Resolved, the 2nd German Empire’s actual mistake is the opposite of what you’ve been told

WolfBear

Well-known member
Nice article for the Wilhelm haters:
(Here is the author for anyone curious: Thomas Fleming (historian) - Wikipedia )






Literally Nazi-esque propaganda.

Well, to be honest, I do think that Kaiser Bill deserves some blame for what he said after the war, such as about his desire to gas the Jews in a global pogrom. However, these can be dismissed as the angry rantings of a former monarch who had lost his throne to a revolution. Back when he was in power, Germany's Jews were treated much better than Russia's Jews were, that's for sure! And Yeah, before 1914, the Kaiser's Germany was more bark than bite. Though I do think that Kaiser Bill deserves some blame for WWI with his blank check to A-H in dealing with Serbia during the July Crisis, though even this can be understood as his anger due to him grieving after the assassination of his friend Franz Ferdinand.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Well, to be honest, I do think that Kaiser Bill deserves some blame for what he said after the war, such as about his desire to gas the Jews in a global pogrom.
Wait what? Do you have a source on that???

However, these can be dismissed as the angry rantings of a former monarch who had lost his throne to a revolution. Back when he was in power, Germany's Jews were treated much better than Russia's Jews were, that's for sure! And Yeah, before 1914, the Kaiser's Germany was more bark than bite. Though I do think that Kaiser Bill deserves some blame for WWI with his blank check to A-H in dealing with Serbia during the July Crisis, though even this can be understood as his anger due to him grieving after the assassination of his friend Franz Ferdinand.
Have you read the 'blank check' letter?
All he said was he would stand by his treaty obligations and it was up to A-H to figure out the Serbia situation. That was at the end of a letter mostly talking about alliances with Bulgaria and Romania. More BS ginned up by the Entente propaganda machine.
 
Last edited:

WolfBear

Well-known member
Wait what? Do you have a source on that???


Have you read the 'blank check' letter?
'
All he said was he would stand by his treaty obligations and it was up to A-H to figure out the Serbia situation. That was at the end of a letter mostly talking about alliances with Bulgaria and Romania. More BS ginned up by the Entente propaganda machine.

Yes: John C. G. Rohl's The Kaiser and His Court, page 210. You can find and read this whole book for free online at LibGen.

Thanks for your explanation about the blank check letter.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
To sum up my posts and arguments in this thread, I think Germany would have gotten better outcomes for itself through encouraging third party wars or launching preventive wars at any of several intervals in the Bismarck era and the early Wilhelm era up through 1909.

The results likely would have been far better than the OTL course of keeping the peace while gradually losing allies as France gained them (and formed the Triple Entente, and attracted more small scavenging powers using Austria d bait), and only then, in 1914, choosing that as the do or die moment to start WWI.

Given the way everything had come to line up against Germany by 1914, the right answer to Berlin’s do or die dilemma was ‘dodge’!

Now I am saying this precocious aggressive policy of preventive war would have been “better” only in the Machiavellian, realpolitik sense, not in a moral or ethical sense. It would have been morally and ethically wicked.

But it’s hard to play great power politics and keep clean hands or souls. I would venture to say that if God is judging on the basis of the 10 commandments with any rigor, we should assume the chief executives of all the powers on *both* sides of both world wars, except for some that got speedily mugged, overrun, and rescued, are in Hell, and disqualified from the other place
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
To sum up my posts and arguments in this thread, I think Germany would have gotten better outcomes for itself through encouraging third party wars or launching preventive wars at any of several intervals in the Bismarck era and the early Wilhelm era up through 1909.

The results likely would have been far better than the OTL course of keeping the peace while gradually losing allies as France gained them (and formed the Triple Entente, and attracted more small scavenging powers using Austria d bait), and only then, in 1914, choosing that as the do or die moment to start WWI.

Given the way everything had come to line up against Germany by 1914, the right answer to Berlin’s do or die dilemma was ‘dodge’!

Now I am saying this precocious aggressive policy of preventive war would have been “better” only in the Machiavellian, realpolitik sense, not in a moral or ethical sense. It would have been morally and ethically wicked.

But it’s hard to play great power politics and keep clean hands or souls. I would venture to say that if God is judging on the basis of the 10 commandments with any rigor, we should assume the chief executives of all the powers on *both* sides of both world wars, except for some that got speedily mugged, overrun, and rescued, are in Hell, and disqualified from the other place

The US's WWI leadership would have been in Heaven had it not been for the fact that the US's late entry into WWI ensured that the Bolsheviks would rise to power in Russia (and remain in power there for the next 70+ years) and that the Nazis would rise to power in Germany. But of course, neither of these two things was actually "reasonably foreseeable" in early 1917. Though the US would have probably been better served entering WWI in 1915, massing up a giant army in Europe over the next two years, and then launching a giant offensive along with the Anglo-French on the Western Front in early 1917. I wonder how that would have turned out.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
I certainly won't dispute this. Although some seem to think that if you don't think Britain was hell-bent on war, then you must think Britain to always be angelically innocent, there simply are a lot of nuances here.

I'm not one of those either/or people

Of course, Britain served its own interests. An empire is not a charity, after all!

a truism indeed

I am a proponent of Anglo-German friendship.

that was Germany's best bet.

I also believe that Germany, under Bismarck, under-valued the Ottoman Empire. Kaiser Wilhelm and Ministers sometimes recognized its value, but often too easily dismissed it until WWI started.

I'd call this foolish on Germany's part, although given Wilhelm's priorities (and the reasoning of those who enjoyed his support), I also do understand the reasoning.

Put me in his place, though, and I'll accept that deal in a heartbeat. Risk war with Russia? Delay favours them. If the war must come, let it come sooner rather than later. As for fighting on the continent while Britain gets the colonies -- let them. Germany's prize here is a continental empire, which victory would produce.

Why would I begrudge Britain getting the French colonies, if I can carve out puppet states in Finlan, the Baltics, Poland, Belarus and the rich bread-basket to the Ukraine? (While, presumably, Austria-Hungary gets to lord it over the Balkans, so it's not like they go home empty-handed, either.)

As for doing the bleeding in a two-front war: that's true. But that has been a given of alliance with Britain since time immemorial. You put the bodies in the field, and Britain pays the bills. You know that going in.

Agreed.

And the most important single thing about being in a modern war with Britain as your ally at the start, is that despite any British balance of power maneuverings, or alleged "perfidy", if Britain brings you to the dance, under modern conditions of mass participation politics and mass media, Britain will *not be able* to cynically switch partners in the middle of the war and side with Germany's enemies once it feels that perhaps Germany has gotten a little too powerful. All it can do is dial back support a little, not a full 180, but Germany won't need the support, and Britain will never be able to contain and certainly not roll back Germany ever again.

Additionally - On colonial gains - sure Britain will "the Lion's Share", but the Germans had their colonies and deployed forces, which will be in supply thanks to being allied with Britain, and those forces will make *some* gains versus France, we can call it 'the Eagle's share' or at least the Vulture's.

You make the point that bleeding lives while Britain spends money is just the fact of life from time immemorial. That point is valid. The Germans needed to accept that and move on, and, they did themselves a disservice by instead allowing themselves to obsess and replay over and over again the trauma of the experience of Prussia in the 7 Years War, and excessively worried and told themselves another alliance with Britain risked a repeat of that experience. This is a crap analogy. The power gap between Britain and Germany in 1900 is much less than between Britain and Prussia in the 1700s. A two-front war for big Germany in 1900 and beyond would not be the same thing as the 360 degree surround-sound war that little Prussia faced in the 1760s. Every neighbor of Frederick the Great except Hanover was an enemy. 1900 Germany would have had Triple Alliance partners.

@Skallagrim The interesting thing is that, in real life's WWI, Britain ultimately ended up doing its fair share of bleeding as well. So, in theory, I don't see anything that should foreclose the possibility of Britain sending a BEF and, if necessary, additional troops to Europe in any early 20th century war with Germany as its ally. Germany could have at least raised this possibility, even without the benefit of hindsight.

The Germans certainly could and should ask for a BEF to provide them, and/or possibly weaker Triple Alliance allies like Italy or Austria, some support within Europe.

@Skallagrim - I don't see eye to eye with you on the significance of the Kaiser's actions but all great minds can't agree on everything.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Additionally - On colonial gains - sure Britain will "the Lion's Share", but the Germans had their colonies and deployed forces, which will be in supply thanks to being allied with Britain, and those forces will make *some* gains versus France, we can call it 'the Eagle's share' or at least the Vulture's.

...

The Germans certainly could and should ask for a BEF to provide them, and/or possibly weaker Triple Alliance allies like Italy or Austria, some support within Europe.

@Skallagrim - I don't see eye to eye with you on the significance of the Kaiser's actions but all great minds can't agree on everything.

What Germany can't gain in the colonies it can compensate by gaining in Eastern Europe, for which it can of course also use British and Imperial British troops to help accomplish this task. A German-British occupation of Ukraine, anyone?

And with Britain on the German side, there is no way in Hell that Italy will fight on the Anglo-French side since AFAIK 90% of imported Italian coal came from Britain:


So, a coal embargo would be VERY severe for Italy, and I'm highly skeptical that France will be able to fully compensate for this, especially if Germany will end up France's resource-rich northeastern region sooner or later.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
On Bismarck, it is true, and to his credit, that he fought in three victorious wars, and then, he stopped launching wars before he got into one he lost. In some ways that’s a rare achievement. (And this is despite the problems that his diplomacy let fester and that I actually don’t think he would have lost if he had started additional wars).

However, he did not need to start all his wars either. From a pure self defense necessity point of view, least justifiable was the war with Austria of 1866. Prussia could have been a perfectly safe, strong, and economically prosperous Major European power, with or without a later overseas colonial empire, without overthrowing the German Confederation and its Austrian Presidency and replacing it with the NGC and then 2nd Reich.

the war with Denmark was not of necessity but it was quite provoked by Denmark’s obnoxiousness. Prussia could have worked with the Confederation rather than aside from it, and left north Schleswig alone.

the war with France was actually most justifiable, because France was really getting in Prussia’s face with its demands, chest thumping, Dick measuring, and other threatening status displays. Of course France may have stayed quieter if the Prussians and Austrians in the Cental European schoolyard had stayed quieter. (I don’t attribute responsibility for the war the Bismarck’s editing of the Ems dispatch - it was on Napoleon To take the bait or not, and he, and even more many of his obnoxious countrymen* were looking to be baited and show who was boss in Western Europe.

*not obnoxious in all things at all times, but about this particular thing
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
On Bismarck, it is true, and to his credit, that he fought in three victorious wars, and then, he stopped launching wars before he got into one he lost. In some ways that’s a rare achievement. (And this is despite the problems that his diplomacy let fester and that I actually don’t think he would have lost if he had started additional wars).

However, he did not need to start all his wars either. From a pure self defense necessity point of view, least justifiable was the war with Austria of 1866. Prussia could have been a perfectly safe, strong, and economically prosperous Major European power, with or without a later overseas colonial empire, without overthrowing the German Confederation and its Austrian Presidency and replacing it with the NGC and then 2nd Reich.

the war with Denmark was not of necessity but it was quite provoked by Denmark’s obnoxiousness. Prussia could have worked with the Confederation rather than aside from it, and left north Schleswig alone.

the war with France was actually most justifiable, because France was really getting in Prussia’s face with its demands, chest thumping, Dick measuring, and other threatening status displays. Of course France may have stayed quieter if the Prussians and Austrians in the Cental European schoolyard had stayed quieter. (I don’t attribute responsibility for the war the Bismarck’s editing of the Ems dispatch - it was on Napoleon To take the bait or not, and he, and even more many of his obnoxious countrymen* were looking to be baited and show who was boss in Western Europe.

*not obnoxious in all things at all times, but about this particular thing

FWIW, I think that Bismarck's greatest mistake was not expanding enough in France in 1871. He should have aimed to expand up to this fortress line (in blue):

Fond_de_carte_1914_%28a%29.JPG


That would have produced an even more secure southwestern border for Germany and, with hindsight, would have also secured a lot of valuable iron ore for Germany in Briey-Longwy. I mean, France was going to be pissed off in any case, so why not go even farther?

Taking Algeria and giving it back to the Ottoman Empire on top of all of that would have been really epic, but I fear that this would have been asking for too much.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
In regards to Austria-Hungary, Bismarck should have taken the northern Sudetenland but nothing else. This would have secured a lot of valuable industries for Germany but without incorporating too many Catholics or pissing off Austria too badly. And the northern Sudeten Germans sort of stuck out like a sore thumb within Austria-Hungary:

 

raharris1973

Well-known member
Aside from preemptive war, another policy recommendation I have for the 2nd Reich is support for Ottoman territorial integrity.

in my view, Bismarck’s advocacy of Austro-Russian partition of the Ottoman Empire was mistaken, because, as it turned out, the two powers could not agree on a simple, stable, durable line of division for both reasons of domestic politics, mutual suspicion and ethnic sentiments.

the rollback of Ottoman power resulted in creation of Balkan states who Russia and Austria instead tried to weaponize against each other and one of whom eventually weaponized Russia against Austria and Germany.

Germany would have been much better off in 1876, joining in parallel with Austria to oppose all proposals by Russia, Serbia and Montenegro to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. Faced with that diplomatic opposition, Russia would not have proceeded.

worst case, if Russia did proceed, she would have lost badly. France probably wouldn’t have joined her in ruin. Even if France did, France would have lost too. Britain would not have fought Germany to be any Ottoman in the 1870s for sure, so Germany can’t lose.

from this stance, Germany and Europe benefit from increased European stability and keeping European Turkey together as a single market.

likewise, in the 20th century, Germany should have firmly vetoed Italy’s war of territorial predation on the Ottomans, which encouraged the Balkan states predation and weakened Austria’s southern flank.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Aside from preemptive war, another policy recommendation I have for the 2nd Reich is support for Ottoman territorial integrity.

in my view, Bismarck’s advocacy of Austro-Russian partition of the Ottoman Empire was mistaken, because, as it turned out, the two powers could not agree on a simple, stable, durable line of division for both reasons of domestic politics, mutual suspicion and ethnic sentiments.

the rollback of Ottoman power resulted in creation of Balkan states who Russia and Austria instead tried to weaponize against each other and one of whom eventually weaponized Russia against Austria and Germany.

Germany would have been much better off in 1876, joining in parallel with Austria to oppose all proposals by Russia, Serbia and Montenegro to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. Faced with that diplomatic opposition, Russia would not have proceeded.

worst case, if Russia did proceed, she would have lost badly. France probably wouldn’t have joined her in ruin. Even if France did, France would have lost too. Britain would not have fought Germany to be any Ottoman in the 1870s for sure, so Germany can’t lose.

from this stance, Germany and Europe benefit from increased European stability and keeping European Turkey together as a single market.

likewise, in the 20th century, Germany should have firmly vetoed Italy’s war of territorial predation on the Ottomans, which encouraged the Balkan states predation and weakened Austria’s southern flank.

I wonder if a part of the reason why Bismarck hesitated to go to war with Russia was the fear of the creation of an independent Poland in the event of a German victory in that war. This Poland wouldn't have taken any German territory, of course, but Bismarck was still notoriously Polonophobic.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
Preferred COAs for Germany, year-by-year, if that year is the PoD:

1871 – If you can swing being nice, by restraining internal demands and enthusiasms, do not annex Alsace-Lorraine. Also, do not coronate the Emperor at Versailles. Coronate the Emperor either in Germany (at Aachen, or any border city attacked, or Frankfurt; or if in France, at Sedan)

1871 – Alternatively, if you can’t swing being nice, and there must be annexations, take a little more. Take the Briey-Longwy region, and possibly fill in the A-L bend up to the line of the Meuse or Moselle river.

1873 – When setting up the Three Emperors League, try to make it broader, into a Four Emperors League, including the Ottoman Sultan.

1875 – Actually go to war with France in the spring/summer. Upon victory, charge another indemnity, seize Briey-Longwy and up to the Moselle. Try to get Italy as an active ally. If so, gain territorial concessions for Italy.

1876-77 – Work in parallel with Austria-Hungary to warn off Serbia, Montenegro, and Russia from launching war against the Ottomans in support of Bosnian and Bulgarian revolts.

1877-78 – When Britain and Austria get hostile to Russian war on Turkey, probably during defense of Plevna, negotiate alliance with them to make an unacceptable ultimatum and war on Russia; if they refuse to fight, switch sides and support Russian peace demands completely.

1881 – Urge Italy to move on Tunis as fast as France. If France opposes, support Italy to the point of war. Upon victory, charge another indemnity, seize Briey-Longwy and up to the Moselle. Gain territorial concessions for Italy in Tunis, the Alps, and Corsica

1885-1889 – Attack Russia, in league with Austria and Ottomans. Defend vs. France if needed.

1890 – Keep reinsurance treaty

1890s – Keep building up ground forces, especially after Franco-Russian alliance; Attempt, discreetly, colonial deals and swaps with Britain, Netherlands, Belgium, to minimize crossing colonial paths with Britain and maximize crossing colonial paths with France.

1890s – Woo Ottoman Empire

1890s – Keep mouth shut on Transvaal

1897 – Take Ottoman Empire’s side against Greece in Greco-Ottoman war, to signal, hands off the empire.

1899 – Accept Britain’s alliance offer, even if it is Far East based and less than ideal or immediately useful

1903 – Accept Russian alliance offer when Russia is open to it

1905 – Attack Russia shortly after Tsushima, with the Navy and Army, in League with Austrians and Ottomans, set up a ribbon of border states. Defend against France in the west.

1906 – Immediately set to work trying to bring the Ottomans into the Triple Alliance

1908-1909 - Attack Russia, with the Navy and Army, in League with Austrians and Ottomans, set up a ribbon of border states. Defend against France in the west.

1908 – Alternatively, with advent of Triple Entente, cut loose from alliance competition, and cut loose from sole reliance on Austria-Hungary. Therefore, decline to support Austria-Hungary on Bosnia annexation, at least unless there is unanimous German, Italian, Austrian consent. Actually, thenceforth use the consent rule to rein in both of them, or disavow both of them.

1911 -- Forcefully diplomatically oppose Italy's plans for war against the Ottomans behind the scenes. First goal is prevention of war. Secondary goal is to gain Ottomans as an ally.

1912 and on - avoid initiating war at all costs for as long as the Triple Entente is a going concern.
 

Skallagrim

Well-known member
1912 and on - avoid initiating war at all costs for as long as the Triple Entente is a going concern.
To this last one I'd add: assuming that you're never 100% certain you can avoid war, carefully plot out an 'East first' strategy, whereby Germane fights a deensive war in the West and never violates Belgian neutrality.


In addition/alteration to the given points, I'd suggest:

-- Focus on strenthening the army at the expense of OTL's naval expansion
-- Rather than just discreet colonial swaps, offer to sell any existing German colonies to Britain for a reasonably low price
-- Avoid interfering in Morocco, since it's not going to do you any good
-- Do everything to dissuade Wilhelm II from any misguided 'public relations' efforts, e.g. no giving interviews to the foreign press


ETA:

-- Don't suddenly decide to extend the Berlin-Baghdad railway beyond Baghdad and right towards those British-owned oilfields
 
Last edited:

WolfBear

Well-known member
To this last one I'd add: assuming that you're never 100% certain you can avoid war, carefully plot out an 'East first' strategy, whereby Germane fights a deensive war in the West and never violates Belgian neutrality.


In addition/alteration to the given points, I'd suggest:

-- Focus on strenthening the army at the expense of OTL's naval expansion
-- Rather than just discreet colonial swaps, offer to sell any existing German colonies to Britain for a reasonably low price
-- Avoid interfering in Morocco, since it's not going to do you any good
-- Do everything to dissuade Wilhelm II from any misguided 'public relations' efforts, e.g. no giving interviews to the foreign press

Agreed with all of this and I'd also like to point out that in the East, Germany should aim to expand up to the Daugava-Dnieper Line and then dig in right there.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
I wonder if a part of the reason why Bismarck hesitated to go to war with Russia was the fear of the creation of an independent Poland in the event of a German victory in that war. This Poland wouldn't have taken any German territory, of course, but Bismarck was still notoriously Polonophobic.

Probably.

But nothing would be stopping him from being "creative" in victory. He could have independent buffers set up in Finland, the Baltics and Ukraine, but leave Poland Romanov in the peace settlement, just to keep the Poles down, even though during the war itself, the Germans/Austrians would have occupied it. It would leave a Russian Polish salient next to Germany, but with such long-exposed flanks, it wouldn't be too hard to neutralize the offensive threat from it. Another alternative could be to gift Congress Poland to Austrian Cisleithania.

And most of all, this fear over-estimates the ability of even an independent Poland carved out of Russia to make trouble for Germany and Austria. It will have desires to reunite with Poles across every border, but it will fear reabsorption into Russia most. Germany can always threaten rapprochement and repartition with the Russians at any time and hold it over the Poles heads.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Probably.

But nothing would be stopping him from being "creative" in victory. He could have independent buffers set up in Finland, the Baltics and Ukraine, but leave Poland Romanov in the peace settlement, just to keep the Poles down, even though during the war itself, the Germans/Austrians would have occupied it. It would leave a Russian Polish salient next to Germany, but with such long-exposed flanks, it wouldn't be too hard to neutralize the offensive threat from it. Another alternative could be to gift Congress Poland to Austrian Cisleithania.

And most of all, this fear over-estimates the ability of even an independent Poland carved out of Russia to make trouble for Germany and Austria. It will have desires to reunite with Poles across every border, but it will fear reabsorption into Russia most. Germany can always threaten rapprochement and repartition with the Russians at any time and hold it over the Poles heads.

An independent Ukraine will be harder to defend if Poland is Russian. But Yeah, the idea of giving Poland to Austria could work here.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
To this last one I'd add: assuming that you're never 100% certain you can avoid war, carefully plot out an 'East first' strategy, whereby Germane fights a deensive war in the West and never violates Belgian neutrality.

I tend to agree, but it's not 100% risk free, there is still that chance Britain will join in France backstabbing you and even bribe the Belgians, maybe even Dutch, into letting them all pass through.

In addition/alteration to the given points, I'd suggest:

-- Focus on strenthening the army at the expense of OTL's naval expansion

A necessity

-- Rather than just discreet colonial swaps, offer to sell any existing German colonies to Britain for a reasonably low price

Germany can work sales to its possible benefit. The best terms, just in case Britain cheats, would be to get immediate payment in durable goods, especially any stuff that might be blockaded, gold, or marks.

Also, without ruining the sale price negotiations, it's good if the legislatures and media of the Dominions - South Africa, Australia, know that Namibia and New Guinea are on offer for sale, even if those Dominions can't unilaterally make a purchase decision without London. Because it's good to influence public opinion not just in Britain but also those Dominions that Germany is not a threat and also a country you can do business with.

Also, you're not limited to selling colonies to Britain either. You can see if the US is interested in Micronesia, in order to link the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii, and so much the better if you get on their good side.

I'm not sure the value of selling Togo and Kamerun. France got most of them in OTL, Who do you sell to here? A neutral country like the Dutch who you can still trade with if blockaded?

A benefit to keeping Togo and Kamerun is that any troops the French use to overrun them, even just African troops, are troops that are not available for use in crucial battles in Europe, at least until later.

In fact that's the value of the option of swaps instead of sell-outs in general. If Germany could trade in, pre-WWI, most of its existing colonial empire to Britain, in return for some of the British outpost colonies in West Africa like Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia (a boy can dream and say Nigeria, but I won't), it can tie down alot of French African and Algerian troops for a long time, especially if there's any German commanders on par with Lettow-Vorbeck.


-- Avoid interfering in Morocco, since it's not going to do you any good

More is probably gained than lost by this.

-- Do everything to dissuade Wilhelm II from any misguided 'public relations' efforts, e.g. no giving interviews to the foreign press
--Yes, it's not helpful, even if I don't think its as decisive as you do


-- Don't suddenly decide to extend the Berlin-Baghdad railway beyond Baghdad and right towards those British-owned oilfields

sure
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
In regards to strengthening the German Army, trucks would be a REALLY good investment, especially if one still wants to make the Schlieffen Plan work. But even if one doesn't, trucks should still significantly help with logistics, just like they did for the Soviet Union during WWII when they got a lot of Lend-Lease trucks from the US.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Top