Resolved, the 2nd German Empire’s actual mistake is the opposite of what you’ve been told

[Aldarion]

The US mostly avoided the rush for colonies, and it turned out excellent.

United States also had extreme expanse of land which contained literally all resources necessary for industrial development. That is something no other country had except for Russia and China - but much of Russian resources were inaccessible in Siberia, while China had its own issues.

 

[raharris1973]

***a few edits made Sunday***

I don't actually disagree with any particular point here, but there is a bit of logical conflation going on in this whole thesis statement.

The German Empire’s actual mistake is the opposite of what we’ve been told? Okay. What have we been told? Well, that Germany made too many powerful enemies.

We have been told that Germany made too many powerful enemies (which itself presumes total responsibility on Germany’s part for how their Russian and British relations worked out), but there are many other things we are told as part of this, or which are implied:


For the sake of relations with Britain:


· Germany shouldn’t have built a navy, because it spooked the British (never mind it needed one against France and Russia and for trade protection and to not be naked against close blockade) [you seem to have echoed this one]


· Germany shouldn’t have taken overseas colonies, because it rubbed up against the British and others and irritated them (nevermind that everybody, including punk-ass Belgium did it) [you seem to have echoed this one]


· Germany shouldn’t have competed with Britain in overseas, global markets (so now Germany is supposed to stay poor to keep Britain happy?)


· Germany shouldn’t have invested in the Ottoman Empire/Berlin-Baghdad railway (which was kind of a discussion between Germans and Turks foremost ya think?)


[I would add by the way, that the country Britain allied with, France, did all those things, some of them (colonial expansion) in a bigger way than Germany.


For the sake of relations with Russia:


· Germany should have continued the reinsurance treaty, but further than that...


· …consistently favored Russian over Austrian interests and desires everywhere, including the Balkans and Middle East


· Shaped its immigration and tariff policies around keeping Russia happy, at the cost of domestic economic and political interests (in exchange for what exactly?)


Basically what we’re told is that Germany rather than just doing what all the other kids were doing (even Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and the US) was just supposed to sit down, shut up, not move, and be a big Switzerland.


Also, in general, part of what “we’re told” is...


· Germany was was too militaristic, because it made other countries edgy or something, which implies it should have been less militaristic (but if anything they needed bigger ground forces)





Furthermore, while Bismarck was a smooth, suave, and debonair diplomatic genius, after Wilhelm fired him, Germany’s foreign policy, especially anything Wilhelm II ever said or touched, was a disaster.


The list of typical blunders is long but usually includes dropping the Reinsurance Treaty, the Kruger Telegram, the Manila Bay incident, the Huns speech, the 1st Morocco Crisis, the Bjorko Treaty, the Bosnia Crisis, the Daily Telegraph Affair, the 2nd Morocco Crisis, the Liman Von Sanders Affair and the Berlin-Baghdad railway project.


Altogether they are by now taken together as ‘clear evidence’ of German diplomacy that was incorrigibly aggressive, inept, or incompetent, or all three. Usually this is attributed to the Kaiser specifically.





Just as important as what “we’re told” about the Wilhelmine era, is what we’re *not* told, which is that the other great powers, including the Entente ones had their own ambitious agendas, pursued to the point of war at times [Sino-French, Russo-Turkish, Boer War, Russo-Japanese], and they made moves that ended up injurious to Germany, not only in direct response to Germany, but in response to deal-making and log-rolling and horse-trading with each other.

And what's the suggested "opposite"? That Germany failed to draw powerful nations into an alliance with itself, at which point it could have won an earlier war easily. That's true, but "Germany failed to make the right friends" is another way of approaching "Germany made the wrong enemies". Because we're talking about the exact same powers here. Britain and/or Russia.

Persomaly, I'd say that "Germany made the wrong enemies" is more accurate than "Germany failed to make the right friends", because... well, because Germany did actively antagonise its eventual enemies (and ATL would-be allies) for no good reason at all. And this was primarily the work of Wilhelm II and his really stupid ideas.

I would therefore say that this is in no way the "opposite" of what we typically believe, but rather an elaboration. One with which I agree, mind you, but hardly a very shocking reversal of insight. My own view, I'd line up like this:

A) The traditional view, that Germany made the wrong enemies, is 100% accurate. Had Germany managed to turn either Russia or Britain into a long-term ally, and had the war still started in 1914, their side would have won.

B) The expanded view, that every moment the war was delayed strengthened Germany's enemies, is also 100% accurate. Had Germany fought the war earlier, and against the same enemies, each year by which the war's commencement is hastened ends up favouring Germany more. I have to agree with ol'Adolf (of all people!) that the Central Powers would have won a war in 1904. (However, I also agree with @raharris1973 that earlier would be better still.)

C) The ideal scenario would actually be "both", which is the "war Germany can't lose" that @raharris1973 referred to. If Germany had turned either Britain or Russia into an ally, and had launched a war at the earliest opportunity during the reign of Wilhelm II, it would have been a very short war indeed. The enemy would have been flattened.

My suggested opposite to “what we’ve been told” is the following:

1. The view that Germany had a poor selection of allies and enemies and allies in 1914 is correct, but…
2. The traditional view that Germany’s own actions were the primary driver consolidating this enemy coalition is incomplete and incorrect. A more correct view would acknowledge that British, French, and Russian agendas more related to their own goals and horse-trading among each other, horse trading in which Germany and Austria-Hungary were too weak or irrelevant to matter, did even more to forge Entente commitments to each other than direct reactions to Austrian or German moves did.

B) The expanded view, that every moment the war was delayed strengthened Germany's enemies, is also 100% accurate. Had Germany fought the war earlier, and against the same enemies, each year by which the war's commencement is hastened ends up favouring Germany more. A crucial reason for this, is because, until the 20th century, it is far less likely that all three of these enemies would be likely to confront Germany at the same time!


C) Each decade of peace for Germany after 1871 saw Germany’s diplomatic & alliance position worsen in relative terms, until the formation of the Triple Entente in 1907, and since the war launched against the still existing Triple Entente that was launched in 1914 was a loss for Germany, this means that the decades of peace before 1907 were overrated, and Germany would have been better off had other wars occurred featuring, for example, Germany facing only one or two, but not three of the Entente members, while being allied to the third, or featuring a neutral Germany, while Entente members warred with each other. Basically, from any point after 1909, the Triple Entente was too consolidated, and it *was already too late* for Germany to fight WWI, it was well past too late for Germany to fight WWI in 1914, and it would have been strategic malpractice to do anything but avoid war at all costs until some point after the Triple Entente somehow broke up on its own, which Germany has no guarantee of controlling.


D) In light of C) above, Bismarck’s preservation of peace , and acting as “honest broker” during his Chancellorship from 1872-1890 was overrated, because it ended up helping Britain, France, and Russia stay at peace with Germany, and each other so they could grow, and in the case of France, recover, and later on, end up aligning up against Germany. Bismarck bought time, but time ended up working against Germany.


It is easier to envision Germany winning rather than losing for instance, a rematch with France in the 1870s over the war in sight crisis of 1875, or doing so while the other powers were preoccupied with the eastern question.


OTL’s handling of the eastern question as “honest broker” merely served to initiate long-term alienation of a Russia that expected total loyalty and alignment from Germany. Germany would have been far better off had Bismarck *not* contained the Russo-Turkish war and let it envelop more European countries.


The ideal situation for Germany instead would have been if, in the absence of German mediation, Austria-Hungary and Britain had come in to support the Ottoman Empire against Russia for Crimean War 2.0, weakening all four of those powers, but especially Britain and Russia.


While not playing, and a detached neutrality might be the lowest cost winning move, if Germany picked a side in this Crimean War 2.0, either the Russian side, or my favorite, the British-Austro-Ottoman side, I don’t see how Germany could lose, and certainly couldn’t have a treaty of Versailles imposed upon it.


If allied with Russia, it could blockaded, but the pair would be invincible on land, and would feed themselves. They would dismantle Austria-Hungary in a couple seasons, and assuredly push the Ottomans and British out of the Balkans. If the French are tempted in by the prospect of revenge, British alliance and finances, the Germans can crush them in what will soon become a one-front war.





If allied with the British-Austro-Ottoman side against Russia, the Germans with their allies can blockade Russia, blast away its military forces, and impose a Brest-Litovsk style peace on it with a string of border states pried out of western Russian territories. France probably would stay quiet and out of the fray. If it dares enter the fight, it is dealing with Germany and Britain as enemies, so is in big trouble losing colonies as they get picked off and then some borderlands when the Germans turn their attention in that direction.





So that’s what I mean by a war the Germans can’t lose.





Likewise, contrary to what some others are saying, Britain did offer Germany an alliance in the late 1890s. However, the terms were very one-sided, and Germany declined because they were afraid that they would be obligated to get into war against France and Russia because either of those countries had a colonial dispute with Britain, and thereby Germany would be stuck with the bulk of the fighting.





However, if anything, the German refusal shows the Germans were not militaristic and bloody-minded enough. If they feared in the 1890s, a two front-war in Europe, even with Britain and the other Triple Alliance states as allies, it shows they weren’t keeping their army large enough, to be brave enough to accept an alliance with Britain.


They were too soft to be useful to Britain, not too hard.





In my view, this was a mistake for Germany. Given power realities, if Britain and the Triple Alliance were aligned, the Russo-French combination would not have dared go to war with them. And if they did dare go to war, they would have lost, and much more speedily than the CPs in WWI.


If Britain is offering to be your ally in a hypothetical WWI, TAKE IT, even on crappy terms, lest they go off and offer their de facto alliance to the other guys, your enemies.





The German gambit in Morocco certainly failed to weaken the Anglo-French Entente and only tightened it. The Kaiser’s taking of force off the table mid-crisis meant the German’s got no compensation, and Germany was outvoted at the conference because it hadn’t horse traded with everyone else as well as France, so yes, Wilhelm and his government did poorly.


But even here, I’d argue that its policy reaction after was too timid and indecisive, rather than too aggressive. After seeing the Triple Entente was intact, and how perfidious the Italians were, the Germans really should have pulled out all the stops to get a firm alliance with the Ottomans, and deterred everyone from beating up on the Ottomans in the wars of 1911-1913. As it turned out, pound for pound, the Ottomans were their best WWI ally, and Germany would have been better off with them less battered to begin with and in possession of more of Europe. To be sure, the Ottomans are no substitute for prying loose one of the Entente majors, but the Ottomans are the only ones left to bring a little weight back to the CP side, especially against Russia. Letting them get beat down unassisted lets troublemakers like Serbia grow, and the German flirtations with Serbia, Greece, and Romania as allies, were all a waste of time and unrealistic. The Austrians had a much more realistic conception of who could end up lining up with who, and the Germans would have done a little better to embrace the ones who would have worked with them earlier (primarily Turks and secondarily Bulgarians).

 

[Skallagrim]

Yet Britain didn't have a problem with it until 1908. Or really 1905 when the RN formulated the blockade policy.

You only prove my point: that British alarm over German designs only really escalated after Wilhelm II had successfully pushed for an escalation of German naval build-up. That clearly demonstrates which is the inciting event, and which the reaction. Yet you claim the opposite. To quote a certain someone:

All I'm seeing you post is sophistry because you don't like the conclusion that the evidence points towards.

Eat your own words.

So what decisive changes actually happened in the 1890s? Or is it a hollow phrase?
Seems is one of those dangerous words if not supported by actual data.

You boast about your sources, and in the same breath, link a wiki article as if it proves your point. I directly quote the article that you linked as "proof" of your opinion... and suddenly, that article is no longer to be taken as credible. Now, it's just hollow words. Seems like sources are only valid when they agree with you, and in fact, they magically stop being valid when it turns out they don't agree with you after all.

Sound to me like...

you don't like the conclusion that the evidence points towards.

Your double standard is showing.

How could they be when all the biggest economies in the world were colonialists and Germany would have been economically limited by refraining from a global trade network when globalism was the word of the day? Seems like you think Germany should have had to play by different rules than Britain.

Once again with the one-track thinking. My whole thesis is that Germany and Britain are fundamentally different countries, with different interests. Germany in fact became wealthy and extremely successful by understanding this. Wilhelm II did a lot to ruin it. His pursuits harmed the German economy, and created rivalry by trying to fish in the same pond as Britain.

He seems to have believed, as you seem to believe, that only one 'pond' existed. And that it involves colonialism as a recipe for success. But that doesn't hold up. If you need colonies for economic prosperity, why was Germany booming before it got into colonialism? Why were the German colonies, overall, money sinks? How can that be, if what you say is true?

And why do you rigidly assume that "no colonies, so over-investment in the navy" is equal to "no access to global trade"? Was Germany somehow cut off from trade before Wilhelm II came to power? No. The opposite is true.

This proves that Germany didn't so much have to play by different rules than Britain, but that it would have been in Germany's fundamental interest to do so. Because prior to Wilhelm II, Germany was rapidly emerging as a continental power, and continental powers do actually play by different rules than oceanic powers. Not because they are forced to, but because it's in their interest to do so.

And mind you, in this whole period, Britain wasn't somehow categorically opposed to German success and ascendancy.



----------------------------

Wilhelm's time saw the King of Bavaria removed and murdered in a palace coup shortly before he became Emperor.

You refer to the mentally unstable Otto, who followed the also mentally unstable Ludwig II? Yeah, he was removed. By his closest relatives, not by some kind of parliamentary action. So this doesn't in any way prove the thesis that monarchs at this time are by definition just powerless figureheads.

That's not to mention the fact that the position of the King of Bavaria wasn't the ame as that of the Kaiser of Germany.

Finally, you have your facts mixed up. Otto wasn't murdered. He died from an obstruction of the bowel. There aren't even any conspiracy theories about it supposedly having been murder.

He lived at the mercy of the German State Bureaucracy. One false move and he would be deposed. As it was, he was essentially usurped by Hindenburg and then forced to Abdicate when shit went down in 18.

Utter nonsense. You project the situation in 1918 -- when Germany was literally collapsing politically after years of war, and when Hindenburg and Ludendorff had very gradually usurped ever more power -- onto the pre-war period.

That's like pretending that the fact that Hitler was eventually confined to the Führerbunker in '45, commanding armies that only existed on paper, somehow proves that Hitler never had armies to command in the years beforehand. That would be a ridiculous assertion, and what you claim here is of the same sort.



----------------------------

That was kinda my point. Wilhelm - and so many during that time - subscribed to Mahan's idea that control of the sea was a key aspect for any power - even those on the continent. So I have to wonder whether Wilhelm's project of building a navy really was just vanity, as often suggested - rather, I would argue that it was a serious project based on the fundamental misreading of strategic realities. You already covered the rest of it, and I agree with your points, so I'll stop here.

I agree with this completely; we may let this matter rest here.

EDIT: To add here however, the time before World War I was insanely globalistic, and rush for colonies was an aspect of that. So while it may have been possible for Germany to avoid colonial craze, it would have been incredibly difficult - especially with German industry rapidly developing post-unification.

I would argue that stepping into the colonial game was pure vanity, because it didn't actually net Germany anything (it cost more than it delivered by every metric, including diplomatic leeway). Of course, it may well be motivated by Wilhelm II's indeed fundamental mis-reading of strategic realities. Even then, though, it makes no sense. It must be noted that Bismarck spent quite some effort opposing the colonial lobby, and (correctly, I think) pointed out that Germany's role as neutral mediator in colonial affairs had considerable value in itself.

 

[Chiron]

You refer to the mentally unstable Otto, who followed the also mentally unstable Ludwig II? Yeah, he was removed. By his closest relatives, not by some kind of parliamentary action. So this doesn't in any way prove the thesis that monarchs at this time are by definition just powerless figureheads.

That's not to mention the fact that the position of the King of Bavaria wasn't the ame as that of the Kaiser of Germany.

Finally, you have your facts mixed up. Otto wasn't murdered. He died from an obstruction of the bowel. There aren't even any conspiracy theories about it supposedly having been murder.

Ludwig II, who I am talking about, was declared insane without being examined by a doctor, removed by his cabinet, and then murdered when it was clear he wasn't insane and the conspirators couldn't risk him coming for them. Otto clearly was insane, no arguments there as multiple doctors confirmed it.

Utter nonsense. You project the situation in 1918 -- when Germany was literally collapsing politically after years of war, and when Hindenburg and Ludendorff had very gradually usurped ever more power -- onto the pre-war period.

That's like pretending that the fact that Hitler was eventually confined to the Führerbunker in '45, commanding armies that only existed on paper, somehow proves that Hitler never had armies to command in the years beforehand. That would be a ridiculous assertion, and what you claim here is of the same sort.

Wilhelm II could only do what the Reichstag allowed and his early reign was spent cleaning up Bismarck's mess as he left the country on the verge of civil war because of his constant scapegoating of different German factions. His dismissal was one of the smarter things he did. Also standing up for Morocco's Independence was a good thing. Though I'm surprised US Officials spat on Morocco's request for support as it was the first nation to recognize the US and paid off the Barbary Pirates on our behalf.

That being said, you really only have sophistry and bluster. Britain wanted war to be the top Colonial Power, it got a war and destroyed itself as an Empire.

Hitler is not relevant here.

 

[Skallagrim]

Ludwig II, who I am talking about, was declared insane without being examined by a doctor, removed by his cabinet, and then murdered when it was clear he wasn't insane and the conspirators couldn't risk him coming for them.

Ludwig was plenty cuckoo. There is debate about how cuckoo he was, ranging from 'eccentric' to 'yeah, actually a nutcase'. There is still considerable debate about the motives of his opponents, and the extent to which they were or wrre not justified. You are clearly a partisan of one reading, but you treat that as if it's a proven fact. That's not the case.

As for the murder theory. That's still a theory for a reason. Again, there's serious controversy over it, and you choose the interpretation you like and again present it as uncontested fact. It's not.

Wilhelm II could only do what the Reichstag allowed and his early reign was spent cleaning up Bismarck's mess as he left the country on the verge of civil war because of his constant scapegoating of different German factions.

Germany wasn't "on the verge of civil war" when Wilhelm II came to power. That's completely ridiculous.

[Bismarck's] dismissal was one of the smarter things [Wilhelm] did.

I couldn't possibly disagree more.

Also standing up for Morocco's Independence was a good thing.

Good for Germany's enemies, to be sure. Not good for Germany.

That being said, you really only have sophistry and bluster.

This coming from someone who thinks Germany was being smart about the Morocco affair...

It's impossible to take you seriously.

 

[raharris1973]

Had Germany managed to turn either Russia or Britain into a long-term ally,

This isn't for lack of trying on the part of both Bismarck, and then Wilhelm, and Wilhelm's Ministers.
The stars never aligned that way, and not solely because of Wilhelm's gaffes and his Ministers' initiatives - also because incompatible priorities or expectations that Russia and Britain had.

First, Russia:

Unfortunately for Germany (and Austria-Hungary!), by 1892, Russia was able to make a compatible long term deal with France. By 1904, Britain was able to make a long-term compatible deal with France. And by 1907, Britain and Russia were able able to make a compatible deal that went the distance the 1914, the outbreak of the July Crisis of 1914 and WWI.

First consider Russia - Bismarck rode good Prussian relations with Russia (and a dollop of bad Russian relations with Austria) to great effect for the early part of his Chancellorship in the 1860s. Despite these good relations, and the Three Emperor's League of 1873, and the mutual personal admiration of Kaiser Wilhelm I and his nephew Tsar Alexander II, the Russians meddled diplomatically in the German-French 'War in Sight' scare of 1875 [though actual Russian military follow-through had there been a war would have been extremely, extremely unlikely].

Bismarck gave clearance to Russian plans for the Russo-Turkish war, as did the Austrians when consulted and the Russians outlined their plan.

After winning the war, the Russians broke their promises and imposed a more aggressive settlement at San Stefano, so Austria and Britain complain. Sure the Russians won the war, but they tired themselves out and couldn't afford it and are not in great shape to get into an immediate follow-up war with Austria and Britain. Bismarck offers to hold a conference as honest-broker.

That Berlin Congress ends putting the settlement back to what the Russians promised everyone they would do at the beginning.

Instead of thanking the Germans for saving them from a ruinous war, or taking their lumps, Russian opinion now starts flipping out against Germany like its a cheating girlfriend that owed Russia total loyalty and support for its over-sized claims at the European Congress. So Russia was demonstrating if it was going to be an ally, it was only willing to be one on a jealous, one-sided, and psychotic basis.

Later on, after Bismarck shows the Russians they risk isolation (by making his alliance with Austria), he gets to revive the Three Emperor's League a couple times. Even so, Russia complains about German immigration law and tariffs and its press and court circles start calling Germany an enemy and agitating for an alliance with France. Russia quits the Three Emperors League and only signs the secret Reinsurance Treaty.

So Bismarck is patiently keeping up a connection with Russia here, but Russia is still showing signs of psycho animus, bringing racial Slavism into it, and none of the terms of the treaties really truly *guarantee* a free hand to Germany if Germany chose to go attack France.

OK, then we move on to Wilhelm. Encouraged by his Ministers, he drops the Reinsurance Treaty. [On balance, I think it was a mistake to toss it aside for nothing rather than just keep re-signing it. Benefits, even if meagre, outweighed harms. Let's fairly acknowledge that willingness to sign is no guarantee that Russia would a) not have made a French alliance anyway, b) Russia might not have dropped the treaty with Germany on its end]

Between 1891-1894 the Franco-Russian alliance solidifies, codifying the great German fear of a two-front war.

Ironically, tensions in continental Europe *do not* increase. From 1890, through 1904 in fact, relations between France-Germany-Austria-Russia get more quiet and cordial than they had been since before 1848, while they all pursue adventures outside Europe.

Wilhelm in 1895, tries becoming Russia's friend again, and he keeps trying through 1905-1906.
But it just doesn't work, because the Russians are hooked on French cash and loans, and have taken the hint that those will dry up if they make any treaties with Germany.

So Wilhelm's first 17 years in charge he drops the Reinsurance treaty (oops) and tries to win over Russia (but fails - can't outbid sugar daddy), but it hardly matters because things aren't that tense on Russia's western border. From 1908 and after, problems start with Russia, because it's boxed out of the Far East (by losing a war - not Germany's fault), and the Near East (by diplomacy with Britain - not directly Germany's fault).

Second, Britain:

Bismarck went through a spell of needlessly antagonizing Gladstone's Liberal government in the 1880s more for his own domestic political purposes and his own ideological beliefs than for any sound geopolitical rationale. However, it seemed to have no lasting negative effect. Most of the time under Bismarck, relations with Britain were on an even keel.

Wilhelm was starting off his reign seeking alliance with Britain. He succeeded in making small-scale colonial deals at multiple points - The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty, the Samoan Condominium of 1889 and a broader Pacific agreement on the Caroline islands boundary at that time, 10 years later the partition of Samoa and the Solomons, then the Yangtze agreement. Even up through 1914 he had a hypothetical contingency agreement going for the partition of Portuguese Africa if the Portuguese defaulted on their debt. [However, historian Norman Rich, always keen to prove that the British were always outsmarting the Germans said that the British intent was to always re-subsidize the British debt so that Portuguese default and partition would never come to pass, so this was a mere "promise" to silence German whining.]

Apparently by the 1890s, the British were ready to sign an alliance but they insisted that among its casus foederis be included protecting China's territorial integrity. The Germans, not wanting to offend Russia unduly, would not extend such a commitment north of the Great Wall into Manchuria. The British insisted any deal included all of China be guaranteed, including Manchuria, or no deal at all.

The Germans were afraid taking this deal put them at too much risk of them being called into a war by Britain over a colonial issue (like China or India) that they didn't care too much about, yet suffering most of the fighting in a two front-war on the continent with France and Russia, while Britain has fun getting all the colonies, kind of like what happened to Prussia in the 7 Years War.

So in the end, they didn't accept the alliance Britain offered, because the terms seemed too unattractive.

Yet Britain, which was so picky about the terms of the proposed alliance with Germany, was ultimately less picky when it made its Ententes with Japan, France, and Russia, accepting, for example, de facto Russo-Japanese partition of Manchuria. So Britain had its own incoherency and improvisation.

You know in some ways, WWI happened the way it did, because the two strongest European powers, Britain and Germany, didn't have the confidence to stay aloof, and instead allowed themselves to be led by the nose by their weaker partners into conflict.

The list of typical blunders is long but usually includes dropping the Reinsurance Treaty, the Kruger Telegram, the Manila Bay incident, the Huns speech, the 1st Morocco Crisis, the Bjorko Treaty, the Bosnia Crisis, the Daily Telegraph Affair, the 2nd Morocco Crisis, the Liman Von Sanders Affair and the Berlin-Baghdad railway project.


Altogether they are by now taken together as ‘clear evidence’ of German diplomacy that was incorrigibly aggressive, inept, or incompetent, or all three. Usually this is attributed to the Kaiser specifically.

Doing a a quick review of the Wilhelmine blunders, we can find some mistakes in there, but also items that have been blown out of proportion by any objective standard, or that only seem like provocations or a string of blunders if one is rifling through the historical record looking for a string of incidents after the fact to reconstruct as such.

Non-renewal of Reinsurance Treaty with Russia - on balance, I agree this was a needless mistake

[off-topic but related to Bismarck's fall- on the domestic issues Bismarck and Wilhelm disputed, from most of what I've read, Wilhelm sounds rationale and Bismarck the lunatic. Wilhelm opposed making the anti-Socialist laws more severe and Bismarck's advocacy of suspending the Reichstag and moving to direct military dictatorial rule. I can't a imagine a timeline where Bismarck's solution to domestic German politics leads to a more stable Germany from 1890-1914, and probably beyond, than what we got in OTL. I don't give an 'eff if you hate Socialism or not, it's bad news to give Socialist, or any other Party politicians practice how to work in underground and conspiratorial ways instead of parliamentary ones. But extra-constitutional government gives them exactly that kind of practice. Give Germany a and the SPD a political tradition like that, and you end up with Friedrich Eberts being Lenins, Kurt Schumachers being Stalins, Helmut Schmidts being Gorbachevs, and Olaf Scholz's being Putins]

The Kruger Telegram - The British getting outraged over the Boers being congratulated for enforcing their own laws, for an action that even Britain prosecuted people for? Sure it's not exactly friendly or solicitous for Britain's feelings in its embarrassed state, but a cause for British geopolitical realignment? Gimme a break.

The Manila Bay incident - What really happened here- observational positioning for the battle. And we have basically just Dewey's braggadocious account of it. I wonder how much was said about this after the incident, but *before* WWI started and US and UK propagandists were trying to dig up a lineage of US-German incidents.

The Huns Speech - There's some allegations this was selectively quoted - who knows what types of tough guy pep talks the troops of any of the Boxer suppressing countries heard. Almost all (except for the most the Japanese) engaged in loot and murder while putting down the Boxers.

The first Morocco Crisis - the Kaiser personally intervening and sending a ship was overdramatic. It was an attempt to divide the Entente that clearly backfired, mistake. Delcasse was trying to deliberately snub, even provoke Germany by compensating every other interested power, except Germany, but Germany's better response probably would have been a no drama, quiet, economic form of retaliation, related to finance and coal exports or something.

The Bjorko Treaty - The attempt at a German-Russian Treaty in 1905. I put this in the "at least Willy was trying" category. It's an example of Willy, and even Nicky, temporarily being wiser than their Ministers and trying to come to an agreement to stay at peace with each other. It only looks like an embarassment or 'blunder' because it didn't work and because the monarchs didn't have the political chops/savvy/leverage to prevent their respective ministers from overriding the initiative. A world with the Bjorko Treaty, much better for both countries.

Bosnia Crisis - Russian diplomat proposes a deal with the Austrians. Austrians leap at it to stabilize and clarify their situation. Russian diplomat goes home to find a) it's deeply unpopular at home, and b) his new Entente partner, Britain, isn't agreeing to be helpful in collecting on Russia's straits part of the bargain. Russian diplomat reacts by lying about the whole thing and riding along with and stoking domestic and Serbian outrage. Serbia mobilizes and threatens war with one or more neighbors. So again, we have more of Russia being psycho, not questioning its British Entente, but using Austria as a whipping boy and scapegoat, and letting tensions rise, hoping somebody else gives way to calm the trouble. Austria, seeing regicidal militarists next door threaten the OE or itself says "simmer down now or war". Germany backs them up. Serbs and Russians simmer down.
Sounds like any given Tuesday morning for America. What's the problem here?

Daily Telegraph Crisis - Britain oh so offended when the Kaiser is interviewed and says that he was behind the scenes relatively pro-British and working against other European countries (like France and Russia) attempts during the Boer War to form anti-British continental coalition. So the Kaiser is saying in public that eight years before Britain's current allies sucked and planned to do Britain dirty, and the Kaiser is tweeting like he was Britain's secret hero, and he wants the world to know it, which shows he cheesily wants attention. But if you boil away any bullshit about manners and propriety he's basically just saying, "hey I wasn't trying to screw you over when others were inviting me to help screw you over." And Britain's outraged about this?

Well maybe, but not because represents Germany hurting or intending to hurt Britain in any way, but only because it embarrasses the diplomats in the foreign office who made the decision to prioritize Ententes with France and Russia and justify domestically. [and so they start tampering with diplomatic documents to starting putting hostile Russian words during the Boer War into German mouths].

2nd Morocco Crisis - Sending the Panther is an over-dramatic escalation. But France's moves in Morocco are going beyond the letter of what was agreed at the Algeciras conference. Germany's got an argument for compensation. You can argue about the spirit of that conference. Maybe the cynical, naked spirit of that conference that everybody should have understood was France gets to do whatever the eff it wants with Morocco whenever it wants, and that's it, full stop. Germany took the spirit to mean, France follows the letter of the Algeciras terms, which we signed, and was a diplomatic hit for us, or we get something.
The Germans do walk out of the conference with something, compensated with hundreds of square kilometers of additional territory from French Equatorial Africa.

In one sense it's a bad blunder, because it strengthens Entente solidarity against German bullying. On the other hand, it's an example of Germany using a pressure tactic, walking away with colonial compensation, and no war happening, and no irrevocable decisions for war being made, so its a success.

Overall I'd say it wasn't worth the costs or opportunity costs, because the timing was bad in terms of French politics - it weakened Caillaux, who was the most peace-minded mainstream French premier of that time. Also, it encouraged the Anglo-French fleet talks which deepened those two powers' "moral commitments" to each other by making the British responsible for the French channel coast in ensuing negotiations. Plus it led to the rise of Poincare and his worries about Russian reliability in a crisis over French interests, leading him to emphasize France's readiness, even eagerness to support Russia, not only in Russia's self-defense, but in support of Russia's Balkan interests.

Liman Von Sanders Affair - Germans and Russians were viewing their situation in hopelessly zero-sum terms by this point.

Berlin-Baghdad railway - Not doing it isn't going to be the thing that gets Russia to not champion Serbia, or not mobilize, or it won't be the thing that keeps Britain off the western front. All it does is weaken Germany's attraction to the Ottomans and make them slightly less likely to commit, making it more likely for Germany to lose WWI sooner.

 

[WolfBear]

I'll respond to the rest later since I don't want to respond to too much at once.

Doing a a quick review of the Wilhelmine blunders, we can find some mistakes in there, but also items that have been blown out of proportion by any objective standard, or that only seem like provocations or a string of blunders if one is rifling through the historical record looking for a string of incidents after the fact to reconstruct as such.

Non-renewal of Reinsurance Treaty with Russia - on balance, I agree this was a needless mistake

[off-topic but related to Bismarck's fall- on the domestic issues Bismarck and Wilhelm disputed, from most of what I've read, Wilhelm sounds rationale and Bismarck the lunatic. Wilhelm opposed making the anti-Socialist laws more severe and Bismarck's advocacy of suspending the Reichstag and moving to direct military dictatorial rule. I can't a imagine a timeline where Bismarck's solution to domestic German politics leads to a more stable Germany from 1890-1914, and probably beyond, than what we got in OTL. I don't give an 'eff if you hate Socialism or not, it's bad news to give Socialist, or any other Party politicians practice how to work in underground and conspiratorial ways instead of parliamentary ones. But extra-constitutional government gives them exactly that kind of practice. Give Germany a and the SPD a political tradition like that, and you end up with Friedrich Eberts being Lenins, Kurt Schumachers being Stalins, Helmut Schmidts being Gorbachevs, and Olaf Scholz's being Putins]

Excellent analysis and hilarious but very spot-on analogy in regards to German Socialists. In fact, this is what I myself have previously speculated: Specifically the fact that Russia did not have as ripe of a vibrant democratic or even semi-democratic political tradition as Britain, Germany, France, and the US had made it much more vulnerable to being taken over by left-wing totalitarians during World War I. At least German socialists presumably had greater faith in the democratic process and thus were less inclined to support the nuts among them. But democracy unfortunately didn't mean very much to a lot of Russians. It wasn't as tested of a concept for them as it was for even, say, Germans.

(Interestingly enough, as evidenced by Trump's attempts to overturn the 2020 election, some Americans might also be losing faith in democracy right now in spite of a long democratic tradition. This might have to do with a combination of cancel culture, Wokeness (including and especially racial grievance politics), and the "Great Replacement".)

The Kruger Telegram - The British getting outraged over the Boers being congratulated for enforcing their own laws, for an action that even Britain prosecuted people for? Sure it's not exactly friendly or solicitous for Britain's feelings in its embarrassed state, but a cause for British geopolitical realignment? Gimme a break.

The Manila Bay incident - What really happened here- observational positioning for the battle. And we have basically just Dewey's braggadocious account of it. I wonder how much was said about this after the incident, but *before* WWI started and US and UK propagandists were trying to dig up a lineage of US-German incidents.

The Huns Speech - There's some allegations this was selectively quoted - who knows what types of tough guy pep talks the troops of any of the Boxer suppressing countries heard. Almost all (except for the most the Japanese) engaged in loot and murder while putting down the Boxers.

The first Morocco Crisis - the Kaiser personally intervening and sending a ship was overdramatic. It was an attempt to divide the Entente that clearly backfired, mistake. Delcasse was trying to deliberately snub, even provoke Germany by compensating every other interested power, except Germany, but Germany's better response probably would have been a no drama, quiet, economic form of retaliation, related to finance and coal exports or something.

Makes sense.

The Bjorko Treaty - The attempt at a German-Russian Treaty in 1905. I put this in the "at least Willy was trying" category. It's an example of Willy, and even Nicky, temporarily being wiser than their Ministers and trying to come to an agreement to stay at peace with each other. It only looks like an embarassment or 'blunder' because it didn't work and because the monarchs didn't have the political chops/savvy/leverage to prevent their respective ministers from overriding the initiative. A world with the Bjorko Treaty, much better for both countries.

Yeah, if it wasn't for the French alliance, Bjorko could have actually been ratified and implemented. Though a modus vivendi would still need to be reached between Russia and A-H in the Balkans.

Bosnia Crisis - Russian diplomat proposes a deal with the Austrians. Austrians leap at it to stabilize and clarify their situation. Russian diplomat goes home to find a) it's deeply unpopular at home, and b) his new Entente partner, Britain, isn't agreeing to be helpful in collecting on Russia's straits part of the bargain. Russian diplomat reacts by lying about the whole thing and riding along with and stoking domestic and Serbian outrage. Serbia mobilizes and threatens war with one or more neighbors. So again, we have more of Russia being psycho, not questioning its British Entente, but using Austria as a whipping boy and scapegoat, and letting tensions rise, hoping somebody else gives way to calm the trouble. Austria, seeing regicidal militarists next door threaten the OE or itself says "simmer down now or war". Germany backs them up. Serbs and Russians simmer down.
Sounds like any given Tuesday morning for America. What's the problem here?

Frankly, Russia's mistake here was in actually assuming that A-H had the capacity to give away the Straits to Russia. At best, A-H could give Russia its own support for this position, but there would still be the positions of the other Great Powers on this issue, which are unlikely to be changed/swayed.

Daily Telegraph Crisis - Britain oh so offended when the Kaiser is interviewed and says that he was behind the scenes relatively pro-British and working against other European countries (like France and Russia) attempts during the Boer War to form anti-British continental coalition. So the Kaiser is saying in public that eight years before Britain's current allies sucked and planned to do Britain dirty, and the Kaiser is tweeting like he was Britain's secret hero, and he wants the world to know it, which shows he cheesily wants attention. But if you boil away any bullshit about manners and propriety he's basically just saying, "hey I wasn't trying to screw you over when others were inviting me to help screw you over." And Britain's outraged about this?

Well maybe, but not because represents Germany hurting or intending to hurt Britain in any way, but only because it embarrasses the diplomats in the foreign office who made the decision to prioritize Ententes with France and Russia and justify domestically. [and so they start tampering with diplomatic documents to starting putting hostile Russian words during the Boer War into German mouths].

Honestly, I'm wondering if the Daily Telegraph Crisis can be a Kaiser Bill equivalent to one or several of Donald Trump's tweets over a century later. Seriously.

2nd Morocco Crisis - Sending the Panther is an over-dramatic escalation. But France's moves in Morocco are going beyond the letter of what was agreed at the Algeciras conference. Germany's got an argument for compensation. You can argue about the spirit of that conference. Maybe the cynical, naked spirit of that conference that everybody should have understood was France gets to do whatever the eff it wants with Morocco whenever it wants, and that's it, full stop. Germany took the spirit to mean, France follows the letter of the Algeciras terms, which we signed, and was a diplomatic hit for us, or we get something.
The Germans do walk out of the conference with something, compensated with hundreds of square kilometers of additional territory from French Equatorial Africa.

In one sense it's a bad blunder, because it strengthens Entente solidarity against German bullying. On the other hand, it's an example of Germany using a pressure tactic, walking away with colonial compensation, and no war happening, and no irrevocable decisions for war being made, so its a success.

Overall I'd say it wasn't worth the costs or opportunity costs, because the timing was bad in terms of French politics - it weakened Caillaux, who was the most peace-minded mainstream French premier of that time. Also, it encouraged the Anglo-French fleet talks which deepened those two powers' "moral commitments" to each other by making the British responsible for the French channel coast in ensuing negotiations. Plus it led to the rise of Poincare and his worries about Russian reliability in a crisis over French interests, leading him to emphasize France's readiness, even eagerness to support Russia, not only in Russia's self-defense, but in support of Russia's Balkan interests.

Yeah, weakening Caillaux was certainly a stupid move on Germany's part. If there was ever a German ass-kisser in pre-WWI France, it was him. (OK, a bit exaggerated, but still, ...)

And Yeah, you previously mentioned how the French were unsure in 1914 that the Russians would actually be willing to fight in a future war for French interests so they decided to go to war in 1914 for Russian interests since that way, they would know that they would be going to war with Russia and possibly Britain on their side.

Liman Von Sanders Affair - Germans and Russians were viewing their situation in hopelessly zero-sum terms by this point.

What exactly was the big deal here, again?

Berlin-Baghdad railway - Not doing it isn't going to be the thing that gets Russia to not champion Serbia, or not mobilize, or it won't be the thing that keeps Britain off the western front. All it does is weaken Germany's attraction to the Ottomans and make them slightly less likely to commit, making it more likely for Germany to lose WWI sooner.

Agreed. And also, the B-B Railway actually made sense for Germany if Germany subsequently wanted to do economic penetration of Persia, Afghanistan, and China since theoretically this railroad could have eventually subsequently been extended to China through both Persia and Afghanistan.

 

[raharris1973]

There's a slight timing problem with attributing Germany's problems with Britain significantly to colonialism, and specifically to *Wilhelm II* era colonialism.

The vast majority of Germany's colonies, in terms of land area, and population, were acquired under Bismarck's chancellorship and Wilhelm I'd reign. This included *all* the particular colonies that Britain and her Dominions seized during WWI. Kaiser Wilhelm's acquisitions were more modest, Tsingtao in China in 1897, and the leftovers of Spanish Micronesia in 1899. KWII seemed to have a pretty amicable colonial settlement with the Brits settling Pacific boundaries including Samoa and Solomons in 1899, and the two were cooperating collecting Venezuelan debts as late as 1902.

I mean, can we say that by 1900, British relations were definitively worse with France and Russia than with Germany? Not really. I'm not even sure we can say so by 1902. It only jumps out with clarity with the Entente Cordiale of 1904-05.

On German navalism, one can be on stronger ground criticizing it, and in any case, Germany needed stronger ground forces. Too bad for Germany the Prussian Army Staff leadership couldn't get over itself, wake up and smell the danger, and be ready to commission bourgeois officers and enlist urban youth in large numbers.

 

[sillygoose]

On German navalism, one can be on stronger ground criticizing it, and in any case, Germany needed stronger ground forces. Too bad for Germany the Prussian Army Staff leadership couldn't get over itself, wake up and smell the danger, and be ready to commission bourgeois officers and enlist urban youth in large numbers.

Problem was Germany didn't have enough horses to form more units without caused big food problems (which is what happened during the war). There are several books that cover this, "The Kaiser's Army" is probably the most accessible. Effectively the German army thought they had topped out in the number of troops they could field and it was only around 1911 or so that it became clear that an army expansion was needed quickly to keep up with France and Russia. That's why the army league sprung up in 1912 and the naval league dropped off. Prior there really wasn't a need for an army build up, so the navy was able to lobby to get more funding especially once the Dreadnought made all their BBs obsolete in 1906. As soon as the threat on land was obvious they did exactly what you're saying, but they had a limit in how much expansion they could do due to horse shortages and the lack of motorization (which everyone had a problem with at that time since the technology was brand new and the navy had priority for what little oil the CPs had access to). Plus don't forget that the air force was starting to expand and also demanding oil.

Its a whole complex history to the early 20th century arms race, especially once you factor in the major spending on forts in the east during this period.

 

[raharris1973]

since theoretically this railroad could have eventually subsequently been extended to China through both Persia and Afghanistan.

Really?

Wouldn't any such project be doomed to be torn up by Afghan tribesmen for never getting sufficient pay-offs to stop interfering? Or, if built, it would constantly be robbed and broken. I mean that's been the history of the ring road reconstruction attempts.

 

[WolfBear]

United States also had extreme expanse of land which contained literally all resources necessary for industrial development. That is something no other country had except for Russia and China - but much of Russian resources were inaccessible in Siberia, while China had its own issues.

Germany can buy natural resources from other countries, no?

Really?

Wouldn't any such project be doomed to be torn up by Afghan tribesmen for never getting sufficient pay-offs to stop interfering? Or, if built, it would constantly be robbed and broken. I mean that's been the history of the ring road reconstruction attempts.

Couldn't Germany simply bribe the Afghan tribesmen even more, though? It's worth noting that Germany actually had the Ottoman Sultan, aka the Caliph of Islam, on its side. Devout Sunni Muslims often obeyed their Caliph, no? This would be especially true if they got paid to do this.

Germany in Afghanistan wouldn't actually be seen as invaders, but rather as friendly people allied with the Ottoman Caliph/Sultan who will seek to bring greater growth and prosperity to Afghanistan. What exactly would be so objectionable about that?

 

[Aldarion]

Germany can buy natural resources from other countries, no?

And then risk having the supply cut off by its competitors. Like what has happened in, like, I don't know... both World Wars?

 

[WolfBear]

And then risk having the supply cut off by its competitors. Like what has happened in, like, I don't know... both World Wars?

Then don't start any World Wars, at least not without Britain as an ally or at least as a friendly neutral?

 

[Aldarion]

Then don't start any World Wars, at least not without Britain as an ally or at least as a friendly neutral?

Neither World War was, technically speaking, intentional. Or at least not at the point where it started.

First World War was a screwup of major proportions on all sides: a perfect storm, if you will. Argument could be made that it was completely unintended by all sides, but once cup spilled over, nets of alliances dragged the entire Europe down to Hell.

As for the Second World War... Hitler's strategy was in fact largely shaped by German experiences in the First World War. Lebensraum? To avoid starvation in the case of blockade. Invasion of USSR? Same. But he did not intend to fight France and UK at that point: in fact, Hess' mission - self-appointed or not - suggests that Hitler had hopes for the UK joining him in a fight against Communism. At what point that hope existed is not very clear, but it did.

 

[WolfBear]

Neither World War was, technically speaking, intentional. Or at least not at the point where it started.

First World War was a screwup of major proportions on all sides: a perfect storm, if you will. Argument could be made that it was completely unintended by all sides, but once cup spilled over, nets of alliances dragged the entire Europe down to Hell.

As for the Second World War... Hitler's strategy was in fact largely shaped by German experiences in the First World War. Lebensraum? To avoid starvation in the case of blockade. Invasion of USSR? Same. But he did not intend to fight France and UK at that point: in fact, Hess' mission - self-appointed or not - suggests that Hitler had hopes for the UK joining him in a fight against Communism. At what point that hope existed is not very clear, but it did.

AFAIK, Hess acted without official authoritarization from Hitler. But Yes, Hitler did want to make peace with Britain (and France).

 

[Skallagrim]

My apologies for the delay in responding, @raharris1973. I'm working 14-hour days this week, and that plus commuting time makes for a tired Skall! Hope my response is still somewhat legible, regardless.

This isn't for lack of trying on the part of both Bismarck, and then Wilhelm, and Wilhelm's Ministers.
The stars never aligned that way, and not solely because of Wilhelm's gaffes and his Ministers' initiatives - also because incompatible priorities or expectations that Russia and Britain had.

I certainly won't dispute this. Although some seem to think that if you don't think Britain was hell-bent on war, then you must think Britain to always be angelically innocent, there simply are a lot of nuances here. Of course, Britain served its own interests. An empire is not a charity, after all!

For Russia, even more so. I think Russia was in a difficult situation, and indeed distrusted Germany and Austria immensely. Maintaining good relations as much as possible would be in Germany's favour -- if only to make Russia the undeniable aggressor and guilty party if war did come -- I personally have little faith in the prospect of a German-Russian Alliance. I still think it's an option to consider, but as this thread (and other threads, I suppose) must surely show: I am a proponent of Anglo-German friendship.

The main point I have attempted to make here is that, contrary to the borderline perverse claims of some, Germany is neither innocent victim nor evil aggressor. German interests were going to clash with those of either Russia or Britain. The point is... Germany should (and could) have forged an alliance with one of those two. The reason this didn't happen isn't purely Germny's fault, and to some extent it's just poor luck and circumstances never aligning.

But I would still point to Wilhelm II as the main obstacle. His personality made enemies by the bucket-load, and his mercurial character made him appear very dangerous to practically all foreign observers. Let me put it this way: if we had to change one thing to improve the chances of either Russo-German or Anglo-German alliance... would we effect a change pertaining to Russia or Britain? I don't see it. No. The change is obvious: make Wilhelm II a different man. Calm, stable, genial, enjoying warm and good relations with all his cousins, with no colonial ambitions (instead known as a mediator and peace-maker between others), and with the clear understanding that Germany is a land power that must focus on its army, not its navy.

I can imagine nothing else that could possibly bring us closer to this particular goal. Which suggests that Wilhelm II, and nothing else, was indeed the crux here. Not British foreign policy. Not even the clear Russian hankering after a French alliance. I don't deny those factors, certainly! I just consider them secondary to the elephant in the room, who is named Wilhelm II.

First, Russia:

Unfortunately for Germany (and Austria-Hungary!), by 1892, Russia was able to make a compatible long term deal with France. By 1904, Britain was able to make a long-term compatible deal with France. And by 1907, Britain and Russia were able able to make a compatible deal that went the distance the 1914, the outbreak of the July Crisis of 1914 and WWI.

First consider Russia - Bismarck rode good Prussian relations with Russia (and a dollop of bad Russian relations with Austria) to great effect for the early part of his Chancellorship in the 1860s. Despite these good relations, and the Three Emperor's League of 1873, and the mutual personal admiration of Kaiser Wilhelm I and his nephew Tsar Alexander II, the Russians meddled diplomatically in the German-French 'War in Sight' scare of 1875 [though actual Russian military follow-through had there been a war would have been extremely, extremely unlikely].

Bismarck gave clearance to Russian plans for the Russo-Turkish war, as did the Austrians when consulted and the Russians outlined their plan.

After winning the war, the Russians broke their promises and imposed a more aggressive settlement at San Stefano, so Austria and Britain complain. Sure the Russians won the war, but they tired themselves out and couldn't afford it and are not in great shape to get into an immediate follow-up war with Austria and Britain. Bismarck offers to hold a conference as honest-broker.

That Berlin Congress ends putting the settlement back to what the Russians promised everyone they would do at the beginning.

Instead of thanking the Germans for saving them from a ruinous war, or taking their lumps, Russian opinion now starts flipping out against Germany like its a cheating girlfriend that owed Russia total loyalty and support for its over-sized claims at the European Congress. So Russia was demonstrating if it was going to be an ally, it was only willing to be one on a jealous, one-sided, and psychotic basis.

Later on, after Bismarck shows the Russians they risk isolation (by making his alliance with Austria), he gets to revive the Three Emperor's League a couple times. Even so, Russia complains about German immigration law and tariffs and its press and court circles start calling Germany an enemy and agitating for an alliance with France. Russia quits the Three Emperors League and only signs the secret Reinsurance Treaty.

So Bismarck is patiently keeping up a connection with Russia here, but Russia is still showing signs of psycho animus, bringing racial Slavism into it, and none of the terms of the treaties really truly *guarantee* a free hand to Germany if Germany chose to go attack France.

I agree completely with all these points, and this in fact does an excellent job outlining why I think a Russo-German alliance, while possibly -- is by far the longer shot, and would be far less stable anyway.

I've heard it suggested that Germany and Russia could join forces in a tacit understanding to throw Austria under the bus when the time came. Then they'd both be equally mercenary and betrayal-minded, with their shared goal being "we grab what we can and fuck everybody else". I think this would be a suicide pact, and that it would align literally everybody else against them, but I just wanted to bring up the notion.

OK, then we move on to Wilhelm. Encouraged by his Ministers, he drops the Reinsurance Treaty. [On balance, I think it was a mistake to toss it aside for nothing rather than just keep re-signing it. Benefits, even if meagre, outweighed harms. Let's fairly acknowledge that willingness to sign is no guarantee that Russia would a) not have made a French alliance anyway, b) Russia might not have dropped the treaty with Germany on its end]

I agree with the assessment.

Between 1891-1894 the Franco-Russian alliance solidifies, codifying the great German fear of a two-front war.

Ironically, tensions in continental Europe *do not* increase. From 1890, through 1904 in fact, relations between France-Germany-Austria-Russia get more quiet and cordial than they had been since before 1848, while they all pursue adventures outside Europe.

Wilhelm in 1895, tries becoming Russia's friend again, and he keeps trying through 1905-1906.
But it just doesn't work, because the Russians are hooked on French cash and loans, and have taken the hint that those will dry up if they make any treaties with Germany.

So Wilhelm's first 17 years in charge he drops the Reinsurance treaty (oops) and tries to win over Russia (but fails - can't outbid sugar daddy), but it hardly matters because things aren't that tense on Russia's western border. From 1908 and after, problems start with Russia, because it's boxed out of the Far East (by losing a war - not Germany's fault), and the Near East (by diplomacy with Britain - not directly Germany's fault).

I think we shouldn't ignore the role of Wilhelm's mercurial behaviour here. Everything you say about Russia is true, and I completely agree that as soon as the FRanco-Russian understanding was reached, all hope for a Russo-German alliance was in vain. However, note that the Russians started shopping around for the French alliance the year after Wilhelm (then still prince) made his visit to Russia. He made a terrible impression. And then they really put the efforts into over-drive when Wilhelm became Kaiser. His callous willingness to let the Reinsurance treaty lapse only confirmed the Russian impression of him.

Sure, we may call the Russians hypocritical here. But they were not the only ones who were worried about Wilhelm II.

Wilhelm was starting off his reign seeking alliance with Britain. He succeeded in making small-scale colonial deals at multiple points - The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty, the Samoan Condominium of 1889 and a broader Pacific agreement on the Caroline islands boundary at that time, 10 years later the partition of Samoa and the Solomons, then the Yangtze agreement. Even up through 1914 he had a hypothetical contingency agreement going for the partition of Portuguese Africa if the Portuguese defaulted on their debt.

The underlying problem is that he was seen as unreliable, and not without good reason. He wants Britain to love him, but he also wants to show them up -- to be seen as the greatest. This is the man who hated that his uncle Edward didn't love him, but also chafed at the fact that Edward treated him as a cousin, without formality, and responded to that by deliberately lording his position as Kaiser over the 'mere' Prince of Wales. (Which is not a good way to get the love he initially wanted.)

Wilhelm's character is well-illustrated by that example, and this carried over into his role as sovereign. It's not entirely unsurprising that the friendly overtures of such a man are, at the very least, approached with wariness...

Apparently by the 1890s, the British were ready to sign an alliance but they insisted that among its casus foederis be included protecting China's territorial integrity. The Germans, not wanting to offend Russia unduly, would not extend such a commitment north of the Great Wall into Manchuria. The British insisted any deal included all of China be guaranteed, including Manchuria, or no deal at all.

The Germans were afraid taking this deal put them at too much risk of them being called into a war by Britain over a colonial issue (like China or India) that they didn't care too much about, yet suffering most of the fighting in a two front-war on the continent with France and Russia, while Britain has fun getting all the colonies, kind of like what happened to Prussia in the 7 Years War.

So in the end, they didn't accept the alliance Britain offered, because the terms seemed too unattractive.

I'd call this foolish on Germany's part, although given Wilhelm's priorities (and the reasoning of those who enjoyed his support), I also do understand the reasoning.

Put me in his place, though, and I'll accept that deal in a heartbeat. Risk war with Russia? Delay favours them. If the war must come, let it come sooner rather than later. As for fighting on the continent while Britain gets the colonies -- let them. Germany's prize here is a continental empire, which victory would produce.

Why would I begrudge Britain getting the French colonies, if I can carve out puppet states in Finlan, the Baltics, Poland, Belarus and the rich bread-basket to the Ukraine? (While, presumably, Austria-Hungary gets to lord it over the Balkans, so it's not like they go home empty-handed, either.)

As for doing the bleeding in a two-front war: that's true. But that has been a given of alliance with Britain since time immemorial. You put the bodies in the field, and Britain pays the bills. You know that going in.

Yet Britain, which was so picky about the terms of the proposed alliance with Germany, was ultimately less picky when it made its Ententes with Japan, France, and Russia, accepting, for example, de facto Russo-Japanese partition of Manchuria. So Britain had its own incoherency and improvisation.

Once Britain formed the entente with France, the shift in attitude towards Russia (allied to France) made more sense, I'd say. By that point, the chance for actual Anglo-German alliance had passed.

Also, short of actually getting involved in the Russo-Japanese War, the outcome of that conflict wasn't exactly Britain's to dictate. As far as reasonably hemming in Russia was concerned, Japan actually did a good job of that, and Britain sought good relations with Japan.

You know in some ways, WWI happened the way it did, because the two strongest European powers, Britain and Germany, didn't have the confidence to stay aloof, and instead allowed themselves to be led by the nose by their weaker partners into conflict.

I agree.

off-topic but related to Bismarck's fall- on the domestic issues Bismarck and Wilhelm disputed, from most of what I've read, Wilhelm sounds rationale and Bismarck the lunatic. Wilhelm opposed making the anti-Socialist laws more severe and Bismarck's advocacy of suspending the Reichstag and moving to direct military dictatorial rule. I can't a imagine a timeline where Bismarck's solution to domestic German politics leads to a more stable Germany from 1890-1914, and probably beyond, than what we got in OTL. I don't give an 'eff if you hate Socialism or not, it's bad news to give Socialist, or any other Party politicians practice how to work in underground and conspiratorial ways instead of parliamentary ones. But extra-constitutional government gives them exactly that kind of practice.

I wouldn't call Bismarck a lunatic. The whole assumption that forcing the socialists underground will make things worse, I think, gives too much credit to the socialists. The late 19th and early 20th century comprised a period when far-left radicals were murdering people on the regular. Luigi Lucheni murdering Empress Elizabeth. Alexander Soloviev attempting to murder Tsar Alexander II. The Narodnaya Volya terrorists repeatedly attempting to murder Tsar Alexander II, and ultimately succeeding. Jean-Baptiste Sipido attempting to murder the Prince of Wales. Ivan Kalyayev murdering Grand Duke Sergei. Mateu Morral attempting to murder Alfonso XIII and Victoria Eugenie during their wedding, and killing 30 others in the process. Examples abound.

Bismarck was justified in seeking the utter extinction of the socialist movement. These were not reasonable people. Giving them democratic ways to gain power would not make them love you. It would just give them one more knife to stick in your back. Indeed, most people agreed about this at the time, and the Kartell ultimately split about one single article of the anti-socialist bill. (And we must note, that bill was already in effect: the question was whether to make it permanent with that article, or without it.)

I do agree that Bismarck, when faced with the danger of the anti-socialist powers being limited, set out on a wild scheme: to deliberately sink the whole bill, in the hope of causing social agitation, which could then be used to form an emergency government and definitively crush the socialists with armed forced. I don't interpret that proposal exactly as you appear to, but I still disapprove of it. However... this is something he raised once, in discussion with Wilhelm. He immediately realised his error, knew he'd over-played his hand, and the very next morning, he attempted to reach a compromise with Wilhelm by agreeing to the Kaiser's proposed social policies towards industrial workers. He even suggested a European council on working conditions, presided over by the Kaiser. (Which would actually be smart, but which Wilhelm then shot down out of personal animosity for Bismarck.)

(I stress again that what Bismarck proposed as a one-off, while a bad idea, was in nor way as radical a proposal as some have suggested. Nor was it som serious plan. It was a single remark, of which nothing came. It's even been suggested, in this thread, that Bismarck brought Germany "to the brink of civil war". It should be clear that such claims are hysterical nonsense.)

My own reasoning here is that Bismarck was correct to want the entire anti-socialist bill made permanent, although doing this in conjunction with attemt to improve working class conditions would be smart. Wilhelm II and Bismarck could have productively worked together on this. things went wrong, not beause of Bismarck, but because Wilhelm II deliberately undermined him on this topic, and did so for months.

Had Wilhelm II supported Bismarck, the Kartell wouldn't have broken up over it, Bismarck would have gotten his way, and extra-constitutional government would never have come up. They could have agreed to make the unaltered bill permanent, and then the Kaiser could have presided over a European council on working conditions, making him look good.

(Incidentally, Bismarck was ultimately forced to resign, not over thi matter directly, but because he sought a new legislative majority and Wilhelm felt insulted that Bismarck dared such a thing without consulting him first. The Kartell had been voted from power as a consequence of the anti-socialist bill mess-up, and Bismarck had informal talks with the (Catholic) Centre Party. Wilhelm despised the Catholics.[1] Wilhelm had the power to force Bismarck to resign over it. [2])

[1] There is some irony here, since, again, some have claimed here that Bismarck was horribly divisive. He was, at times, but his record shows that he was also willing to make alliances. It was Wilhelm who was far more hunkered down in his hatred for perceived "enemies".

[2] So much for Wilhelm having no real powers, and having to rely on his ministers and on the legislature. Some have claimed that in this thread as well, but the facts prove that Wilhelm held very real power, and that even Bismarck, and even with a legislative majority behind him, could not contradict the Kaiser's wishes.

The Manila Bay incident - What really happened here- observational positioning for the battle. And we have basically just Dewey's braggadocious account of it. I wonder how much was said about this after the incident, but *before* WWI started and US and UK propagandists were trying to dig up a lineage of US-German incidents.

The Huns Speech - There's some allegations this was selectively quoted - who knows what types of tough guy pep talks the troops of any of the Boxer suppressing countries heard. Almost all (except for the most the Japanese) engaged in loot and murder while putting down the Boxers.

The Bjorko Treaty - The attempt at a German-Russian Treaty in 1905. I put this in the "at least Willy was trying" category. It's an example of Willy, and even Nicky, temporarily being wiser than their Ministers and trying to come to an agreement to stay at peace with each other. It only looks like an embarassment or 'blunder' because it didn't work and because the monarchs didn't have the political chops/savvy/leverage to prevent their respective ministers from overriding the initiative. A world with the Bjorko Treaty, much better for both countries.

Bosnia Crisis - Russian diplomat proposes a deal with the Austrians. Austrians leap at it to stabilize and clarify their situation. Russian diplomat goes home to find a) it's deeply unpopular at home, and b) his new Entente partner, Britain, isn't agreeing to be helpful in collecting on Russia's straits part of the bargain. Russian diplomat reacts by lying about the whole thing and riding along with and stoking domestic and Serbian outrage. Serbia mobilizes and threatens war with one or more neighbors. So again, we have more of Russia being psycho, not questioning its British Entente, but using Austria as a whipping boy and scapegoat, and letting tensions rise, hoping somebody else gives way to calm the trouble. Austria, seeing regicidal militarists next door threaten the OE or itself says "simmer down now or war". Germany backs them up. Serbs and Russians simmer down.

I agree with these points.

The Kruger Telegram - The British getting outraged over the Boers being congratulated for enforcing their own laws, for an action that even Britain prosecuted people for? Sure it's not exactly friendly or solicitous for Britain's feelings in its embarrassed state, but a cause for British geopolitical realignment? Gimme a break.

I really feal that you're kind of downplaying that things do have different implications when a foreign monarch does it. Even Wilhelm himself, in his memoirs, recognised what a terrible blunder it was, and how obvious it was that this could do nothing but anger Britain for no good reason. He immediately goes on to unconvincingly blame his foreign secretary for the telegram, and outright claims he was always against it. This is, it goes without saying, demonstrably a bald-faced lie. But it does demonstrate that the guy who did the thing, though trying to shift the blame, never tries to pretend that it was just a minor thing. If it had been as minor as you make it out to be, that would be a far easier excuse for him to use.

The first Morocco Crisis - the Kaiser personally intervening and sending a ship was overdramatic. It was an attempt to divide the Entente that clearly backfired, mistake. Delcasse was trying to deliberately snub, even provoke Germany by compensating every other interested power, except Germany, but Germany's better response probably would have been a no drama, quiet, economic form of retaliation, related to finance and coal exports or something.

Your phrasing rather makes it seem as if Delcasse is the instigator here, and Germany just "reacted poorly". I assume that's unintentional. The fact is that Wilhelm II meddled in Morocco, where he had no business meddling, and then made statements that amounted to an outright challenge to existing French influence in Morocco. This played out terribly for Germany, of course. To Britain, this exact kind of unstable, provocative action confirmed the image of Wilhelm II that had become ever more clear: that of an unguided projectile, who was actively out to force himself into the colonial affairs and spheres of interest of other nations.

Daily Telegraph Crisis - Britain oh so offended when the Kaiser is interviewed and says that he was behind the scenes relatively pro-British and working against other European countries (like France and Russia) attempts during the Boer War to form anti-British continental coalition. So the Kaiser is saying in public that eight years before Britain's current allies sucked and planned to do Britain dirty, and the Kaiser is tweeting like he was Britain's secret hero, and he wants the world to know it, which shows he cheesily wants attention. But if you boil away any bullshit about manners and propriety he's basically just saying, "hey I wasn't trying to screw you over when others were inviting me to help screw you over." And Britain's outraged about this?

Well maybe, but not because represents Germany hurting or intending to hurt Britain in any way, but only because it embarrasses the diplomats in the foreign office who made the decision to prioritize Ententes with France and Russia and justify domestically. [and so they start tampering with diplomatic documents to starting putting hostile Russian words during the Boer War into German mouths].

Again, some pretty severe downplaying here. The Daily Telegraph affair was such a disaster that it even had major political consequences for Wilhelm back home. You make it appear as if he was basically a jovial fellow who was just misconstrued due to por phrasing, when the general reception at the time -- in Britain and Germany alike -- was "Good God, there's a raving lunatic in charge of Germany!"

It's worth noting that, again, Wilhelm even admitted what a adisaster it really was. He angrily blamed his ministers for not censoring the interview in the German domestic press. When the guy who says the crazy stuff doesn't even try to pretend that it's not crazy, and is instead claiming his people should have censored it because it's crazy... then it was really crazy.

2nd Morocco Crisis - Sending the Panther is an over-dramatic escalation. But France's moves in Morocco are going beyond the letter of what was agreed at the Algeciras conference. Germany's got an argument for compensation. You can argue about the spirit of that conference. Maybe the cynical, naked spirit of that conference that everybody should have understood was France gets to do whatever the eff it wants with Morocco whenever it wants, and that's it, full stop. Germany took the spirit to mean, France follows the letter of the Algeciras terms, which we signed, and was a diplomatic hit for us, or we get something.
The Germans do walk out of the conference with something, compensated with hundreds of square kilometers of additional territory from French Equatorial Africa.

In one sense it's a bad blunder, because it strengthens Entente solidarity against German bullying. On the other hand, it's an example of Germany using a pressure tactic, walking away with colonial compensation, and no war happening, and no irrevocable decisions for war being made, so its a success.

Overall I'd say it wasn't worth the costs or opportunity costs, because the timing was bad in terms of French politics - it weakened Caillaux, who was the most peace-minded mainstream French premier of that time. Also, it encouraged the Anglo-French fleet talks which deepened those two powers' "moral commitments" to each other by making the British responsible for the French channel coast in ensuing negotiations. Plus it led to the rise of Poincare and his worries about Russian reliability in a crisis over French interests, leading him to emphasize France's readiness, even eagerness to support Russia, not only in Russia's self-defense, but in support of Russia's Balkan interests.

The analysis of the events themselves seems even-handed to me, and I agree with you. My only critique here is that it cannot be seen in isolation. As I have attempted to clarify here, Wilhelm's behaviour was hardly innocent and more-or-less "misunderstood". He was a veritable bull in a china shop, and a very unpredictable bull at that. All his actions must be viewed as part of an emerging pattern, and by this stage, he couldn't afford to be anything other than careful. (Yet he chose to be anything but.)

Paryicularly regarding Britain, it mut be noted that Grey was, by this point, extremely worried about a German naval port being established in Morocco, and this fear made him inclined to back French interests againt German ones. Even then, though, he wrote that "what the French contemplate doing is not wise", and he strongly argued against them sending troops. I notice that, once more, these are not the actions one would expect from an empire of evil scumbags who are rearing to declare war on Germany.

In fact, I'd argue that it's a pretty good indication that the German naval ambitions must not be down-played. It was the min reason for Britain to not explicitly turn against the French plan. And, we may note, a major reason to oppose Germany. Which supports my thesis that if Wilhelm hadn't been so insistent on trying to have a fleet that he wanted to threaten Britain with, a lot of room would have existed for Anglo-German alliance.

In fact, this whole event strongly supports the case that Britain only really pursued the entente because it perceived Germany as such an imminent threat. The thesis that Britain was a big bully, loo

Liman Von Sanders Affair - Germans and Russians were viewing their situation in hopelessly zero-sum terms by this point.

I agree, and I think this whole thing is mostly Russia trying to push Britain and France into a more firm anti-German partnership with Russia. In context of this ongoing debate, it's perhaps worth noting that it was Britain who refused to go along with it. The French were just hesitant, but the British explicitly came out about the point that they had ctually made quite similar arrangements with the Ottomans as the Germans had. And as such they felt it improper to begrudge Germany this.

That's... pretty telling, considering how "late in the game" we are at this stage. The reading that Britain was looking for war, and would use any excuse to crush Germany, can pretty much be resigned to the dustbin after this.

Berlin-Baghdad railway - Not doing it isn't going to be the thing that gets Russia to not champion Serbia, or not mobilize, or it won't be the thing that keeps Britain off the western front. All it does is weaken Germany's attraction to the Ottomans and make them slightly less likely to commit, making it more likely for Germany to lose WWI sooner.

I actually agree with you completely, most especially in regards to Russia. As I've stated before: all attempts at Russo-German alliance were moot after the Russians sided with France. (There were possibilities before then, but regardless, I repeat that I structurally cosider a British alliance to be a far more realistic prospect for Germany.)

Regarding Britain: the attempts, by some, to make it appear as if Britain just automatically wanted to crush Germany's efforts here... that's bullshit.

Britain was initially strongly supportive of the project. (Not exactly the attitude of a bunch of German-hating war mongers.)

Only once the Germans revealed plans to extend the railway a bit more, onward to Basra and then along the Persian Gulf, did the British become alarmed. At this point, a project that at most offered a prospect of future economic competition became... something a bit more than that. More of a strategic threat in a region in which Britain had a vested interest. Particularly, it began to look suspiciously like a dagger aimed at the developing British-owned oil fields in Persia.

At that point, with Wilhelm's attitude about Morocco still fresh in the memory, it's not exactly surprising that there would be some alarm about this.

In short: Russia would be opposed to the railway no matter what, but Britain would have had no problem -- in fact, may reasonably be assumed to have remained supportive -- if Germany hadn't decided to "alter the deal (pray I don't alter it any further)" and extend their project to aim squerely at those British-owned oil-fields.

 

[WolfBear]

@Skallagrim The interesting thing is that, in real life's WWI, Britain ultimately ended up doing its fair share of bleeding as well. So, in theory, I don't see anything that should foreclose the possibility of Britain sending a BEF and, if necessary, additional troops to Europe in any early 20th century war with Germany as its ally. Germany could have at least raised this possibility, even without the benefit of hindsight.

Interestingly enough, in the Durnovo Memorandum, Russian statesman and politician Pyotr Durnovo made the same mistake. He believed that both Britain and the US would be useless for Russia in any future Great War as land allies and that Russia would end up having to do most of the fighting on land, which ultimately turned out to be inaccurate in the long(er)-run for World War I--though it was closer to the mark for World War II, which was NOT anticipated back then.

And BTW, Wilhelm II actually was known as a peacemaker as late as 1913:

KAISER WILHELM II., PEACEMAKER, BY ANDREW CARNEGIE; " The Civilized World This Day Bows Reverently Before You," Writes the American Peace Advocate, in Congratulating the Emperor on the Occasion of His Jubilee Celebration. (Published 1913)

www.nytimes.com

KAISER WILHELM AS PEACEMAKER; Books That Show the Remarkable Record of a Ruler Who Was Feared as a "War Lord" Twenty-five Years Ago (Published 1913)

www.nytimes.com

This was, of course, conveniently forgotten once World War I broke out.

 

[BlackDragon98]

The US mostly avoided the rush for colonies, and it turned out excellent.

Spanish American War?

Roosevelt's idea of stealing colonies from a dying Spanish Empire did work out in the end.

America still has much of what she stole.


Back to the topic.

German should have fought her enemies piecemeal, one by one.

In 1904, they should have joined in attacking the Russian with Japan. The Russian Baltic fleet had left for the Pacific and the majority of the Russian troops which meant that the Germans could blitz Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltics with the Russians helpless to respond.

With Poland, the Baltics, Ukraine and the East secured, the Germans has the strength to move against the Entente.

 

[WolfBear]

Spanish American War?

Roosevelt's idea of stealing colonies from a dying Spanish Empire did work out in the end.

America still has much of what she stole.

That's why I included the word "mostly" in that post of mine.

Back to the topic.

German should have fought her enemies piecemeal, one by one.

In 1904, they should have joined in attacking the Russian with Japan. The Russian Baltic fleet had left for the Pacific and the majority of the Russian troops which meant that the Germans could blitz Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltics with the Russians helpless to respond.

With Poland, the Baltics, Ukraine and the East secured, the Germans has the strength to move against the Entente.

That would have required Germany invading and quickly knocking out France beforehand.

 

[sillygoose]

Nice article for the Wilhelm haters:

You Want Propaganda? Now This Is a Story About Propaganda

As the media becomes more and more pervasive in daily life, one of the fastest growing historical fields is the study of how certain nations or groups or individuals have manipulated the news for their own purposes. There are few better examples than the British and American demonization...

historynewsnetwork.org

(Here is the author for anyone curious: Thomas Fleming (historian) - Wikipedia )

As the media becomes more and more pervasive in daily life, one of the fastest growing historical fields is the study of how certain nations or groups or individuals have manipulated the news for their own purposes. There are few better examples than the British and American demonization of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany before and during World War I.

Wilhelm II was a juicy target. Before the war, Lord Northcliffe, the conservative British press lord, had regularly abused him as a warmonger and a menace. A grandson of Queen Victoria, the Kaiser had a prickly relationship with his British royal cousins and a tendency to shoot off his mouth about Germany's martial prowess and its right to a "place in the sun." He was also fond of discoursing on the danger of "the yellow peril" -- the growing power of Japan -- and the superiority of white northern European Protestants. One pundit dubbed him a German version of Theodore Roosevelt.

Soon the Kaiser, who had little more control over his armies than King George V of England had over the British Expeditionary Force, was being blamed for rapes and murders in Belgium and called a megalomaniac with a hunger to rule the world. From here it was only a short step to calling him "the Mad Dog of Europe" and "The Beast of Berlin." The British hired a Dutch cartoonist, Louis Raemakers, to portray the Kaiser as a cross between a Cro-Magnon primitive and a slavering crocodile. Raemakers' handlers made sure he was hailed as a great artist and distributed books of his caricatures in the United States, one of them with an introduction by Prime Minister Herbert Asquith. When the artist visited the United States, Woodrow Wilson invited him to the White House.

Totally forgotten was the special supplement devoted to the Kaiser in the New York Times on June 8, 1913, on the 25th anniversary of his coronation. On its front page, along with a handsome portrait of the monarch in a Navy uniform, was an effusive salute to him from the paper's editors. The banner headline at the top read: KAISER, 25 YEARS A RULER, HAILED AS CHIEF PEACEMAKER. The accompanying story called him "the greatest factor for peace that our time can show" -- and credited Wilhelm with frequently rescuing Europe from the brink of war.

Along with the Times's unstinting praise came effusive tributes from prominent Americans, including Theodore Roosevelt, his White House successor William Howard Taft, Columbia University president Nicholas Murray Butler and steel tycoon Andrew Carnegie, whose full page commentary concluded that all the citizens of the civilized world were the Kaiser's "admiring loving debtors" for his service to the cause of peace.

When America entered the war, Hollywood decided to make the Kaiser one of their prime targets. Their opening assault was My Four Years in Germany, a film based on the book by former Berlin ambassador James W. Gerard. In the first reel, a card announced: "FACT NOT FICTION." The Kaiser was portrayed as a man with the IQ of a paranoid six year old. He rode a hobby horse as he made plans to invade Belgium. The German general staff was introduced with a series of superimposed images comparing each man to an animal.

Literally Nazi-esque propaganda.

On July 15, 1959, on the 100th anniversary of the Kaiser's birth, the British Broadcasting Company released a film about the fallen monarch. Five days before it was broadcast, its producer, Christopher Sykes, published an article about it in the Radio Times. He admitted that in his boyhood, even the mention of the Kaiser sent "tremors of appalled horror through my nerves." This was not unusual for any Briton who grew up during the era of the Great War. The myth of the wicked Kaiser had been propagated so relentlessly by British historians and newspapermen, even otherwise intelligent statesman reacted with revulsion when they heard Wilhelm's name.

The film was remarkable as much for what it did not say as for what it said. There was no attempt to explain how the myth of the wicked Kaiser came into being. The largely covert British propaganda machine of World War I remained covert. The myth was merely stated as a fact which endured for at least ten years after World War I. Meanwhile, a parade of distinguished Britons such as Sir Harold Nicholson exonerated the Kaiser from the charge of starting the war. His responsibility was described as "small" compared to leaders in Russia and Austria-Hungary. The VIPs described meetings with the Kaiser before the war and in his postwar years of exile in Holland. Everyone burbled about his amiability and sincerity. There was much talk about his love of England and his devotion to his grandmother, Queen Victoria. The film closed with discussions of Wilhelm's old age and death, with flattering comments on the way he displayed no bitterness toward those who had slandered him so viciously.