Panzerfaust invented in 1940

[ATP]

He did threaten the Soviets with nuclear war in 1946 if they didn't honor their agreements to leave Iran. He picked and chose his battles with Stalin given that US policy was still cooperation with the Soviets to make the peace after WW2 durable. Full break with the Soviets didn't come until later. Plus don't forget Truman started immediately eliminating communists from the government, starting with firing Morgenthau (who had a bunch of communist agents in his department) in June 1945, which eliminated the highest level spy the Soviets had in the US government.


Maybe, maybe not. Truman, once he got his bearings since he was unprepared for the presidency by the dying FDR, did start immediately diverging from FDR's subservience to Stalin, which alarmed the Soviets and probably helped lead to the breakdown in relations so quickly after the war.


Not sure how accurate that is relative to American sources, since it was our aircraft. I think you're confusing the B-35 for the B-2 or Horten flying wing. The German wing bomber project was stealthy in the way the Mosquito was due to the wooden construction.


That often failed due as a tactic. If it were so simple the Soviets wouldn't have taken nearly so many losses in 1944-45. After all during Bagration the Soviets took days to fight their way through the German defenses and probably would have stalled out if there had been any significant reserves left in AG-Center.


That's the issue, exploitation units could only be inserted once the line was broken open. If there were sufficient reserves that generally failed. See the fighting at Rzhev and in Belarus in 1943-April 1944. So infantry having a direct fire AT/explosive rocket weapon would make it much harder to breakthrough and allow for limited penetrations to be dealt with.

Interestingly I've also come across reports about the extensive use of Panzerfausts against enemy infantry, especially on the Eastern Front. One report even said 84% of infantry casualties inflicted by frontline infantry units (company level and below) by one army in 1944 was through Panzerfausts and Panzerschrecks. The Panzerfausts of the time had 1.5kg of explosives, more than twice the explosive content of the American 'pineapple' grenades (about 600g), which were noted for being especially dangerous due to the lethal radius of the blast. So Panzerfausts were equivalent to direct fire mortars and against massed Soviet infantry on the defensive the PzF was a quite effective and lethal weapon. Much like how modern insurgents use RPGs as 'pocket artillery' the PzF was used as an all purpose explosive weapon, not much different from how the US and UK used their bazookas and PIATs, just more effective. After all by 1945 the US airborne was issuing captured Panzerfausts as standard gear once they had captured enough of them. Seems like the Soviets did too for the engineer assault units.


Apparently due to the heavy decline in quality of Soviet infantry in 1944-45 infantry-armor coordination would still frequently breakdown. See the Seelowe Heights for an example of when a weak defensive force was able to hold off the crushingly superior Soviet force for a while and still inflict a surprising amount of losses with Panzerfausts. It is claimed that they were running out of ammo too, so had that not happened the Soviets could have suffered quite a bit worse.

1.Truman stand for Iran,but not Poland.In 1946.Which mean,that he would support soviets in 1945 - especially,if that cost him only burning few german cities with A bombs.

2.Infrantry could use PZF against soviet infrantry,only if they are still alive.After 2h of soviet bombarment of trenches and bunkers which was known to soviet artillery observes,no many would survive.Not mention,that in that scenario at least part of PzF would be destroyed or even explode.
And yes,their infrantry become worst - but it means more soviet losses,not stopping them for longer.

Only effect would be in 1942 and 1943,when Lend-Lease still was relatively small,and soviets failed to coordinate their units.
Which mean -1944 soviets woud be on Don river and Caucassus,not Dniepr.Maybe Charkow,but that is best scenario for them.

Which mean,that 1.9.45 ,when USA burn Berlin with A bombs,soviets would fight between Dniepr and Vistula.Hungary and Bulgary would remain free,maybe part of Poland,Czech and Romania,too.

 

[sillygoose]

1.Truman stand for Iran,but not Poland.In 1946.Which mean,that he would support soviets in 1945 - especially,if that cost him only burning few german cities with A bombs.

Why would he? Poland by treaty was within the Soviet sphere, Iran wasn't and Stalin promised to leave, so violated his agreement. Stalin wasn't supposed to know about the A-bomb, so couldn't ask without giving away that he had spies in the US government, which he couldn't admit without Truman turning on him hard. FDR knew and didn't care, Truman did care very much and was removing them when he took office.

2.Infrantry could use PZF against soviet infrantry,only if they are still alive.After 2h of soviet bombarment of trenches and bunkers which was known to soviet artillery observes,no many would survive.Not mention,that in that scenario at least part of PzF would be destroyed or even explode.
And yes,their infrantry become worst - but it means more soviet losses,not stopping them for longer.

You apparently think the Germans were a gaggle of retards. They evolved tactics to deal with Soviet bombardments, so dodged most of them. The problem was the Soviets were willing to keep throwing men at the problem until they won or ran out of men and had enough men to keep fighting until the end historically. German infantry more often than not survived, so having lots of firepower far forward would continue to help them survive the onslaught of tanks and infantry. As with Seelowe Heights they managed to evade the Soviet bombardments and despite being grossly outnumbered and outgunned held up the Soviets for days and destroyed over 700 tanks. If not for running short of ammo they could have done even better.

More Soviet losses means they won't be able to keep fighting, as they were running dry by the end and having to remobilize PoWs and Ostarbeiters (and Poles, Yugoslavs, Romanians, Bulgarians, and Hungarians) to keep fighting.

Only effect would be in 1942 and 1943,when Lend-Lease still was relatively small,and soviets failed to coordinate their units.
Which mean -1944 soviets woud be on Don river and Caucassus,not Dniepr.Maybe Charkow,but that is best scenario for them.

In 1942-43 is the critical period when the Panzerfaust would do the most damage to the Soviets and prevent them from having enough men in 1944 to score their big victories. Not enough Soviet tanks or men by 1944 would change the entire course if not outcome of the war. Plus if by 1944 the Panzerfaust 250 is available in the millions the Germans would have a weapon with 1000% more range than their OTL 1944 model (PzF 30). That way they could stay outside Soviet infantry spotting range and destroy substantially more Soviet tanks, while being able to reload existing launchers instead of having to get a new launching tube for each shot.

If the Soviets are stuck on the Don river in 1944 they've lost the war and run out of men, because it means the Germans still control the Donbas and have all those resources AND rebuilt industry that had to be destroyed in the 1943 retreat before it was ready.

Which mean,that 1.9.45 ,when USA burn Berlin with A bombs,soviets would fight between Dniepr and Vistula.Hungary and Bulgary would remain free,maybe part of Poland,Czech and Romania,too.

By August 1945 the Soviets would have had to drop out of the war, which means the US and UK have to make peace, because the Allied publics would never continue the war without a chance to win. No one in the public did know or could know about the A-bomb research, so they won't hold out for that long. Also FDR would lose the November 1944 election if the Soviets were still on the Don or dropped out of the war, which means Dewey would make peace after winning, since he and the other Republicans HATED the Soviets.

So rather than being independent those states would still all be under Hitler's control. Not so good for Poland or perhaps the Czechs, and of course the Jews, but better for the Romanians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians than OTL.

Depending on what happens with D-Day, assuming it even happens ITTL Normandy would be hellish for the Allies if they have to deal with millions of PzF 250s being available, rather than a few hundred thousand of the PzF 30's.

 

[themarcksplan]

That interviewee is such a midwit it is painful. Thinks he's got the entire conflict figured out, but is repeating a bunch of modern Russian internet myths about the war.

I find him incredibly annoying on twitter as well. Total midwit. Because he seems like the kind of person who would care, I'd love to let him know that I went to a much better law school than him.

How do you figure that the Soviet ones were more efficient?

The direct fire method is more efficient with shells.

Given actual combat results German methods were vastly more efficient and effective.

We have to keep analytical levels separate. That direct fire uses shells more efficiently, ceteris paribus, does not mean that Soviet direct fire was more efficient with shells than was German indirect fire.

Given their losses and defeat I'd argue that that efficiency was more a 'penny-wise, pound-foolish' type given the combat results and casualties, which created a vicious cycle of lower accuracy the quicker trained troops were killed.

Maybe?

To close the argument, you'd have to show that accepting higher artillerist losses was more costly than needing several times more shells to replace the direct fire effect. I doubt that's correct, given Soviet shell supply problems.

Again we need to separate Soviet vs. German comparisons from intra-Soviet options. The Soviets didn't have the option of doing things as efficiently as Germany and had very different optimization parameters. Most important was the relative abundance of lives versus material and training time.

Wait how is 4:1 better than 5:1?

Advantage of defense vs. offense is typically ~1.5 in WW2 per Dupuy's analysis.

it was one that was a losing strategy unless they could advance quickly and seize more population to recruit from given their replacement exhaustion of core territories in 1943.

What does "quickly" mean? I don't see much difference between covering Bagration's gains in one month versus three months.

A different shopping list means a zero-sum removal of something else. What would that be and how would it distort the Soviet war effort?

In the "fewer tanks" scenario, SU asks for fewer tanks and more explosives/shells. In the "use tanks only as direct-fire artillery" scenario, no adjustment to LL.

Korsun saw a 2:1 casualty ratio and stripping of German forces of their heavy equipment that was difficult to replace in large masses like that. That was on order of Bagration, just smaller.

Absolute levels are needed, in addition to ratios, to reach conclusions. Otherwise I could argue that the Battle of [Fictional Place] was decisive for SU because German losses exceed Soviet by 10:1. A reasonable person would ask what the absolute levels were, and if told the Germans lost 10 men and the Soviets 1, would obviously reject the thesis.

The smaller Ostheer pockets in 1944 yielded maybe 100k PoW? I just don't see how giving the Germans those 100k back would in any way change the war's course/outcome.

 

[sillygoose]

I find him incredibly annoying on twitter as well. Total midwit. Because he seems like the kind of person who would care, I'd love to let him know that I went to a much better law school than him.

The direct fire method is more efficient with shells.

Sure, but more accuracy comes with all sorts of other downsides that need to be factored in as well, such as the enemy being able to see you and return fire, which degrades accuracy and dramatically increases casualties, creating a vicious cycle.

We have to keep analytical levels separate. That direct fire uses shells more efficiently, ceteris paribus, does not mean that Soviet direct fire was more efficient with shells than was German indirect fire.

Right.

Maybe?

To close the argument, you'd have to show that accepting higher artillerist losses was more costly than needing several times more shells to replace the direct fire effect. I doubt that's correct, given Soviet shell supply problems.

Again we need to separate Soviet vs. German comparisons from intra-Soviet options. The Soviets didn't have the option of doing things as efficiently as Germany and had very different optimization parameters. Most important was the relative abundance of lives versus material and training time.

Fair enough; the Soviets apparently made the calculation that manpower was cheap, material not in 1941-43. They were able to compensate enough for lack of training by 'plug and play' force design and tactics. Of course they demographically crippled themselves so badly that even today there are very dangerous echoes of the losses in their generational birthrates.

Advantage of defense vs. offense is typically ~1.5 in WW2 per Dupuy's analysis.

Dupuy's analysis is interesting, but IMHO limited due to focusing on cherrypicked tactical engagements. Operational implications matter and influence the tactical situation, as the Soviets had no problem sacrificing corps in pinning attacks to achieve a breakthrough elsewhere and cut off the victorious enemy units. So tactically the defensive has the advantage if the defenders make near optimal choices and the situation is relatively static, operationally (and during open maneuver) the attacker usually has the advantage due to the ability to mass firepower, numbers, and supplies.

What does "quickly" mean? I don't see much difference between covering Bagration's gains in one month versus three months.

Quickly is relative to the situation. If the enemy can evacuate population and retreat in good order to fight at the next like you get an Operation Buffalo situation:

Операция «Бюффель» — Википедия

ru.wikipedia.org

Losses
38,862 non -returnable, 99,715 ambulances, total 138,577 [1] 4th and 9th armies in the period 1.3–31.3.1943: 3,450 killed, 10,891 wounded, 926 prop. missing , total 15,267 [2]

9:1 casualty ratio, very little population recovered, and total devastation of infrastructure.
However it happened over 1 month as well.

If you mean Bagration if it took 3 months to push the Germans back they probably retreat in good order and you have a rerun of the Smolensk operation with lots of casualties for only symbolic gains and an intact German army group:

Smolensk operation - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In the "fewer tanks" scenario, SU asks for fewer tanks and more explosives/shells. In the "use tanks only as direct-fire artillery" scenario, no adjustment to LL.

Ok, in that case the Soviets run out of armor then, as it was only L-L tanks that kept their heads above water in terms of losses, as for most of the war tank losses exceeded production. So they rely more on material and manpower and bleed out more quickly after a much slower, WW1 style advance. Meanwhile the Germans learn how to fight that like they did the WW1 style set piece advance.

Absolute levels are needed, in addition to ratios, to reach conclusions. Otherwise I could argue that the Battle of [Fictional Place] was decisive for SU because German losses exceed Soviet by 10:1. A reasonable person would ask what the absolute levels were, and if told the Germans lost 10 men and the Soviets 1, would obviously reject the thesis.

Korsun specifically was important because it helped lead to Hube's Pocket that saw an entire panzer army encircled and lose it's equipment. With vast strategic consequences, since that set up Bagration to succeed:

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518046.2015.998134?journalCode=fslv20

But then we've already discussed that on AHF.

The ratios are important because if the absolute ratio was say 6:1 Soviet replacement ability to the Germans, then 3:1 casualty ratios for Soviet victories are completely sustainable to the end and the Germans would need a 7:1 consistent casualty ratio to win the attrition war.

The smaller Ostheer pockets in 1944 yielded maybe 100k PoW? I just don't see how giving the Germans those 100k back would in any way change the war's course/outcome.

It wasn't simply the PoWs, but the total casualties as well as equipment losses, which were getting harder to replace in 1944 due to the bombing and increasing number of fronts and intensity of combat. See the above paper for how the situation in 1944 Ukraine effectively cost Germany the war. It didn't need to in hindsight, but given the information available and Hitler's reactions to things it effectively doomed them.

 

[ATP]

Why would he? Poland by treaty was within the Soviet sphere, Iran wasn't and Stalin promised to leave, so violated his agreement. Stalin wasn't supposed to know about the A-bomb, so couldn't ask without giving away that he had spies in the US government, which he couldn't admit without Truman turning on him hard. FDR knew and didn't care, Truman did care very much and was removing them when he took office.


You apparently think the Germans were a gaggle of retards. They evolved tactics to deal with Soviet bombardments, so dodged most of them. The problem was the Soviets were willing to keep throwing men at the problem until they won or ran out of men and had enough men to keep fighting until the end historically. German infantry more often than not survived, so having lots of firepower far forward would continue to help them survive the onslaught of tanks and infantry. As with Seelowe Heights they managed to evade the Soviet bombardments and despite being grossly outnumbered and outgunned held up the Soviets for days and destroyed over 700 tanks. If not for running short of ammo they could have done even better.

More Soviet losses means they won't be able to keep fighting, as they were running dry by the end and having to remobilize PoWs and Ostarbeiters (and Poles, Yugoslavs, Romanians, Bulgarians, and Hungarians) to keep fighting.


In 1942-43 is the critical period when the Panzerfaust would do the most damage to the Soviets and prevent them from having enough men in 1944 to score their big victories. Not enough Soviet tanks or men by 1944 would change the entire course if not outcome of the war. Plus if by 1944 the Panzerfaust 250 is available in the millions the Germans would have a weapon with 1000% more range than their OTL 1944 model (PzF 30). That way they could stay outside Soviet infantry spotting range and destroy substantially more Soviet tanks, while being able to reload existing launchers instead of having to get a new launching tube for each shot.

If the Soviets are stuck on the Don river in 1944 they've lost the war and run out of men, because it means the Germans still control the Donbas and have all those resources AND rebuilt industry that had to be destroyed in the 1943 retreat before it was ready.


By August 1945 the Soviets would have had to drop out of the war, which means the US and UK have to make peace, because the Allied publics would never continue the war without a chance to win. No one in the public did know or could know about the A-bomb research, so they won't hold out for that long. Also FDR would lose the November 1944 election if the Soviets were still on the Don or dropped out of the war, which means Dewey would make peace after winning, since he and the other Republicans HATED the Soviets.

So rather than being independent those states would still all be under Hitler's control. Not so good for Poland or perhaps the Czechs, and of course the Jews, but better for the Romanians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians than OTL.

Depending on what happens with D-Day, assuming it even happens ITTL Normandy would be hellish for the Allies if they have to deal with millions of PzF 250s being available, rather than a few hundred thousand of the PzF 30's.

1.USA quaranteed free election in Poland in Yalta.

2.Sowiets was not retard,too - that is why they used penal companies to find where german infrantry is,and artillery observers to destroy them before they could retreat.

3.Greater range to destroy tank do not help,when you must storm trenches with soviet soldiers who encircled germans - becouse they have Studebackers,and germans their foot or horse wagons.

4.Why soviet should drop out of war,if they advanced thanks to encircling german infrantry using their own on american trucks? Only difference woud be,that thheir steamrolling of germans in 1944 would start on Don,not Dniepr - and it would save part of european states.Not Poand and Romania,probably.

 

[Chiron]

Weighing in:

Taking Op at face value. Though the bulk of Allied Tanks in 1940 are easily dealt with by the Pak 36, the Germans who used hollow explosives that are the pre-cursor to the Panzerfaust to crack Eben Emael, decided, yeah, maybe giving each squad one disposable standoff AT weapon might be a good ideal. Lets give it a shot.

This means the earliest the Panzerfaust 30 klein starts showing up would be June of 41, because they have to get the prototype ready, re-tool a factory or build one, and start the planning and distribution. Hence why German Tank production didn't massively expand till the Nibelungenwerk became fully operational as it took time and work to get it going. But once online, it meant the Panthers were cheaper and faster to mass produce than the Panzer IV while being a far more effective combat vehicle, something often overlooked by casual readers who read postwar myths instead of primary sources of operational reports.

Any event, we are looking at first operational use in late September because the weapon has to go to Depots, get logged in and then be distributed, and that takes time. Since its a new weapon and considered an experiment, staff officers will also want to be present to observe its effectiveness and whether its worthwhile to continue.

This "testing phase," will likely last till December, because again its a novel weapon and the Germans want to be sure it works and is worthwhile to mass produce. So in terms of effect, not much. Soviets take slightly higher losses, but things remain the same as OTL. Where things change is 42, the weapon is now considered worthwhile to mass produce, has clear general purpose use outside of AT use and can free up AT guns for other uses or allow them to be potentially withdrawn from Frontline Units and repurposed in practical terms if not official terms. Its also is something they can give their Allies to mass produce.

Panzerfaust 30 would begin showing up in 42 based on combat reports and the Italians, Romanians, and Hungarians get the license to make them to better enable them to handle flank protection roles. It will likely first go to those Nation's Cavalry Forces which were used as mobile fire brigades.

This in turn could mean the 2nd Battle of Kharkov goes worse for the Soviets. Depending on the supply of the Panzerfaust 30 being limited to AGS only, the Soviet Causalities might even double, which would make Voronezh fall in June to 4th Panzer Army via Coup de Main and secure a crossing point on the Don. If that is successfully done, the whole Stalingrad debacle is averted as the Germans can use Voronezh as the crossing point and pin the Soviets in a large Don Pocket and even cross the Volga further north and then pivot south to Stalingrad. Even Hitler seeing this would agree not to split Army Group South as he did as this would mean Astrahkan would be in reach with its oil fields. We might even see the formation of the previous year super pockets with hundreds of thousands of Soviet Troops surrendering. This would take Operation Uranus off the table or Operation Mars plus the concurrent attacks on Leningrad.

Even if the use is not decisive in early summer, it does become so in September where large numbers of these make many Soviet Defenses in Stalingrad untenable and means the City falls in mid October as the Germans can bring pocket artillery into the fray, freeing up their normal Infantry Guns and AT weapons for more critical fights where they can be massed to devastating effect instead of spread all around to break buildings.

If Stalingrad falls, then the Germans can anchor on the Volga and free up troops to ensure the Romanians and Hungarians don't fold and use their stronger position to deal a death blow in 43 against Leningrad and finally force Stalin to the Table.

 

[sillygoose]

1.USA quaranteed free election in Poland in Yalta.

Not sure what you've read on the subject, but the US didn't really care about 'free' elections, a nebulous concept at the best of times:

YALTA AND THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO FREE ELECTIONS IN POLAND on JSTOR

WILLIAM LARSH, YALTA AND THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO FREE ELECTIONS IN POLAND, The Polish Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1995), pp. 267-280

www.jstor.org

2.Sowiets was not retard,too - that is why they used penal companies to find where german infrantry is,and artillery observers to destroy them before they could retreat.

Except that rarely worked in practice as evidenced by the huge Soviet body count even in 1944-45.

3.Greater range to destroy tank do not help,when you must storm trenches with soviet soldiers who encircled germans - becouse they have Studebackers,and germans their foot or horse wagons.

Ok? As I said the PzF could be used against infantry and greater stand off range helps there. Also remember the Soviets had fewer trucks than the Germans even with L-L in 1944, so only a tiny fraction of Soviet infantry had access to such trucks, mainly those supporting tanks in the tank armies. German infantry had horses for intra-division use, but they used trucks for corps and higher level supply, while like the Soviets the Panzer divisions/corps/armies got the bulk of the trucks. Again, more firepower with more effective range in the hands of the infantry results in worse losses for the Soviets how have a replacement limit.

4.Why soviet should drop out of war,if they advanced thanks to encircling german infrantry using their own on american trucks? Only difference woud be,that thheir steamrolling of germans in 1944 would start on Don,not Dniepr - and it would save part of european states.Not Poand and Romania,probably.

That's the entire point of the POD: they can't advance quickly without breakthroughs, which become harder if the infantry have ways to protect themselves from being overrun. Per David Glantz by 1942 the Soviets did not advance significantly without tanks acting as the bulldozer to turn break-ins into breakthroughs, which then enabled those Soviet Studebakers to operate. If the Soviets are on the Don 1944 they'd have starved out, as the only thing that kept them going was to recapture farmland in Ukraine in 1943 and start replanting it thanks to Lend-Lease and reconquered population; if they hadn't achieved that in 1943 the 1944 malnutrition deaths would have been vastly worse. Not only that, but without recapturing the population in Ukraine in 1943 they'd have run out of replacements, so no steamrolling possible.

 

[ATP]

Not sure what you've read on the subject, but the US didn't really care about 'free' elections, a nebulous concept at the best of times:

YALTA AND THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO FREE ELECTIONS IN POLAND on JSTOR

WILLIAM LARSH, YALTA AND THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO FREE ELECTIONS IN POLAND, The Polish Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1995), pp. 267-280

www.jstor.org

Except that rarely worked in practice as evidenced by the huge Soviet body count even in 1944-45.


Ok? As I said the PzF could be used against infantry and greater stand off range helps there. Also remember the Soviets had fewer trucks than the Germans even with L-L in 1944, so only a tiny fraction of Soviet infantry had access to such trucks, mainly those supporting tanks in the tank armies. German infantry had horses for intra-division use, but they used trucks for corps and higher level supply, while like the Soviets the Panzer divisions/corps/armies got the bulk of the trucks. Again, more firepower with more effective range in the hands of the infantry results in worse losses for the Soviets how have a replacement limit.


That's the entire point of the POD: they can't advance quickly without breakthroughs, which become harder if the infantry have ways to protect themselves from being overrun. Per David Glantz by 1942 the Soviets did not advance significantly without tanks acting as the bulldozer to turn break-ins into breakthroughs, which then enabled those Soviet Studebakers to operate. If the Soviets are on the Don 1944 they'd have starved out, as the only thing that kept them going was to recapture farmland in Ukraine in 1943 and start replanting it thanks to Lend-Lease and reconquered population; if they hadn't achieved that in 1943 the 1944 malnutrition deaths would have been vastly worse. Not only that, but without recapturing the population in Ukraine in 1943 they'd have run out of replacements, so no steamrolling possible.

1.Yet still in Yalta they decided that Poland must be independent country.That is why soviets killed those jews in Kielce on american national holliday - to test waters what USA woud do.
If USA reacted,Srain would say "oops,somebody made mistake" and let Poland be free.

2.Thanks commanders like Zhukow for that,who keep use human wave tactic,and Sralin who tolerated that,becouse feared that popular commander could pull Napoleon on him.
If things was worst,it would not occure - he would replaced idiots with normal commanders.

3.Soviets still could encircle german infrantry dyvisions using motorized infrantry,who could get through thanks to artillery,not tanks.Only difference - more dead soviets.
PzF250 alone would not let german break through,and they would must abadonn their artillery to go faster.

4.Kazachstan have very good soil,too - all they need it stop kolchoz nonsense and they would produce food again.Or only gave peasants more land which they could cultivate.Sralin was pragmatic enough for that.

 

[sillygoose]

1.Yet still in Yalta they decided that Poland must be independent country.That is why soviets killed those jews in Kielce on american national holliday - to test waters what USA woud do.
If USA reacted,Srain would say "oops,somebody made mistake" and let Poland be free.

That is one theory of several, but no evidence to actually support it.

2.Thanks commanders like Zhukow for that,who keep use human wave tactic,and Sralin who tolerated that,becouse feared that popular commander could pull Napoleon on him.
If things was worst,it would not occure - he would replaced idiots with normal commanders.

Again, interesting theory, but no evidence that that would happen given how many butchers existed in the Soviet command hierarchy. Or that the Red Army was capable of more sophisticated tactics given their training issues and manpower quality problems.

3.Soviets still could encircle german infrantry dyvisions using motorized infrantry,who could get through thanks to artillery,not tanks.Only difference - more dead soviets.
PzF250 alone would not let german break through,and they would must abadonn their artillery to go faster.

Only if they broke through first, which was only possible with horrific loss of lives. More so if German infantry had more and more dangerous weapons and means to fight the Soviet weapon that actually caused penetrations, the tank. Soviet artillery was so preplanned it didn't adjust nearly as easily as other country's artillery, so there were plenty of ways to defeat the effectiveness of the artillery or the follow up infantry attack. More dead Soviets means at some point they have to quit due to too few soldiers to continue on.
The Germans aren't trying to break through with the Panzerfaust, they are trying to defend.

4.Kazachstan have very good soil,too - all they need it stop kolchoz nonsense and they would produce food again.Or only gave peasants more land which they could cultivate.Sralin was pragmatic enough for that.

They tried that and couldn't make it work. Conscripted too many people and didn't have enough horses or tractors to make it work. At that point the collectivized agriculture issue was besides the point.

 

[ATP]

That is one theory of several, but no evidence to actually support it.


Again, interesting theory, but no evidence that that would happen given how many butchers existed in the Soviet command hierarchy. Or that the Red Army was capable of more sophisticated tactics given their training issues and manpower quality problems.


Only if they broke through first, which was only possible with horrific loss of lives. More so if German infantry had more and more dangerous weapons and means to fight the Soviet weapon that actually caused penetrations, the tank. Soviet artillery was so preplanned it didn't adjust nearly as easily as other country's artillery, so there were plenty of ways to defeat the effectiveness of the artillery or the follow up infantry attack. More dead Soviets means at some point they have to quit due to too few soldiers to continue on.
The Germans aren't trying to break through with the Panzerfaust, they are trying to defend.


They tried that and couldn't make it work. Conscripted too many people and didn't have enough horses or tractors to make it work. At that point the collectivized agriculture issue was besides the point.

OK,let agree,that we disagree.