History Learner
Well-known member
A thought: part of the Soviet success in August Storm was derived from the Russians achieving a certain level of surprise. IGHQ and the like expected they (the Soviets) would be unready to commence an offensive until early 1946 or late 1945; some, particularly in the Kwantung Army itself, were expecting even earlier, perhaps September. August, however, was unexpected simply because the Japanese were well aware of the Soviet logistical lackings in the Far East and the level of supply needed caused them to doubt such an early offensive. How Moscow got away with it-as they did most things in WWII concerning material-was rely on Lend Lease. The protocols agreed to in the earlier part of the year led to things like Operation HULA and MILEPOST, which allowed for the earlier Soviet attack.
While Stalin will still, undoubtedly, want to attack the Japanese the need to rebuild his forces-presuming the Lend Lease extensions still happen-would alone be sufficient to delay the timeframe for his offensive. In such a case, the Japanese will be ready with prepared fortifications and be expecting the attack; IF IGHQ decides to use the lull to their full advantage and launch a preemptive strike, Soviet sources are pretty firm this would be a disaster for themselves given the supply and force transfer limitations of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Regardless, either way sees much, much less Soviet success.
While Stalin will still, undoubtedly, want to attack the Japanese the need to rebuild his forces-presuming the Lend Lease extensions still happen-would alone be sufficient to delay the timeframe for his offensive. In such a case, the Japanese will be ready with prepared fortifications and be expecting the attack; IF IGHQ decides to use the lull to their full advantage and launch a preemptive strike, Soviet sources are pretty firm this would be a disaster for themselves given the supply and force transfer limitations of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Regardless, either way sees much, much less Soviet success.