History Western Civilization, Rome and Cyclical History

Moving away from all the miserable stuff (convincing yourself it can't be done is the death of action), I have noted there are other figures who are almost "Augustus" like throughout the world. Although I think I'd disagree with some by saying the Asian Augustus was not Qin Shi Huang, but Tokugawa Ieyasu; a man who in all honesty was more formidable than Augustus himself.

In Britain's case meanwhile, I'd give that honour to King Alfred the Great.

Qin was transition tyrant the ceasar like figure for china the asain equivalent for china is likely Emperor Gaozu of Han.
 
Moving away from all the miserable stuff (convincing yourself it can't be done is the death of action)

I stress that nobody here claimed that triumph is impossible. Merely that implementation of your suggested goals and methods, in the short term, seems exceedingly implausible. I'm happy to move on from that whole line of discussion, but remain eager to receive even a single example of a Western country that has forcibly assimilated or expelled the bulk (let's conservatively define that as >50%) of its non-Western immigrants. Once you can point me to such an example, we will have reached the start of the next great turning, and your suggestions will have become viable policy.


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I have noted there are other figures who are almost "Augustus" like throughout the world. Although I think I'd disagree with some by saying the Asian Augustus was not Qin Shi Huang, but Tokugawa Ieyasu; a man who in all honesty was more formidable than Augustus himself.

In Britain's case meanwhile, I'd give that honour to King Alfred the Great.

What @Cherico noted re: the comparison of Augustus and Qin Shi Huangdi (indeed, Gaozu is the proper analogue). Besides this, however, I'm not sure that conflating a "national" hero-king to a "civilisational" hero-king (or rather: emperor) is the right track.

Alfred, very crudely put, is like the English "national" iteration of the same archetype that produced Charlemagne in a somewhat more universal "European" fashion. He is the uniter and founder of the realm in its quintessential form.

I do see a strong basis for comparison between England/Britain and Japan, in that they are both island-realms off the coast of a continent that houses a developed civilisation; that both of these island-kingdoms have been influenced (at times very strongly) by continental culture, but typically put their own spin on things; and that their histories (up to a certain point in time) follow a remarkably similar track.

However... just as Henry Tudor was not the Western Augustus, I strongly feel that Tokugawa Ieyasu was not the East Asian Augustus.

That explicit comparison already indicates my line of thinking, which (to some extent) I've detailed in this thread, where I tried to set up for a Britain whose history follows Japan more closely-- including a "Tokugawa period", with an equivalent of sakoku.

My general interpretation is that while it is accurate to say that Japan didn't really have a true analogue for the Anglo-Saxons, we can still argue that there is a basis for historical comparison, going back very far. Japan in the Jomon period is more or less "analogous" to pre-Roman Britain, in my interpretation, and I cast the arrival of the (external!) Roman influence as being akin to the emergence of the Yayoi period in Japan. It is now generally understood, after all, that the Yayoi people were formed around a nexus of migrating groups from the Korean peninsula. They brought external culture unto the island-realm, but by and large, they we not numerous enough to demographically supplant the native population. (Much as was true for Celtic Britain during the Roman period.)

I am inclined to carry on that comparison, and liken the influx of ethnic Han migrants during the Kofun period as being at last somewhat similar to the arrival of the Anglo-Saxons. Sure: purely periodisation-wise, the Kofun period happens in the era that is temporally equivalent to the age of Sub-Roman Britain, and the Kofun-era migrants didn't shape Japan quite to the extent that the Anglo-Saxons altered the fate of Britain... but there are at least some similarities. After all, the consensus of historians tends more and more to recognise that the Kofun influence (both as far as culture and genetics are concerned) has been wrongly downplayed in the past. They played a more major role than was previously thought.

Now we come to Alfred the Great, because the subsequent consolidation of the central monarchy in Japan during the Asuka period can be seen as similar to Alfred's consolidation of royal power in England, ending the divisions of the Heptarchy. Indeed, even the introduction of Buddhism in this era can be seen as very much like the introduction of Christianity into Anglo-Saxon England. This suggests to me that the most plausible "equivalent" to Alfred in Japanese history is probably Tenji, although this equivalence is not exact. Alfred basically did more by himself, whereas in Japan, equivalent steps were taken by three separate rulers who reigned in quick succession. Tenji being the most prominent of them, who basically brought about the "crowning achievement".

...Now, hereafter, Japanese history remains quite similar to English/British history in various ways. There is even the characteristic conflict with other populations/realms that represent an older native demographic cohort-- and who are ultimately overcome in a series of conflicts across the centuries.

There is, however, a major difference, presumably caused (at least to the greatest extent) by the fact that Japan is significantly further away from the continent next door. Britain historically saw more invasions and invasion attempts, and conversely, was engaged in more direct involvements on the continent.

Of course, before any serious centralised state formation, the islands of Britain and Japan both saw similar patterns of migration from the continent, which suggests that the greater distance isn't that overwhelming a factor in all of this. It just seems that once state formation got underway, the greater distance combined with "actually having to make an effort" discouraged most would-be invaders of Japan. By contrast, Britain continued to see invasion attempts.

But not all that many. And practically all of them failed. The Channel is a pretty impressive moat. Even with the reduced distance, compared to what Japan has, the same scenario of "would-be invasion fleet gets totally wrecked by unexpected storm, ha ha fuck you" actually occurred in both cases.

Conversely, the differences are clearly there. I see no Japanese equivalent of William the Conqueror; I see no Japanese involvement on the continent such as that of the English in the Hundred Years' War. This suggests to me that Japan was, from the start, more "isolated" than Britain could ever be. Regardless of that, though, Japanese history continue on otherwise quite similar paths.

I view the Wars of the Roses as a British equivalent of the Sengoku Period. Sure, the Sengoku Period in Japan lasted a century and a half, and the Wars of the Roses lasted only three decades. But then again, the Hundred Years' War was also a cause of considerable disturbance, and it preceded (and to a considerable degree, led to) the Wars of the Roses. (And per my previous analysis, I'm pretty sure that if Britain has been less involved in continental affairs, it would have fought its own internal wars instead of the Hundred Years' War, anyway. Much as Japan did.)

This then brings us to the point where I started this lengthy comparison. What is Bosworth Field, if not Britain's Sekigahara? The battle where an entire historical period is brought to an end; whereafter a new era commences. It even has the same backdrop of notable defections, and the same aftermath of "mopping up" as straggling pockets of dissent are crushed.

Britain's history being less isolated, the natural direction of the new period was one that led to a great opening. Japan, instead, had its great period of closing-off. This is where the underlying divergence really manifests. Which is why from that point on, further comparisons become far more tenuous.
 
So long as we're making "ad-hoc" comparisons, I actually wonder if we've glimpsed at some "previews" of what the West's Caesar figure might look like already? In fact, while Tsarist Russia may not have been a High Culture in of itself, I'd actually say Vladimir Lenin (and the Bolsheviks) provides a decent diorama for what latter-day Caesarism might look like.

Obviously, the Neo-Populares would be more like economically "Third-Positionist" religious zealots, and would happily crucify each and every Red they get their hands on in public right alongside all the Globalists, Muslims, and (quite possibly) Jews. Thankfully, their nature as the "Caesarist" transitional tyranny probably means they won't reign nearly as long as the USSR did, which makes their lifespan more comparable to that of Hitler's Reich (or even the Khmer Rouge) before they self-destruct.

Nonetheless, I'd still draw quite a few parallels between the Bolshevism of the early 20th century and the Caesarism of the late 21st. That is, both are brutal revolutionary movements that arose as blowback against decades of stodgy, oppressive oligarchy (the Tsar then; the Globalist cabal now), who resort to even more repressive means to keep power, including secret police (the Okhrana then; the FBI now) and "useful idiot" street fighters on their payroll (the Black Hundreds then; Antifa and BLM now). Alas, their refusal to reform only sets off more loose cannons (Socialist agitators then; Christian-revivalist terrorists in future), with the first serious revolts (the 1905 Revolution then; Civil War, Round I in future) resulting in token concessions at best (a powerless Duma then; UBI bullcrap in future).

Even then, it only gets worse from there, with a massive war abroad in which troublemakers are thrown onto the front lines and the nation's efforts are put towards crushing foreign enemies (the Great War then; the War in Turkey in future) bleeding the nation dry and catalyzing revolts at home in which the ruling regime is deposed and the period of chaos afterwards culminates in the most extreme and bloodthirsty gangsters of them all (the Bolsheviks then; the Neo-Populares in future) winning out as their ruthless, yet charismatic leader seizing the reigns of power (VI Lenin then; Neo-Caesar in future). After years of brutal civil war in which the factions are engaged in a knife fight to the death (the Russian Civil War then; the Western Civil War in future), the populist revolutionary faction triumphs through their grit, organization, and terror tactics (the Red Terror and War Communism then; the White Terror and mass-looting in future).

The aftermath is spent demolishing all traces of the previous regime (Tsarist Russia then; the Globalist plutocracy in future) and bludgeoning the populace into submission through political terror and collectivization, with a long-term goal of exporting their radical insanity to the ends of the Earth (World Revolution then; the Last Crusade in future). Again, I'm sure Neo-Caesar's regime won't last anywhere close to as long as the USSR did (which makes it more comparable to Nazi Germany, in the sense of burning itself out so fast), though that won't stop it from wrecking at least as much havoc in one decade as Lenin's prized monstrosity did in seven.

Fortunately, it seems Imperial America will avoid the shameful fate of Putinist Russia by emerging stronger than ever as a Universal Empire. Gorbachev (and Yeltsin, even more so) weren't Augustan material by a long shot, but whoever arrives to establish the Neo-Principate will certainly have to be. The West's long-term future in the wake of Neo-Caesar's terror campaign depends on it, I suspect.
 
So long as we're making "ad-hoc" comparisons, I actually wonder if we've glimpsed at some "previews" of what the West's Caesar figure might look like already? In fact, while Tsarist Russia may not have been a High Culture in of itself, I'd actually say Vladimir Lenin (and the Bolsheviks) provides a decent diorama for what latter-day Caesarism might look like.

Obviously, the Neo-Populares would be more like economically "Third-Positionist" religious zealots, and would happily crucify each and every Red they get their hands on in public right alongside all the Globalists, Muslims, and (quite possibly) Jews. Thankfully, their nature as the "Caesarist" transitional tyranny probably means they won't reign nearly as long as the USSR did, which makes their lifespan more comparable to that of Hitler's Reich (or even the Khmer Rouge) before they self-destruct.

Nonetheless, I'd still draw quite a few parallels between the Bolshevism of the early 20th century and the Caesarism of the late 21st. That is, both are brutal revolutionary movements that arose as blowback against decades of stodgy, oppressive oligarchy (the Tsar then; the Globalist cabal now), who resort to even more repressive means to keep power, including secret police (the Okhrana then; the FBI now) and "useful idiot" street fighters on their payroll (the Black Hundreds then; Antifa and BLM now). Alas, their refusal to reform only sets off more loose cannons (Socialist agitators then; Christian-revivalist terrorists in future), with the first serious revolts (the 1905 Revolution then; Civil War, Round I in future) resulting in token concessions at best (a powerless Duma then; UBI bullcrap in future).

Even then, it only gets worse from there, with a massive war abroad in which troublemakers are thrown onto the front lines and the nation's efforts are put towards crushing foreign enemies (the Great War then; the War in Turkey in future) bleeding the nation dry and catalyzing revolts at home in which the ruling regime is deposed and the period of chaos afterwards culminates in the most extreme and bloodthirsty gangsters of them all (the Bolsheviks then; the Neo-Populares in future) winning out as their ruthless, yet charismatic leader seizing the reigns of power (VI Lenin then; Neo-Caesar in future). After years of brutal civil war in which the factions are engaged in a knife fight to the death (the Russian Civil War then; the Western Civil War in future), the populist revolutionary faction triumphs through their grit, organization, and terror tactics (the Red Terror and War Communism then; the White Terror and mass-looting in future).

The aftermath is spent demolishing all traces of the previous regime (Tsarist Russia then; the Globalist plutocracy in future) and bludgeoning the populace into submission through political terror and collectivization, with a long-term goal of exporting their radical insanity to the ends of the Earth (World Revolution then; the Last Crusade in future). Again, I'm sure Neo-Caesar's regime won't last anywhere close to as long as the USSR did (which makes it more comparable to Nazi Germany, in the sense of burning itself out so fast), though that won't stop it from wrecking at least as much havoc in one decade as Lenin's prized monstrosity did in seven.

Fortunately, it seems Imperial America will avoid the shameful fate of Putinist Russia by emerging stronger than ever as a Universal Empire. Gorbachev (and Yeltsin, even more so) weren't Augustan material by a long shot, but whoever arrives to establish the Neo-Principate will certainly have to be. The West's long-term future in the wake of Neo-Caesar's terror campaign depends on it, I suspect.

Generally speaking, I think that using communism as a reference point for this can hardly be useful. Caesarism is forged in the age of dwindling properity, where the great masses are in fear of the yawning abyss of destitution; while politics outwardly become a much more "simple" binary of the populists versus the establishment, Beyond that, there is little in the way of ideoloy, and ruthless expedience and pragmatism reign-- albeit coupled with a deep and abiding hatred. Bitterness and wrath.

This is the age of vendetta, when the knives no longer need sharpening, and are instead put to use.

"Caesar" is no follower of an ideology, but if anything driven by his own sense of destiny. This is not a time of revolutions, but of final consequences. Ideologues, with their theoretical obsessions, run the risk of getting buried alive for their bullshit. (As Qin Shi Huangdi demonstrated on the grand scale.)

Basically: Richard Nixon would do a whole lot better in this period than a freak like Lenin, who would be executed in the first rounds. There was a time when such frivolities as theory-heavy ideologies could be entertained. That time is over now.



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In fact, while Tsarist Russia may not have been a High Culture in of itself

This is the more interesting point. What, really, is the nature of Russia?

We've entertained the notion of Russia as a "failed" High Culture, whose history was terminally distorted by the Mongols, and which has been unable to get back on the proper track ever since. Yet, we have also discussed the notion of what Spengler called "Moonlight Civilisations", and a potential re-interpretation thereof. In this context, we talked about the relation of Kush to Egypt.

I wonder if we may find the proper point of comparison for Russia there? Certainly, the "Russian" (or, if you will, "Ruthenian") cultural realm had its Carolingian figure in Vladimir the Great, putting it two centuries "behind" the West. Less than 250 years later, the Mongols barged in at a very inopportune time. Ever since, Russia has been casting about for its sense of self.

But if the Mongols had not existed, would Russia have been a fully-formed High Culture in its own right, or a somewhat stunted type, limited by its unfortunate formation on the periphery of a somewhat more established rival (the West)? Might Russia, without the Mongol invasion, perhaps even have been gradually absorbed into the West as a peripheral region?

My sense is that without the Mongol invasion, the Russian/Ruthenian cultural sphere would not have been "Boyarised", remaining more akin to the traditional example of Kievan Rus'. The Byzantines were already fading out by this point, although it's possible that the *Ruthenians might have propped up a Byzantine rump state, thus keeping the Bosphoros out of Turkish hands. This implies that "Great Ruthenia" (or whatever) would become the leading power of the Eastern Orthodox world. A world that would presumably be shaped far more by the direct Ruthenian leadership, thus growing clearly away from the Western sphere... but without being partially conquered and "deformed" by Ottoman occupation. And thus more secure in its own identity.

Thus, I suspect, the Mongols robbed the world of an "Eastern Orthodox / Great Ruthenian" High Culture, which (going by the standard chronology of these things) would be entertaining or avidly expecting its very own Napoleonic figure right about now.

Instead, there is only the ruin of a could-have-been civilisation, which rather than a Napoleon, has... a Putin.

It's almost enough to pity them.

Almost.
 
A Russian rump state does have the potential to do well. There is a chance that with the implosion of the Russian Federation, a lot of its corruption might implode with it. That would leave any enterprising battle tested warlord with some nice natural resources, subjects just desperate for an end to the madness, and a few hundred nuclear warheads lying around. A fine "fuck off and leave me alone" button which can be used for the breathing space to push through desperately needed reform. Hell, such a man might even have the resources and clout to crown himself Tsar.

It also wouldn't have the problem of administering very distant, impoverished, provinces.
 
A Russian rump state does have the potential to do well. There is a chance that with the implosion of the Russian Federation, a lot of its corruption might implode with it. That would leave any enterprising battle tested warlord with some nice natural resources, subjects just desperate for an end to the madness, and a few hundred nuclear warheads lying around. A fine "fuck off and leave me alone" button which can be used for the breathing space to push through desperately needed reform. Hell, such a man might even have the resources and clout to crown himself Tsar.

It also wouldn't have the problem of administering very distant, impoverished, provinces.
Part of the problem is that most of the nice natural resources are in the distant, impoverished provinces. As the whole "resource curse" problem demonstrated in many places shows, corruption will likely follow said impoverished provinces with nice resources unless they were to get really good independent leadership or end up in a polity so rich that the value of their resources would not become a decisive factor in its economy.
 
A Russian rump state does have the potential to do well. There is a chance that with the implosion of the Russian Federation, a lot of its corruption might implode with it. That would leave any enterprising battle tested warlord with some nice natural resources, subjects just desperate for an end to the madness, and a few hundred nuclear warheads lying around. A fine "fuck off and leave me alone" button which can be used for the breathing space to push through desperately needed reform. Hell, such a man might even have the resources and clout to crown himself Tsar.

It also wouldn't have the problem of administering very distant, impoverished, provinces.

Things for Russia are very much going down the crapper right now. Even if European Russia, post-Putin, wants to make a swerve in the direction of sanity, they'll need help. Basically: Marshall Aid, second round, with the equivalent of denazification tied into it.

I'm convinced that "give up all the WMDs" is going to to have to be a hard condition for that deal to work.

As @Marduk notes, the resources are mostly in the regions that rump-Russia will be losing (effectively, to China) in this scenario. On the other hand, this truncated Russian state will then be drawn into the Western sphere, and (like West Germany against the Soviet Bloc in the last century) will be supported as an important forward position against the Chinese sphere.

It's almost certainly the best outcome for the Russians living there, and I think it's a good outcome for the West overall. Ideally, I'd like the border a bit further East than the Urals, but we'll take what we can get, won't we?
 
Have some further thoughts on the "Ruthenian" High Culture for later (especially in light of my "Mercantile Russia" counterfactual from before), but with regard to OTL comparison:

Generally speaking, I think that using communism as a reference point for this can hardly be useful. Caesarism is forged in the age of dwindling properity, where the great masses are in fear of the yawning abyss of destitution; while politics outwardly become a much more "simple" binary of the populists versus the establishment, Beyond that, there is little in the way of ideoloy, and ruthless expedience and pragmatism reign-- albeit coupled with a deep and abiding hatred. Bitterness and wrath.

This is the age of vendetta, when the knives no longer need sharpening, and are instead put to use.

"Caesar" is no follower of an ideology, but if anything driven by his own sense of destiny. This is not a time of revolutions, but of final consequences. Ideologues, with their theoretical obsessions, run the risk of getting buried alive for their bullshit. (As Qin Shi Huangdi demonstrated on the grand scale.)

Basically: Richard Nixon would do a whole lot better in this period than a freak like Lenin, who would be executed in the first rounds. There was a time when such frivolities as theory-heavy ideologies could be entertained. That time is over now.

My point was hardly that Neo-Caesar would be an ideologue. While I know this wasn't what you were aiming at, I'd again emphasize that I have no doubts about him exterminating Neo-Communists just as fervently as readily as he does Globalists, Muslims, and Jews.

Rather, I view Lenin's terror tactics and the sequence of events surrounding the Bolshevik Revolution as indicative of what kind of faction the "Caesarist" populists would be, at least if we remove Commie ideology and simply leave power-mad gangsterism (coupled, of course, with ISIS-style religious zealotry) in its place. Constant blood purges, mass-looting, a permanent wartime economy, and the destruction of the old regime — all unmistakable similarities between the Communist utopians of yesteryear and Caesarist Crusaders of tomorrow. It wouldn't be a case of one-to-one parallelism, obviously, but I expect there to be a definite "rhyming scheme" between the events of 1917 and those of 2090 (or thereabouts).


Having said that: I suspect a Stalin expy would fare much better than another Lenin or Trotsky in the "Caesarist" period, as you describe it. Again, little to no direct expies here, but I'd bet that a key figure with Uncle Joe's brutal tenacity, hard-ass pragmatism, and lack of proud ideological zealotry (compared to his peers, anyway) would claw their way to the top and purge their rivals in short order. Maybe that's the best way to think of "Neo-Antony", so long as ruthless expedience and bitter wrath are what "Neo-Caesar" demands of his followers instead.
 
Would I be wrong in assuming the Arabs have their own cycle according to this theory? And if so, where on that cycle does Saladin (the greatest Muslim of them all in my view) stand?
An arab scholar named ibn Khaldun wrote about Asabiyyah. A desert tribe living harsh life becomes hardened and develops very strong solidarity abd social cohesion. It uses its solidarity to subjugate or ally with its neighbours. It then conquers the ruling dynasty and installs itself. Over time this solidarity, which he calls Assabiya begins to fray under the pressures of ruling and urban civilisation. It is then in turn overthrown by another tribe with superior Asabiyyah.
 
Things for Russia are very much going down the crapper right now. Even if European Russia, post-Putin, wants to make a swerve in the direction of sanity, they'll need help. Basically: Marshall Aid, second round, with the equivalent of denazification tied into it.

I'm convinced that "give up all the WMDs" is going to to have to be a hard condition for that deal to work.

As @Marduk notes, the resources are mostly in the regions that rump-Russia will be losing (effectively, to China) in this scenario. On the other hand, this truncated Russian state will then be drawn into the Western sphere, and (like West Germany against the Soviet Bloc in the last century) will be supported as an important forward position against the Chinese sphere.

It's almost certainly the best outcome for the Russians living there, and I think it's a good outcome for the West overall. Ideally, I'd like the border a bit further East than the Urals, but we'll take what we can get, won't we?

"The hen is the wisest of all the animal creation, because she never cackles until the egg is laid."

Getting ahead of ourselves arent we? I have observed that western conservatives tend to suffer from the same problem that western liberals suffer from, though to a lesser degree..a believe thats its enough to declare something is so, and that makes it so.

"I think, therefore it is"
 
An arab scholar named ibn Khaldun wrote about Asabiyyah. A desert tribe living harsh life becomes hardened and develops very strong solidarity abd social cohesion. It uses its solidarity to subjugate or ally with its neighbours. It then conquers the ruling dynasty and installs itself. Over time this solidarity, which he calls Assabiya begins to fray under the pressures of ruling and urban civilisation. It is then in turn overthrown by another tribe with superior Asabiyyah.

Yes, he was pretty much the originator of the "weak men > hard times > strong men > good times > weak men..." idea. (Although Boethius had suggested much the same earlier, but less succinctly.)



"The hen is the wisest of all the animal creation, because she never cackles until the egg is laid."

Getting ahead of ourselves arent we? I have observed that western conservatives tend to suffer from the same problem that western liberals suffer from, though to a lesser degree..a believe thats its enough to declare something is so, and that makes it so.

"I think, therefore it is"

My thoughts on Russia's fate are based on the long-term analysis. I've been saying that Russia is headed for the drain for quite some time (well before the current debacle). My thinking a few years ago was that Putin had held back the inevitable for the duration of his reign, and that things would fall apart some time after his demise. Instead, his choices have accelerated the process again, effectively undoing all his work of the last two decades in just two years.

To clarify: Russia isn't a dying empire because it's gotten into this war. It's gotten into this war because it's a dying empire.

And hens, in my experience, cackle at all times, and never anything sensible can be made of it. The wise contend not to put their eggs in a basket that's falling apart. From where I'm standing, the Russian 'basket' is worth less than the Ruble. That's not anything to do with the current situation. They committed national suicide when they chose communism as the vehicle for their attempt at world-hegemony. It was a foolish bet, and it cost them everything.
 
Would I be wrong in assuming the Arabs have their own cycle according to this theory? And if so, where on that cycle does Saladin (the greatest Muslim of them all in my view) stand?

You're quite right. Indeed, Islam is one of the two "post-Classical rebirth" civilisations. The other being, of course, Christendom. (It stands out that both of these are defined through religious primacy. This may be tied to the emergence of monetheism.) Islam -- of which the Arabs are the progenitors, albeit not forever the sole carriers -- is in fact the older of the two, by almost two centuries. (I'm well aware Christianity is older, but Christendom as a civilisation was founded by Charlemagne.)

Saladin is quite hard to place, in par because Islam underwent two disturbances that ended up stagnating it. The first issue is internal: the anti-rationalist doctrines won their 'culture war', whereas in Christendom, reason won out. The second issue, partially concurrent, is external: the Crusades occurred. (In a piece of great irony, Crusading Europeans brought back philosophical works that had been preserved in the now-Islamic East, and these would be embraced in Europe... whereas a mere century later, they'd be burned as 'heresies' in the Islamic world.)

Now, Saladin arose in the direct wake of this, and since Islam as a civilisation was soon to become dangerously stagnant (to its own intellectual detriment), we may ask ourselves how typical Saladin was. Some points of comparison, however, do arise. We may attempt to form a tentative understanding.

The role of Saladin, in history, can be defined by two main traits.

One, he was a relative outsider from a (geographically and politically) peripheral background, whose ancestral line had nonetheless -- or because of that -- maintained a distinct vitality that had waned in the more predominant powers. So, stepping into an age of decline and uncertainty, he put forth a claim to power. His dynastic legacy was in actual fact short-lived (about a century), but it marked a cultural transition of enormous importance, which defined the future of the region.

Two, he was a distinctly 'kingly' figure, who actively sought to rule wisely and honestly; to a degree that made even his enemies admire him without real reservations. Notably, although the Ayyubid Caliphate was short-lived, Saladin was noted as bringing about a revival of the 'true' Caliphate, for a short time.

Now, let us look to Christian Europe, (roughly) 550 years after Charlemagne -- that is, the same span of time that lies between Mohammed and Saladin. This puts us in the middle of the fourteenth century. Do we see there any equal of Saladin? I don't, although I might be missing something. (I haven't given the matter much thought, previously, so an omission on my part is distinctly possible.)

There are some possibilities for comparison, though. I'd point at Charles IV, the first King of Bohemia to become Holy Roman Emperor. Also, this reign of the House of Luxembourg lasted roughly the same time as the Ayyubid dynasty did, before giving way to the dominance of the Habsburgs. (Just as in the relevant parts of the Islamic world, the Turkic dynasties rose to power.) Charles IV (after all, the promulgator of the Golden Bull of 1356) was also noted as a wise and peace-loving ruler, who in many ways brought back the old dignities of the Holy Roman Empire. Again, a basis for comparison.

Charles IV, however, was no great warrior-king. Of course, he didn't have to face an analogy to the Crusades, so the background situation was a bit different.

That leads me to another example, however, albeit a somewhat more speculative one. An established power that considers itself to have a measure of primacy, weakened from within, falling prey to a foreign claim to the rulership? In fourteenth-century Europe? Hmmm.....

Edward III of England began that whole thing, of course, but I think that Europe missed its warrior-king equivalent to Saladin when the Black Prince predeceased his father. We may speculate that this led things to become the Hunder Years' War, rather than a Hundred-Year Anglo-French Dynastic Union.

That we may find two potential candidates who share distinct characteristics with Saladin in Europe, rather than just one clear cognate, shouldn't be too surprising. In both twelfth-century Islam and fourtheenth-century Europe, we see a degree of flux and upheaval that invited multiple figures who share some such characteristics. Islam may have been unusually marked by circumstance in that it had such a stellar "example of the type", who united all the potential traits in one figure.
 
ou're quite right. Indeed, Islam is one of the two "post-Classical rebirth" civilisations. The other being, of course, Christendom. (It stands out that both of these are defined through religious primacy. This may be tied to the emergence of monetheism.) Islam -- of which the Arabs are the progenitors, albeit not forever the sole carriers -- is in fact the older of the two, by almost two centuries. (I'm well aware Christianity is older, but Christendom as a civilisation was founded by Charlemagne.)
What nonsense is this? No Charlemagne did not found Chrisendom. If anyone did it would be Constantine who made Christendom and Rome one and the same. Charlemagne was not even ruler of all of Christendom the east did not listen to him, hell even in western Christianity was not all controlled by him Iberia did not regard him as their king or emperor.
 
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What nonsense is this? No Charlemagne did not found Chrisendom. If anyone did it would be Constantine who made Christendom and Rome one and the same. Charlemagne was not even ruler of all of Christendom the east did not listen to him, hell even in western Christianity was not all controlled by him Iberia did not regard him as their king or emperor.

You seem to have missed the past 43 pages of discussion. You also seem to have missed the entire field of study that this thread is about. Because of this, you have no idea what we're actually talking about, and now you spout uninformed opinions that dramatically miss the point.

Now, I realise that macro-history has (like most fields) its own jargon, its own specific application of certain terms. This can be confusing. But from your reply here, I can make out that you must not have even read the first page of this thread (where this very point comes up), nor are you at all familiar with the basic background materials (such as Spengler or Toynbee; even a summary of their works might have removed your confusion).
 
There's a lot said about the Crusades, how bad they were for the Islamic world.

But, the Islamics had been attacking the Christian world for centuries before that. Taking cities, entire kingdoms and more. Raids into distant parts of Europe for slaves and more.

Not a simple picture. Although, Saladin being affected by that retaliation being somewhat effective is certianly possible.
 
You seem to have missed the past 43 pages of discussion. You also seem to have missed the entire field of study that this thread is about. Because of this, you have no idea what we're actually talking about, and now you spout uninformed opinions that dramatically miss the point.

Now, I realise that macro-history has (like most fields) its own jargon, its own specific application of certain terms. This can be confusing. But from your reply here, I can make out that you must not have even read the first page of this thread (where this very point comes up), nor are you at all familiar with the basic background materials (such as Spengler or Toynbee; even a summary of their works might have removed your confusion).
You expect me to remember what happened 3 years ago? Be real. You claimed that Christendom(distinct from Christianity) started with Charlamagne. This is false, unless you have some weird fucked up definition of what Christendom is. The standard definition is the worldwide body, or society of Christians. Or nations that are primarily Christian. Again there were nations that were majority Christian or had the state religion be Christianity hundreds of years before the 800's. So Charles the Great can't have been the founder of Christendom.

According to Malcolm Muggeridge (1980), Christ founded Christianity, but Constantine founded Christendom.

 
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You expect me to remember what happened 3 years ago? Be real. You claimed that Christendom(distinct from Christianity) started with Charlamagne. This is false, unless you have some weird fucked up definition of what Christendom is. The standard definition is the worldwide body, or society of Christians. Or nations that are primarily Christian. Again there were nations that were majority Christian or had the state religion be Christianity hundreds of years before the 800's. So Charles the Great can't have been the founder of Christendom.




I expect you to use your brain and read the thread that you're barging into, before spouting opinions that are entirely unburdened by any comprehension of the subject manner.

If you're unwilling to read back, then please refrain from loudly interrupting a discussion on a subject that you know nothing about.

Seriously: first page of the thread, man. Most key ideas are discussed pretty much up-front. Pretty much all your potential questions have been answered already. In detail. It's all there, and nobody here owes you an additional free education. If you don't know what we're talking about it, it's up to you to correct that. If this were the first page of the thread, I'd happily write up a bunch of explanations for you. But this is page 43, and I already did all that.


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There's a lot said about the Crusades, how bad they were for the Islamic world.

But, the Islamics had been attacking the Christian world for centuries before that. Taking cities, entire kingdoms and more. Raids into distant parts of Europe for slaves and more.

Not a simple picture. Although, Saladin being affected by that retaliation being somewhat effective is certianly possible.

Certainly, the Crusades were justified. But that is wholly separate from the question of whether it had a harmful effect on Islamic civilisation. That latter discussion has no moral dimension: it's a clinical matter, as it were.

I do agree that there has been a tendency (since Runciman, and getting worse from there) to frame the Crusaders as "evil barbarians" and the Muslims as "enlightened people, brought down by evil invaders". That's hardly true, and I'd never suggest such a thing.
 
I expect you to use your brain and read the thread that you're barging into, before spouting opinions that are entirely unburdened by any comprehension of the subject manner.

If you're unwilling to read back, then please refrain from loudly interrupting a discussion on a subject that you know nothing about.

Seriously: first page of the thread, man. Most key ideas are discussed pretty much up-front. Pretty much all your potential questions have been answered already. In detail. It's all there, and nobody here owes you an additional free education. If you don't know what we're talking about it, it's up to you to correct that. If this were the first page of the thread, I'd happily write up a bunch of explanations for you. But this is page 43, and I already did all that.


--------------------------




Certainly, the Crusades were justified. But that is wholly separate from the question of whether it had a harmful effect on Islamic civilisation. That latter discussion has no moral dimension: it's a clinical matter, as it were.

I do agree that there has been a tendency (since Runciman, and getting worse from there) to frame the Crusaders as "evil barbarians" and the Muslims as "enlightened people, brought down by evil invaders". That's hardly true, and I'd never suggest such a thing.
I'm not rereading 43 pages. Second I can enter this thread if I want to. Feel free to not respond if you get embarrassed because I corrected the idiocy you were spouting.
 
The Crusades were a nasty affair for Islamic culture…but then the Mongols showed up and things got tremendously worse. To this day they have not mentally recovered from what Genghis Khan did to them.

I'm not rereading 43 pages. Second I can enter this thread if I want to. Feel free to not respond if you get embarrassed because I corrected the idiocy you were spouting.
Calm down. Ask nicely and I’m sure you can get a reader’s digest of the matter. Essentially, “Christendom as we know it” comes into existence with Charlemagne. Constantine certainly laid the foundations, but the Roman Empire of the Dominate Era is certainly not Christendom as we’d know it.
 
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