I'm not sure if you're being serious here. You say this and then proceed to quote wikipedia -- which I didn't even reference -- yourself, and at length. That's kind of a weird move, as if you're trying to call me out for supposedly using a source you don't seem to value, and then referencing that same source as the basis of your own argument.
What am I supposed to do with this?
I was saying your claim was verbatim taking from a section of wikipedia linking to an Italian blog. Wikipedia isn't inherently bad, you just have to have a better sourced article, which is why I quoted at length from one, since people never actually read the links. So the entire quote was to show that Mussolini intended to go to war anyway and the AGNA was really not a factor in their decision. That means the AGNA POD is not helpful. You do with it what you want.
Anyway, what I outlined is simply how I read it in the history books. It has always seemed like common knowledge to me. The fact that Mussolini wanted some kind of action in Ethiopia for quite some time is beyond dispute. That he held back on actually committing to a war of conquest is also evident, however. Note that you actually quote a segment of text that makes it explicit that Mussolini only really committed after the British agreement with Germany. That's when it became obvious that Britain wasn't worth much as a partner to him.
Sure, being Mussolini, he hoped that still paying lip service to the Stresa Front would keep Britain and France from openly acting against him. But by that point, he'd stopped actually caring about what they thought. The inciting reason he stopped caring was that in his view, Britain had reneged on the Stresa Front within two months anyway...
Yeah the history books recycle dumb shit all the time, mostly from the British perspective, which is often incredibly flawed when it comes to understanding what was going on in different countries. Seems like a common Anglophone problem.
Britain's deal with Germany was coincidental to Italian actions even if, hypothetically, Mussolini told some British politician at the time that was why. The founding of the Stresa Front actually was what convinced Mussolini he could invade given the wording of the deal they agreed to.
Again you keep asserting something that other sources show was not the case. The wording of the Stresa Front deal convinced Mussolini he could invade and was preparing for it for months, before the AGNA deal, and it only happened months later because it took a long time to build up 300k men for the invasion in East Africa.
My AH suggestion here is that if Britain had actually committed fully to the Stresa Front, Mussolini would have had no such reason to see them as faithless partners, and would have had less doubts about the Stresa Front actually being worth something. Moreover, without it looking like a dud to the public, he would have continued to portray himself as the big genius behind it all. That, taken together, would be worth the effort of avoiding any needless antagonism within the Stresa Front. Which in turn means that in such a scenario, Mussolini would take far more limited action in Ethiopia, presumably accepting some kind of partitition with a corridor of some sort. (His reasoning no doubt being, by the way, that he'd always be able to take more later, if it became... expedient.)
Mussolini was never committed to the Stresa Front, it was a means to an end to him to invade Ethiopia. He had been flirting with Hitler since 1933 and only dealt with Britain and France when working with the Allies seemed to offer the potential of gaining territory and international prestige. After all he had secretly plotted to invade France in summer of 1933 before realizing the French had detected his move and he cancelled the invasion. Actually he repeatedly ordered preparations to go to war with Britain in 1935 before and after the AGNA and in September 1935 even had several divisions built up on the Egyptian border preparing to invade. That would make an interesting TL.
This is covered in detail in the Italian chapter (called The Ethiopian War and the origins of the Second World War) of "The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered" edited by Gordon Martel. When the Allies acted against him after he invaded he realized the deal was pointless and officially ditched it. Mussolini actually was happy about the AGNA deal for a variety of reasons.
So the best option for preventing the Ethiopian war is actually to prevent the Stresa Front from even forming by Britain categorically denying Italy the option to invade Ethiopia. That would restrain Italy more than no AGNA.
Italy planned form 5 armored dyvisions ,if they do not invade Abisynia,they could have them.2 would be enough to take Egypt in 1940.And,they would not need german help - 2 more german armored dyvisions with Rommel on East.
Interesting. Do you have a source I could check out about the planned 5 divisions?
In the chapter mentioned above apparently most of what Italy spent on the military from 1935-40 was on the Ethiopian war and occupation/economic development, which combined with the much more modest Spanish Civil War spending amounted to 108 billion Lira (over 2/3rds spent on Ethiopia). The entire Italian economy in 1938 was 138 billion Lira. So Mussolini spent nearly the equivalent to an entire year's GDP before WW2 even started on foreign wars, mostly Ethiopia, which means that there was more than enough for 5 armored divisions and to motorize several more not to mention modernize the entire military.
Yes 2 extra armored divisions, maybe a couple of motorized ones, and supporting truck transport would be a total game changer in 1940.
Not just 2 extra German divisions, but 10% more trucks and 20% more air force. Not to mention without Italy invading Greece (or potentially Britain not getting involved) due to Italy taking Egypt that would free up several more German divisions since Crete wouldn't need to happen, nor German divisions getting involved. That would in fact free up 2 more panzer divisions on top of Rommel's since they wouldn't be needed in Greece. 12th army could attack out of Romania on June 22nd (or even a few days earlier) rather than 11th army having to wait a week.
German would lost thanks to Hitler supidity,but taking more territories,and soviet would advance slover.
Allies would retake Africa,but probably not try Italy.Landing in France in 1944,just like OTL.
More countries free from soviets,but that would be all.
Extra material makes up for a lot of stupidity otherwise Stalin and the US would have lost WW2.
Plus with the above and some extra time Stalin could very well lose the war in 1941. I'm not saying the fighting would end in 1941, but the conditions would be set for the USSR to fall apart.