Regarding the Officer Corps accession process, I was able to find
this data from 1999 (pre-911/OEF/OIF) that indicates Capt. X is about right, but the paper doesn't address green-to-gold (or blue to gold, I'll duplicate AF terms through this for broad understanding), or prior service personnel who attend a school after their ETS and return as an officer through the ROTC program, essentially going where the money is for the long haul (keep in mind that sweet, sweet O-E pay). I couldn't find anything with a few minutes of checking on that. I'm sure it's around somewhere.
As for the "DIE" thing, it looks to me just like every other special program of the week that would pop up, have some 2LT assigned to the additional duty, would involve some in-person training that becomes a tiresome chore where everyone in the room knows all about it, and eventually falls into one of two categories: "Training Distractor" or "The Boss's Focus" which will decide if it gets more attention or not. In the case of the former it probably becomes an annual training requirement or an online training your 1SG bugs the unit to finish so he can stop hearing about it from the CSM/SEA.
From the Army training standpoint, the focus was, is, and will VERY likely remain that the focus of the Army is warfighting and training for such; while they'll be willing to work with the current trends of the civil administration and the population at large, anything that distracts or interferes with that training will be met with the absolute minimum effort, slow rolled implementation, and "We'll commission a Rand Study to look at the way ahead on that.." responses until the administration changes.
As an example, right around 2013 we had to deal with PERSTEMPO changes (specifically dealing with Deployment-to-Dwell ratios, especially for SOF), which had complete buy-in from the JCS. Without a ton of alphabet-ridden detail, we found ourselves with a Battalion-level (Squadron) civilian overseer to manage our deployment-to-dwell ratio. In theory, this sounds like the JCS inserted someone who had the power to say "No, that person right there can't deploy." Needless to say, this riled the assorted levels of the chain of command a bit. In practice, this civilian was pretty useless and within a year the focus shifted and that person was gone. The D2D policy remained, and we handled it internally.
Broadly speaking, the responsibility for maintaining a non-exclusionary environment in the unit (at whatever level) will fall on the commander of that unit, and the expectation to address issues will be there as well. There absolutely will not be some kind of "shadow chain of command," because doing so would interfere with the existing CoC's function, and reduce the effectiveness of the unit. While there may be some additional reporting channels generated, those will continue to circle back around to the chain of command. They did the same thing with the revised Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention when they implemented the new policies for that about 10 years ago. None of those alternate reporting methods do anything except provide a means for Soldiers to bypass the chain of command for reporting purposes only, the shit still has to roll back down the chain of command, and Soldiers have been doing Congressionals probably since before the Civil War.
