Future War with (Red) China Hypotheticals/Theorycrafting

[Zachowon]

I'm not sure we would, better than the Chinese. A top gun Maverick situation would be a disasterous ratio which we would lose attempting against China.

There are several hundred airports, and an airport takes a large effort to temporarily disable, and can be repaired quickly. You have a few thousand missiles. So, you can suppress all the airports for a day, and then your out of missiles. Bombing missions have the issue of driving deep into SAM systems, which are mobile specifically to increase survivability, which we know they do, into situations your going to have very poor observation over compared to any previous wars.



I mean, much smaller forces have given the US a run for its money. This is the most balanced fight the US has ever fought in the last 100 years. Much more level than WWII even. China is very capable of inflicting casualties that will necessitate conscription.



Your the one suggesting the US will perform in a war against China better than we did against Iraq, a much weaker opponent with a much less advantageous position, while we have an army weaker than what we had in 1990.

I don't think there's any evidence the US is as invincible as you suggest, or the Chinese as helpless. This just seems delusional. The US reserves are shallow enough that we'll run out of ammo pretty quickly if the Chinese countermeasures are at all effective. And if the US takes any sort of casualties, the US's depth of reserves means our ability to maintain offensive actions are going to peak fairly quickly too.

Even 0.1% casualties per sortie, Iraq war like casualties, means if your launching hundreds of sorties, the US is going to lose 1-2 planes per day, and SAM systems are survivable for months under much more intense air campaigns than the US can actually run against the relevant front. Iraq was against roughly a 500 km front. Your talking about suppressing a 4,000-6,000 km front, with a smaller air force, against a more powerful enemy, with much more strategic depth to retreat into. We could hit everywhere in Yugoslavia and Iraq with impunity, and with short range easy strikes. China meanwhile has 4,000 km to pull back anything they want to hide. That strategic depth alone makes destroying the PLA nearly impossible. They can actually keep reserves out of pratical strike range, and feed them into the battle zone as needed.

If we accept that China is even 10x stronger than Iraq, were then going to be looking at probably closer to 1-10% sortie casualty rate, depending on how aggressive the US military is, which would be 10-100 plane casualties per day of intense campaign. One week of campaign is going to cost more than we can build in a year. Which suggests the US is likely not going to be able to maintain offensive operations for more than 10-100 days.

I'm sorry, but the idea that China is weaker than Iraq just doesn't seem plausible to me.

Radars have weaknesses
Its called they have to be on to work, and being on makes them a target.
And while some SAMs have thier own radar, none are truly capable of being able to defend an air space by itself.
Destroy the more powerful radars you destroy that SAM bubble.

This isn't even i clouding stealth aircraft.

And the airfields that would be targeted would be ones that house the J 20, and the aircraft we think would have the most potential.
And then we make it harder fro front lines forces to use those airfields.

SAM systems are only viable when they arnt also being suppressed.

*Looks at Serbia*
You can get lucky but they didn't do much.
Now imagine the full might if the US military.

I am telling you, you have NO idea how radars work

 

[Doomsought]

Radar doesn't work well close to ground, or in bad weather. Also China has a problem with Tofu Dreg construction so their radars probably only have an effective range and/or endurance a fraction of specification.

 

[IndyFront]

Radars have weaknesses
Its called they have to be on to work, and being on makes them a target.
And while some SAMs have thier own radar, none are truly capable of being able to defend an air space by itself.
Destroy the more powerful radars you destroy that SAM bubble.

This isn't even i clouding stealth aircraft.

And the airfields that would be targeted would be ones that house the J 20, and the aircraft we think would have the most potential.
And then we make it harder fro front lines forces to use those airfields.

SAM systems are only viable when they arnt also being suppressed.

*Looks at Serbia*
You can get lucky but they didn't do much.
Now imagine the full might if the US military.

I am telling you, you have NO idea how radars work

I mean, just the sheer size difference in tonnage is insane. People don't realize just how utterly and truly MASSIVE the US Navy is, and don't even get me started on the size of our air force...

 

[LordsFire]

Your the one suggesting the US will perform in a war against China better than we did against Iraq, a much weaker opponent with a much less advantageous position, while we have an army weaker than what we had in 1990.

And you're running into all kind of flawed assumptions right out of the gate here.

First off, in order to win, the US does not need to invade China, or even control their coast. We just need to get control of the straits of Malacca, and the lower reaches of the South China Sea.

Second off, you are seriously underestimating how heavily-fortified Iraq was. They had an enormous air-defense complex, with hundreds of anti-air emplacements. On top of that, unlike the Chinese, the Iraqis actually had some bloody experience, having fought a war with Iran for many years in the 80's. Despite this, they were utterly obliterated, without being able to inflict more than a few token casualties here and there.

Third off, while the US military is numerically weaker than it was in 1991, it is intensely technologically superior. Military technology in the West has come a long, long ways since 1991, and the same can not be said of communist world. As Russia has demonstrated, communists are still shit at technology and quality training, and almost all signs point to corruption in China making the same problems Russia has even worse there.

Again, the J-20 might be able to make some difference, but aside from that, the only thing for air combat the Chinese have that the Iraqis didn't, is a mid-sized inventory of Gen 4 aircraft. Bluntly put, that wouldn't be enough to stop the 1991 USN and USAF, much less the 2023 USN and USAF, with F-35s and F-22s.


You clearly do not understand just how big of game changers the stealth capabilities of our two Generation 5 combat aircraft are.

To try to explain this to you, during Desert Storm 1, there was a small number of very specific missions flown by stealth aircraft, to take out certain specific AA emplacements and command/control nodes. The F-117 was used for this, and while it being a stealth aircraft at all was revolutionary, it was built with early 1980's technology, there are only 64 of them, and they only have two hardpoints, for up to 2 tons of payload. It couldn't even break the sound barrier.

The F-22 can get to Mach 2.25, and supercruise at Mach 1.8, which means it can be reasonably fuel-efficient at that speed and use it to travel long distances, so it can cross almost a thousand kilometers in half an hour. It has eight external hardpoints, 4 under-wing which can carry two and a half tons each, plus four AMRAAMS on the other four.

The F-35 as a multi-role/carrier craft is somewhat less capable than the F-22, but can still make Mach 1.6, and carry up to 9 tons of ordinance between internal and external hardpoints. Importantly, the 4 internal hardpoints mean it can carry a decent payload without degrading its aerodynamic or stealth profile.

These are both stealthed aircraft, and while they weren't designed to be completely invisible to radar, they are designed to get well within the normal detection range of regular radar, and can end up being completely invisible to lower-quality and obsolete radar, at least IIRC.

The particular significance of this, is that they can get inside of your AA envelope, and launch HARMs at your SAM sites before you even know they're there. When it comes to air-to-air, they can get inside of their own missile range, and launch before your radar even detects them.

There is literally nobody else in the world flying stealthed aircraft like this right now, just NATO and the one or two other nations the USA sells the F-35 to.

The J-20, might, might, might be able to meaningfully contend with the F-22 and F-35, but the long history of combat performance of communist aircraft suggests that's not likely to go well; hell, they still don't have all of them properly engined. Even if they do perform somewhere close to their hype, there still aren't enough to deal with the superior numbers the USA can throw at them.

And the F-22 and F-35 vs older, more primitive Chinese aircraft will be a complete and utter slaughter. There would be a butt-ton of 'missile launched from unknown source, J-10 shot down.'

No, the US military is not invincible or indestructible.

Yes, it is by far the most powerful destructive force mankind has ever assembled, and it has crushing advantages over every other military in the world.


A war between the US and China, again, if not crippled by pants-on-head retarded political leadership, would not look exactly like a rehash of Desert Storm, but there would be more than a little resemblance, as utterly outclassed PLA forces are systematically destroyed by enemies that a lot of the time, they don't even know are there until the explosions start.

After the most advanced parts of the PLA are destroyed by the bleeding-edge of the USN and USAF, the Gen 4 and Gen 4.5 aircraft we have will use cheaper semi-guided munitions to start demolishing the PLA's older, shittier stuff.

And unless the Chinese somehow manage to perform to a level that no communist nation ever has before, and show a professional military competence that there is zero indication that they have, there will be nothing they can do about it except fire shots blindly into the sky, and watch death fall on them.

 

[JagerIV]

Second off, you are seriously underestimating how heavily-fortified Iraq was. They had an enormous air-defense complex, with hundreds of anti-air emplacements. On top of that, unlike the Chinese, the Iraqis actually had some bloody experience, having fought a war with Iran for many years in the 80's. Despite this, they were utterly obliterated, without being able to inflict more than a few token casualties here and there.

This seems to be dangerous levels of blank slatism here. Well, blank slatism with the assumption of American Superiority. The Iraqis repeatedly lost and did extremely badly against Iran, despite overwhelming numerical and material superiority. The Iranians with much of their professional officer corp gutted by the revolution and often throwing children at a problem outperformed the Iraqis. And the Iranians are likely just average. With much of their population in the 1980s just coming out of agricultural subsistence, and an average literacy rate of about 40%. They also lost terribly to ISIS initially, with tanks routed by trucks.

Israel's great performance in its war is likely just as much, if not more, due to incredible Arab incompetence at modern war, as their own greatness.

China is a totally different beast, and is going to be much more competent than Iraq, and is likely to be much closer to Yugoslavia, where much of American air power was negated with a tiny available force. Man for man Chinese troops are likely going to be many multiple times better than Iraqis. Your basic human capital is just so much dramatically higher.

The Iraqi, as insanely incompetent as they were, still inflicted a casualty rate of 0.1% per sortie. Chinese troops with the same equipment at the time would have likely inflicted 10x as many casualties. And of course, Like you say later, stealth tech is 40 years old at this point. China has Iraq war, Yugoslavia, Iraq II, Ukraine, and Afghanistan to draw from. Its dangerous to assume the Chinese have not paid attention to US operations over the last 40 years, including the successes in Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Afghanistan of operating under airpower, something Chinese stategies have assumed for its entire life, seems a dangerous assumption to rest on.

You seem to assume the Chinese will perform worse than Yugoslavia, Russians, and Taliban. That the Chinese IQ will drop by 20 points moving from commercials activities to War activities. While the US will perform better than it ever has. This is a very flimsy and dangerous place to rest your hat on.

Stealth from my understanding currently makes it difficult to target them, but not know they're there. Which is the more important part for running the kind of gorrilla air war China is likely to run.



Video on the detectability of Stealth Aircraft, and why an ancient Yogoslavian radar could detect it was there, and the small flaw necesary for the ancient radar to get a lock.

China has 40 years of study of American Stealth, its own stealth program, and that mole in the F-35 program who fed them most of the design documents. China probably has radar and other sensors much more capable than the 1960s systems the Serbs had to shoot at American stealth craft.

War with China is much more likely to look like Yugoslavia, with hundreds of missiles fired for a handful of kills.

Yugoslav air defences were much fewer than what Iraq had deployed during the Gulf War – an estimated 16 SA-3 and 25 SA-6 surface-to-air missile systems, plus numerous anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) – but unlike the Iraqis they took steps to preserve their assets. Prior to the conflict's start Yugoslav SAMs were preemptively dispersed away from their garrisons and practiced emission control to decrease NATO's ability to locate them.[132] The Yugoslav integrated air defence system (IADS) was extensive, including underground command sites and buried landlines, which allowed for information to be shared between systems. Active radar in one area could target NATO aircraft for SAMs and AAA in another area with no active radar, further limiting NATO's ability to target air defence weapons.[133]

During the course of the campaign, NATO and Yugoslav forces engaged in a "cat-and-mouse" game which made suppressing the air defences difficult. Yugoslav SAM operators would turn their radars on for no longer than 20 seconds, allowing little chance for NATO anti-radiation missions to lock on to their emissions.[129] While most Yugoslav SAMs were fired ballistically (with no radar guidance) at NATO aircraft, as many as a third were guided by radar, forcing the targeted aircraft to jettison fuel tanks and take evasive action.[134] In response, over half of NATO's anti-radiation missiles were pre-emptively fired at suspected air defence sites so that if a radar system did become active the missiles would be able to lock on more quickly.[130]

Where possible, Yugoslav air defences attempted to bring NATO aircraft into range of AAA and MANPADS. A common tactic was to target the last aircraft in a departing formation, on the assumption that it received less protection, was flown by a less-experienced pilot, and/or was low on fuel needed to make evasive manoeuvres.[132] However, because AAA were limited to deploying close to roads for mobility and became bogged down in difficult terrain, NATO pilots learned to avoid these by staying at least five kilometers away from roads, never flying along them and only crossing them at a perpendicular angle, though this made spotting ground traffic more difficult.[130]

By focusing on their operational survival, Yugoslav air defences ceded a certain amount of air superiority to NATO forces. Yet the persistence of their credible SAM threat forced NATO to allocate greater resources to continued SEAD operations rather than conducting other missions, while Yugoslav AAA and MANPADS forced NATO aircraft to fly at 15,000 ft (4,600 m) or higher. NATO reportedly fired 743 HARMs during the course of the 78-day campaign, but could confirm the destruction of only 3 of the original 25 SA-6 batteries. Over 800 SAMs were fired by Yugoslav forces at NATO aircraft, including 477 SA-6s and 124 confirmed MANPADS, for the downing of only two aircraft and several more damaged.[129]

 

[JagerIV]

Exactly none of this addresses the sheer military tonnage that the U.S. possesses over China however, yeah China has its missiles and its large manpower but that's not nearly enough to give the U.S. a run for its money in even a one-on-one fight.

Its about 2-1 I believer right now? 2 million tons vs 4 million tons? That's not a great advantage, especially when the US Navy needs to accomplish so much more than the Chinese navy does. Many places the US would need to deploy a 8,000 ton destroyer where the Chinese could make do with a couple hundred ton missile boat. The Chinese navy mostly just has to stay a fleet in being and degrade the US's ability to inflict meaningful damage, so that the War can be won on other fronts.

False. The only forces required are the Navy and the Air Force. It's all about destroying any combat capability that can project force into Taiwan.

Where? Where do we need to go in on the ground?

The only place I can possibly think of would be in Taiwan itself to help retake ground if China successfully makes a beachhead.

I mean, probably the best way to break the American blockade is land operations. Fleets are often destroyed by taking the harbors, and air forces by physically taking the air bases.

Chinese invasions down to Australia and pushing the US out of the middle East would free up the oil supplies, which then relieves short term pressure and can open up a better blockade of Korea and Japan to soften them up for ground invasion. Some troops to Europe might also be good. Increase attrition and commitment in Ukraine, and if it can be defeated, secures food and a staging area to inflict a lot of virtual attrition on Blue forces, tying up a lot of advanced military hardware and personnel to prevent an invasion of Europe.

Probably initially the fighting would be the middle East and South East Asia though. Taking both of those dramatically limits the US's ability to interfere with oil shipments from the middle East, provides leverage over Europe, and basically puts Japan and Korea in a strong blockade, with everything having to come across the Pacific from America.

Maybe Korea starts off early too, though that's less desirable from a China perspective. Though its also probably the most difficult place for the US to make a ground fight, unless they can be tricked to mass deploy into Thailand. Both of those would benefit from a year+ of troop movement and diplomatic wrangling. If it can be determined that Singapore, Malaysian, and Indonesia are going let China move in unless there are large American forces pre-positioned to fight, China might be able to roll down to Australia basically without a fight, so they can start grinding the Australians to dust in relatively short order.

Between fighting in the Middle East (who to be determined by the particulars of current deplomacy), Australia, Philippines, and maybe Europe/Korea, though hopefully not, and hopefully India doesn't need invaded either and can be adequately appeased, Taiwan might run out of SAMs/Oil/Food and will surrender, providing another base to forward deploy air defense and to launch raids into the Pacific and against Japan. Maybe invade the Philippines if they somehow last longer than Taiwan, despite likely being a more priority target. Assuming they do decide to get involved.

But, yeah, in a shooting war the Chinese have every incentive to invade everyone shooting at them, especially if they're basically un-defended. And mine everywhere that isn't immediately invadable.

 

[Zachowon]

This seems to be dangerous levels of blank slatism here. Well, blank slatism with the assumption of American Superiority. The Iraqis repeatedly lost and did extremely badly against Iran, despite overwhelming numerical and material superiority. The Iranians with much of their professional officer corp gutted by the revolution and often throwing children at a problem outperformed the Iraqis. And the Iranians are likely just average. With much of their population in the 1980s just coming out of agricultural subsistence, and an average literacy rate of about 40%. They also lost terribly to ISIS initially, with tanks routed by trucks.

Israel's great performance in its war is likely just as much, if not more, due to incredible Arab incompetence at modern war, as their own greatness.

China is a totally different beast, and is going to be much more competent than Iraq, and is likely to be much closer to Yugoslavia, where much of American air power was negated with a tiny available force. Man for man Chinese troops are likely going to be many multiple times better than Iraqis. Your basic human capital is just so much dramatically higher.

The Iraqi, as insanely incompetent as they were, still inflicted a casualty rate of 0.1% per sortie. Chinese troops with the same equipment at the time would have likely inflicted 10x as many casualties. And of course, Like you say later, stealth tech is 40 years old at this point. China has Iraq war, Yugoslavia, Iraq II, Ukraine, and Afghanistan to draw from. Its dangerous to assume the Chinese have not paid attention to US operations over the last 40 years, including the successes in Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Afghanistan of operating under airpower, something Chinese stategies have assumed for its entire life, seems a dangerous assumption to rest on.

You seem to assume the Chinese will perform worse than Yugoslavia, Russians, and Taliban. That the Chinese IQ will drop by 20 points moving from commercials activities to War activities. While the US will perform better than it ever has. This is a very flimsy and dangerous place to rest your hat on.

Stealth from my understanding currently makes it difficult to target them, but not know they're there. Which is the more important part for running the kind of gorrilla air war China is likely to run.



Video on the detectability of Stealth Aircraft, and why an ancient Yogoslavian radar could detect it was there, and the small flaw necesary for the ancient radar to get a lock.

China has 40 years of study of American Stealth, its own stealth program, and that mole in the F-35 program who fed them most of the design documents. China probably has radar and other sensors much more capable than the 1960s systems the Serbs had to shoot at American stealth craft.

War with China is much more likely to look like Yugoslavia, with hundreds of missiles fired for a handful of kills.

The guy who led the SAM battery to shoot down the F117 only did so because they were flying the same path every day at the same time, and they saw a anomaly knowing what it was and the fact it flew the same path every night.
He fired blindly because he couldn't lock and got lucky.

Funnily enough, do you know how many aircraft were lost in 99? 2.
Do you know how many sorties were being flown?
38000.

And Yugo is the exception, because they had troops with experience manning thier things.
Something China lacks.
And the fact tech has come a FAR way since then in the field of SEAD/DEAD and EW

 

[paulobrito]

Zach, Zach, China has Stealth planes/drones. If you think that the ground forces don't train against them, you are delusional.

About the USN - in the past decades they have had several serious accidents that show that most of the ships are undercrewed, said crew is overworked and badly trained, and the ships are in dire need of comprehensive refit/maintenance. Most of the attack planes - right now and in the next years are F-18, that have the airframes tired with a lot of hours wasted against 3rd rate adversaries.

If you think that going against a peer that can shoot back, is the same boy, you are going for a very rude surprise.
Not even talking about the anti-ship weapons that Shina as been busy developing - nobody knows if they work has advertised, but they maybe can, and in that case, your carriers are just expensive target ducks.

 

[The Whispering Monk]

Chinese invasions down to Australia and pushing the US out of the middle East would free up the oil supplies, which then relieves short term pressure and can open up a better blockade of Korea and Japan to soften them up for ground invasion. Some troops to Europe might also be good.

Probably initially the fighting would be the middle East and South East Asia though.

Maybe Korea starts off early too, though that's less desirable from a China perspective.

Sure...China could invade the ME...if it wants to eat that turd it can. Go through India? Nah, that ain't gonna work well. Those moves are really just equivalents to 'death by cop'.

Australia and the rest of the Pacific Islands...How in the hell is China going to transport the troops to get to Australia. Almost ALL of their amphibious lift capacity is civilian, slow, ungainly, and not suited to the sort of voyages needed for Australia. All that tonnage is gonna get sunk pretty dang easily, and their Navy wouldn't be able to really protect them.

As for Korea...at this point, we can let the RoK deal with the Norks by themselves, with the assistance of whatever assets are already on the peninsula.

What you're discussing here is really just a form of suicide by the Chinese that will make sure they are isolated from the rest of the world.

 

[Zachowon]

Zach, Zach, China has Stealth planes/drones. If you think that the ground forces don't train against them, you are delusional.

About the USN - in the past decades they have had several serious accidents that show that most of the ships are undercrewed, said crew is overworked and badly trained, and the ships are in dire need of comprehensive refit/maintenance. Most of the attack planes - right now and in the next years are F-18, that have the airframes tired with a lot of hours wasted against 3rd rate adversaries.

If you think that going against a peer that can shoot back, is the same boy, you are going for a very rude surprise.
Not even talking about the anti-ship weapons that Shina as been busy developing - nobody knows if they work has advertised, but they maybe can, and in that case, your carriers are just expensive target ducks.

Yes they have 'stealth' aircraft.
Do they train on it? Maybe, but would they also risk thier adversaries getting the same information?

If they can get past the most sophisticated and powerful AD family in the world?
AEGIS laughs as you have the coordination between damn near the entire Battle group or even a fleet keeping eyes on and firing back.
As Ukraine has showed, US AD is no slouch and hypersonic mean Jack shit.

Remeber, when China shot the satellite and caused debris.
We shot multiple and made no debris to show our hand.

We as the military take China at thier word.
So we train and prepare for that word.

And yes, USN is undercrewed.
Still better trained then the Chinese.
Who have....never had any experience in any form in.....50 60 years?

Let's not even get into what the Chinese peacekeepers did in Somalia...

 

[LordsFire]

Snip.

I'm assuming a high degree of competence and professionalism from the US military...

...based on the fact that it has a track record of professionalism and being the most competent military in the world.

It's declined somewhat due to leftist influence, but it's still one of the best in the world.


I'm assuming Chinese incompetence, because...

...The PLA has a history of incompetence, and nothing points to that having meaningfully changed.

What evidence do we have towards this?

1. Massive systemic corruption throughout the entire CCP's structure.
2. The PLA's officer corps spends more time being politically indoctrinated than actually training for competent military operations.
3. Their military hardware keeps performing poorly. Their carriers don't work properly, their most recent new rifle was keyholing at ridiculously short ranges, the engine in the J-20 was reportedly only fit for 20 hours before needing to be pulled for complete servicing, etc.
4. They haven't had a real military conflict in forty+ years, meaning they have no veterans in service.
5. They got their asses kicked in every war they've fought in. The Nationalists were winning until the Japanese invaded, they got their own people slaughtered in Korea to manage a stalemate, they lost to Vietnam in their fight with them over Cambodia. The only success they had was against Tibet, where they had utterly absurd numerical advantage.
6. Reports of how PLA soldiers perform in any situation where they've gotten into incidental firefights depict them as either mediocre, or absolute cowards panicking almost instantly.
7. Every communist military in history has had a performance range from 'mediocre' to 'utterly dreadful,' with a handful managing 'reasonably competent.' There's no sign that the Chinese are in any way exceptions to this.


All of this together, I expect the Chinese to fight at least as poorly as the Iraqis did, possibly worse. Islamists have something larger than themselves that they believe in, and the more fanatical will deliberately face death.

Communist soldiers are generally cowards when death comes for them, because mixed in with their other ideological nonsense and generally being shat on by those higher up the party hierarchy, they're atheists, and death is the end to them. There are some exceptions, of course, but they are pretty bloody rare.


Now what, exactly, are your reasons for thinking that the PLA will suddenly perform so much better than they, or any other communist army has, in the past?

 

[The Whispering Monk]

...snip...

where's my chef's kiss emoji...?

nvmd...here's something

 

[JagerIV]

What evidence do we have towards this?

1. Massive systemic corruption throughout the entire CCP's structure.
2. The PLA's officer corps spends more time being politically indoctrinated than actually training for competent military operations.
3. Their military hardware keeps performing poorly. Their carriers don't work properly, their most recent new rifle was keyholing at ridiculously short ranges, the engine in the J-20 was reportedly only fit for 20 hours before needing to be pulled for complete servicing, etc.
4. They haven't had a real military conflict in forty+ years, meaning they have no veterans in service.
5. They got their asses kicked in every war they've fought in. The Nationalists were winning until the Japanese invaded, they got their own people slaughtered in Korea to manage a stalemate, they lost to Vietnam in their fight with them over Cambodia. The only success they had was against Tibet, where they had utterly absurd numerical advantage.
6. Reports of how PLA soldiers perform in any situation where they've gotten into incidental firefights depict them as either mediocre, or absolute cowards panicking almost instantly.
7. Every communist military in history has had a performance range from 'mediocre' to 'utterly dreadful,' with a handful managing 'reasonably competent.' There's no sign that the Chinese are in any way exceptions to this.
[8] Communist soldiers are generally cowards when death comes for them, because mixed in with their other ideological nonsense and generally being shat on by those higher up the party hierarchy, they're atheists, and death is the end to them. There are some exceptions, of course, but they are pretty bloody rare.

1) Its honestly hard to say for sure, but most of the weapons do exist, and you can have a fair bit of corruption and functionality. US military also has a good deal of corruption, I vaguely recall one happened at my dad's navy base where a supplier was effectively bribing the local leadership for sweetheart deals. Another case where an exercise was delayed for a week because people were falsely passing maintenance inspections so the landing door fell open at sea and had to slowly go back to port to repair it. This is early 2000s. Iraq and Afghanistan were rife with corruption, probably in quite systemic ways. Corruption is very much a fact of life though, and most organizations operate with a fair level of it.

At the very least, Chinese corruption is probably not as crippling as African or Arab corruption is, because things do actually get built, and most of the world wanted to buisness with them. One mans corruption is often is another mans grease and the system working as intended. I'm not sure I've seen much evidence for Chinese corruption being crippling, rather a small hinderance, or even benifitical to the system.

2) Maybe. I don't know, nor how much this matters if it is true. Depends what the relevant comparison is. A devout Christian in the US military might technically spend more time learning Christianity and devoted to his church than on training for the military too (40 hours a week doing his job, maybe 100 hours of formal new training a year, 2 hours a week on Christian stuff would mean he spends mor time a year on theology than military training). If what's counted in that number is the Communist equivalent of attending Communist sermon on sunday and adult bible school Tuesdays afternoon, and attending the monthly day of communism x Celebrations, that adds up to a lot of hours on communism (104 hours if you have a 2 hour sunday service, 52 hours for weekly 1 hour study period, 96 hours if you have 12 hole day, 8 hour events, for 252 hours of communist indoctrination time). That's a lot of hours, but probably not particularly meaningful one way or the other for effectiveness.

3) What particular evidence do you have for this? All these sound suspiciously like single example failures, or teething issues.

4) Experience also degrades very quickly, and isn't necessarily all that valuable, especially past the people with the actual experience. Then you just have basically manuals and exercises which you hope the next generation keeps doing the things actually useful for war, rather than convenient for garrison. The last really big operation against a serious foe capable of any air resistance was probably those 90s wars, and that's my parents generations. The people in charge in the 90s, even at the lower levels of like 40s people are 70 years old now. Average length of service for Enlisted and officer is about in the 10-15 year period. So, right now then over half the military has been in uniform for less than 5 years most likely: our veterans experience if fighting ISIS and serving during the losing stages of Afghanistan. That might not be particularly valuable combat experience for a china war.

5) This is a very strange read of history. They beat the Nationalists, achieved their minimum objectives in Korea in the face of immense material mismatch, probably overperforming what an average nation would achieve, Vietnam wasn't a particular defeat,.

6) I'd have to see what you mean, and how representative it is, and how much it matters. Are you counting not being an idiot as being cowardly? Are those Americans who surrendered to Iran as proof of American cowardliness? Are you just using a situation like that?

7) This is a, take. Have virtually no objective basis in reality as far as I can see, but it is a take. What does this mean for all the people who lost to Communist armies, like the US? Is the US below mediocre then? Is this "they kept losing the war, and then for no reason at all won" arguments? Lenin's red army was just awful, until for totally unconnected reasons, it won? Mao's red army was totally awful, until for totally unrelated reasons, it won? Ho Chi Minh's Red Army was totally awful and lost for 10 years, before for totally unrelated reasons, won?

8) This is also a take, though I wonder what universe your basing it on. When I think of the red army, I definately think cowardly surrender. Same with the Vietnamese. Or the Communist rebels in Malaysia. Or the Chinese in Korea or the Civil War. Pol Pots troops were definately cowardly, that's the description. George Orwell was the ur coward. Cowardly leaving Britain to fight for the Communists in Spain. Such cowardness. And obviously the proto communists, the French Revolutionaries, were well known for their cowardyness. Fighting the entire European continent for over a decade, invading Russia, fighting European line battles, levee en massing, losing millions of soldiers. Very traditional signs of cowardlyness.

Meanwhile, Sadam's troops who repeatedly ran away before the Iranians, ran away and surrendered en mass against the Americans, and ran away en mass when faced with terrifying ISIS trucks. That is your model of a committed, brave soldiery?

Are you really making this argument, that communists aren't willing to die for their cause, or able to get lots of other people to die for their cause, which is just as good, and do it better than many others, like many kings and dictators could?

 

[JagerIV]

Also, some documents I found while doing research on this topic:

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=cmsi-red-books

A look at what seemed to be China's core Naval Strategy, at least as of 2009: mines.

People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) strategists contend that sea mines are "easy to lay and difficult to sweep; their concealment potential is strong; their destructive power is high; and the threat value is long-lasting."3 Key objectives for a Chinese offensive mine strategy would be "blockading enemy bases, harbors and sea lanes; destroying enemy sea transport capabilities; attacking or restricting warship mobility; and crippling and exhausting enemy combat strength."4 For future littoral warfare, it is said that "sea mines constitute the main threat [主要威胁] to every navy, and especially for carrier battle groups and submarines."5 Moreover, this emphasis corresponds to the PLAN evaluation that "relative to other combat mission areas, [the U.S. Navy's] mine warfare capabilities are extremely weak."6 Chinese naval strategists note that of eighteen warships lost or seriously damaged since World War II, fourteen were struck by sea mines.7 As the PLA's Chinese Mine Warfare A PLA Navy 'Assassin's Mace' Capability 2 china maritime studies newspaper has stated, "When military experts cast their gaze on the vast sea battle area . . . submarines attacking in concealment with torpedoes and the ingenious deployment of mines are still the main battle equipment of a modern navy."8 The prominent role of "minelaying" in contemporary Chinese military doctrine is highlighted by the fact that this term was used no less than three times in China's 2008 defense white paper.9 While many countries are vigorously studying mine countermeasures, few are so brazenly pursuing offensive mine warfare.10 Thus, for example, the 2006 edition of Science of Campaigns (Zhanyi Xue), an operationally and tactically focused Chinese doctrinal textbook, declares, "[We must] make full use of [units] . . . that can force their way into enemy ports and shipping lines to carry out minelaying on a grand scale."11

In this thinking, the gulf war is apparently a major influence, along with WWII and the Korean war.

Since 1978, however, consistent with China's kaifang (开放) "open" orientation, PRC specialists have been assimilating foreign experiences in a systematic effort to develop naval analyses for planners. MIW campaigns figure prominently in these studies. According to a PRC textbook of mine warfare, 810,000 sea mines were laid during World War II, sinking approximately 2,700 ships.17 Moreover, PLAN strategists keenly appreciate that in the same conflict Germany alone lost twenty-seven U-boats to Allied MIW.18 Also of great interest to Chinese naval strategists is the 1945 U.S. mine campaign against Japan.19 Noting the distinct contribution of this strategy to Japan's unconditional surrender, they observe that 12,053 mines were employed, causing the destruction of 670 Japanese ships.20 Chinese naval analysts have also examined the Falklands War, positing that Argentina's failure to use sea mines to counter the Royal Navy constituted a major lost opportunity.

Among the many military campaigns analyzed by PRC strategists, the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) was singularly important, however, in shocking the People's Liberation Army (PLA) out of a Deng Xiaoping–era malaise characterized by declining defense budgets, low technology, and poor readiness. According to David Shambaugh, "In the PLA's seventy year history, only the Korean War produced such a thoroughgoing reassessment."22 Describing the impact as a "jarring effect on the PLA," Shambaugh explains: "[PLA] planners had never imagined the application of the numerous new high technologies developed by the United States. . . . Nearly every aspect of the campaign reminded the PLA high command of its deficiencies."23 There is a noteworthy caveat that has been overlooked in such analyses but has major implications for Chinese naval development, Chinese analysts having, not surprisingly, scrutinized all naval aspects of the 1990–91 4 china maritime studies conflict carefully.24 That is, PRC writings concerning MIW almost universally cite the damage mines caused to two U.S. Navy warships during that war.25

PRC specialist Fu Jinzhu, noteworthy for his prolific writings on all aspects of MIW and MCM, published a detailed and comprehensive analysis of mine warfare in the Persian Gulf War in the March 1992 issue of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) journal 现代舰船 (Modern Ships). 26 Fu concludes that MIW played an unexpectedly large role, demonstrating conclusively that mines are one of the most effective methods with which weak countries can defend against strong countries, though Fu is careful to state that strong countries can also employ mines effectively.27 Fu contends that the successful MIW attacks against USS Tripoli and USS Princeton illustrate the "relatively feeble" character of U.S. MCM. He argues that this is particularly true given the apparent failures of Iraqi MIW, which Fu lists as inadequate planning and preparation, inability to lay a sufficient quantity of mines (Iraq laid "only" 1,100 mines), and inappropriate reliance on moored mines, as well as failure either to conceal MIW operations adequately or to conduct long-range MIW operations. While recognizing the distinctive role of civilian vessels in Iraqi MIW, Fu concludes that coalition air superiority hindered Iraqi MIW decisively by preventing air delivery of mines and by inflicting heavy losses on Iraqi MIW assets. In addition, Fu asserts that this historical episode fundamentally demonstrates the "extremely difficult nature of MCM" (反水雷艰巨性).

Similar themes are echoed in another lengthy examination of Gulf War naval operations.28 This analysis emphasizes the irony that whereas the Persian Gulf War is universally considered a "high-tech war," a traditional weapon like the sea mine played a significant role. This commentary notes the impressive cost-effectiveness of MIW, describing it as "cheap price, beautiful substance" (价廉物美). It also argues that sea mines are particularly appropriate weapons for China, not only in a defensive sense, because of its long and complex coastline, but also in an offensive sense, affording opportunities to blockade enemy ports and break sea lines of communication.29 Like Fu Jinzhu, this analyst emphasizes that Iraq's experience can be improved upon, because "sea mines should incorporate high technology" as well. Among the methods and technologies that must be prioritized are counter-MCM equipment, "intelligized" (智能化) mines, rapid laying of mines, and "high-volume carriers for mines" (多载体布雷手段). Like the piece mentioned previously, this second study does not appraise coalition MCM highly: "Despite deploying 13 vessels from four nations, this force proved insufficient, was plagued by wide discrepancies in the capabilities of each vessel, and made only slow headway [against Iraq's mines]."...

Western and Chinese strategists are equally familiar with the allied minesweeping operation at Wonsan.45 Chinese sources show ample awareness of North Korea’s success in laying three thousand mines and thereby temporarily denying the U.S. Navy access to local littoral waters.46 Allied forces succeeded in sweeping or destroying only 225 of these mines, and at heavy cost. Four U.S. minesweepers and one fleet tugboat were lost, and five destroyers were severely damaged. Mines also sank the South Korean minesweeper YMS-516 and damaged several other South Korean ships.47 Rear Admiral Allan Smith, U.S. Navy, who led the advance force at Wonsan, summarized this episode: “We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using pre–World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.”48

The paper then lays out the phrases that seem to define the Chinese thinking and doctrine on the US of sea mines, for which China as of 2007 seemed to have accumulated between 50-100 thousand. They boil this down to 13 points/ideas/technologies

A Preliminary Conception of PLAN Mine Warfare Doctrine

Combining the historical development of Chinese mine warfare, its present capabilities, and the considerable training activities outlined in the preceding section, it is possible to sketch the broad outlines of contemporary PLAN MIW doctrine. One likely forum for dissemination of such doctrine is China's MIW/MCM journal Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense (水雷战与舰船防护).318 The existence of such a professional publication in itself suggests a decisive commitment to this warfare specialty. The doctrinal outline that follows represents only a preliminary sketch, given the continuing opacity of all Chinese military programs, including MIW. The following thirteen points are derived from phrases that appear repeatedly in Chinese MIW writings, where they are treated as having major strategic and tactical significance.319

1. "易布难扫" (Easy to Lay, Hard to Sweep). This simple formulation of the advantages of offensive mining is used universally in PRC writings on mine warfare. It reflects a strong conviction, based on historical analyses and trends in naval warfare, that MIW possibilities have significantly outpaced MCM development and will continue to do so.320 This is a core motivating principle for Chinese MIW, but it is also built on specific assessments that mine countermeasures represent a critical vulnerability of the U.S. Navy. However technically superior the U.S. Navy may be in MCM to the PLAN, the basic calculus that MCM will remain arduous and resource-intensive for all navies does not change.

2. "不惹人注意" (Not Attracting Attention). MIW and MCM are among the least glorious components of modern naval warfare. Dropping a mine overboard hardly creates the same exhilaration as launching in a fighter from an aircraft carrier. Moreover, the platforms involved generally do not inspire admirers of great ships. In navies around the world, mine warfare is a less favored career route than others. In addition, these weapons are fundamentally difficult to monitor with any confidence, since they are very easily hidden. Chinese naval strategists are aware of these peculiarities and are keen to use the mundane aspects of MIW to their advantage—betting that their own robust offensive capabilities will not be countered and therefore can be exploited in the event of war.321 Finally, unlike the development of aircraft carriers, to give the most obvious contrast, advances in sea mines will not conflict with China's professed strategy of "peaceful development" or trigger arms races with potential adversaries, such as Japan.

3. "四两可拨千斤" (Four Ounces Can Move One Thousand Pounds). The asymmetric nature of mine warfare is reflected in this expression, common to many Chinese MIW analyses.322 The aphorism also suggests, however, that MIW is capable of inducing major strategic effects well beyond actual combat losses inflicted on the adversary.323 One Chinese naval analyst contends that MIW imposes "huge psychological pressure" on 42 china maritime studies the enemy.324 This conclusion echoes notions in the U.S. Navy: "[Mines are such] highly effective psychological weapons [that the] mere suspicion that they might be present is usually sufficient cause to shut down a port or shipping channel, disrupt battle plans, and force the re-routing of personnel, weapons, and supplies."325 Consistent with this approach, Science of Campaigns discusses the employment of "decoy minelaying" for the purpose of confusing the enemy and causing him to waste limited MCM resources.326

4. "控在一定时间一定海区" (Sea Control at a Specific Time in a Specific Sea Area). PLAN leaders recognize that they cannot challenge the U.S. Navy symmetrically for absolute sea control. A 2005 article in China Military Science by a scholar from Nanjing Naval Command and Staff College outlines a Chinese notion of "sea control" that is described as distinct from the American conception: "For military circles in China, command of the sea means one side in a conflict having control over a specific sea area for a specific period of time."327 The U.S. Navy is said to seek total mastery of the seas; the PLAN conception is much narrower. MIW could logically play a decisive role in such a strategy, given its strong potential for impeding the adversary's momentum and also for channeling the adversary into selected sea areas.

5.巨大数量 (Huge Numbers). Vast quantities of sea mines offer the PLAN a variety of operational possibilities, particularly given the important psychological effects of even comparatively obsolete sea mines under the right circumstances. Persian Gulf War analyses by PLAN strategists cited above suggest a clear realization that relatively low numbers of laid mines (1,100) inhibited Iraqi MIW.328 Recall that the same analyses call for developing methods for "high-volume carriers for mines."329 Moreover, we have cited above a Chinese report discussing submarine mine belts.330 A Chinese analysis of the U.S. mine blockade of Japan in 1945 concludes that the "high number of mines" was a critical factor.331 Estimates of the number of mines currently required to blockade Taiwan vary between seven and fourteen thousand,332 which amounts to a relatively small proportion of available estimates of PLAN aggregate sea-mine stocks. Science of Campaigns emphasizes the importance of having sufficient numbers of mines so that a specified number can be held in reserve to replenish minefields during the course of a "joint blockade campaign."333

6. "先制" (First Control). The concept of "first strike," which permeates PLA doctrine, is especially relevant to mine warfare. This phrase, which appears often in Chinese writings concerning MIW, suggests a strong preemptive tendency. Surreptitiously laying sea mines might give the advantage of surprise. According to an article in Naval and Merchant Ships, "mines have become an important component of the 'first to control' . . . combat operations."334 Another article from the same periodical observes that "refitted civilian ships are particularly suited for offensive mine-laying operations before the enemy has figured out one's strategic intentions."335 PRC MIW expert Fu Jinzhu alludes chinese mine warfare 43 starkly to the preemption issue when, in an appraisal of Taiwan MIW, he asserts, "Since Taiwan's minelaying capability is already known, it ought to be easily removed."336 Yet another article in Naval and Merchant Ships, from 2005, hints even more directly at preemption: "If minelaying cannot be done rapidly, it will probably be impossible to accomplish MIW missions before the outbreak of war."337

7.高低技术 (High and Low Technology). PLAN writings commonly cite the cost-effective nature of MIW. A typical graphic, from a 2004 Naval and Merchant Ships article, juxtaposes the costs of Iraqi mines in the Persian Gulf War, $1,500–$10,000, with the costs to repair U.S. Navy ships damaged by them, which ranged as high as ninety-six million dollars.338 Nevertheless, it is also important to recall the mid-2004 statement from People's Navy that "China is not Iraq. . . . It has advanced sea mines."339 As already noted, China has acquired and now produces some of the world's most advanced and lethal mines. Used in combination, high- and low-technology MIW will make the MCM challenge that much more complicated and difficult for any prospective opponent.340 The PLAN seeks to maximize its MIW capabilities through fuse retrofits and prioritization of the most advanced mines for the most challenging missions.

8.潜载雷为隐蔽, 空载雷为多快 (Submarine Delivery for Concealment, Air Delivery for Speed and Quantity). Chinese strategists have carefully considered the comparative advantages of various laying platforms. Their analyses of Iraqi MIW in the Gulf War emphasize the extensive vulnerability of surface ships engaged in minelaying.341 Submarine delivery is viewed as ideal for mine strikes against hard targets, such as ports and bases, because of the unparalleled stealth qualities of submarines.342 "The submarine's most notable characteristic is its high degree of stealth, which assures that [submarinelaid] minefields remain far more dangerous to the enemy than [fields] sown by aircraft or surface vessels."343 The preceding section of this study suggests a high level of training activity focusing on submarine MIW operations. While submarines can deliver mines with great precision, however, their load-outs are not very large, and their sortie rates are low. Aircraft, by contrast, can deliver mines with much greater speed and efficiency, potentially also reaching waters too shallow for submarines.344 Chinese analysts also understand the factors that influence the efficacy of laying particular types of mines in particular locations.345 Dalian Naval Academy experts cite such factors as "water depth, seabed geology, seabed form, tide, current, wind, wave, degree of transparency of seawater, temperature of seawater, salinity of seawater, ocean organisms, various noises, earthquakes, [and] magnetic storms." 346

9.军民联合 (Civil-Military Integration). PRC historical analyses point to numerous examples, ranging from World War II to the Persian Gulf War, of civilian vessels executing MIW and MCM missions during wartime. Chinese analysts additionally point out that civilian vessels actually cleared mines from waterways during the Chinese civil war.347 44 china maritime studies According to a 2004 article in Modern Navy: "Organizing quick and effective civilian ship participation in warfare is an important guarantor of victory in naval warfare." It continues, "China's coastal [civilian] ships are now an abundant resource . . . [and thus constitute] a huge maritime war force." Finally, it is argued that MIW/MCM missions should receive first priority when making modifications to upgrade civilian ships for combat.348 Exercise activity noted in the preceding section suggests that these ideas are not simply theoretical. Moreover, civil-military integration for MIW/MCM is consistent with China's strategic culture.349

10. "水下卫士" (Undersea Sentry). Although U.S. aircraft carriers are taken seriously in China,350 there is evidence that PLAN strategists are equally or more concerned with U.S. SSNs.351 Whereas PLAN submarines might not fare well in head-to-head combat with U.S. Navy submarines, MIW is viewed as potentially effective for coping with this threat.352 Even Navy Militia minelaying is viewed in this context, albeit likely in coastal waters.353 Chinese analysts note that the Soviets revived mine warfare during the late Cold War in part to counter American SSNs. Indeed, one Chinese survey of ASW explains how new mines emerged in the 1980s "that are more appropriate to the requirements of modern anti-submarine warfare."354 A detailed Chinese analysis of Russian rocket mines concludes, "These weapons will attack SSNs too rapidly for countermeasures to engage, and are also rated to be highly effective against the mono-hull construction of U.S. submarines."355 Chinese strategists note that "submarines are acutely vulnerable to mines, because passive sonar is not likely to be effective in locating mines, and because submarines have very limited organic MCM capabilities."356 Moreover, the surprise nature of the mining threat is likely to reduce the efficacy of the submarine's countermeasures.357 ASW is repeatedly emphasized as a mission in a Chinese textbook on mine warfare published in 2007358 and already practiced in Red-versus-Blue confrontational exercises.359 Campaign Theory Study Guide calls explicitly for the formation of "anti-submarine mine zones."360 In so doing, China could draw on advanced Russian mines, such as the PMK-2, specifically designed to target U.S. submarines, as well as indigenous variants. Sea mines, therefore, potentially give the PLAN affordable "poor man's" ASW capabilities that it could not otherwise obtain, providing a stopgap measure until Beijing can put a more robust ASW posture into place. U.S. submarines are highly survivable, but adversary war planners may consider a "mission-kill" damaged submarine equivalent to a destroyed one.361

11. "水雷管理的信息化" (Mine Management "Informatization"). The integration of information technology has become a major goal of contemporary Chinese military reforms, and this goal also applies to mine warfare.362 The implications for logistics management practices, a priority for the PLA since the Korean War, are particularly salient. Chinese naval analysts emphasize the importance of transporting large quantities chinese mine warfare 45 of different types of mines efficiently.363 Additional reports suggest that the PLAN takes MIW logistics seriously—for example, revamping depot leadership,364 improving information flow365 and logistics management,366 regularly culling obsolete weapons from the sea-mine inventory,367 and training officers and enlisted in technical checks and deployment preparation.368 Recognizing the vital role of logistics in MIW, in March 1994 the Navy Logistics Department's "Navy Rear Services Depot Vocational Administration Regulations" stipulated high-level training for cadres and soldiers specializing in seamine technology in all aspects of their work, including monitoring inventories, repairing, and discarding obsolete weapons.369 The PLAN Ordnance Support Department has issued and implemented further regulations such that "the time to rotate from one mine war-readiness level to another has been reduced."370 As of 2008, for one South Sea Fleet sea mine depot to know exactly the inventory in the depot is no longer enough for the electronic "housekeepers," they should also be good at designing well-conceived and detailed support plans under various complicated conditions. In fact, the support plans automatically produced by the system are so precise that they can not only show the specific model of any piece of ordnance, but can also tell the environment, weather, current and tide of the waters where support is needed.346 A Qingdao Logistics base reportedly has drawn on "good working relationships with about 20 schools inside and outside of the military, about 30 research organizations inside and outside of the military, and about 40 equipment production factories" to make great progress in solving practical problems associated with developing and maintaining equipment appropriate to support realistic training under informatized conditions. A resulting "'Automatic Mine Checking System' and 'Navy Ship Equipment Automatic Maintenance and Repair System' . . . earned military-wide first- and second-class awards for rear services equipment technological advances."372 The PLAN has also developed a "simulation training system for mine clearance craft."373 A plethora of articles in the Chinese journal Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense demonstrate the strong Chinese conviction that mine warfare cannot be effective without weapons that work reliably.374

12.布扫雷互相支持 (MIW/MCM Mutual Support). Chinese naval strategists are cognizant of China's traditional weakness in MCM and of resulting vulnerabilities. It is observed that "it will be extremely easy for an enemy to sow large numbers of mines among the many islands and numerous harbors . . . along China's southeast coast."375 Chinese MCM will not reach the technological level of Western MCM in the near future. Although new platforms and technologies are now entering China's inventory of MCM capabilities, the basic approach is likely to remain different from that of the West.376 Nevertheless, the exercise activity noted in the preceding section does suggest a reinvigorated commitment to MCM, as do the several new-type minesweepers that have entered the PLA Navy in the last few years (see above). Moreover, a major research effort in MCM seems to be under way.377 This research includes advanced methods, such as employment of helicopters for MCM,378 and UUVs.379 Science of Campaigns observes that Chinese naval bases are likely to be targets of adversary mine warfare.380 There also seems to be a fundamental conviction that a synergistic relationship exists between MCM and MIW—that China's mine countermeasures will fundamentally support robust mine warfare. One People's Navy article endorsed this and related capabilities as vital "sharp double-edged swords."381 Indeed, to support minesweeping and minelaying exercises during March–September 2005, the PLAN "organized systematic training, observation, and exchanges with regard to the entire processes of ships' operations of sweeping and hunting for mines."382 Reflecting their importance in Chinese mine warfare, civilian vessels are also participating in MCM exercises.383

13.卫星航海 (Satellite Navigation). Knowing the precise location of mines is vital for creating and maintaining safe passages through or around minefields and for future clearing or reseeding efforts. A significant problem in past MIW campaigns has been that of friendly-fire casualties. Communications and navigation errors in wartime have frequently led MIW practitioners to destroy their own ships.384 It is worth considering chinese mine warfare 47 how the advent of GPS technologies could enhance the future effectiveness of MIW if this technology enables much more accurate laying of fields (or MIW operations by less experienced cadres), as well as the transmission of information on the parameters of those fields to friendly units.385 Mentions of GPS-related training activities in PLAN reports, including MIW and MCM exercises at night and in bad weather, may indicate that this new technology could become a significant MIW enabler.386 This may also be suggested by a minesweeper unit's development of a "recording instrument" that "raises the accuracy and battle operations capacity of sea mine sweeping and laying."387

I found it a very informative piece. Among all the speculation of what China might do, its probably good to look a bit at what China has said its going to do, at least around 2009.

Edit: and also a document going over a marintime blockade of China, sepecifically on oil, and why its likely not the silver bullet it might seem.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1735&context=nwc-review

Basic points

1) China itself is a major oil producer of the world: its not like Taiwan where if imports are cut off, production basically goes to zero. China produces roughly 3.6 million barrels of oil a day (at time of study), and production is likely a bit lower than could be supported because Chinese oil is relatively expensive compared to importing it from the middle east. This is extra plausible looking at Chinese oil production which peaked 2015 at 4.3 million barrels a day, then slumped down before rising again starting in 2018. China has roughly 20,000 million barrels of proven reserves, so there's definately room to expand domestic production in an emmergancy.

2) Domestic production is enough to meet more or less any reasonably concieved military need. So the military is not plausiblity at risk of oil shortages, unlike the Japanese and Germans. The blockade then is based on causing pain to the civilian economy, not negatively impacting the military in any particularly direct way.

3) China has extensive fuel reserves: drawing on an assumedly full strategic oil reserves assuming no adjustment and just domestic and overland oil, China can last 3 months with no consumption reduction. With relatively minor rationing and surging overland production, Chinese oil reserves can last for 12 months. During which of course many other options can be gotten. Harsh rationing and surging easy overland options would give China 4 years. Which is a lot of time to expand oil production domestically and open up other foreign options.

 

[Zachowon]

I mean, the sailors there were in a boat, nit a ship and would have most likely been all killed had they not surrendered.
They did something smart.

Where as when Iranians threaten ships we laugh

 

[LordsFire]

7) This is a, take. Have virtually no objective basis in reality as far as I can see, but it is a take. What does this mean for all the people who lost to Communist armies, like the US? Is the US below mediocre then? Is this "they kept losing the war, and then for no reason at all won" arguments? Lenin's red army was just awful, until for totally unconnected reasons, it won? Mao's red army was totally awful, until for totally unrelated reasons, it won? Ho Chi Minh's Red Army was totally awful and lost for 10 years, before for totally unrelated reasons, won?

This whole post reveals a massive swath of historical ignorance, but I'm going to focus on just this one element, to really drive the point home.

1. The US has never militarily lost to a communist nation. We have, in fact, utterly crushed them militarily every time we fought them on the field of battle. Political subversion has always been the problem. It's not 'for no reason at all they won,' it's 'Democrats with treasonous sympathies to foreign authoritarians pulled us out of the war and left our allies to hang.'

2. Yes, Lenin's Red Army was just awful, and it won because the Russian Civil War was a massively multi-sided affair where tons of other forces primarily fought each other, and the Bolsheviks were an afterthought to them until far too late. Stalin's Red Army was getting its ass kicked by the Wehrmacht, and enormous amounts of logistical support, including trucks, trains, boots, and other things were absolutely critical to enabling the USSR to fight Germany effectively. On top of that, if Germany hadn't been fighting a war against Britain, the USA, and the free remnants of other nations at the same time, yeah, the USSR would have been broken.

3. Mao's Red Army was totally awful, and for totally unrelated reasons it won. Specifically:
A: The Japanese invaded, and the Red Chinese basically didn't fight them at all outside of minor token efforts, while the Nationalists fought the IJA for more than a decade. This cost them an immense amount of blood, treasure, and war exhaustion, and Mao's red bastards swept in once the US had forced the IJA to defeat.
B: After WWII ended, the Soviets pushed a lot of support behind Mao, while communist traitors in the US State Department successfully pushed for the US to stop supporting the Nationalists, in spite of us having been direct war-time allies against the Japanese.

4. For as long as the US was in Vietnam, we crushed the North Vietnamese in basically every battle we fought against them, while bloody traitors in the US media acted like we were not only losing, but there was no reason for us to be fighting them in the first place. Due to political meddling, especially refusal to bomb or assault Hanoi over fear of hitting Soviet liason officers and escalating the war, victory was functionally impossible, but we still inflicted hilariously disproportionate losses on the commies.

Eventually, the war was fought to a standstill, and in 1973 the North Vietnamese signed a cease-fire deal in large part in exchange for the US withdrawing its forces.

Of course, the bloody communists never actually stopped fighting, and the US pulling out was basically the only part of the agreement anyone fulfilled. The US withdrew, the Communists kept attacking, and the USSR and China kept supporting the North Vietnamese, while bloody Democrat Traitors in the senate blocked the US from resuming support for the South Vietnamese.

In spite of this, it still took two more years for the North Vietnamese to grind the South Vietnamese down to defeat.

So yes, when one of the two world superpowers is backing your half of a nation, and one of the most populous nations in the world is backing it too, while the other half of the nation is suddenly bereft of allies and support in fighting against you, you can win a war even if you have a sucky army.

Notably, even among communist militaries, the PLA performed more poorly than the Vietnamese did, which is part of why I expect it to continue performing poorly if they get into an open conflict with the US military.


In every war they've ever fought, Communist militaries have suffered disproportionate losses, under-performed compared to how they were expected, and generally given shitty results. If you compare Soviet performance in Afghanistan, to US performance in Afghanistan, you get similar results; while both nations ultimately withdrew from 'the graveyard of empires,' the US did so having suffered a fraction of the casualties, in spite of having been present in the nation for twice as long.

 

[Zachowon]

What 3k total in both Iraq and A Stan for the US.

Look at how Communist armies did in Korea.
Literal waves of soldiers after the initial surprise attack.
The Norskies got pushed back, then once MacArthur wen into China did the Chinese get invovled.
And remember, this was the PLA that beat the nationalists.
They used literal wave tactics and were facing such horrible conditions compared to thr US and UN forces.

 

[JagerIV]

This whole post reveals a massive swath of historical ignorance, but I'm going to focus on just this one element, to really drive the point home.

1. The US has never militarily lost to a communist nation. We have, in fact, utterly crushed them militarily every time we fought them on the field of battle. Political subversion has always been the problem. It's not 'for no reason at all they won,' it's 'Democrats with treasonous sympathies to foreign authoritarians pulled us out of the war and left our allies to hang.'

2. Yes, Lenin's Red Army was just awful, and it won because the Russian Civil War was a massively multi-sided affair where tons of other forces primarily fought each other, and the Bolsheviks were an afterthought to them until far too late. Stalin's Red Army was getting its ass kicked by the Wehrmacht, and enormous amounts of logistical support, including trucks, trains, boots, and other things were absolutely critical to enabling the USSR to fight Germany effectively. On top of that, if Germany hadn't been fighting a war against Britain, the USA, and the free remnants of other nations at the same time, yeah, the USSR would have been broken.

3. Mao's Red Army was totally awful, and for totally unrelated reasons it won. Specifically:
A: The Japanese invaded, and the Red Chinese basically didn't fight them at all outside of minor token efforts, while the Nationalists fought the IJA for more than a decade. This cost them an immense amount of blood, treasure, and war exhaustion, and Mao's red bastards swept in once the US had forced the IJA to defeat.
B: After WWII ended, the Soviets pushed a lot of support behind Mao, while communist traitors in the US State Department successfully pushed for the US to stop supporting the Nationalists, in spite of us having been direct war-time allies against the Japanese.

4. For as long as the US was in Vietnam, we crushed the North Vietnamese in basically every battle we fought against them, while bloody traitors in the US media acted like we were not only losing, but there was no reason for us to be fighting them in the first place. Due to political meddling, especially refusal to bomb or assault Hanoi over fear of hitting Soviet liason officers and escalating the war, victory was functionally impossible, but we still inflicted hilariously disproportionate losses on the commies.

Eventually, the war was fought to a standstill, and in 1973 the North Vietnamese signed a cease-fire deal in large part in exchange for the US withdrawing its forces.

Of course, the bloody communists never actually stopped fighting, and the US pulling out was basically the only part of the agreement anyone fulfilled. The US withdrew, the Communists kept attacking, and the USSR and China kept supporting the North Vietnamese, while bloody Democrat Traitors in the senate blocked the US from resuming support for the South Vietnamese.

In spite of this, it still took two more years for the North Vietnamese to grind the South Vietnamese down to defeat.

So yes, when one of the two world superpowers is backing your half of a nation, and one of the most populous nations in the world is backing it too, while the other half of the nation is suddenly bereft of allies and support in fighting against you, you can win a war even if you have a sucky army.

Notably, even among communist militaries, the PLA performed more poorly than the Vietnamese did, which is part of why I expect it to continue performing poorly if they get into an open conflict with the US military.


In every war they've ever fought, Communist militaries have suffered disproportionate losses, under-performed compared to how they were expected, and generally given shitty results. If you compare Soviet performance in Afghanistan, to US performance in Afghanistan, you get similar results; while both nations ultimately withdrew from 'the graveyard of empires,' the US did so having suffered a fraction of the casualties, in spite of having been present in the nation for twice as long.

Hm, I can't really think of a nicer way to say, this but this really sounds like the cope of everyone who's ever lost: we didn't really lose because the enemy didn't fight the war we wanted to fight, and instead fought the War the way they were going to win it.

I'm sure southerners coped that their soldiers were better, their generals better, and the Union only won because of numbers and dishonorable things like burning fields, starvation blockades. And despite all their disadvantages they still put up a hell of a fight. And if only the politics had played out a bit differently. Some, maybe even all of that could be true.

The Union still won. Union played to its strengths of immense material and manpower reserves, better access to foreign markets, and played the political game better than the Confederates did. Including undermining military objectives in order to better win that political game. For example a lot of blockade runners made it through, and when caught got slaps on the wrist, because many of the blockade runners were crewed by British sailors and funded by British interests, and it was more valuable to not bring Britain into the war than for the Confederates to receive 100,000s of munitions. Union fought the war in a way that it would win, not in the way that the Confederates would win.

Confederates might have been correct that they're men made better soldiers, and their Commanders better generals. However, those strengths weren't enough of a Strength to overcome the Unions strengths when properly applied, and were not as big as southerners probably hoped.

If the war came down to attrition and numbers, the Union had a population advantage of a bit over 2-1. With slaves and the Unions supply of new immigrants taken into account, the real ratio is something closer to 4-6 to 1 in manpower advantage. The Union was able to recruit roughly half a million foreign born into its service for example. Doesn't matter that much how good a soldier a southern boy is compared to a mercenary Irishman fresh off the boat if the Union can throw 3 of them at every southern boy.

However good the southerners were, they weren't 3-1 good. If you look at a list of battles, sorted by biggest, most of the time the Southerners trade roughly 1-1. A really good big battle like Fredericksburg was closer to 2-1. Getting to 1-1 casualty rates was probably very good performance from the Southerners, given the men and material shortfalls they were operating under. But a good try doesn't really count for much.

All wars are settled politically, so the fact that politics are at play is more or less mute. And ignores the roll the military plays in shaping those political outcomes. Would you argue the US Revolutionary army was terrible because they won for "totally different reasons" of the French getting involved?

Or would you credit the American Revolutionaries for putting together an army which succeeded well enough in not dying and inflicting enough of a bloody nose on the British for the French to get interested in becoming involved?

If you applied this standard you seem to be using consistently, it would seem like you would have to declare both the Union and Revolutionary army's to both be shit. I don't think you would, so this analysis is flawed.

Would you like to look at one of your examples in more details and what concrete things can you actually point to be worse than Iraqis as some general communist flaw? Obviously I'm most familiar with Vietnam, secondly with USSR in WWII.

 

[LordsFire]

Hm, I can't really think of a nicer way to say, this but this really sounds like the cope of everyone who's ever lost: we didn't really lose because the enemy didn't fight the war we wanted to fight, and instead fought the War the way they were going to win it.

Okay, seriously, are you not reading my posts?

I have said repeatedly throughout them that the one thing that could ruin the US military fighting against China, was incompetent political meddling. I'm not some fantasizer that is unaware that this can be a real problem, I know just how much of a problem it can be, and that it is literally the worst possible thing that could happen on the US side.

 

[Zachowon]

The politicians set how we fight, the soldiers just win the battles