Depends on whether on not Franz Ferdinand is still assassinated in Sarajevo in June 1914. If he is, I could see Teddy pushing to get the US into the war after the Lusitania or whatever its equivalent in this TL is is sunk by the Germans. This would mean many more US casualties in WWI, but might also mean that one or both Russian Revolutions in 1917 would be prevented, which would be extremely great for the entire world, including for the US. I could also see Teddy successfully creating a peacetime defensive alliance between the US, Britain, and France after the end of World War I and successfully getting the US Senate to ratify it.
Alternate History Ideas and Discussion
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Depends on whether on not Franz Ferdinand is still assassinated in Sarajevo in June 1914. If he is, I could see Teddy pushing to get the US into the war after the Lusitania or whatever its equivalent in this TL is is sunk by the Germans. This would mean many more US casualties in WWI, but might also mean that one or both Russian Revolutions in 1917 would be prevented, which would be extremely great for the entire world, including for the US. I could also see Teddy successfully creating a peacetime defensive alliance between the US, Britain, and France after the end of World War I and successfully getting the US Senate to ratify it.
Circle of Willis
Well-known member
Yes - TR jumping into WW1 early is the most obvious change attached to a POD involving his continued presidency IMO, given that he was gung-ho for war over the Lusitania's sinking IRL and already had a pretty interventionist foreign policy record as president. It'd be interesting to see what kind of peace he might work to arrange as well, since although his popular image is that of an all-American and all-conquering super-badass, the man actually carefully negotiated his fair share of peace treaties & conferences while in the White House (the ones that ended the Russo-Japanese War, resolved the 1905 Moroccan crisis and fixed Alaska's border in American favor being the most famous).
I imagine TR would have way fewer hang-ups about supporting Victoriano Huerta (towards whom he had a much more pragmatic attitude than Woodrow Wilson, and seems to have thought the latter should've recognized as President of Mexico right off the bat) south of the border as well, so that's probably that for the Mexican Revolution. A quieter, much more conservative Mexico that doesn't raid Texan border towns or plot to start a race war in the American Southwest would obviously be a more ideal regional partner to the US than the unstable hellhole that was RL Mexico for most of the 1910s and '20s, as well.
TIL about this:
Thanks for that.
Anyway, reasonable analysis for everything here, frankly. FWIW, I would expect TR to get defeated for reelection in 1920 due to WWI fatigue; that said, though, in regards to the post-WWI peace settlement itself, I would expect TR to have a much more "realist" peace settlement. His response to Wilson's 14 Points gives some suggestions of what I'm thinking of here:
October 30, 1918: Theodore Roosevelt Responds to the Fourteen Points
As the War was nearing its close, Theodore Roosevelt responded in the Kansas City Star with a blistering assessment of the Fourteen Points that President Wilson was seeking to make t…
the-american-catholic.com
I would also expect TR to live longer without his 1913 jungle trip in South America, which will very likely be avoided here since he'll still be US President during this time.
I also wonder if TR might actually try launching a large-scale US military intervention to purge Russia of Bolshevism if necessary, though again, I do suspect that the earlier US entry into WWI will make this unnecessary.
TR I think would be delighted in having a chance to purchase the Danish West Indies again during World War I, specifically in 1916-1917. He tried back in 1902 but the attempted failed by one vote (specifically by a tie vote) in the upper house of the Danish parliament after overwhelmingly passing the lower house of the Danish parliament. In 1916, the Danes approved this sale through a national referendum.
I suspect that WWI will make TR much more in favor of immigration restrictionism in order to combat the risk of hyphenated Americanism.
To understand why the Danish West Indies were important, their location was on a strategic route near the Panama Canal, they were great as a naval basing station, and they were right next door to Puerto Rico:
@Circle of Willis Off-topic, but does the US still experience a huge baby boom in the 1945-1965 time period without either World War II itself or the 1940 Fall of France (both of which mean no US participation in another global war, unless of course Japan still attacks Pearl Harbor, which I suspect is probably unlikely in this TL)?
@Circle of Willis Off-topic, but does the US still experience a huge baby boom in the 1945-1965 time period without either World War II itself or the 1940 Fall of France (both of which mean no US participation in another global war, unless of course Japan still attacks Pearl Harbor, which I suspect is probably unlikely in this TL)?
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Zyobot
Just a time-traveling robot stranded on Earth.
Circling back to Skallagrim’s last post about Germany as Victorious Macedon and America as New Carthage:
Hmm...
An interesting premise, for sure. I don’t suppose you could get a Cold War scenario between the US and Germany here? Because funnily enough, I actually put forward a TL idea based on a similar premise (described here), sans the macro-historical comparisons and with more mind to the fate of Asia. China still exists, after all, and with Russia presumably beaten back and decisively neutralized by the Germans, I imagine the Russians’ ability to conquer its neighbors would be greatly reduced, at the very least.
Anyway, even if they don’t come to blows, I still wonder how the two blocs would stack up against one another? On the one hand, Germany is an established military power with hegemony over continental Europe, having drawn in the Ottomans and strong-armed its neighbors into joining Mittëleuropa. (I suppose Austria-Hungary wouldn’t need much badgering there, though.) Further, they’d have substantial territorial gains in the east via knocking out Russia, the occupation effort for which will no doubt incentivize them to maintain their already-large army and retain conscription. However, I doubt the Germany Navy would amount to much, especially since a decisive victory in the Great War probably means Wilhelm played more to Germany’s strengths (overland ground forces) than its shortcomings (a rushed naval buildup), though even then, sailors and soldiers alike are more battle-hardened than their American counterparts. There’s also the fact that the German scientists who encouraged the development of breakthroughs like advanced rocketry—and, more importantly, the atomic bomb—wouldn’t be persecuted or discouraged via Deutschephysiks or other Nazi claptrap that cost them certain technological footholds IOTL, a more traditionally “vanilla” flavor of anti-Semitism directed towards Einstein and his Jewish colleagues notwithstanding. On the whole, quite a few advantages to start with, though I still think America’s odds of outlasting (or even overpowering!) Germany are much greater than Carthage’s odds of doing the same to Macedon (or Rome, for that matter).
For one, even as a mercantile power that mostly keeps to itself, the US is still an economic juggernaut and a Great Power in its own right, with tons of potential that’s yet to be realized. In fact, I’d actually say it’s more accurate to characterize America as the product of angry sex between Rome and Carthage, so even though its Punic half is “dominant” here, I don’t think it’s too late for its Roman half to awaken later. Maybe it’s my Yankee bias showing, but considering how massively the US out-industry’d the Axis IOTL, I wouldn’t rule out a similarly expansive (peacetime) military buildup here that closes the gap with Germany rather quickly, if push ever comes to shove. In which case, perhaps they could consult British and French military advisors still peeved about losing, seeing as veterans who have experience fighting the Germans and losing would still have valuable input to offer. Another advantage US has (which further illustrates its parallels with Carthage) is how it’s better positioned to build a massive blue-water navy, thanks to all that coastline and being surrounded by two oceans, whereas Germany’s geography—combined with strategic pressures from the last war—forces it to largely neglect its navy in favor of its army (which America, as again evinced by OTL, is also capable of rivaling). Lastly, even if the Germans get the bomb first, it’s not like that alone will stop the US from catching up. If Stalinist Russia obtained the bomb just a few years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then I don’t see why the (much more economically efficient) US couldn’t do the same with Germany.
Ultimately, things could go in various directions based on how the details play out. But overall, I suspect America has a much better shot at outcompeting Germany—and consequently, many more chances to become the Empire of the West—than Carthage ever had of overshadowing Macedon (or Rome) as hegemon of the Classical World.
Hmm...
An interesting premise, for sure. I don’t suppose you could get a Cold War scenario between the US and Germany here? Because funnily enough, I actually put forward a TL idea based on a similar premise (described here), sans the macro-historical comparisons and with more mind to the fate of Asia. China still exists, after all, and with Russia presumably beaten back and decisively neutralized by the Germans, I imagine the Russians’ ability to conquer its neighbors would be greatly reduced, at the very least.
Anyway, even if they don’t come to blows, I still wonder how the two blocs would stack up against one another? On the one hand, Germany is an established military power with hegemony over continental Europe, having drawn in the Ottomans and strong-armed its neighbors into joining Mittëleuropa. (I suppose Austria-Hungary wouldn’t need much badgering there, though.) Further, they’d have substantial territorial gains in the east via knocking out Russia, the occupation effort for which will no doubt incentivize them to maintain their already-large army and retain conscription. However, I doubt the Germany Navy would amount to much, especially since a decisive victory in the Great War probably means Wilhelm played more to Germany’s strengths (overland ground forces) than its shortcomings (a rushed naval buildup), though even then, sailors and soldiers alike are more battle-hardened than their American counterparts. There’s also the fact that the German scientists who encouraged the development of breakthroughs like advanced rocketry—and, more importantly, the atomic bomb—wouldn’t be persecuted or discouraged via Deutschephysiks or other Nazi claptrap that cost them certain technological footholds IOTL, a more traditionally “vanilla” flavor of anti-Semitism directed towards Einstein and his Jewish colleagues notwithstanding. On the whole, quite a few advantages to start with, though I still think America’s odds of outlasting (or even overpowering!) Germany are much greater than Carthage’s odds of doing the same to Macedon (or Rome, for that matter).
For one, even as a mercantile power that mostly keeps to itself, the US is still an economic juggernaut and a Great Power in its own right, with tons of potential that’s yet to be realized. In fact, I’d actually say it’s more accurate to characterize America as the product of angry sex between Rome and Carthage, so even though its Punic half is “dominant” here, I don’t think it’s too late for its Roman half to awaken later. Maybe it’s my Yankee bias showing, but considering how massively the US out-industry’d the Axis IOTL, I wouldn’t rule out a similarly expansive (peacetime) military buildup here that closes the gap with Germany rather quickly, if push ever comes to shove. In which case, perhaps they could consult British and French military advisors still peeved about losing, seeing as veterans who have experience fighting the Germans and losing would still have valuable input to offer. Another advantage US has (which further illustrates its parallels with Carthage) is how it’s better positioned to build a massive blue-water navy, thanks to all that coastline and being surrounded by two oceans, whereas Germany’s geography—combined with strategic pressures from the last war—forces it to largely neglect its navy in favor of its army (which America, as again evinced by OTL, is also capable of rivaling). Lastly, even if the Germans get the bomb first, it’s not like that alone will stop the US from catching up. If Stalinist Russia obtained the bomb just a few years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then I don’t see why the (much more economically efficient) US couldn’t do the same with Germany.
Ultimately, things could go in various directions based on how the details play out. But overall, I suspect America has a much better shot at outcompeting Germany—and consequently, many more chances to become the Empire of the West—than Carthage ever had of overshadowing Macedon (or Rome) as hegemon of the Classical World.
Circling back to Skallagrim’s last post about Germany as Victorious Macedon and America as New Carthage:
Hmm...
An interesting premise, for sure. I don’t suppose you could get a Cold War scenario between the US and Germany here? Because funnily enough, I actually put forward a TL idea based on a similar premise (described here), sans the macro-historical comparisons and with more mind to the fate of Asia. China still exists, after all, and with Russia presumably beaten back and decisively neutralized by the Germans, I imagine the Russians’ ability to conquer its neighbors would be greatly reduced, at the very least.
Anyway, even if they don’t come to blows, I still wonder how the two blocs would stack up against one another? On the one hand, Germany is an established military power with hegemony over continental Europe, having drawn in the Ottomans and strong-armed its neighbors into joining Mittëleuropa. (I suppose Austria-Hungary wouldn’t need much badgering there, though.) Further, they’d have substantial territorial gains in the east via knocking out Russia, the occupation effort for which will no doubt incentivize them to maintain their already-large army and retain conscription. However, I doubt the Germany Navy would amount to much, especially since a decisive victory in the Great War probably means Wilhelm played more to Germany’s strengths (overland ground forces) than its shortcomings (a rushed naval buildup), though even then, sailors and soldiers alike are more battle-hardened than their American counterparts. There’s also the fact that the German scientists who encouraged the development of breakthroughs like advanced rocketry—and, more importantly, the atomic bomb—wouldn’t be persecuted or discouraged via Deutschephysiks or other Nazi claptrap that cost them certain technological footholds IOTL, a more traditionally “vanilla” flavor of anti-Semitism directed towards Einstein and his Jewish colleagues notwithstanding. On the whole, quite a few advantages to start with, though I still think America’s odds of outlasting (or even overpowering!) Germany are much greater than Carthage’s odds of doing the same to Macedon (or Rome, for that matter).
For one, even as a mercantile power that mostly keeps to itself, the US is still an economic juggernaut and a Great Power in its own right, with tons of potential that’s yet to be realized. In fact, I’d actually say it’s more accurate to characterize America as the product of angry sex between Rome and Carthage, so even though its Punic half is “dominant” here, I don’t think it’s too late for its Roman half to awaken later. Maybe it’s my Yankee bias showing, but considering how massively the US out-industry’d the Axis IOTL, I wouldn’t rule out a similarly expansive (peacetime) military buildup here that closes the gap with Germany rather quickly, if push ever comes to shove. In which case, perhaps they could consult British and French military advisors still peeved about losing, seeing as veterans who have experience fighting the Germans and losing would still have valuable input to offer. Another advantage US has (which further illustrates its parallels with Carthage) is how it’s better positioned to build a massive blue-water navy, thanks to all that coastline and being surrounded by two oceans, whereas Germany’s geography—combined with strategic pressures from the last war—forces it to largely neglect its navy in favor of its army (which America, as again evinced by OTL, is also capable of rivaling). Lastly, even if the Germans get the bomb first, it’s not like that alone will stop the US from catching up. If Stalinist Russia obtained the bomb just a few years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then I don’t see why the (much more economically efficient) US couldn’t do the same with Germany.
Ultimately, things could go in various directions based on how the details play out. But overall, I suspect America has a much better shot at outcompeting Germany—and consequently, many more chances to become the Empire of the West—than Carthage ever had of overshadowing Macedon (or Rome) as hegemon of the Classical World.
Somewhat relevant here: One thing that I find fascinating is that both the US and Germany were created as federations of much smaller countries which later on had the potential to become superpowers. The US was created from the original 13 Colonies, and in the late 18th century, less than a century before German unification, Germany was a conglomeration of hundreds of often tiny separate independent states:
Even the post-Napoleonic map of Germany was an improvement lol:
BTW, did you know that Imperial Germany made contingency plans for an invasion of the US?
Skallagrim
Well-known member
These points all tie into the suggested premise: "a world in which the USA decides upon small-government non-interventionism".
If you go with a scenario where Germany wins the Great War (less focus on the navy, more on the army, and then the Schlieffen Plan works, thus yielding victory in 1915?) and this then leads to increased US isolationism... well, that's a perfectly valid idea, and could easily result in your proposed sequence of events.
My own idea was a POD a bit further back, which changes the context. We should view the time of the Spanish-American as the USA's "hour of decision", when it embraced an imperialist streak. We've compared this to the Pyrrhic War, when the upstart power that was Rome defeated a more established Hellenic power and conquered beyond its traditional domains in Central Italy. It is not without reason that I place my POD for the "Rome eclipsed/Macedonian hegemony" scenario in the context of the Pyrrhic War. In the same fashion, I reach back to the time of the Spanish-American War in order to comprehensively avert American imperialist tendencies.
Imagine the following: Cleveland-esque small government figures stay in charge, there is no annexation of Hawaii, there are no overseas wars, the military stays tiny, the progressives never really get a foothold, there is no American effort to construct a Panama Canal... et cetera.
Is the resulting version of the USA, which remains much more "the old republic", also as capable (or as willing) to go toe-to-toe with some European Empire? Why? Zany war plans notwithstanding (all countries had them), it's not like Germany is going to invade North America. And without overseas possessions, it's not like the USA will be drawn into any war in the Pacific, either.
A small-government USA would certainly not be ready to invest huge sums of money into some insane weapons project.
This, too, despends on the scenario. One way to have Germany decisively win the war (and indeed, my preferred way) is to establish an Anglo-German alliance. If we go with that, then the British certainly won't be advising the USA on much of anything in this regard. And Britain would be the predominant naval power, so any US naval build-up would be a threat to Britain, thus creating animosity there...
(Not that I'd expect a meaningful US naval build-up if the progressives never come to power. Traditionally, the conservative Democrats were like "fuck the navy, it's an instrument of imperialism". That sentiment goes all the way back to Jefferson -- and played a role in the USA losing the War of 1812. Which Theodrore Roosevelt noted in his history of the naval war of 1812, and which he used to justify a naval build-up. Go figure.)
As I have argued, with an early enough POD, the ATL USA is not quite comparable to OTL's USA.
Now I'm imagining an ATL where Aeneas chooses to stay with Queen Dido and their progeny turns Carthage into more of a warrior-empire.
More seriously, I've argued before that Rome was not without its mercantile streak, nor Carthage without its bellicose impulses. The USA that we know in OTL is, I think, much like Rome in its general attitude towards the world, and in the dominant aspect of its nature. As I've argued, this is something that I think was solidified at the very tail-end of the 19th century, and first manifested on a larger scale in World War I, which in turn led to an even more expansive role in World War II, and so on and so forth. An alternative path for America leads to the USA that the Old Right would have desired. An America that believes in the Peace of Dives.
Zyobot
Just a time-traveling robot stranded on Earth.
'What Happens After ISOT American 2002 Ends?'.
Do you have a TL;DR version here?
Zyobot
Just a time-traveling robot stranded on Earth.
Sure thing.
On March 13th, 2002, the continental United States (read: no Alaska or Hawaii) is sent sixty years back in time to the same day in 1942. With a chance to get things right, an insurmountable technological lead, and President Bush as commander-in-chief, America commits to crushing the Axis and putting Soviet Russia in its place, as well as peacefully resolving the whole "imperialism debate" with their British and French allies. In any case, it'll be a wild ride, though given Dubya's personality and America's worrying ineptitude when it comes to nation-building, expect the butterflies to fly freely as the newly turbocharged US throws its weight around and makes new mistakes for every old one it's learned from.
Expect the US to establish a global sphere of influence in this TL. Communism will be crushed everywhere--in Eastern Europe, Russia, Central Asia, China, North Korea, Indochina, et cetera--but of course only after the Nazis are fully crushed. This would usher in a global era of prosperity and liberalism under the US aegis and might result in a push for a one-world government, though one that will obviously be rejected by Americans due to their nationalist nature. Still, regional integration could become a much bigger thing all over the world. For instance, in this TL, the EU could stretch from Vladivostok to Lisbon while the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere idea could be revived, simply under the US aegis.
What would Anglo-French World War II casualties have looked like in a TL where France did not fall in 1940? What about if Hitler and the Nazis would NOT have been subsequently overthrown by internal opponents of theirs in this TL, thus necessitating an Anglo-French (or Soviet, if they will still eventually enter the war) march onto Berlin?
TheRomanSlayer
Putang Ina Mo, Katolikong Hayop!
"PC: Marshal Tito gets killed during WWII"
Operation: Rosselsprung was one of the most likely missions that the Germans had that could have been successful in eliminating Tito from the equation, thus potentially crippling the Partisan movement by depriving it of its main figure. Could the Partisan movement collapse without a charismatic figure to lead it? Would it also lead to Yugoslavia never being revived, and in its place you'd have an independent, pro-Western Slovenia and Croatia, while Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia would become communist states (or Serbia and Montenegro reform Yugoslavia or an alternative counterpart while Macedonia would be hotly contested between Red Serbia-Montenegro and Soviet puppet Bulgarian government)?
Operation: Rosselsprung was one of the most likely missions that the Germans had that could have been successful in eliminating Tito from the equation, thus potentially crippling the Partisan movement by depriving it of its main figure. Could the Partisan movement collapse without a charismatic figure to lead it? Would it also lead to Yugoslavia never being revived, and in its place you'd have an independent, pro-Western Slovenia and Croatia, while Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia would become communist states (or Serbia and Montenegro reform Yugoslavia or an alternative counterpart while Macedonia would be hotly contested between Red Serbia-Montenegro and Soviet puppet Bulgarian government)?
Batrix2070
RON/PLC was a wonderful country.
The assumption should be reversed, if PLC had not been partitioned, grain prices would not have been as high as OTL because the Polish nobility sold it cheaper than when it was under partition and thanks to this the French Revolution would probably not have broken out because the most important factor causing chaos, i.e. famine, would have been much weaker and thus the turmoil would not have reached the level of revolution.
Instead, France would most likely have followed a similar political path to that of the Revolution anyway, but it would have been an evolution, gradual and not as deep as the OTL hence any subsequent shocks to the system would have been less severe.
In the case of only one partition, King Louis XVI has a further chance to hold on to power but the problem of famine will occur and the revolution will heat up. Besides, the revolution will most likely stop at the level of the Constitutional Monarchy. And what's more, thanks to this, the turmoil in Poland will probably be weaker which will protect it for longer.
Without a lot of violence, there will probably not be such revolutionary fervor for the creators of the May 3 Constitution and so it will be more conservative thus easier to swallow for the "patriots" which will save PLC from inviting Russia into Poland so easily which in effect will give it a chance to survive and the opportunity to reclaim the lost western and northern lands from the First Partition.
Rather not, such a personal union is between very different countries, namely the Ancien Regime Republic and the Ancien Regime Monarchy which are quite different. It is possible to place one of the Romanovs on the Polish throne, but nothing more. (with such a Romanov will be damn near unpopular without making himself a real Pole in earnest which will in effect reverse what Russia wants to achieve, better to look for another Poniatowski.)
OTL we had a similar idea of a personal union between Poland and Russia and it ultimately didn't work out.
Besides, such a union in such a configuration will make the PLC eventually dominate Russia by virtue of the fact that it is much richer than Russia despite being less numerous. OTL the Kingdom of Poland consisting only of Mazovia and Northern Lesser Poland accounted for 1/3 of the total wealth of the Russian Empire, here we have all of Greater Poland, Lithuania, a large part of Belarus, and Western Ukraine in addition.
Industrialization came to Poland OTL faster than to Russia, here Poland is much larger and has more room for development and it will be much harder for Russia to impose anything on Poland.
A possible November Uprising will certainly throw off Russian dependence.
And this creates quite a field for Poland to take back the lost lands, and the desire to unify Germany, OTL Prussia proved very weak, if there is no Napoleon, their weakness will be longer undetected by it will be easier to beat them.
Austria, on the other hand, will all the time have a problem with reunification as long as it holds the rest of Lesser Poland and Red Ruthenia, on the other hand, it was too much for them, most likely in time they will give these lands in exchange for something.
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Batrix2070
RON/PLC was a wonderful country.
Well who was talking about peasants here? It was the townspeople who were starving as usual so for the power-hungry non-nobles there were "volunteers" to help, but later the whole situation got out of hand and the ride started when food prices jumped even more.
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@Skallagrim Just how difficult was it for former Austro-Hungarian subjects to move across the newly created national borders after the end of World War I? I mean for, say, a Vojvodina Serb to move to Czechoslovakia or for a Transylvania Romanian to move to rump Austria?
Would Louis XVI and his successors have approved?
So, Russia will help the PLC recover the lands that it lost to Prussia and Austria?
So, Poland will help sympathetic German nationalists unify Germany? Just so long as they are not Prussian?
Would Louis XVI and his successors have approved?
So, Russia will help the PLC recover the lands that it lost to Prussia and Austria?
So, Poland will help sympathetic German nationalists unify Germany? Just so long as they are not Prussian?
Batrix2070
RON/PLC was a wonderful country.
Louis XVI just happened to believe in something like the social contract and other ideas of the era. Which ironically ultimately killed him, had he been a motherfucker like his grandfather and stayed out of it he might have survived and even avoided the revolution.
No less, he probably would have been guided by the ideals of the era to give some form of constitution, some form of human rights and that sort of thing. Though certainly much more fastidious and less revolutionary. All of these ideas had been in the ether for some time, it was more a matter of time before they became reality.
Not a bit of it, Poland if it wants it will have to recover it on its own. Russia doesn't have much interest, because then Poland can turn back to the east again and focus on Russia.
The problem is that then she will have to unleash a war, and as I mentioned once, there was no pro-Russian party in the PLC at the end of its existence. Russia was invited because the Constitution hit the interests of certain groups hard. Less revolutionary will hit a smaller group, possible Targowica will be weaker hence the possibility that even the invitation will not happen, and even if it does happen there is a greater chance of quick help from other interested parties because Russia cannot count on tacit support in suppressing revolutionary inclinations as is possible. It is important to know that in Warsaw of this period also heated seriously, what was happening in Paris greatly influenced the Great Seym.
Not really, the possible concessions from Poland are rather to help suppress other threats, in addition to taking Prussia, the whole of Prussia Poland has no interest in weakening it too much, because a united Germany is not to her liking as well as France.
And nationalism can be a bit of a problem for the multinational PLC, although it should be remembered that without partition the Polish spirit would most likely eventually dominate all of its territory, forming the Poles into a Great Nation that includes Lithuanians, Ruthenians and Byelorussians in addition to Poles proper.
No less, it would have been better for the spirit of nationalism to be less significant and not set an example for the natives.
Buba
A total creep
Unasked for Clarification Note - up to more or less mid XIXth c. "Polish" had the meaning of "British". It meant member of a "political nation"/a supra ethnic identity.
Limited to nobles/landowners. Maybe some burghers.
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