TheRejectionist
TheRejectionist
Typo of writing fast.
What if the post Cold War US from 1991 told its treaty allies "you're on your own" for conventional defense
- Thread starter raharris1973
- Start date
Typo of writing fast.
Maybe he made a typo with the G?
But that shouldn't affect the EU's perceptions of Russia, should it?
Zyobot
Just a time-traveling robot stranded on Earth.
Yeah, he clarified up-thread.
TheRejectionist
TheRejectionist
Honestly who is gonna be scared of Russia besides the Baltics and Poland and Ukraine?
No one.
No one.
Romania? Slovakia? Hungary? Maybe even Czechia?
raharris1973
Well-known member
Why is Buchanan the only way? Why not Perot? I mentioned Tsongas as well earlier, with his swipe at allied free-riding on security while getting ahead economically:
Even in the first couple Clinton years, Clinton sent over Mickey Cantor as trade negotiator with Japan to try to knock down some trade barriers and threaten retaliation if that didn't work. The idea of economic competition surpassing political-military competition in relevance was a thing in the early 1990s.
It just sort of deflated away from any impetus to burden-shift defense costs towards allies as the economy recovered from the early 1990s recession fast, Japan faced its reckoning from the bubble-economy and looked less-imposing as a "threat" mid-decade, and the tech boom and broader growth started to make the American way of economics and trade something Clinton really leaned in to celebrate and be complacent about. That plus Western Europe not resolving the Balkans, and think-tank and Gingrichite Republican pressures to expand NATO by mod-decade overcoming the Administration's initial hesitancy.
I could imagine in the early 90s an independent, or particular varieties of Republicans (not GHWB) or Democrats (not Al Gore) reviving some of the burden-shifting arguments people like McGovern and Mike Mansfield were making in the 1970s to have allies pay their own way and do more self-defending, which were even partly reflecting by some actual Nixon and Ford draw-downs in the Pacific Rim and (to a much lesser extent) Europe.
----in any case, moving beyond the "politics of how", and exploring the reasons for "why" this could lead to some superior outcomes by the 2020s and "what" those benefits might be:
Western and Central European countries, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, without the reassurance of on-site US conventional troops and AirPower, and without the reassurance/belief/promise of speedy US power projection, won't have the moral hazard of being on security welfare, and letting their local country defenses vis-a-vis Russia, North Korea, and China atrophy.
In the short-run that is more expensive, but in the long run, it means that even as potential threat countries (like Russia, North Korea, and China) develop anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) (The Emerging Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenge) technologies and skills aimed against US power projection, that can erode the promise of speedy and massive US support at the point of hostile contact, the allies can defend themselves, and deny the adversary their own territory and access to it on a local regional scale.
What happened in OTL post-Cold War to US allies is that they came to feel, there is no point in a military for defense because either there is no threat, and if there really is one, America will take care of it. We're too small and unmilitary a country to make a difference, so we'll leave it up to America. (And besides, that's more convenient for my domestic politics).
This is most dangerous in the case of places like Taiwan, which is way less militaristic today than it was at the beginning of the 1990s, and has sat on its ass and relied on America entirely for deterrence even though there's no Americans on the ground there, and their introduction would spark, not end, a crisis. In 1996, Clinton could parade the US carriers through the straits with impunity to symbolize China had no military option. You give China 25 years to work on the problem, it turns out they can build and buy enough kit that the straits are too perilous to send our carriers through.
raharris1973
Well-known member
You know, going on about 20 years ago now, I used a variation on this idea. I took as my premise the idea that the engine for all possible foreign change in America is within the Republican Party, the Democrats are basically just in a reactive position.
With that in mind, and looking for a way to partly disentangle the US from its degree of commitments to the Middle East, I hit upon the idea of Pat Buchanan and Pat Robertson after the Persian Gulf War bitching and moaning about how the Saudi Arabians had American soldiers hide any religious paraphernalia (crosses, etc.) and not have any religious services while on their soil and defending them. After the war, they raise a stink and say that our troops are brave but these conditions are anti-God and anti-freedom, and they insist we don't station troops in Saudi Arabia for this reason. As a consequence, US troops and bases are withdrawn from Saudi Arabia in the 1990s.
Skallagrim
Well-known member
My reasoning is that you're asking for a really big shift here. Not just "the USA cuts back on its NATO spending and tells the allies to pull their weight" but more "the USA pulls out of NATO in all but name".
Perot and Tsongas just didn't want that. They'd be game for the former idea, but not the latter. Buchanan, on the other hand, is so isolationist that he has outright argued that the USA shouldn't have gotten involved in World War II. With the Cold War over, he'd be all for getting rid of NATO and turning the USA isolationist and economically protectionist.
I frankly can't think of any other half-way realistic candidate who would support this proposal you have outlined. Perot would support a more moderate alternative, yes, and so would Tsongas. But I don't think Tsongas ever really had a chance, because the Democrats really didn't want his ideas. See how his budget proposals at the convention were shot down. So, really, it's Buchanan or bust to make your premise work.
raharris1973
Well-known member
Alright, let's set aside politics. Thoughts on substance and allied reactions and this policy's better fit with A2AD technology as its evolved over the last 30 years?
Skallagrim
Well-known member
Well, I already jotted down my general thoughts in post #2 of this thread.
Regarding military, what you're doing is dividing the world into blocs that will be fairly distrusting of each other. As I mentioned, I'd expect poorer-than-OTL-China to partnet up with Russia, at which point they also control Central Asia. The Eurasian bloc is now a reality. Bulked-up EU would be another bloc, quite possibly strengthening ties with India.
Everyone's relations with North Africa, greater Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan and Pakistan are hard to predict. In any event, the realities of self-reliance and the need to have one's very own nuclear arsenal built up will almost certainly effect a major pro-nuclear shift. Expect nuclear plants everywhere, no fucking around with wind-mills and solar panels. Oil imports would be seen as undesirable, and there would be an early shift to (nuclear-)electric power, e.g. loads of subsidies to develop electric cars on the double. (This suggests that the Gulf states would be considerably less rich/important, which means that various brands of Islamic radicalism get way less funding. Between the USA's isolationism and the Arabs' reduced affluence, you've just made sure nothing like 9/11 ever happens.)
As mentioned, the USA would go full isolationist. (Because nobody short of a dedicated isolationist would do what you suggest.) Since the Eurasian bloc is limited by reduced Chinese wealth/power compared to OTL (due to their export market being terminated), I think the EU will have a fairly free hand in Sub-Saharan Africa. They'll use it, too, if only to get their hands on those resources. If they go nuclear, they'd sure like to get the African uranium deposits under European control. Since the EU will be far more military-oriented, I'd expect them not to be too subtle about securing control of strategic resources.
Indochina, the Phillipines and Indonesia will be poorer, too, for the same reason China is poorer. Same goes for Japan and South Korea, which -- without US protection -- will have to bulk up fast, or the Eurasians will come to get them.
If we assume that the EU (and its allies) will bring North Africa, Turkey, the Levant, Iraq and Arabia into their camp (in addition to exerting considerable control over Sub-Saharan Africa), the the outcome in that regard is that Eurafrica becomes a reality. This camp will also include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and presumably Malaysia and Singapore.
Meanwhile, the Eurasians would presumably bring Iran, Pakistan and everything North of those into their camp. Presumably, they'd bring Bangladesh into the fold as well. And bully Japan, South Korea, Indochina and the Philippines into submission.
The fate of Indonesia and Thailand would be uncertain. Could go either way.
The Americas South of Canada would be the USA's back-yard. This would be the third bloc.
I don't see any of these blocs having any major designs on each other's territory. They'd all have a clear sphere of power, well-defined and ultimately agreed-upon. They'd have nukes pointed at each other just to be sure, but in effect, the world would be divided into three separate power blocs that would have relatively little to do with each other. They'd all deal with their own internal affairs, and there would be very little inter-bloc trade.
This would probably be easier to do if the US would have outright overthrown Saddam Hussein in 1991. But of course if there will subsequently be an Iraqi insurgency, then the Democrats are going to say "We were right! We shouldn't have gotten involved in the Gulf War in the first place!"
Skallagrim
Well-known member
A bit off-topic, but if you're going to overthrow Saddam, the obvious next step is to carve up the country into three parts: a Kurdish one, a Shi'a one and a Sunni one. This would generally prevent insurgencies, although there'd be a fair amount of ethnic cleansing & expulsions going on amongst the three countries. Letting Syria absorb the Sunni part is probably smart, because then it's their problem.
But then we get to the problem, which is that Kurdistan's very existence pisses off the Turks, so now you've made an enemy. And Shi'a Mesopotamia is extremely vulnerable to Iranian expansion, so either you have to put troops there forever, or you've given all that oil to the Ayatollahs. (Or you go whole hog, invade Iran, and carve off their Kurds, Azeris, Arabs and Baluchis.)
Obviously, these outcomes are really in opposition to the stated goal of withdrawing from interventionist geo-politics.
I don't think that the Alawite Assad dynasty in charge of Syria would actually want to rule over even more Sunnis, especially when these territories don't come with a lot of natural resources attached to them.
Otherwise, though, Yeah, good points.