumes that the Soviets are going to be forced out and, although it wasn't very clear at the time this was a long shot by late 42.

Maybe, though given how the Axis reacted far more quickly than anticipated and the proximity of Axis air units in Sicily and Sardinia, not to mention OTL French resistance, the Allies could have ended up in a really bad situation that ended much worse than their repulse in Tunisia IOTL. Also if you're right that a more eastern landing works and the Axis bails on North Africa much more quickly, then invading Italy in 1943 is impossible due to how many forces they'd have, including several thousand aircraft not lost in Tunisia.

That assumes that they can keep them there - or on Sardinia which would also be vulnerable now - in case of an invasion with the demands for a/c elsewhere. Its still going to be a hell of a lot easier than trying an invasion of France in 43.

If no Italian campaign then think about all that the Germans poured in there IOTL, but now the Italians are able to help them. The partisans are f-ed because now Yugoslavia would be flooded with all the troops needed to ensure supplies kept up because they would know exactly the problems that would be caused by what you describe. Remember too that terrain and logistics are a two way problem. Good luck attacking south to north out of Greece.

Which is a good reason for Italy, or at least Sicily as well as possibly later Greece and the Balkans.

I'm not assuming a rapid advance to Vienna say. I'm assuming a secure foothold that the Germans have difficulty countering because of the limited logistics in the region, which would be worsened once the allies have enough air bases for secure air domination and then a steadier advance.

See Greek terrain and what is beyond. There is a reason Salonika became an open air prison in WW1.
No way the Allies win quickly and easily enough to influence Bulgaria, especially with the Germans, Romanians, and Hungarians so nearby. IOTL they only switched once the Soviets had boots on the ground in their country, same with Romania, and only after German forces were decisively beaten.

1943 is too soon, they could really only pull that off in 1944 when the Soviets show up, but then could the Soviets do that as quickly if the Allies have been stuck grinding away in Greece instead of Italy and the Axis reinforcing the Balkans decisively?

I think it all depends on a win, not necessarily a quick one. Once German power starts to falter both Bulgaria and Romania have strong incentives to defect once they feel the allies can provide protection and before the Soviets show up. Or simply Bulgarian and heavy bombing of Polesti and the Danube from tactical a/c as the ranges close.

Doubtful since it really added nothing on its own. If the Mediterranean is open to shipping and Vichy is neutral it would be a huge waste of resources when Stalin was playing hardball for help.

Actually your contradicting yourself. I'm arguing for it as a preparation for the invasion of Sicily/Sardinia and then Italy. As you said yourself without Tunisia that's going to be a hell of a lot more difficult if not impossible. Also taking at least those two islands would largely reopen passage through the Med which would be of great help to the allies but was impossible while the islands were in Axis hands. After all Italy was ready to make peace once Sicily was lost.

Nope, 1941. It was Malta that cut off supplies so badly in the 2nd half of the year that Rommel was stuck in eastern Libya; had Malta been out of the picture from June on (which is when over 125,000 tons of supplies were delivered which were quickly cut in half in the following months with a nadir of about 30,000 by October-December). Without Malta then Rommel can supply a proper assault on Tobruk which it could have survived, and then given the weakness and poor performance of the 8th army at that point they'd have been rolled over in the Autumn/Winter. In fact they very nearly lost the OTL Crusader offensive when German forces disregarded intel about British supply dumbs that they passed within miles of. Had those been taken not only would the 8th army have lost probably two corps but also given Rommel enough to assault Tobruk with and then there'd be no stopping him in Egypt as he'd have enough supplies to keep going both from Tobruk and what was/would be taken from the 8th.

In 1942 the defeats were due to the bouncing of Tobruk (Gazala would have been an analogue for how the British would have defended in 1941 had they not gone to Greece BTW) and so many British forces being lost a la what nearly happened during Crusader. That could have happened in 1941, especially with no Beda Fomm.

In 42 the defeats were due to a combination of factors including the over-confidence by Churchill that Tobruk could be held, the loss of forces to the east added onto earlier ones and a very good campaign, albeit again with a number of gambles by Rommel that worked. Egypt was always highly unlikely because of the closed blocking position at El Alamein.

In 41 he gained surprise in part because of attacking in breach of his orders and the dire state of the forces in the region with supplies and equipment going to Greece/Crete. With more forces available, even if only to counter attack his advance and also some of the air and naval units not sent to Greece there's markedly more chance of his being stopped.

In 1941 there were the Tiger Convoys that went from Gibraltar to Egypt. They enabled Crusader IIRC.
The strategic bomber offensive is a whole other argument and one I'd say actually wasn't wasted given how many German resources were occupied fighting against it even in 1941. More than the British invested in the bomber offensive IIRC, which when coupled with the costs of Barbarossa were pretty draining of Axis resources.

The only reference to Tiger convoys was a single one, Operation_Battleaxe-Tiger_Convoy that:

On 12 May, the Tiger convoy arrived in Alexandria with 238 tanks and 43 Hurricanes consisting of 21 Light Tank Mk VI, 82 Cruiser tanks (including fifty of the new Crusader tanks) and 135 Matilda II Infantry tanks.[17][18] There were delays in unloading the tanks, which also had to be adapted for desert use, so Battleaxe was postponed until 10 June.[19] The tanks were intended for the 7th Armoured Division, which had been out of action since February, after most of its tanks had worn out during Operation Compass.[20]

Note what it says about the 7th Armoured. This was for Battleaxe, a failed counter offensive in June 41. IIRC there was similarly a convoy pushed through at some risk in late 1940 enabling the running of Operation Compass. However the vast majority of supplies for the forces in the western desert came either around Africa or from India and points east. As the RN found even supplying Malta was very expensive let alone trying to send major supplies to Egypt. Such a mission here would have been greatly helped by the fact the Germans were concentrating on their coming attack on the Soviets.

 

[History Learner]

It can have an impact although how much is unclear. There are still some rivers to cross which could delay matters. Plus without the fighting in Greece even Stalin might finally accept that the massive build up of Axis forces at his borders have hostile intent.

He did anyway, which is why he ordered a partial mobilization in April that led to the callup of 800,000 reservists by June. There was nothing else Stalin could do, which has been repeatedly pointed out by me to you in multiple other threads. I think this is why you can never explain what else Stalin could do when challenged, beyond generalities.

 

[ATP]

He did anyway, which is why he ordered a partial mobilization in April that led to the callup of 800,000 reservists by June. There was nothing else Stalin could do, which has been repeatedly pointed out by me to you in multiple other threads. I think this is why you can never explain what else Stalin could do when challenged, beyond generalities.

Sralin could widraw his 171 dyvisions from border,so german would not encircled them in first weeks.If he fought on Stalin line,he could hold germans there.
And if he do not genocide his own people,soldiers would not mass surrender.But he did,so he lost with 6:1 tank advantage and 3:1 air advantage.If Hitler treated prisoners decently,entire Europe would be taking german now.

 

[sillygoose]

Sralin could widraw his 171 dyvisions from border,so german would not encircled them in first weeks.If he fought on Stalin line,he could hold germans there.
And if he do not genocide his own people,soldiers would not mass surrender.But he did,so he lost with 6:1 tank advantage and 3:1 air advantage.If Hitler treated prisoners decently,entire Europe would be taking german now.

Theoretically yes, but that would mean abandoning every Soviet war plan they'd come up with.

 

[stevep]

He did anyway, which is why he ordered a partial mobilization in April that led to the callup of 800,000 reservists by June. There was nothing else Stalin could do, which has been repeatedly pointed out by me to you in multiple other threads. I think this is why you can never explain what else Stalin could do when challenged, beyond generalities.

Well he could have actually prepared for a potential German attack rather than refusing to allow any such preparations. That's an obvious step. I.e. listened to warnings and allowed defensive positions to be built rather than having his entire army caught unprepared and with commanders afraid to even fire back initially because of his orders.

If he had learnt earlier than counter attacks by weakened and disorganisaed forces, or the stupidity of insisting on stand and die orders rather than withdrawing to avoid being encircled then there would have been a hell of a lot of changes for the better for the Soviets but then he won't have been Stalin.

 

[sillygoose]

Well he could have actually prepared for a potential German attack rather than refusing to allow any such preparations. That's an obvious step. I.e. listened to warnings and allowed defensive positions to be built rather than having his entire army caught unprepared and with commanders afraid to even fire back initially because of his orders.

He did though. The Molotov Line, mobilization of 800k reservists, pushing troops right up to the border, etc.
The restricted ROE were a function of not wanting to look like the aggressor for international opinion and genuinely not expecting a full on attack from the beginning, as they assumed the pattern would hold and there would be a build up to war with escalations and mobilization, then border incidents that would lead to war over a week or so. Then the Soviet war plan called for the first strategic echelon to absorb the invasion at the border and the 2nd would counterattack with a 3rd then acting as a reserve to exploit successes (DP-41 was the Soviet war plan if you want to look it up).

What Stalin didn't expect was his forces to crumble like they did and the war plan to collapse within a week. If you look at the numbers the Soviets should have just rolled over the Germans without issue due to the huge numbers of men and material they had, which is undoubtedly what Stalin did and didn't consider all the 'soft' factors of war. Really the Soviet first echelon was sacrificeable to buy time for the rest of his armies to get into action, but the 2nd and 3rd strategic echelons completely failed to do their jobs (per the plan) other than act as speed bumps. That is really what the issue was for the Soviets, even when mobilized and equipped their reserves just fell apart in combat even deep within their own country.

If he had learnt earlier than counter attacks by weakened and disorganisaed forces, or the stupidity of insisting on stand and die orders rather than withdrawing to avoid being encircled then there would have been a hell of a lot of changes for the better for the Soviets but then he won't have been Stalin.

The problem for the Soviet military was they couldn't have acted differently due to the problems of their forces, which they only found out the hard way after the damage was done. The 2nd Soviet strategic echelon was anything but weak and it still fell apart when counterattacking the Axis invaders who were still occupied dealing with the 1st echelon. The stand and fight order was really all they could do because in actual maneuver fighting they suffered worse; retreating units were devoured by German airpower and mobile units. It happened over and over. The only reason unauthorized withdrawals worked to avoid encirclement in 1942 was because of how deep in the USSR the fighting happened, which resulted in massive supply problems for the Axis offensive; it is hard to advance without fuel.

Plus the encircled troops in 1941 bought the Soviets time to mobilize more reserves and form a new line, so their sacrifices had a vital purpose in the wider Soviet strategy, even if it were a flailing one. That's why Hitler copied it in 1944-45, though he of course seemed to forget that that only works when you have reserves to mobilize.

It is very easy to say in hindsight what the Soviets should have done, but we have access to info that the actors of the period did not and had to learn the hard way via flawed reporting sources; remember too in 1941 Soviet communications broke down and commanders, the further away from the front the worse it was, lost complete touch and understanding with what was happening, especially when the reports coming in were distorted through a game of telephone as each command level reported inaccurate information to the next and more and more distortions crept into the message.

Stalin was only a fraction of the problem with the Soviet military and conduct of the war. There were massive problems from the ground up that were only really exposed in full during the war when it was far too late to change anything. The 1939 fighting against Japan gave a very problematic picture of Soviet military capabilities, since it seemed to suggest the problems in the west (East Poland and Finland) were a function of bad commanders or rushing things rather than serious structural issues. The situation in Finland too seemed to suggest by the end that the problems had been identified and fixed, which lulled the Soviets into a false sense of their actual abilities.

 

[sillygoose]

Well that differs from most sources I've read. Plus of course supplies arriving at Tripoli still have to be moved by road or coastal shipping to the front which is a long way away.

Most sources just tend to repeat earlier sources instead of doing their own research, which is how myths get born.
I thought the same thing for a while until I came across a more academic source that had the numbers that proved van Creveld wrong. You are right however about the distance issue, which is why I keep mentioning the British issues around that in Libya in 1941.

That's an opinion but it still depends on at least as much going right for the Germans as OTL. They have to deal with huge distances and wear and tear on forces as well. Also the mud is still going to occur and if they bypass the defenses on the roads and reach the outskirts of Moscow their going to find their logistics screwed when their busy trying to fight their way into the city, or trying a very ambitious encirclement possibly?

IOTL they were doing just fine until the mud really hit. They still soldier on to a really remarkable degree until they literally just could not move until the ground froze again. Assuming they take the city the issue wouldn't the be same because they would have the huge warehouses of Moscow to supply them, plus paved/heated airfields, not to mention capture a bunch of rolling stock from the rail yards in the capital (the center of the system), so could simply use the existing rail system with Soviet gauge thanks to having all those trains. Unlike in other areas it would be impossible to evacuate and sabotage everything on such short notice; I'm reading an account of the Moscow panic of October right now and basically the evacuation was a joke and the panic effectively disrupted the Soviet ability to do any sort of planned scorched earth like they did in Kiev. It would be more like the capture of Orel than Kiev or Kharkov.

Encirclement wouldn't be necessary in September or early/mid-October 1941, a straight thrust into the city after the Vyazma pocket would cause it to fall due to The Panic (half the city, 2 million people, fled on foot or by car in terror from October-January) and the lack of defenders. IOTL they were only able to hold due to the very limited number of surviving defenders being concentrated on the highways into the city and thanks to the mud preventing offroad travel and with it the ability to maneuver around the defenders they had to fight through while supply was strangled by the mud causing the highway to collapse behind the lines due to the heavy traffic on the limited number of paved roads and the ground underneath losing its integrity.

I didn't say it helped them during the invasion but they had contacts with the Croatian fascists prior to the invasion although broken at one point. See Ante_Pavelic and Ustase-Ideology, especially the paras:

Although I do note they disagree on when and why Italy briefly dropped support for the moment.

Your article states that it was the Germans who got the Croats to declare independence before the invasion, though the leader did end up heading to Italy where the puppet regime was set up. Also note too that the Italians banned the Ustace in their country in the 1930s, again per your link.

Also they point out the Ustace had only about 2% support and even the Germans considered them too much of a joke to bother with; ironically the Nazis didn't want to deal with the Croat Fascists and thought the non-Fascists were the better option to work with per your link:

The Germans generally preferred to collaborate with non-fascists who were willing to work with them, and only placed out-and-out fascists in charge as a last resort.[65]

I appreciate the links, but if anything it shows that internal dissent was immaterial to taking down Yugoslavia, it was the rapid German led assault that collapsed the country and follow up efforts then with the locals that initially kept occupation troops to a minimum. When I say German led assault I mean the coalition effort that including Germany, Italy, and Hungary with some help by the Bulgarians and Romanians.

Especially given Yugoslavia's ethnic problems and Mussolini's ego I wouldn't rely on him not considering Italy could take out Yugoslavia. Although the main issue would probably be until the coup against the regent on the issue of joining the Axis Yugoslavia looked fairly secure in the German camp, which would have put it off limits.

Sure. Question is whether Italy would act on that without Hitler's go-ahead given his interests in that area. Invading Greece is one thing given that it was outside Hitler's purview, but with the Axis alliance it would be clear that acting without asking would be a major problem given how dependent Italy was on German coal. I'm bringing that up now because I entirely forgot about that as an issue until now.

Having a quick look at one of my books, John Ellis's WWII Data Book it suggests that forces in Egypt [plus occupied Libya] were:
Feb 41 2 Arm Div [7th and 1st] 2 Inf Div [6th & 7th Aus divs] - Plus TTL 4th Ind div
Mar 41 - 2 Arm div - possibly less one Arm brig sent to Greece? 2 Inf - 9th Aus replaced 6th Aus which was sent to Greece
Apr 41 - 2 Arm div [minus losses from Rommel's attack from late March - with 7th Aus div replaced by 70th Inf and the return of the 4th Ind div.

Also for Greece it reports the primary ground forces were the 6th Aus div, 2NZ div and 1 Arm brigade.

For Crete from wiki the Commonwealth forces were 2NZ div, 14th Inf Brig and 19th Aus Brig plus a couple of impromptu forces.

As such assuming that 4th Indian wasn't sent south and no battle for Greece then there are several division size units available that weren't OTL. How many could have operated as far west as Benghazi or further would be difficult to say.

I'm not sure those tables are accurate. 1st Armoured division was in Britain until November 1941. 2nd Armoured was in Libya minus a brigade to Greece. 7th Armoured spent 8 months in action, so was withdrawn for a rest and refit and would do so anyway ITTL, leaving only 2nd Armoured by itself with all its brigades.

Wait why would 4th Indian be any different? The East African campaign would still be going on and they were needed there. I thought we were only changing forces that were sent to Greece IOTL from February on. I'd imagine some of the divisions transferred out to Greece would instead here be removed to be rested, like 7th Arm.

As to the 4th Indian:

4th Infantry Division (India) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In December 1940, the division was rushed to the British Sudan to join with the 5th Indian Infantry Division in order to prevent the numerically vastly superior Italian forces (ten divisions in total) from threatening Red Sea supply routes to Egypt as well as Egypt itself and the Suez Canal from the south. The East African campaign culminated in March 1941 with the battles at Keren in Eritrea.

So they'd likely still go.

6th Aussie would stay in Libya for defense, as that was the original plan. 7th Aussie was not trained yet, so only the 18th brigade was in Libya:

7th Division (Australia) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It would likely go back there once the 9th division became available.

The 19th Aussie brigade was part of the 6th Australian division.
The 14th infantry brigade was part of the 8th divisions in Palestine and would have stayed there but for the Crete situation.

Also why wouldn't extra forces be sent to East Africa instead? 2nd New Zealand would be prefect for deployment there given their availability and proximity. Perhaps 2nd NZ replaces 4th Indian in North Africa?

Might be the case although how quickly would Italian morale recover and also would they gain better equipment?

They didn't really need better at the time, just better leadership and training, which they worked out during the 1941 campaign. I wish I could find the paper again that described the retraining efforts they made to learn from their mistakes in 1940, it was really interesting and would answer your question.

Morale recovery was actually pretty quick for survivors of the 1940 disaster once they got a chance to catch their breath and get reinforced by fresh units. So I'd imagine they'd be ready to go by the time either Rommel attacks or the Italians gets enough forces in place to do it on their own, deciding ITTL that they don't need the Germans. They could probably defend without any major issue by February.

The forces in the Pacific in mid-late 42 are largely naval and marine forces which as you say would be politically impossible for the US to commit to the European theatre and I wouldn't fancy the chances of the navy operating for long under German air control in support of such operations.

The army committed more divisions than the marines to the pacific campaign. If the Soviets looked like they'd collapse it is possible for FDR to take the political risk and just focus on Europe, because otherwise if the USSR falls the war in Europe is effectively over since it would be unwinnable for the Allies, per their own planning and internal discussions.

The USN focusing on Europe with the RN and with all the focused RAF and USAAF air support available in 1942 would probably be more than enough to overwhelm the Luftwaffe in the Channel, even though losses might be heavy. Given that the choice would be losing the war in Europe or going ahead with the invasion, that's kind of a no brainer to personalities in charge.

It notes in the Operation_Sledgehammer_plan that Britain could land only 6 Inf Divs at most and the US had only 2-3 divs available. Since as Dieppe showed taking a port would be very difficult and the invaders would be facing both much larger German forces - it predicts 25-30 divs as well as German air superiority then successfully holding a bridgehead during the winter then extending it - if it survived that long - would be hugely difficult and costly. Even with the forces reported for Torch, and some of them came directly from the US which might be where the discrpency occurs in terms of numbers their going to face a huge tasks even if they manage to seize a port. [Coming directly from the US are the men, after several days of voyage going to be that prepared and organised for going into a major contested assault rather than landing almost unopposed on beaches in N Africa?]

I'm just telling you what divisions were actually used in North Africa, so perhaps things changed from the early part of 1942 when they originally make the Sledgehammer plan.

Dieppe would have worked had they not tried a frontal assault on the city. I'm cynical and of the opinion they did that so the operation would fail and they could say to the Americans "look at how bad it was!" to win the argument.

The 25-30 German divisions was likely an overestimate and they'd only arrive later over the course of the operation. The initial landing would be by probably 3-5 divisions and initially face only 1-2 static German ones. They'd have air superiority and naval gun fire support (see Normandy and Sicily for how effective that was) plus face no Atlantic wall defenses of any significance unlike in 1944 so landing on beaches instead on in a city should be a piece of cake, same with cutting off the peninsula, either Brittany or Cotentin. The challenge would be dealing with the counteroffensives, but once again they would have air superiority and naval gunfire support, so won't be able to be dislodged easily or without extremely heavy cost to the attackers. It would probably be more no more costly to land and take the peninsula than OTL Normandy, but the breakout is going to be like Normandy+Italy+Tunisia all in one if they plan on grinding forward. It plays to the Germans overall benefit (relative to OTL battles) to fight like that even though it would be insanely costly (OTL Normandy had higher casualty rates than the worst WW1 battles or WW2 Eastern Front), though potentially overall not worse than those campaigns combined.

Actually the problem was the US with its fixation on the Pacific and N France which meant that they were determined to move forces from Italy and also promise amphibious capacity wasn't available.

It depends on what the situation is. If they build up for a 1943 invasion then if no Torch or Italy they could land as early as May 1943 while still keeping up OTL Pacific moves. If they opt for a November 1942 invasion they could do that instead of Torch. If they opted for no Pacific attacks in 1942 then they could probably invade France in July or September 1942.

That assumes that the Soviets are going to be forced out and, although it wasn't very clear at the time this was a long shot by late 42.

I'm talking about a situation where as a result of no Greece the extra time, forces, supplies, etc. are enough to take Moscow in 1941 and all the cascading problems that would cause the Soviets would result in them effectively being defeated in 1942. Leningrad for one thing would fall without the Moscow rail system and even Stalin told Harriman (US representative to Stalin) in 1942 that had Moscow fallen the war would have effectively been lost even if the fighting continued to some degree thereafter.

That assumes that they can keep them there - or on Sardinia which would also be vulnerable now - in case of an invasion with the demands for a/c elsewhere. Its still going to be a hell of a lot easier than trying an invasion of France in 43.

Who can keep who where?

Which is a good reason for Italy, or at least Sicily as well as possibly later Greece and the Balkans.

Sure.

I'm not assuming a rapid advance to Vienna say. I'm assuming a secure foothold that the Germans have difficulty countering because of the limited logistics in the region, which would be worsened once the allies have enough air bases for secure air domination and then a steadier advance.

Secure foothold sure, but then not being able to breakout due to the terrain and it being a worse version of Italy for no real gain. The lack of good terrain for air bases would be a huge problem. The Germans had that issue in Crete for instance.

I think it all depends on a win, not necessarily a quick one. Once German power starts to falter both Bulgaria and Romania have strong incentives to defect once they feel the allies can provide protection and before the Soviets show up. Or simply Bulgarian and heavy bombing of Polesti and the Danube from tactical a/c as the ranges close.

The only way they'd feel that is if the Germans were driven away from their borders and the Allies had boots on the ground right next to their territory. I.e. already did all the heavy lifting.

Actually your contradicting yourself. I'm arguing for it as a preparation for the invasion of Sicily/Sardinia and then Italy. As you said yourself without Tunisia that's going to be a hell of a lot more difficult if not impossible. Also taking at least those two islands would largely reopen passage through the Med which would be of great help to the allies but was impossible while the islands were in Axis hands. After all Italy was ready to make peace once Sicily was lost.

Not sure how I'm contradicting myself. Could you quote the two statements I made that you feel shows that?

You're arguing Tunisia as prep for Sicily/Sardinia? AKA OTL? I'm getting confused then as to what we're even discussing then.

How was it impossible to run convoys through the Med. without Sicily and Sardinia? It was done starting IOTL in May 1943:

Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1942-1943

www.naval-history.net

MAY 1943​

Merchant Shipping War - In the first five months of 1942 Allied forces had sunk over 500 Axis merchantmen of 560,000 tons throughout the Mediterranean. In contrast, the end of the Tunisian campaign marked a major upturn in the fortunes of Allied shipping. By mid-month minesweepers had cleared a channel through the Strait of Sicily, and the first regular Mediterranean convoys since 1940 were able to sail from Gibraltar to Alexandria (GTX). Return XTG's started in June 1943. The long haul around the Cape of Good Hope to the Middle East was no longer necessary, and the WS troop convoys were discontinued. The opening of the Mediterranean was equivalent to commissioning a large amount of new Allied merchant ship tonnage.

In 42 the defeats were due to a combination of factors including the over-confidence by Churchill that Tobruk could be held, the loss of forces to the east added onto earlier ones and a very good campaign, albeit again with a number of gambles by Rommel that worked. Egypt was always highly unlikely because of the closed blocking position at El Alamein.

The El Alamein position was very nearly lost IOTL. Once things bogged down though the logistics of the campaign turned against the Axis and then they couldn't win by October.

In 41 he gained surprise in part because of attacking in breach of his orders and the dire state of the forces in the region with supplies and equipment going to Greece/Crete. With more forces available, even if only to counter attack his advance and also some of the air and naval units not sent to Greece there's markedly more chance of his being stopped.

Oh I agree he will probably be stopped by Gazala, but the logistical situation being what it was coupled with holding a very extended defensive line would mean even with fresh forces there wasn't a way to really stop him before that point.

The only reference to Tiger convoys was a single one, Operation_Battleaxe-Tiger_Convoy that:

Note what it says about the 7th Armoured. This was for Battleaxe, a failed counter offensive in June 41. IIRC there was similarly a convoy pushed through at some risk in late 1940 enabling the running of Operation Compass. However the vast majority of supplies for the forces in the western desert came either around Africa or from India and points east. As the RN found even supplying Malta was very expensive let alone trying to send major supplies to Egypt. Such a mission here would have been greatly helped by the fact the Germans were concentrating on their coming attack on the Soviets.

Ok, so what I said.

 

[stevep]

Most sources just tend to repeat earlier sources instead of doing their own research, which is how myths get born.
I thought the same thing for a while until I came across a more academic source that had the numbers that proved van Creveld wrong. You are right however about the distance issue, which is why I keep mentioning the British issues around that in Libya in 1941.

And yet you keep suggesting that logistics is only a problem for the allies and underplaying it for the Axis.

IOTL they were doing just fine until the mud really hit. They still soldier on to a really remarkable degree until they literally just could not move until the ground froze again. Assuming they take the city the issue wouldn't the be same because they would have the huge warehouses of Moscow to supply them, plus paved/heated airfields, not to mention capture a bunch of rolling stock from the rail yards in the capital (the center of the system), so could simply use the existing rail system with Soviet gauge thanks to having all those trains. Unlike in other areas it would be impossible to evacuate and sabotage everything on such short notice; I'm reading an account of the Moscow panic of October right now and basically the evacuation was a joke and the panic effectively disrupted the Soviet ability to do any sort of planned scorched earth like they did in Kiev. It would be more like the capture of Orel than Kiev or Kharkov.

That is assuming that they can take Moscow that quickly. If not their stuffed ever worse than OTL.

Sure. Question is whether Italy would act on that without Hitler's go-ahead given his interests in that area. Invading Greece is one thing given that it was outside Hitler's purview, but with the Axis alliance it would be clear that acting without asking would be a major problem given how dependent Italy was on German coal. I'm bringing that up now because I entirely forgot about that as an issue until now.

I agree that would be the most likely barrier to Mussolini attacking Yugoslavia if he doesn't attack Greece. In which case he might send major reinforcements to Libya and it becomes a solely Anglo-Italian conflict.

I'm not sure those tables are accurate. 1st Armoured division was in Britain until November 1941. 2nd Armoured was in Libya minus a brigade to Greece. 7th Armoured spent 8 months in action, so was withdrawn for a rest and refit and would do so anyway ITTL, leaving only 2nd Armoured by itself with all its brigades.

Wait why would 4th Indian be any different? The East African campaign would still be going on and they were needed there. I thought we were only changing forces that were sent to Greece IOTL from February on. I'd imagine some of the divisions transferred out to Greece would instead here be removed to be rested, like 7th Arm.

As to the 4th Indian:

4th Infantry Division (India) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

So they'd likely still go.

6th Aussie would stay in Libya for defense, as that was the original plan. 7th Aussie was not trained yet, so only the 18th brigade was in Libya:

7th Division (Australia) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It would likely go back there once the 9th division became available.

The 19th Aussie brigade was part of the 6th Australian division.
The 14th infantry brigade was part of the 8th divisions in Palestine and would have stayed there but for the Crete situation.

Also why wouldn't extra forces be sent to East Africa instead? 2nd New Zealand would be prefect for deployment there given their availability and proximity. Perhaps 2nd NZ replaces 4th Indian in North Africa?

Possibly Ellis confused the 1st and 2nd armoured then, I was working under the assumption that a decision is taken to give N Africa the priority without diversions to E Africa or Greece, which under the assumption isn't being attacked here and hence won't occur. Its possibly that given a quickly victory in the advance on Benghazi Churchill especially might well want to transfer some of other units to E Africa.

They didn't really need better at the time, just better leadership and training, which they worked out during the 1941 campaign. I wish I could find the paper again that described the retraining efforts they made to learn from their mistakes in 1940, it was really interesting and would answer your question.

Morale recovery was actually pretty quick for survivors of the 1940 disaster once they got a chance to catch their breath and get reinforced by fresh units. So I'd imagine they'd be ready to go by the time either Rommel attacks or the Italians gets enough forces in place to do it on their own, deciding ITTL that they don't need the Germans. They could probably defend without any major issue by February.

According to most source I've read they found their equipment grossely inadequate, especially against the Matilda's. Morale was affected, hence the large number of surrenders but as you say a lot would depend on getting adequate leadership. Its noted that the Italian commanders formally over Rommel were often far more cautious about his actions.

The army committed more divisions than the marines to the pacific campaign. If the Soviets looked like they'd collapse it is possible for FDR to take the political risk and just focus on Europe, because otherwise if the USSR falls the war in Europe is effectively over since it would be unwinnable for the Allies, per their own planning and internal discussions.

The USN focusing on Europe with the RN and with all the focused RAF and USAAF air support available in 1942 would probably be more than enough to overwhelm the Luftwaffe in the Channel, even though losses might be heavy. Given that the choice would be losing the war in Europe or going ahead with the invasion, that's kind of a no brainer to personalities in charge.

If it was an operation say near Calais then possibly but against the Brittany region how do you achieve air superiority when your fighters can only operate over the region for short periods of time? Plus using naval bombardment is going to be risky, especially with so few BBs available at this point. Furthermore with N Africa still ongoing which ties down both ground and naval units especially. Ditto unless you can capture a defended port quickly - and that's where the bulk of the defenders were - without Mulberries how do you maintain adequate supplies to the forces being landed, let alone reinforcements.

Remember this is happened at the same date as OTL Germany was engaged in both the attempts to relieve Stalingrad and to send forces to Tunisia. Here the latter isn't happening so most/all of the forces that went there can reach N France a lot easier than they can Tunisia and if we're assuming Russia is collapsing then there won't be a crisis in the east either.

Dieppe would have worked had they not tried a frontal assault on the city. I'm cynical and of the opinion they did that so the operation would fail and they could say to the Americans "look at how bad it was!" to win the argument.

Dubious conclusion. How do you take a port, which is what the attempt was supposed to do, without attacking the city its in? Agree that Britain might have felt pressurised to make a sacrificial effort to get the US to realise that such an idea was wildly impractical.

The 25-30 German divisions was likely an overestimate and they'd only arrive later over the course of the operation. The initial landing would be by probably 3-5 divisions and initially face only 1-2 static German ones. They'd have air superiority and naval gun fire support (see Normandy and Sicily for how effective that was) plus face no Atlantic wall defenses of any significance unlike in 1944 so landing on beaches instead on in a city should be a piece of cake, same with cutting off the peninsula, either Brittany or Cotentin. The challenge would be dealing with the counteroffensives, but once again they would have air superiority and naval gunfire support, so won't be able to be dislodged easily or without extremely heavy cost to the attackers. It would probably be more no more costly to land and take the peninsula than OTL Normandy, but the breakout is going to be like Normandy+Italy+Tunisia all in one if they plan on grinding forward. It plays to the Germans overall benefit (relative to OTL battles) to fight like that even though it would be insanely costly (OTL Normandy had higher casualty rates than the worst WW1 battles or WW2 Eastern Front), though potentially overall not worse than those campaigns combined.


It depends on what the situation is. If they build up for a 1943 invasion then if no Torch or Italy they could land as early as May 1943 while still keeping up OTL Pacific moves. If they opt for a November 1942 invasion they could do that instead of Torch. If they opted for no Pacific attacks in 1942 then they could probably invade France in July or September 1942.

See my notes above. Forget about air superiority and expect a lot more German forces to arrive. The allies don't have the massive air superiority of later nor a lot of time so there's no mass destruction of the French railway system either. For most of the time, if the attackers manage to capture a port in something like working position, their going to face continuously air and ground attacks, probably including a lot of artillery which will greatly hinder chances to resupply them. Plus your going to be putting the naval forces supporting the invasion through the mill, at a time when Britain is facing continued problems with supply over the Atlantic and naval power is short all around the world.

- This largely talking about a Sledgehammer operation but a May 43 landing might not be much better off, especially since that means cancelling Torch, which might mean that N Africa isn't cleared.

Who can keep who where?

Germany keeping large forces in Sicily and Sardinia to guard against possible allied landings. We were talking here about after a clearing of N Africa by the allies.

Secure foothold sure, but then not being able to breakout due to the terrain and it being a worse version of Italy for no real gain. The lack of good terrain for air bases would be a huge problem. The Germans had that issue in Crete for instance.


The only way they'd feel that is if the Germans were driven away from their borders and the Allies had boots on the ground right next to their territory. I.e. already did all the heavy lifting.

You can break out. The big issue with an amphibious landing is getting securely ashore and having enough depth to the position that you can't be forced back into the sea. This is helped in the Balkans by the relatively limited logistics at that period as its difficult for the Germans to get reinforcenments to the region, especially once the allies can commit air power against the rail lines further north. As I said I'm not talking about a rapid advance to Vienna say. Get ashore, build up and advance northwards given the much broader front that's available compared to Italy.

Actually look at what happened OTL, see History_of_Bulgaria_World_War_II_and_after. The Bulgarians were desperate to get out of the war and avoid a communist occupation once they realised that Germany was losing. With Allied forces in N Greece - i.e. adjacent to Bulgaria those conditions are met.

Not sure how I'm contradicting myself. Could you quote the two statements I made that you feel shows that?

You're arguing Tunisia as prep for Sicily/Sardinia? AKA OTL? I'm getting confused then as to what we're even discussing then.

In one post you said that Tunisia would be necessary for a realistic attack on Sicily or Sardinia. Then in the next one that there was no reason to occupy Tunisia. The 2nd of those posts was

Doubtful since it really added nothing on its own. If the Mediterranean is open to shipping and Vichy is neutral it would be a huge waste of resources when Stalin was playing hardball for help.

Of course without Tunisia being under allied control then not only is it a lot harder if not impossible to get Sicily but the Med won't be open for convoys, at least without having to be fought through at heavy losses.

How was it impossible to run convoys through the Med. without Sicily and Sardinia? It was done starting IOTL in May 1943:

Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1942-1943

www.naval-history.net

Which is because Tunisia and Algeria are under allied control and they can supply air cover to protect the passage of the narrows. If you don't have that then the Italian islands still pose a major threat to even occasional passage.

The El Alamein position was very nearly lost IOTL. Once things bogged down though the logistics of the campaign turned against the Axis and then they couldn't win by October.


Oh I agree he will probably be stopped by Gazala, but the logistical situation being what it was coupled with holding a very extended defensive line would mean even with fresh forces there wasn't a way to really stop him before that point.

Except he was running on fumes and what he could capture anyway. The logistics and the terrain were the reasons why things turned against the Axis and the defenders were able to hold. - That was summer 42.

With a fair sized more forces in the region - IIRC we were talking about Rommel's initial March/April 41 attack here - then not only should be he held say at Gazala but that's far enough away from Tripoli and his forces were still pretty small so its quite possible that he could be overwhelmed. Doubly so say if some of the armour committed to Greece/Crete was used to bring 7th Arm back up to something like full strength.

Ok, so what I said.

Actually as I say there was a single convoy of specialised stuff pushed through, which might have made it in part because German air units were busy in Russia. Think there was an earlier one in late 1940 when was controversial given how stretched
Britain was at the time but made possible the Compass operation. That's some way different from them being a regular thing.

Noticed in looking it up I missed your comment about the strategic bomber offensive. Have to disagree, at least prior to say 43-44. A fraction of the massive commitment to the strategic bomber campaign could have done a lot to win the Atlantic battle earlier, with much less losses, which would have been a huge force multiplier for Britain.

 

[History Learner]

Well he could have actually prepared for a potential German attack rather than refusing to allow any such preparations. That's an obvious step. I.e. listened to warnings and allowed defensive positions to be built rather than having his entire army caught unprepared and with commanders afraid to even fire back initially because of his orders.

....do you suppose he ordered a partial mobilization just for shits and giggles then? Or, more obviously and attested to by modern research, he did it upon the basis of realizing a German attack was coming and such a mobilization was done among many other counters Stalin enacted, including force transfers from the Far East as well as a massive campaign of aerodome building in the west in order to enable better operational capacity on the part of VVS?

Stalin and the Red Army did listen to warnings, did enter into defensive positions and did aggressively fight. This is not conjecture, this is historical fact; I think you need to accept you are reading very outdated materials if this is what most of your sources are telling you.

If he had learnt earlier than counter attacks by weakened and disorganisaed forces, or the stupidity of insisting on stand and die orders rather than withdrawing to avoid being encircled then there would have been a hell of a lot of changes for the better for the Soviets but then he won't have been Stalin.

No because the Red Army's frontier forces were lacking in motorization and conceding the vast amounts of ground suggested here would've undermined the regime, both politically and strategically because it cuts both ways.

 

[ATP]

Theoretically yes, but that would mean abandoning every Soviet war plan they'd come up with.

They had very good plan - made alliance with Germany,let them fight and after few years take on whatever win.
Unfortunatelly,french surrender.And saved Europe that way,otherwise soviets would take everything.
So,all western european should be gratefull to brave french soldiers who heroically surrender.

 

[sillygoose]

Sorry for the delay, I read this and intended to get to it but life got in the way and I forgot.

And yet you keep suggesting that logistics is only a problem for the allies and underplaying it for the Axis.

Because the Axis ports were much closer to the front than the British ones. Axis logistics don't become an issue until they hit Tobruk and don't capture supplies. I'm not trying to claim logistics aren't a problem for the Axis, so don't claim that I am, if anything you're projecting what you're doing on me, because you've done nothing but pretend logistics did not matter to the British effort, despite me quoting the British official history about how the logistical situation prevented any further advance.

That is assuming that they can take Moscow that quickly. If not their stuffed ever worse than OTL.

Given that there were no defenders left in the city and public order had broken down so long as they get through the outer defenses in October there is nothing to stop them from asserting control over Moscow extremely quickly. I've been reading Russian accounts of the Panic and the invaders would have a lot of help from locals who were already burning pictures of Stalin and copies of Marx while painting swastikas around the city because they considered a German victory inevitable as the leaders fled the city and left virtually no one in charge. IOTL once the line held due to the mud Stalin got his nerve back, stayed, and ordered a brutal crackdown with orders to shoot just about for any reason to scare the public back into line; it worked. Had the line not held though Stalin would have fled and from then on the public would have submitted to the conquerors if they didn't flee, just like in every major Soviet city taken in 1941 (Kiev, Minsk, Kharkov, Smolensk, etc.). Not that just about every other country didn't do the same so long as there weren't organized military units in the city still fighting.

I agree that would be the most likely barrier to Mussolini attacking Yugoslavia if he doesn't attack Greece. In which case he might send major reinforcements to Libya and it becomes a solely Anglo-Italian conflict.

Indeed. Question is whether they could counterattack or would remain static around El Agheila. IIRC though they still requested and got Luftwaffe support to deal with Malta, so I think that would still happen. Question is if they remain or head East for Barbarossa in June.

Possibly Ellis confused the 1st and 2nd armoured then, I was working under the assumption that a decision is taken to give N Africa the priority without diversions to E Africa or Greece, which under the assumption isn't being attacked here and hence won't occur. Its possibly that given a quickly victory in the advance on Benghazi Churchill especially might well want to transfer some of other units to E Africa.

Probably given how many units shifted around in that period and the internet didn't exist to make it easier to cross check stuff quickly and efficiently.

As to the priority issue, I'm not sure where you got that impression given that the only change is Mussolini not invading Greece. That changes nothing about East Africa due to the importance of securing the Red Sea. So just not diversions to Greece, which opens up the question of what is actually kept in Libya and how soon any sort of securing of the ports could take place. Any idea what AAA resources were devoted to Greece and when? That seems to have been a major problem for getting Benghazi operational again and that was the constraint when it came to taking the rest of Libya. Of course with Malta becoming more effective it might be an issue of the British also preferring to take the 'indirect approach' of starving Tripolitania into submission rather than trying to conquer it on the ground...which lasts only so long as the Luftwaffe isn't involved. That might belatedly force the British into action.

According to most source I've read they found their equipment grossely inadequate, especially against the Matilda's. Morale was affected, hence the large number of surrenders but as you say a lot would depend on getting adequate leadership. Its noted that the Italian commanders formally over Rommel were often far more cautious about his actions.

The usual AT stuff yes. Howitzers and artillery still worked, but that was a serious diversion of critical resources away from its intended and necessary role. The Italian situation was of course not limited to that, the Breda LMG was one of the worst MG designs ever fielded by a military, but with Compass it was just as much a supply problem and one of very bad tactics that allowed units to be isolated and starved out. When coupled with the Matilda problem it is hardly surprising that the Italian military fell apart, which is exactly what Graziani warned Mussolini about, but was told to do it anyway because the peace negotiations were "just around the corner".

Even the German commanders above Rommel were much more cautious and he repeatedly disobeyed orders, but was generally forgiven by Hitler due to his personal relationship and getting major results; still they hated his guts as a result (IIRC Kesselring also hated working with Rommel for that reason and sided with the Italians when it was politically convenient).
Paulus, before he got his army command, was sent to oversee the situation in early 1941 and was furious with Rommel for attacking too early.

If it was an operation say near Calais then possibly but against the Brittany region how do you achieve air superiority when your fighters can only operate over the region for short periods of time? Plus using naval bombardment is going to be risky, especially with so few BBs available at this point. Furthermore with N Africa still ongoing which ties down both ground and naval units especially. Ditto unless you can capture a defended port quickly - and that's where the bulk of the defenders were - without Mulberries how do you maintain adequate supplies to the forces being landed, let alone reinforcements.

Aircraft carriers and drop tanks. That and surprise given the relative lack of German fighters in the region.
Destroyers were good enough even, as the Germans proved later in the war against the Soviets in the Baltic. Certainly the Allies had enough cruisers for longer range work. BBs have the longest reach and heaviest shells, but that isn't necessary to get the desired results. So long as they aren't attacking Brest or Lorient head on.

Fighting in Libya/Egypt shouldn't tie down anything, but the Eastern Mediterranean fleet which wasn't going to be used outside the region anyway and weren't used IOTL for Torch. There wasn't much back and forth of naval units from Gibraltar to Egypt before Tunisia fell.

As to the solution for no port...both in Normandy and Sicily more supplies were landed directly on the beach than in any port due to the lack of intact port capture.

Remember this is happened at the same date as OTL Germany was engaged in both the attempts to relieve Stalingrad and to send forces to Tunisia. Here the latter isn't happening so most/all of the forces that went there can reach N France a lot easier than they can Tunisia and if we're assuming Russia is collapsing then there won't be a crisis in the east either.

Butterflies due to no Greece may well change the entire situation so that there is no Stalingrad. That said I take your point. Still given the fears about what would happen if Russia quit they would risk it anyway, since that was the plan. It was a hail mary move, because without it working the war is effectively over since it would be unwinnable for the Allies alone; as much as I hate on Roosevelt for giving Stalin everything he wanted to the detriment of US interests, he wasn't wrong that without the Soviets the Wallies would have had to make peace since the price for victory would be unacceptable to Americans.

Dubious conclusion. How do you take a port, which is what the attempt was supposed to do, without attacking the city its in? Agree that Britain might have felt pressurised to make a sacrificial effort to get the US to realise that such an idea was wildly impractical.

Attack from the land side. That was exactly what the pre- and post-Dieppe suggestions were and how Cherbourg was taken IOTL. From the land side it is vastly easier and less costly than an amphibious assault on a defended city/port.

See my notes above. Forget about air superiority and expect a lot more German forces to arrive. The allies don't have the massive air superiority of later nor a lot of time so there's no mass destruction of the French railway system either. For most of the time, if the attackers manage to capture a port in something like working position, their going to face continuously air and ground attacks, probably including a lot of artillery which will greatly hinder chances to resupply them. Plus your going to be putting the naval forces supporting the invasion through the mill, at a time when Britain is facing continued problems with supply over the Atlantic and naval power is short all around the world.

Given how much effort was put into bombing sub pens in 1942 the Allies had overwhelming airpower had they opted to concentrate it.

Given US AAA resources and the likely diversion of German bombers away from Britain they'd probably have a lot to fortify the captured port with. Artillery would only come into play if the Allies failed to seal off the peninsula. Which is probably why they'd have to suck it up and attack Cotentin since it is so close to Britain for mass air support and ease of bomber operations against transporation and it is easier to quickly attack both sides of the peninsula to seal it off before German reinforcements arrive.

- This largely talking about a Sledgehammer operation but a May 43 landing might not be much better off, especially since that means cancelling Torch, which might mean that N Africa isn't cleared.

North Africa not being cleared is actually a good thing for the Allies, as it forces the Axis to divert vital resources away from Europe.

Germany keeping large forces in Sicily and Sardinia to guard against possible allied landings. We were talking here about after a clearing of N Africa by the allies.

Gotcha.

You can break out. The big issue with an amphibious landing is getting securely ashore and having enough depth to the position that you can't be forced back into the sea. This is helped in the Balkans by the relatively limited logistics at that period as its difficult for the Germans to get reinforcenments to the region, especially once the allies can commit air power against the rail lines further north. As I said I'm not talking about a rapid advance to Vienna say. Get ashore, build up and advance northwards given the much broader front that's available compared to Italy.

That isn't really as hard as you think, especially so close to Britain. Even when the Germans broke through in Sicily naval gunfire smashed their offensive. Granted that didn't work out as easily in Normandy, but I am talking about a pincer landing on Cotentin with the terrain making it very easy to fire against any attacks against the landing zones as well as having spotting aircraft constantly hovering overhead.

The landings in the Balkans isn't the issue, it is getting beyond the beachhead due to the terrain. Again see Salonika in WW1. They literally couldn't get out of it until the CPs had literally collapsed. Every effort to push beyond the mountains was smashed and as we saw with Italy WW2 technology didn't change the problems of fighting in mountains even if it were easier to flank by landings on coastlines further north. So I have no doubt the Allies can easily take parts of or the entire nation of Greece but then you have the problem of pushing further north.

I wouldn't claim the German logistics were too restricted to get more reinforcements given that they had 300,000 men in Greece alone in 1944. That was with partisan help directing air strikes and with special operations teams on the ground. All they were ultimately able to achieve was to chew up the German retreat out of Greece thanks to bases in Italy. Without bases in Italy good luck generating sufficient sorties to matter to the logistics situation, especially give that Operation Strangle failed:

Operation Strangle (World War II) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

If you think the Balkan logistics situation was restricted, Italy was vastly easier to concentrate against, especially with two air forces available for the task.

Actually look at what happened OTL, see History_of_Bulgaria_World_War_II_and_after. The Bulgarians were desperate to get out of the war and avoid a communist occupation once they realised that Germany was losing. With Allied forces in N Greece - i.e. adjacent to Bulgaria those conditions are met.

You mean after Romania switched sides and the German position in the Balkans had collapsed. They were worried before then, but lacked the means until the Germans were basically out of men to do anything about a Bulgarian defection and the Soviets were racing through Romania.

In one post you said that Tunisia would be necessary for a realistic attack on Sicily or Sardinia. Then in the next one that there was no reason to occupy Tunisia. The 2nd of those posts was

Of course without Tunisia being under allied control then not only is it a lot harder if not impossible to get Sicily but the Med won't be open for convoys, at least without having to be fought through at heavy losses.

I'm not sure how that post backs up what you claim. I said invading Sicily or Sardinia would require Tunisian bases. In that quoted post I said that they could run convoys, not assault landing flotillas against Italy, through the Mediterranean if Vichy was still neutral and Libya had been cleared since they could hug the coast and avoid Sardinia and Sicily. There would still be attacks on said convoys as well as losses, but it could be done and wouldn't be much if any worse than losses in the Atlantic.

It seems there was just a misunderstanding of what I meant in the quote.

Which is because Tunisia and Algeria are under allied control and they can supply air cover to protect the passage of the narrows. If you don't have that then the Italian islands still pose a major threat to even occasional passage.

Yes. However if Vichy is neutral it could be done by hugging the coast just like the Tiger convoys, but minus having to worry about Libya. Malta then could be properly supplied and provide air cover.

Except he was running on fumes and what he could capture anyway. The logistics and the terrain were the reasons why things turned against the Axis and the defenders were able to hold. - That was summer 42.

Not really an accurate description for the Gazala Line.
Here is what happened IOTL and what is likely to have happened ITTL in 1941:

Battle of Gazala - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The British have reserves to stop Rommel at Gazala and logistics would limit his ability to do more than hold there. Potentially the Italians could do the same if they brought in all they had used for Greece and didn't ask for German help.

With a fair sized more forces in the region - IIRC we were talking about Rommel's initial March/April 41 attack here - then not only should be he held say at Gazala but that's far enough away from Tripoli and his forces were still pretty small so its quite possible that he could be overwhelmed. Doubly so say if some of the armour committed to Greece/Crete was used to bring 7th Arm back up to something like full strength.

He'd have taken back Benghazi, so there would be some supplies coming in from there even with the DAF bombing. Given that he'd likely inflict pretty serious damage if he could advance to the Gazala Line things would likely bog down there for both sides very much like the 1942 Spring situation. Then it is a question of whether we end up seeing a 1941 analogue for the 1942 Battle of Gazala...with either side the potential victor. Rommel's numbers weren't the issue necessarily, since he largely used Italians to hold static positions and the British weren't really adept at coordinated different arms until 1942 and relied on maneuver and Die Gute Quelle:

Black (code) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

https://www.intelligencemuseum.org/assets/pdf/articles/website%20fellers%20in%20cairo.pdf

As well as SigInt:

Radio Kills: Rommel’s 621st Radio Intercept Company | Armchair General Magazine - We Put YOU in Command!

armchairgeneral.com

No way the British fight better at Gazala in 1941 than they did in 1942 and certainly more armor won't help given how abysmal the service rates were for the Crusader tanks:
(the link details the problems of British combined arms as well)

Crusader tank - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Crusader proved unreliable in the desert. This started with their transport from the UK to North Africa. Poor preparation and handling caused problems that had to be rectified before they could be passed to the regiments and ate into the supply of spare parts. Once in use, the sand caused erosion in the cooling system[7] and the stresses of hard cross-country travel caused oil leaks between the engine block and the cylinders. Since there were few tank transporters or railways in the desert, the tanks had to travel long distances on their tracks, causing further wear.

Fighting further forward than during Battle Axe or Compass would be only make the situation even worse.

Actually as I say there was a single convoy of specialised stuff pushed through, which might have made it in part because German air units were busy in Russia. Think there was an earlier one in late 1940 when was controversial given how stretched
Britain was at the time but made possible the Compass operation. That's some way different from them being a regular thing.

Fair enough. Point was that it could be done if needed.

Noticed in looking it up I missed your comment about the strategic bomber offensive. Have to disagree, at least prior to say 43-44. A fraction of the massive commitment to the strategic bomber campaign could have done a lot to win the Atlantic battle earlier, with much less losses, which would have been a huge force multiplier for Britain.

I've got a specialized book on German FLAK and even as early as 1940 the vast investments in civil defense and FLAK defenses/ammo were causing issues for the war economy. It got worse later, but actually not by that much in 1943-44; in that period it was the damage that the bomber campaign inflicted that got worse, not the proportion of German investments in air defense...well that and the worsening of defense crews since the best men ended up in the East or later West/Italian fronts.

In 1941-42 the focus of the strategic bombing campaign by the RAF was German naval bases and sub pens, but they failed to do crippling damage due to the defenses (including sub pens, which weren't conquered until the Grand Slam bomb). Certainly coastal command could have used the bombers, but without the radar tech to go with them they'd have had a hard time being as effective as they were in 1943-44. A lot of what we know today is only in hindsight, since they didn't know their bombing of the sub bases wasn't working nearly as well as they needed. Still until the US coast opened up to Uboats the British basically were winning the Battle of the Atlantic by late Autumn 1941:

Battle of the Atlantic - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org