WI Italy doesn't join the Triple Alliance? Partners with Britain instead.

[raharris1973]

In 1882 Italy joined the Triple Alliance, mostly it seems out of anger over the French annexation of Tunisia. What if they decided not to rashly rush into this alliance and remain a 'free agent' in the Mediterranean? Would they end up an ally of France eventually or would they remain neutral until there was a war in Europe and sell their entry to the highest bidder? What does this mean for Italian foreign policy in the meantime? Do they become more cautious about foreign adventures or become more hostile toward Austria?

A good opportunity came up in 1882: UK and France were planning an intervention in Egypt to protect their investments in the country after the Orabi coup of 1878 which had ousted the khedive. At the last moment France pulled out (IIRC because the government fell). The Gladstone ministry invited Italy to participate but after some hamming and hewing the Depretis ministry declined the opportunity and the British went in alone.

It would have been a good chance of strengthening the ties with UK and avoiding the diplomatic isolation of Italy. There was also a convenient fig leaf since there was a significant Italian presence in Alexandria and some investments in Egypt (though much less than the British and French ones) but internal politics and the disappointment with the outcome of the congress of Berlin resulted in a refusal. The intervention went in without a glitch so there was really no worry on the military or supply side. An Italian participation would have been likely to reap some economic benefits in Egypt (although Italy would have been a junior partner) and would certainly have resulted in a better Italo-British cooperation during the Mahdi revolt and possibly shared spheres of influence in Sudan. It would also derail Italy participation in the Triple alliance.

With Europe having the Austro-German dual alliance of 1879, but no Triple Alliance with Italy, there is also no an Anglo-Italian accord of 1882, principally over Egyptian and Mediterranean matters. I presume by the mid-1880s, Britain has organized something fairly similar to OTL's Mediterranean agreements.

I figure eventually by 1892 the Franco-Russian alliance is coming as a third block.

With Italy outside of German and Austrian reach as an ally, how does German and Austrian diplomacy and military planning proceed differently from OTL?

I assume the Germans would never draw up war plans that assume an infusion of Italian troops to help defend Alsace, like OTL's Schlieffen Plan. I assume the Austrians would always factor in the Italians as a potential menace.

Could this lead the Austrians to work harder enough at accommodating the Russians to avoid an irrevocable break with the Russians?

Would it lead to Austria-Hungary being more worried about being backstabbed from all directions, leading to more defense spending throughout the 1880s, 1890s and early 1900s compared with OTL?

Would Berlin and Vienna be more careful about brinkmanship in general, if they assumed Italy was more likely to be foe than friend?

Might the lack of a tie to Italy lead to more intense efforts to cultivate a different comparable ally, like, for instance, Abdul Hamid's Ottoman Empire, from the mid 1880s onward?

 

[sillygoose]

In 1882 Italy joined the Triple Alliance, mostly it seems out of anger over the French annexation of Tunisia. What if they decided not to rashly rush into this alliance and remain a 'free agent' in the Mediterranean? Would they end up an ally of France eventually or would they remain neutral until there was a war in Europe and sell their entry to the highest bidder? What does this mean for Italian foreign policy in the meantime? Do they become more cautious about foreign adventures or become more hostile toward Austria?

Given the historic evolution of Italian foreign policy after the Triple Alliance was signed Italy would fall into France's orbit because they really coveted Austrian territory; colonial territory was of course desirable, but the desired Austrian territory was much more valuable and arguably easier to seize. I wouldn't be surprised if they signed a deal with the French by the early 20th century, but I think you're somewhat mistaken about the purpose of Italy signing on to the Triple Alliance: Italy was looking for security along with everyone else and needed allies. Tunisia caused them to pick a side, but it was highly valuable at the time given the balance of power was on Germany+Austria's side. It was only later in the late 1900s that the Italian position began to shift. They didn't sign a secret non-aggression pact with France until 1912 IIRC and still did covet Corsica and Nice/Savoy in addition to Tunisia. I think the later 'heel turn' was the result of media manipulation by the Entente making Austrian territory look more enticing as well as the shift of the balance of power by the 1910s.

It is a complicated story that I'm really not all that familiar with to be honest and it would require probably a lot of specialist reading to get an answer, most of which is probably only in Italian.

With Italy outside of German and Austrian reach as an ally, how does German and Austrian diplomacy and military planning proceed differently from OTL?

It largely doesn't beyond having to protect the border with Italy better, probably with greater fortifications. That shouldn't be something the Hungarians would oppose financially given the popular hatred for the Italians since 1848. I'd imagine the Landwehr would also get substantially more funding to raise troops to ensure the Austrian border with Italy was protected enough, though I don't know how the Hungarians would react to that. Germany's plans really aren't changed other than for how it would impact Austrian military commitments against Russia.

I assume the Germans would never draw up war plans that assume an infusion of Italian troops to help defend Alsace, like OTL's Schlieffen Plan. I assume the Austrians would always factor in the Italians as a potential menace.

That was only a variant to the Schlieffen Plan, not something ever really seriously considered since no one really figured the Italians would join the war anyway. Yes the Austrians definitely would.

Could this lead the Austrians to work harder enough at accommodating the Russians to avoid an irrevocable break with the Russians?

There was really not all that much they could do to prevent Russia from turning on them. Pan-Slavism and tradition Russian foreign policy meant that Austria will be a target once Russia feels comfortable enough in their power to begin expanding in the region via their proxy Serbia.

Would it lead to Austria-Hungary being more worried about being backstabbed from all directions, leading to more defense spending throughout the 1880s, 1890s and early 1900s compared with OTL?

Yes. Though in terms of the combined army it wouldn't be enough since the Hungarians were very eager to leverage military spending for their own ends and this simply gives them more leverage. Perhaps the Habsburgs give concessions to the Hungarians to let them expand the Honved more to secure more funding for the Combined Army? I'd imagine the fortifications along the Italian border would be expanded and the Landwehr would be beefed up substantially to guard the frontier in terms of war. Perhaps when it comes down to it Austria isn't willing to go after Serbia even with German support for fear of being surrounded?

Would Berlin and Vienna be more careful about brinkmanship in general, if they assumed Italy was more likely to be foe than friend?

I'd assume Austria might be, but Berlin realized what a bad strategic situation they had so if war were to come might as well get it over sooner rather than later. Perhaps they try to force a confrontation while Russia is recovering from the 1904-05 catastrophies?

Might the lack of a tie to Italy lead to more intense efforts to cultivate a different comparable ally, like, for instance, Abdul Hamid's Ottoman Empire, from the mid 1880s onward?

I wouldn't be surprised.
Britain though might well be more predisposed toward German efforts to cultivate them however if the Entente is looking more powerful since it would have Italy on side or at least Italy would not be on the CP side even nominally and would be relatively hostile to Austria. Or perhaps Britain would be willing to sit out a conflict in Europe as a result? Lots of butterflies here.

 

[raharris1973]

How much of this..

I think the later 'heel turn' was the result of media manipulation by the Entente making Austrian territory look more enticing

..is really needed if we pretty much accept this...

the shift of the balance of power by the 1910s [toward the Entente I assume].

...and this...

Italy would fall into France's orbit because they really coveted Austrian territory; colonial territory was of course desirable, but the desired Austrian territory was much more valuable and arguably easier to seize.

...as true?

It largely doesn't beyond having to protect the border with Italy better, probably with greater fortifications. That shouldn't be something the Hungarians would oppose financially given the popular hatred for the Italians since 1848. I'd imagine the Landwehr would also get substantially more funding to raise troops to ensure the Austrian border with Italy was protected enough, though I don't know how the Hungarians would react to that.

Good point

That was only a variant to the Schlieffen Plan, not something ever really seriously considered since no one really figured the Italians would join the war anyway. Yes the Austrians definitely would.

Apparently it kept showing up in planning documents and related correspondence again and again in the years 1905-1914.

There was really not all that much they could do to prevent Russia from turning on them. Pan-Slavism and tradition Russian foreign policy meant that Austria will be a target once Russia feels comfortable enough in their power to begin expanding in the region via their proxy Serbia.

I would tend to agree Russia would let itself get drawn that way by this or that pressure group or courtier.

Yes. Though in terms of the combined army it wouldn't be enough since the Hungarians were very eager to leverage military spending for their own ends and this simply gives them more leverage. Perhaps the Habsburgs give concessions to the Hungarians to let them expand the Honved more to secure more funding for the Combined Army? I'd imagine the fortifications along the Italian border would be expanded and the Landwehr would be beefed up substantially to guard the frontier in terms of war.

These are all very interesting and plausible sounding coping mechanisms you describe.

Perhaps when it comes down to it Austria isn't willing to go after Serbia even with German support for fear of being surrounded?

This is a very interesting possibility - Austria's more keen awareness of it's vulnerability locks it into a more purely defensive stance. This is not a 100% guarantee against it finding itself at war. There could be some crisis it cannot control that starts a war also. But between chances of being better armed, and perhaps being seen by fewer countries as responsible for the start of the war, the empire might finish the war in better shape, or it might not. Or it might be crushed just as hard but have a better historical reputation.

I'd assume Austria might be, but Berlin realized what a bad strategic situation they had so if war were to come might as well get it over sooner rather than later. Perhaps they try to force a confrontation while Russia is recovering from the 1904-05 catastrophies?

Who specifically would be trying to force a confrontation in 1904-1905, or shortly after? Berlin? Vienna? Both? and who with? Italy? France? Serbia? Russia?

 

[stevep]

Who specifically would be trying to force a confrontation in 1904-1905, or shortly after? Berlin? Vienna? Both? and who with? Italy? France? Serbia? Russia?

On the last one definitely Berlin. SG's basic idea is that Russia is weak enough that France can still be attacked and crushed fairly reliably and also Britain hasn't been alienated enough by German actions against it so France would be seen as vulnerable to a quick and crushing attack. Note that he mentioned before Russia recovered from its 1904/05, not necessarily in that period itself.

Whether this would work I don't know. Germany is in a better position short term compared to 1914 but how much of the Schiefflien plan was advanced at this point and how did German forces compare with Belgium defences? Or is the German plan to try and fight its way through the French border defences?? Also France hadn't adopted the idiotic Plan XVII so its likely to be a much more dangerous opponent if the Germans do come.

In the longer term, if they don't win quick their in a worse position, especially if a drive through Belgium prompts a British response. Remembering that at this stage there's a Tory government in power which is likely to be more eager to use force. Also the RN is clearly stronger at this stage compared to the IGN and subs are weaker. Most of all a British blockade and a long war in isolation means no nitrates for Germany so their doomed to defeat barring miracles.

Of course they could attack Russia but how much would that help them, other than possibly prompt a French attack on their defences in support of their ally and keep Britain neutral? Advancing deep into Russia would cause them problems and if the Russians unite against the threat they could see a nasty fight there as well.

If your going to go for a quick aggressive victory about 1914 is probably the best option for Germany but its always going to be risky and if they had had better political leadership they might have realised its far from the best option.

 

[sillygoose]

On the last one definitely Berlin. SG's basic idea is that Russia is weak enough that France can still be attacked and crushed fairly reliably and also Britain hasn't been alienated enough by German actions against it so France would be seen as vulnerable to a quick and crushing attack. Note that he mentioned before Russia recovered from its 1904/05, not necessarily in that period itself.

Correct, but that is unlikely given the lower levels of tension and appearance that Germany was strong enough not to worry even without Italy at the time. I don't think they realized that Russia would recover so quickly. France too, realizing the weakness of Russia, was willing to back down more readily than later. Ultimately the idea that war was the last resort that had become the only option didn't exist in the 1905-10 period as far as I can tell, so pushing for it to the exclusion of all other alternatives is unlikely and if France backs down on things like Morocco until Russia is recovered then more likely than not there will be no war. I just threw it out there as a potential option, because crazier things have happened.

Whether this would work I don't know. Germany is in a better position short term compared to 1914 but how much of the Schiefflien plan was advanced at this point and how did German forces compare with Belgium defences? Or is the German plan to try and fight its way through the French border defences?? Also France hadn't adopted the idiotic Plan XVII so its likely to be a much more dangerous opponent if the Germans do come.

In the longer term, if they don't win quick their in a worse position, especially if a drive through Belgium prompts a British response. Remembering that at this stage there's a Tory government in power which is likely to be more eager to use force. Also the RN is clearly stronger at this stage compared to the IGN and subs are weaker. Most of all a British blockade and a long war in isolation means no nitrates for Germany so their doomed to defeat barring miracles.

Of course they could attack Russia but how much would that help them, other than possibly prompt a French attack on their defences in support of their ally and keep Britain neutral? Advancing deep into Russia would cause them problems and if the Russians unite against the threat they could see a nasty fight there as well.

If your going to go for a quick aggressive victory about 1914 is probably the best option for Germany but its always going to be risky and if they had had better political leadership they might have realised its far from the best option.

The Schlieffen plan was first proposed in 1905, but Russia was a virtual non-factor militarily, so any invasion plan of France alone would have been fine. Question is whether it would have been possible given French border forts and the lack of mobile siege guns like the Skoda mortars that did not yet exist. The French border forts weren't insurmountable (the Maginot Line learned from all the failures of pre-WW1 fort designs), but the terrain made them very tough to deal with if supported by a field army, which of course they would be. So they'd serve their purpose.

Belgium as an invasion route wasn't necessary per se at this point and wasn't really viable given the lack of heavy guns to bust the Liege forts. Having actually been to that city to see the forts trying to take them without heavy mobile artillery was going to be extremely difficult.

As to France being a much more dangerous opponent in 1905 they were severely outmatched even with their more modern artillery...which was not really adapted well to fight in the terrain of the border areas. Plus given actual French performance (with their combat experienced colonial divisions to boot) in meeting engagement in the Ardennes with all the years of expansion and build up between 1905-1914 they'd likely crumble in combat if it came down to it as they did IOTL. Red pants stand out in the forest.

All would come down to how quick the war would be as you rightly point out. Though war would be incredibly unlikely as France knew it would likely lose quick without Russia.

 

[raharris1973]

but how much of the Schiefflien plan was advanced at this point and how did German forces compare with Belgium defences? Or is the German plan to try and fight its way through the French border defences??

For all these questions, I recommend reading up from the "dueling Terences" Terence Zuber and Terence Holmes who've written on German war plans year by year.

Remembering that at this stage there's a Tory government in power which is likely to be more eager to use force.

That applies to the Tory government of Arthur Balfour, which last from 1902 through December 1905. Tories were accustomed to thinking of Russia as enemy #1 but appeared to feel at this time the Japanese were handling them alright. With them taken care of, and the Entente with France, and then a German attack on France, the Tories might be more eager to use force against the *new* German enemy.

If the Germans move later in the recovery period, after December 1905, they'd be dealing with a Liberal government in Britain, first Campbell-Bannerman, through April 1908, and if after that, Asquith. These governments, interesting in passing the People's budget, might be less keen on force in general principles and priorities, but were generally sympathetic with the Third Republic over the Second Reich.

Most of all a British blockade and a long war in isolation means no nitrates for Germany so their doomed to defeat barring miracles.

Yes, if the Germans are blockaded by Britain, and the war goes longer than 6 month or a year, and the initial campaign, like OTL's initial 1914 campaign, doesn't capture a bunch of nitrates like the capture of Antwerp did, the German's face a precipitous ammo shortage without the Haber-Bosch process.

Of course they could attack Russia but how much would that help them, other than possibly prompt a French attack on their defences in support of their ally and keep Britain neutral?

That's pretty much what they get out of it, they get to tactically dominate the Russians and the French in the border regions, defending in the west and attacking in the east.

Advancing deep into Russia would cause them problems and if the Russians unite against the threat they could see a nasty fight there as well.

That's unlikely to happen, the Germans don't even need to try to go for St. Petersburg or Moscow to cause the Russians, and by extension, the French, a world of hurt. Just manhandling and beating up the Tsarist army in western frontier districts, supporting breakaway buffer states on the western fringe, (Baltics, western Ukraine, Finland) acting in concert with neighbors who want some territory back from Russia (Romania in Bessarabia, Turkey in Kars) will be embarrassing enough to destabilize the Russian regime, crash it down, and by calling into question the Russian economy and its creditworthiness, crash down the French economy as well.

Granted, that's indirect and not the same thing as invading/defeating/occupying France.

France too, realizing the weakness of Russia, was willing to back down more readily than later. Ultimately the idea that war was the last resort that had become the only option didn't exist in the 1905-10 period as far as I can tell, so pushing for it to the exclusion of all other alternatives is unlikely and if France backs down on things like Morocco until Russia is recovered then more likely than not there will be no war.

Yeah, the Kaiser pretty much helped ruin his Ministers' policy of bluff and bluster by early on in the Morocco crisis after cosmetic French concessions and perhaps the firing of Delcasse that Germany wouldn't go to war over Morocco, and then compounded it by putting the issue before a conference of the powers without having figured out all the side deals first.

As to France being a much more dangerous opponent in 1905 they were severely outmatched even with their more modern artillery...which was not really adapted well to fight in the terrain of the border areas.

The French were severely outmatched by Germany in 1905? In what way? In raw numbers of soldiers? Because most discussions I've had about this described France's more modern artillery, the 75's, as France's insurmountable, war-winning advantage in terms of rate of fire at that time. What did Germany have that would beat the 75's? Why do you say the French modern artillery (I presume the 75s) was not well adapted for the terrain of the border areas?

 

[sillygoose]

The French were severely outmatched by Germany in 1905? In what way? In raw numbers of soldiers? Because most discussions I've had about this described France's more modern artillery, the 75's, as France's insurmountable, war-winning advantage in terms of rate of fire at that time. What did Germany have that would beat the 75's? Why do you say the French modern artillery (I presume the 75s) was not well adapted for the terrain of the border areas?

Remind me how well that rapid fire artillery helped France in 1914? Until 1916 artillery caused only as many casualties as small arms:

War Losses (Germany) | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)

2,037,000 German soldiers were killed in World War I. These losses were a military and demographic catastrophe which had enormously important political, social, economic, and cultural consequences.

encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net

Artillery was by far the greatest killer in the war; about 58.3 percent of German deaths were caused by artillery and about 41.7 percent by small arms.[16]

That's for the whole war, small arms casualties were much higher in 1914-15 than from 1916 onwards.
Which would explain the surprisingly low German deaths for 1914:

Boris Urlanis calculates the yearly number of German war dead, by year, as follows:

1914

142,502

The following year it was 5 fold higher. Even allowing for the time period being 2.5x as long, trench warfare was much more costly than the mobile phase of combat at the start of the war due to the lack of firepower relative to later years.
In open combat when artillery couldn't be massed (including the heaps of ammo necessary for lots of firing) like it was from 1916 onwards actual casualties and deaths were quite low; to the 75mm in particular.

Casualties 1914

I wonder if anyone can help me please. I am trying to find accurate (as accurate as possible...) figures for the total casualties for France, Britain and Germany as at the end of 1914 (and not the entire war as most often quoted). Any help most welcome. Many thanks James

www.greatwarforum.org

If this is correct then the French meanwhile suffered more than twice as many deaths as the Germans despite only fighting Germany while German casualties are for fighting the British, French, Belgians, and Russians.

So yeah, the French 75 never lived up to its reputation despite being designed specifically for the mobile fighting experienced in 1914.

The flat firing 75 did not do well in hills or forests as we saw from the fighting IOTL in the Ardennes when it was a small arms battle most of the way, which the Germans dominated. Well that or German howitzers, which the French basically entirely lacked even in 1914 and would certainly do so later on.

Also the MG isn't really around in a big way yet, so the defender would lack a major weapon to bog down the enemy and make him vulnerable to artillery:

Suppression: The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat

American Infantryman with His Rifle By Dr. Jim Storr Jim Storr is a retired army officer who now teaches at the UK’s Joint Services Command ...

roadstothegreatwar-ww1.blogspot.com

Suppression: The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat

Suppression is the effect of small arms and other weapons systems which temporarily prevent the enemy firing its weapons or moving in the open. In simple terms, it makes them keep their heads down. It is critically important. In the offence it allows the attacker to move forward, to find gaps and weak points, and exploit them. In the defence it prevents the enemy moving forward and firing, and thereby sets him up for counterattacks. In both cases it pins the enemy down for incapacitation (or destruction) by other weapons.

From WW2 experience it would seem that the 75mm was understood to be an artillery caliber only good for suppression, not destructive fire or even inflicting major casualties unless it was highly concentrated and caught a large group of enemy troops in the open. There is a reason everyone went up to 105mm at WW2 except the British and Soviets, the former using the 25 pounder/~87mm for suppression and the later using the 76mm as a multi-purpose weapon, but when used as artillery more for suppression than destruction (they had the larger 122mm and up from that).

 

[Buba]

The difference between 1905 and 1914 is that in '05 the French have QF artillery and the Germans do not. This is a difference between 10 shots a minute and 2 rpm.
The mle 97 is as good as it was in '14, but the 7.7cm and 10.5 cm are much worse than in 1914.

An enormous leg up for the French.

 

[sillygoose]

The difference between 1905 and 1914 is that in '05 the French have QF artillery and the Germans do not. This is a difference between 10 shots a minute and 2 rpm.
The mle 97 is as good as it was in '14, but the 7.7cm and 10.5 cm are much worse than in 1914.

An enormous leg up for the French.

So? Artillery played less of a role than commonly thought in 1914 for a variety of reasons.
Ironically, since German war planning anticipated moving through Belgium as early as 1905, though not to the extent Schlieffen considered AFAIK, they could very well penetrate through the Ardennes to turn the French flank in Lorraine. French war plans
prior to 1906 did not allow for a German move through Belgium though it was considered possible and north of Verdun, aka opposite the Ardennes, the French did not have any forts worth the name...right about in the Sedan area. There the 75 wouldn't be present in substantial numbers and the French wouldn't be ready for such a move and have to improvise on the fly, which did not generally work out that well for them in 1914.

BTW all the anticipated French 'leg ups' didn't work out that well in 1914 even when German artillery was lagging heavily and effectively a non-factor in much of the campaign.

Edit:
But if you find any info from the campaign about the role of artillery being greater than I'm allowing for I'm open to revising my position.

 

[Buba]

German artillery was lagging heavily and effectively a non-factor in much of the campaign.

Oh? Good to know, then!

 

[sillygoose]

Oh? Good to know, then!

When they were advancing horse drawn artillery generally couldn't keep up. There is a reason that air support and to some extent self propelled artillery became so important late in WW1 and of course in WW2.

 

[Buba]

Horse drawn trains/artillery does 25km a day. Can be forced marched further for a few days but then the horses simply stop going.
Pure infantry can keep going at 40km a day for longer than horses pulling things, thus I can believe that the German infantry in 1914 outran its artillery ...

BTW - somewhere around 1930 Poland ran a test where some guns were towed by c.6km/h top speed agri tractors (yeah, the type with the small wheels in front, big wheels in back, and mostly seen in front of the plough) while the rest were horse towed. Good horses can, for short periods, tow guns at 12km/h.
But where a day long march is concerned? The horses quickly fell behind the put-putting tractors which easily made 40km a day ...

 

[sillygoose]

Horse drawn trains/artillery does 25km a day. Can be forced marched further for a few days but then the horses simply stop going.
Pure infantry can keep going at 40km a day for longer than horses pulling things, thus I can believe that the German infantry in 1914 outran its artillery ...

BTW - somewhere around 1930 Poland ran a test where some guns were towed by c.6km/h top speed agri tractors (yeah, the type with the small wheels in front, big wheels in back, and mostly seen in front of the plough) while the rest were horse towed. Good horses can, for short periods, tow guns at 12km/h.
But where a day long march is concerned? The horses quickly fell behind the put-putting tractors which easily made 40km a day ...

Don't forget the time it takes to set up and range in. During a mobile battle that adds a pretty substantial delay.

 

[stevep]

The key point I meant in France being in a better position in ~1905 rather than 1914 was that they had a more practical doctrine rather than the frontal assault of fortifications of Plan XVII. Here its the Germans doing the blk of the attacking, against fortifications if their not going through Belgium and against the bulk of the French army. - Rather than the relatively light forces they faced in 1914 while it was the French throwing themselves against forts.

 

[sillygoose]

The key point I meant in France being in a better position in ~1905 rather than 1914 was that they had a more practical doctrine rather than the frontal assault of fortifications of Plan XVII. Here its the Germans doing the blk of the attacking, against fortifications if their not going through Belgium and against the bulk of the French army. - Rather than the relatively light forces they faced in 1914 while it was the French throwing themselves against forts.

They fought defensively in 1870 as well, how did that turn out?
Attacking isn't inherently costly, it is a matter of how you do it. The French did it in style with their bright red pants and with elan and bayonets without waiting for artillery support against machine guns. Not the best way to do it and survive. Foch still had been teaching for a while, so his adherents were already in a lot of positions within the army. Informally it might be doctrine in a lot of units by this point. Official doctrine lags the internal politics around doctrine.

Against forts you don't necessarily need QF artillery to deal with it so long as you have howitzers and the ones the French had weren't as modern as the Belgian ones IIRC, so wouldn't require the Skoda guns or Big Berthas necessarily unless assaulting the Verdun complex frontally (which was avoided IOTL until 1916).

If just going against the French frontier then the German armies would have trouble, but by 1905 French intelligence had gotten ahold of the German war plan that talked about moving through Belgium, though their own war plan wasn't revised to incorporate that info until 1906. Likely they would have moved through Belgium around the forts, especially through the Ardennes. If on the defensive that would give the French room for error as they could respond eventually to an unexpected German advance if necessary, but given their historical result in the Ardennes that wouldn't likely go well for them regardless of doctrine.

 

[Buba]

How much smaller were the respective armies in 1905 than in 1914?

Germany had at least one, if not two Corps less. And might not yet had decided to use Reserve Corps as combat fomations.

 

[stevep]

They fought defensively in 1870 as well, how did that turn out?
Attacking isn't inherently costly, it is a matter of how you do it. The French did it in style with their bright red pants and with elan and bayonets without waiting for artillery support against machine guns. Not the best way to do it and survive. Foch still had been teaching for a while, so his adherents were already in a lot of positions within the army. Informally it might be doctrine in a lot of units by this point. Official doctrine lags the internal politics around doctrine.

Against forts you don't necessarily need QF artillery to deal with it so long as you have howitzers and the ones the French had weren't as modern as the Belgian ones IIRC, so wouldn't require the Skoda guns or Big Berthas necessarily unless assaulting the Verdun complex frontally (which was avoided IOTL until 1916).

If just going against the French frontier then the German armies would have trouble, but by 1905 French intelligence had gotten ahold of the German war plan that talked about moving through Belgium, though their own war plan wasn't revised to incorporate that info until 1906. Likely they would have moved through Belgium around the forts, especially through the Ardennes. If on the defensive that would give the French room for error as they could respond eventually to an unexpected German advance if necessary, but given their historical result in the Ardennes that wouldn't likely go well for them regardless of doctrine.

SG

The French loss in 1870 wasn't because they were fighting defensively, which if anything was more due to the poor organisation and slow moblisation of the French army which was the primary reason for their defeat. Coupled with the superior Prussian artillery at the time.

IIRC the doctrine was more defensive in ~1905 although as you say some commander could well be thinking of a more elan driven approach by then. See Plan_XVII and especially the bit about earlier French plans for some details. It seems that Joffre was the primary supporter of aggressive actions against the German fortresses in A-L and behind Plan XVII which was finalised in 1913.

The big problem for the French in 1914, other than the very heavy losses in the senseless attacks against fortified position in the south was that to do that they left the bulk of their border with Belgium defended by one weak army, the 6th, which included a lot of reservist - and the BEF which they didn't know whether that would actually turn up. This despite as you say and mentioned in the link above, they were aware of a strong probability that a large force of the German army could come that way. As such the success of the German right hook was largely so successful because they had vastly more and better forces fighting against a weaker defender in field battles, not attacking a heavily defended fortress belt with no suitable heavy siege artillery and the French did in the south. Just because their high command made such errors in 1914 doesn't mean they will do so in say 1906, and the earlier plans do definitely seem to have been more defensive.

Steve

 

[sillygoose]

The French loss in 1870 wasn't because they were fighting defensively, which if anything was more due to the poor organisation and slow moblisation of the French army which was the primary reason for their defeat. Coupled with the superior Prussian artillery at the time.

They did and lost as a result, which is why they shifted to an offensive doctrine.

Franco-Prussian War - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Upon learning from captured Prussian soldiers and a local area police chief that the Prussian Crown Prince's Third Army was just 30 miles (48 km) north from Saarbrücken near the Rhine river town Wissembourg, General Le Bœuf and Napoleon III decided to retreat to defensive positions. General Frossard, without instructions, hastily withdrew his elements of the Army of the Rhine in Saarbrücken back across the river to Spicheren and Forbach.[51]

German offensives repeatedly defeated the French offensively, which forced them further back on the defensive and ultimately forced the Emperor into a fort where he was ultimately captured after being bottled up.

IIRC the doctrine was more defensive in ~1905 although as you say some commander could well be thinking of a more elan driven approach by then. See Plan_XVII and especially the bit about earlier French plans for some details. It seems that Joffre was the primary supporter of aggressive actions against the German fortresses in A-L and behind Plan XVII which was finalised in 1913.

It was a mobilization plan at the border. From there they'd decide what to do and in planning to be outnumbered they figured they'd have to stay on the defensive.

The Germans planned on that accordingly:

Schlieffen Plan - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In his war contingency plans from 1892 to 1906, Schlieffen faced the difficulty that the French could not be forced to fight a decisive battle quickly enough for German forces to be transferred to the east against the Russians to fight a war on two fronts, one-front-at-a-time. Driving out the French from their frontier fortifications would be a slow and costly process that Schlieffen preferred to avoid by a flanking movement through Luxembourg and Belgium. In 1893, this was judged impractical because of a lack of manpower and mobile heavy artillery. In 1899, Schlieffen added the manoeuvre to German war plans, as a possibility, if the French pursued a defensive strategy. The German army was more powerful and by 1905, after the Russian defeat in Manchuria, Schlieffen judged the army to be formidable enough to make the northern flanking manoeuvre the basis of a war plan against France alone.[17]

So as of 1905 the 'Schlieffen Plan' wasn't fully developed, but it was a contingency plan if the French remained on the defensive. The French hadn't integrated their intel coup about the German war plan into their own defensive planning yet, which would lead to them being flanked via the Ardennes per Schlieffen's plan.

The big problem for the French in 1914, other than the very heavy losses in the senseless attacks against fortified position in the south was that to do that they left the bulk of their border with Belgium defended by one weak army, the 6th, which included a lot of reservist - and the BEF which they didn't know whether that would actually turn up. This despite as you say and mentioned in the link above, they were aware of a strong probability that a large force of the German army could come that way. As such the success of the German right hook was largely so successful because they had vastly more and better forces fighting against a weaker defender in field battles, not attacking a heavily defended fortress belt with no suitable heavy siege artillery and the French did in the south. Just because their high command made such errors in 1914 doesn't mean they will do so in say 1906, and the earlier plans do definitely seem to have been more defensive.

In 1914 yes, though that was the 5th army, not the 6th. The 6th army defended Paris.
By 1914 things were quite different in terms of planning for both sides than in 1905. In 1905 they planned to concentrate on the Franco-German border only. It was only in 1906 that they revised that to incorporate intelligence about the German war plans obtained in 1905.

 

[stevep]

They did and lost as a result, which is why they shifted to an offensive doctrine.

Franco-Prussian War - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

German offensives repeatedly defeated the French offensively, which forced them further back on the defensive and ultimately forced the Emperor into a fort where he was ultimately captured after being bottled up.


It was a mobilization plan at the border. From there they'd decide what to do and in planning to be outnumbered they figured they'd have to stay on the defensive.

Actually as pointed out by both of us the French only really decided on all out offensive in 1913. The issue for the French imperial army on 1870 wasn't that if was fighting on the defensive but that its slower and disorganised mobilization meant that it was caught fragmented and unprepared and large chunks isolated and destroyed piecemeal.

So as of 1905 the 'Schlieffen Plan' wasn't fully developed, but it was a contingency plan if the French remained on the defensive. The French hadn't integrated their intel coup about the German war plan into their own defensive planning yet, which would lead to them being flanked via the Ardennes per Schlieffen's plan.

Which is ironic as it had its main successes because the French went on the offensive in the south, preventing there being the necessary numbers and resources to check the bulk of the German army further north. A gross triumph of ego over common sense by elements of the French high command. Especially since they had clear evidence of what the Germans planned!

In 1914 yes, though that was the 5th army, not the 6th. The 6th army defended Paris.
By 1914 things were quite different in terms of planning for both sides than in 1905. In 1905 they planned to concentrate on the Franco-German border only. It was only in 1906 that they revised that to incorporate intelligence about the German war plans obtained in 1905.

Yes my error on the number. IIRC the 6th was largely cobbled together from remnants of forces heavily mauled attacking the German fortresses and possibly some late reservists to defend against the advance on Paris. It was the 5th that so heavily outnumbered, and from some reports facing the same issue of subordinates carrying out unauthorized counter-attacks to regain lost ground, was forced to give ground in the face of the bulk of the German army.

Overall in both cases they attacked with the bulk of their army against the much weaker - in manpower terms - wing of the opponent. The primary issue was that the French were attacking prepared fortifications whereas the Germans were fighting markedly more of an encounter battle.

 

[sillygoose]

Actually as pointed out by both of us the French only really decided on all out offensive in 1913. The issue for the French imperial army on 1870 wasn't that if was fighting on the defensive but that its slower and disorganised mobilization meant that it was caught fragmented and unprepared and large chunks isolated and destroyed piecemeal.

Mobilization was part of it, a big part was losing the initiative and being forced on the defensive thanks in part to the timidity of their commanders except when it was too late and they tried some Hail Mary moves.
That was the basis of Foch's offensive doctrine that officially took over by 1911, but was already an unofficial doctrine among the many students of Foch working their way through command positions.

Which is ironic as it had its main successes because the French went on the offensive in the south, preventing there being the necessary numbers and resources to check the bulk of the German army further north. A gross triumph of ego over common sense by elements of the French high command. Especially since they had clear evidence of what the Germans planned!

What do you think would happen if they pulled troops out of there early on to move further north in 1914? They'd free up substantial German forces to reinforce the right wing if they changed their war plan; the German war plan was based on the French attacking in A-L, so they extra weighted forces in the region. Without the French planning to attack there the Germans would free up extra forces to support the main advance.

The French war plan was based on the idea that they could pre-empt the German advance, much like you said the German did to them in 1870, and force them to react to the French moves and be wrong footed, especially in combination with the Russian advance in East Prussia. It made sense at the time, but in retrospect defensive technology and the terrain made it unworkable given the radical massing of forces against Belgium and France the Germans did and left East Prussia heavily under resourced, which was not planned on AFAIK.

Yes my error on the number. IIRC the 6th was largely cobbled together from remnants of forces heavily mauled attacking the German fortresses and possibly some late reservists to defend against the advance on Paris. It was the 5th that so heavily outnumbered, and from some reports facing the same issue of subordinates carrying out unauthorized counter-attacks to regain lost ground, was forced to give ground in the face of the bulk of the German army.

They had help from the BEF, though the French weren't prepared for them to run away like they did at Mons and later on. The French actually did quite well fighting defensively, so I don't know what unauthorized counterattacks you're talking about.

Overall in both cases they attacked with the bulk of their army against the much weaker - in manpower terms - wing of the opponent. The primary issue was that the French were attacking prepared fortifications whereas the Germans were fighting markedly more of an encounter battle.

The Germans had to fight through the Belgian forts. It wasn't an issue of the French attacking fortifications, it was them sucking horribly at attacking. Turns out you need fire and maneuver, not bayonet charges:

Battle of Lorraine - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Most of the Battle of the Frontiers was encounter fighting, not charging forts.

Battle of the Frontiers - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org