The "How" Germany could win
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In early 1918, the German Empire would launch its last series of offensives on the Western Front, although all are collectively referred to in the singular under the umbrella term of the "Spring Offensive". The German effort was the beneficiary of the collapse of the Russians, allowing the German Army to focus on a singular front for the first time in the war, as well as the refinement of tactics via four years of brutal wartime experimentation and learning. Driven by the very real calculation that the mass arrival of American troops would make victory impossible, the Germans would attempt their last ditch attacks starting in March and would not cease until June, by which point they were exhausted and the AEF was beginning to become increasingly noticeable along the front.
Although the Germans ultimately failed, they did come extremely close to victory. Amiens, one of the two critical railway hubs for the BEF's logistics, had the German Army come within three miles of seizing it while its aforementioned railway was subjected to harassment fire that did affect its operations. Indeed, as David T. Zabecki notes in his The German Offensives of 1918, considered one of the premier accounts of the eponymous attacks, the threat was very real and the BEF was in desperate straits:
Indeed, as late as June 9th of 1918, as the last major German attack-directed at Paris-was developing, Lord Milner would write to Lloyd George that:
So how could the Germans come to win? Zabecki presents one such scenario on Pages 139-141, although there are many that could be inserted instead:
So let's say the Germans do this, allowing them to close the remaining mileage to Amiens, eliminating 50% of the BEF's logistics immediately. Combined with the existing disruption to the Hazebrouck route, this allows Operation Georgette to take Hazebrouck; the BEF is thus compelled to destroy 90% of its equipment and retreat off the continent in a "1918 Dunkirk" that leaves the British out, at a minimum, for a year as it will take time to rebuild their equipment. Perhaps more pressing for the United Kingdom is that German control of the Channel ports will provide the Germans with the means of finally starving England into submission:
The situation will be disaster for the French as well, who will now have their right flank open with the evacuation of the British, and are also now greatly outnumbered; the French Army as a result will be compelled to surrender most, if not all, of Northern France and Paris will likely come under siege. Perhaps just as disastrous is the loss of the Bethune coal mines, which fed the Parisian war industries which constituted 70% of overall French output. In short, the Germans will have inflicted a one-two punch that forces the Entente to the table. What does the peace that comes after look like? We will review that in the next post...
Although the Germans ultimately failed, they did come extremely close to victory. Amiens, one of the two critical railway hubs for the BEF's logistics, had the German Army come within three miles of seizing it while its aforementioned railway was subjected to harassment fire that did affect its operations. Indeed, as David T. Zabecki notes in his The German Offensives of 1918, considered one of the premier accounts of the eponymous attacks, the threat was very real and the BEF was in desperate straits:
Indeed, as late as June 9th of 1918, as the last major German attack-directed at Paris-was developing, Lord Milner would write to Lloyd George that:
"We must be prepared for France and Italy both being beaten to their knees. In that case the German-Austro-Turks-Bulgar bloc will be master of all Europe and Northern and Central Asia up to the point at which Japan steps in to bar the way, if she does step in. In any case it is clear that, unless the remaining free peoples of the world, America, this country and the Dominions, are knit together in the closest conceivable alliance and prepared for the maximum of sacrifice, the Central Bloc will control not only Europe and most of Asia but the whole world."
So how could the Germans come to win? Zabecki presents one such scenario on Pages 139-141, although there are many that could be inserted instead:
After 1916 submarines, mines, coastal artillery, and naval aviation were the German Navy's only effective weapons in the West. Had these assets been directed against the BEF's lines of communications (LOCs) in the Channel in coordination with a focused attack ground attack against the BEF's rail network, the British might well have been forced to withdraw from the Continent. The German submarine threat against their sea LOCs was a constant concern to the British, and one of the objectives behind the bloody battle of Passchendaele was to clear the Channel coast of the U-boat bases.
German mines in the Channel could have been delivered by air or by submarine. The Navy's Freidreichshafen bomber was capable of carrying and dropping 750-kilogram naval mines. One such mine, in fact, sank a Russian destroyer during the Baltic Islands operation. Submarines were the other way to lay mines, with the UC-class boats specifically designed as minelayers. Most of the UC-boats carried 18 mines. The U-class boats were fleet submarines that fired torpedoes; but in 1918 the Germans launched ten of the Project 45 fleet U-boats that could lay 42 mines through their torpedo tubes and carry an additional 32 mines in deck containers.
By the start of 1918, the Germans had 42 operational fleet U-boats; 66 operational coastal U-boats (UB-class); and 33 operational UC-class minelayers. During 1918 they built an additional 25 U-class (including the Project 45 boats); 47 UB-class; and 16 UC-class. The British, of course, had the Channel heavily mined, which increased the hazards of any U-boat operations. Mines caused 27 percent of the total German U-boat losses. Of the total of 53 UC type U-boats the Germans lost during the war, 19 were lost to mines. The Germans, nonetheless, had a capability to lay mines in the Channel and at least disrupt that leg of the BEF's LOCs. On 14 February 1918, the German Navy did launch one major and largely successful surface raid against British defenses between Dover and Calais. The Heinecke Torpedo Boat Flotilla sunk 28 British picket ships and other vessels, including an older cruiser. That raid, however, was never followed up. Nor had it been coordinated with OHL, rather it had been launched at the request of the Naval Corps in Flanders. Even after the failure of Operation MICHAEL in March 1918, General Ferdinand Foch still thought that increased submarine operations in the Channel posed a serious threat to cutting off the BEF.
Finally, German naval artillery could have been turned against the BEF's channel ports. The three so-called Paris Guns (Wilhelmgeschütze) were actually manned by naval crews. With a maximum range of 127 kilometers, they had the reach to hit the BEF's three primary northern Channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk) and even Dover, if the guns had been positioned in the Fourth Army sector. But between 16 and 30 March 1918, during 140 Operation MICHAEL, they did not fire in support of the attacking Seventeenth, Second, or Eighteenth Armies. Rather, the guns were positioned in the Seventh Army sector, delivering pointless terrorizing fire against Paris.
At least two German coastal batteries in Flanders were capable of hitting Dunkirk and could have fired in support of ground forces during Operation GEORGETTE. But Batterie Deutschland (four 3 80mm guns) never fired against land targets, and Batterie Pommern (one 380mm gun) delivered only occasional fire against Dunkirk and the major British base at Poperinghe. A third battery, Batterie Tirpitz (four 280mm guns), had the range to hit targets in the northern quarter of the Ypres Salient, but it too never fired in support of ground operations.
So let's say the Germans do this, allowing them to close the remaining mileage to Amiens, eliminating 50% of the BEF's logistics immediately. Combined with the existing disruption to the Hazebrouck route, this allows Operation Georgette to take Hazebrouck; the BEF is thus compelled to destroy 90% of its equipment and retreat off the continent in a "1918 Dunkirk" that leaves the British out, at a minimum, for a year as it will take time to rebuild their equipment. Perhaps more pressing for the United Kingdom is that German control of the Channel ports will provide the Germans with the means of finally starving England into submission:
Submarine warfare that threatened the London approaches increased the pressure, and efforts to divert shipping to west coast ports were only partially successful. London was a lighterage port and could not be converted easily to massive rail use. Attempts to supersede a city infrastructure designed to live off of riverside supply lines with inland shipments by rail were likely to throw distribution networks into chaos. One effort to divert cargoes to Plymouth underscored the futility of feeding the entire London basin via rail deliveries from other ports. Out of 27,000 tons off-loaded, only 7,000 made their way to the capital, and there were railroad backups while they did so. It took approximately three weeks to unload the ships in Plymouth, whereas the job would have been done in seven in London.[15]
The situation will be disaster for the French as well, who will now have their right flank open with the evacuation of the British, and are also now greatly outnumbered; the French Army as a result will be compelled to surrender most, if not all, of Northern France and Paris will likely come under siege. Perhaps just as disastrous is the loss of the Bethune coal mines, which fed the Parisian war industries which constituted 70% of overall French output. In short, the Germans will have inflicted a one-two punch that forces the Entente to the table. What does the peace that comes after look like? We will review that in the next post...