United States The United States and Immigration Policy

Marduk said:

At least where my Polish ass resides, dunno if you Americans finally decided to have your own.

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bintananth said:

A rural American farmer might call that their back yard fence.

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Agent23 said:

Good fences and guns make good neighbors.

Also I don't think that some people raalize just how long the USA-Mexico border is, and that it is going through some inhospitable terrain.

In any case, in most countries in the EU you need to have a personal ID number and ID card to start a job, as opposed to the US and UK, which makes those two more attractive for migrants.

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bintananth said:

The US-Mexico border is about 1,950 miles long. London to Moscow by car is only about 1,800 miles.

LA to NYC by car is much longer and you're going through several mountain ranges, several forests, at least one desert, at least one swamp, an a plain where you're not going to see any trees for several hours. That's the quick "by car" route.

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Cherico said:

Most europeans don't quite grok just how big the US is. I've talked to tourists in cali who thought they could take a quick drive from LA to see the alamo. We then had to explain just how far away it was.

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Cherico said:

Most Europeans don't quite grok just how big the US is. I've talked to tourists in cali who thought they could take a quick drive from LA to see the alamo. We then had to explain just how far away it was.

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bintananth said:

The US-Mexico border is about 1,950 miles long. London to Moscow by car is only about 1,800 miles.

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Marduk said:

So for the scale of US construction industry and GDP, it's not much.
Poland is a much poorer country than USA, with just 37 million population, the 115 mile wall took only half a year to build. If USA could build at that rate, it still could be done within 2 election cycles. If done more proportionally to USA's much larger economy, one should be easy - if only the political will was there.
Israel has a far greater wall building challenge:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_West_Bank_barrier

Tiny 10 million country, 440 mile wall, almost quarter of what USA needs. It's about 2/3 done after about 2.5 decades, with lots of political delays included.
Long story short, walls are not rocket science, China has built an over 13,000 mile one before the age of trucks, mobile cranes, dozers and prefab concrete.

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Agent23 said:

China build its wall with multi-generational slave labor, and I don't think they ever had anything like the Anglo-Saxon property rights.

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Agent23 said:

As to Israel, well the construction is both a matter of greater urgency for them and they have lots of manpower for patrols, they draft their entire population.

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Agent23 said:

You are forgetting a few things here, like U.S. nimbyism, States Rights, inhospitable terrain and differences in per unit labor costs.

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Agent23 said:

The libtards over there will fight tooth and nail to block it because "muh discrimination" and blockage to their voter influx.

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Agent23 said:

Also, since much of that territory is uninhabited and inhospitable there would be a need for sensors and patrols to check integrity, somebody might cut a hole in it, or dig under it, or or use some specialized equipment to climb over it.

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Marduk said:

They had slave labor, but modern USA has modern construction machinery and technologies, which, by all very visible evidence, can get more shit done faster.

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Marduk said:

Again, matter of politics, and its not like Israel is North Korea, not that many soldiers actually patrol along the wall.

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Marduk said:

Other than California all the southern border states tend to favor tightening up the border.
Washington bureaucrats very much not favoring it are the real problem.

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Marduk said:

Well if its uninhabited and inhospitable that only makes nimbyism less of an issue, and migrants crossing with all sorts of supporting equipment while doing so slower and more costly. These things often work both ways.

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The Whispering Monk said:

@Agent23
Don't expect those border blue areas to stay blue during the next few cycles. A lot of work down there is happening to show the border regions that the Ds don't give a crap about them and their efforts or lives...mostly by the Ds themselves.

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Agent23 said:

Yeah, well the problem is that even if you vote out the local politicians a lot of the local nomencaltura, like bureaucrats and judges and the like might remain captured.

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The Whispering Monk said:

It's a process. That won't change in a single election cycle, and the Lefties can't help but be themselves. As they lose elections they'll get more desperate to get their agenda done (see DC) and reveal themselves even more fully. Which will piss off the locals even more.

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Agent23 said:

Compare the per unit labor costs in the two first, then add a minimum 200% extra charge for government corruption and porkbarrel spending.

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Agent23 said:

Got hard numbers on that?

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Agent23 said:

You are forgetting that there is a hell of a lot more political subdivisions than state and federal in the USA.

Those blue areas will bitch and moan like there is no tomorrow, for example, and sue the state and federal governments which means years and possibly millions in litigation.

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Agent23 said:

Not really, some libertarian ranchers might take a dim view to people from the gubrmint building stuff on their land or going through it to build stuff.

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Border Insecurity: Arizona Ranchers Frustrated Over Smugglers, Crime

With Washington unable to agree on comprehensive immigration reform and a heightened border-security plan, safety threats plague rural Arizona.

www.nbcnews.com

The Whispering Monk said:

@Agent23
Don't expect those border blue areas to stay blue during the next few cycles. A lot of work down there is happening to show the border regions that the Ds don't give a crap about them and their efforts or lives...mostly by the Ds themselves.

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Marduk said:

That's why people invented construction machinery... You know, to use less labor to get more shit done.

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Marduk said:

Well, do you?

Pretty sure these are classified. According to this staffing is supposed to be tech heavy and based on mobile reaction forces.

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Marduk said:

They will moan, but in the end it's states' rights, not county rights.

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Marduk said:

More like NGO and activist ops, ranchers focused on other ranching aren't big fans of coyotes walking all over their land with illegals and drug mules in tow, they aren't nice and harmless people.

Border Insecurity: Arizona Ranchers Frustrated Over Smugglers, Crime

With Washington unable to agree on comprehensive immigration reform and a heightened border-security plan, safety threats plague rural Arizona.

www.nbcnews.com

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Agent23 said:

The size of government does not correlate to the complexity of tech in an inverse way.
If anything it corelates directly, since gubrmint has been growing bigger and bigger.
Go read my post, lol.

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Agent23 said:

No dice, dude, you were the one claiming that not that many people were required to patrol and maintain Israel's border wall.
I asked you to provide concrete statistics about the troop numbers and cost, you did not provide that.You do not get to turn it around by asking me to provide statistics.

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Agent23 said:

As to Israel, well the construction is both a matter of greater urgency for them and they have lots of manpower for patrols, they draft their entire population.

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Agent23 said:

I asked you to provide concrete statistics about the troop numbers and cost,

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Agent23 said:

What they can do is sue the government and obstruct the process in courts.

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Agent23 said:

Or, you know, some ranchers might be paid off to ignore some visitors, or to sue the government to get off their land, maybe by snakeheads, maybe by the NGOs.

Hell, some of the ranchers might be using some of that illegal labor on their own land.

Oh, and are we forgetting who is the bigggest farmland owner in the USA and a massive virtue signalling grifter, and he isn't even the biggest private land owner.
CNN founder Ted Turner is ranked number three with 2 million acres of ranch land, and Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos is ranked number 25 with 420,000 acres -— much of which is located in west Texas.

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Marduk said:

Government workers don't do construction labor in USA lol.

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Sometime late in 1936—after Brown & Root had begun construction—the Bureau learned about this second problem. Alvin Wirtz (who assured Herman and George that he hadn’t known about it) told the two brothers that some low-level attorney in the office of the Comptroller General had thought to do what no one in Washington had done before: had checked the title for the land under the dam, learned that the federal government didn’t own it, and informed his superior. Wirtz also reported that the Comptroller General, in a face-to-face confrontation with Buchanan, had pointed out that he was charged with the responsibility of certifying the legality of public works contracts. This contract, he said, was clearly illegal. Unless the conflict with the federal law was resolved, he said, he would not approve a second appropriation, whether or not Congress authorized it.


Decades later, George Brown agreed to tell a story he had never told before except to a handful of intimates: the story of the Marshall Ford Dam. He would, he said, never forget the day he and his brother discovered that the federal government was required by law to own the land on which the dam was being built—and that the federal government didn’t own the land. The words “legal” and “illegal”—referring not to lack of congressional authorization but to lack of federal title to the land—recur frequently as he tells about that day. “We had put in a million and a half dollars in that dam, and then we found out it wasn’t legal,” he says. “We found out the appropriation wasn’t legal, but we had already built the cableway. That cost several hundred thousands of dollars, which we owed the banks. And we had had to set up a quarry for the stone, and build a conveyor belt from the quarry to the dam site. And we had had to buy all sorts of equipment—big, heavy equipment. Heavy cranes. We had put in a million and a half dollars. And the appropriation wasn’t legal!”
...
TOMMY CORCORAN was Johnson’s bluntest weapon. Abe Fortas, too young to have entrée but gifted with that lawyer’s mind at which other lawyers marveled, was the sharpest. And this weapon, too, was to be called into use.


Herman Brown had his dam now—so he wanted the dam to be bigger.


On November 30, 1937, just four months after Johnson had rescued him from financial disaster by obtaining the vital congressional authorization for a $10,000,000 Marshall Ford Dam, Brown’s construction superintendent, Ross White, speaking at an Austin Rotary Club luncheon in the Driskill Hotel, urged that the dam be made higher, at the cost of an additional $17 million. The next speaker, Howard P. Bunger, who was supervising construction for the Bureau of Reclamation, said that the dam must be made higher, for its present height would be “inadequate to control large floods,” and he urged “all interested persons to contact the Congressman representing this district and urge … construction of the high dam.” When the next speaker moved that the club’s board of directors prepare a resolution endorsing the dam, it was obvious that Brown, who was sitting quietly in the audience, had orchestrated the meeting. Ray Lee wrote Johnson that evening: “It seems definitely that a carefully staged coup was pulled to get the thing into the public demand stage.”


Johnson’s first reaction, and Wirtz’s, was fury, both political (the statement that the dam was “inadequate” to provide flood control was embarrassingly accurate; Wirtz, of course, had never intended it to provide flood control; despite his statement to the contrary, he had always intended its primary purpose to be the production of hydroelectric power which could be translated into political power) and personal (the two men felt that Brown had taken advantage of them to obtain a bigger profit). Wirtz’s anger was also fueled by fear; the first interest payments on the LCRA’s outstanding bonds were due on January 1, 1939, and the only way to meet the payments was by the sale of power from the LCRA dams; power could not be sold until the dams were completed, and Brown’s proposal would mean that the Marshall Ford Dam, at least, would not be finished in time. Under the terms of the bond indentures, the bondholders could foreclose and take over the project if an interest payment was not met, and the holder of the bonds was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, whose director, Jesse Jones of Houston, was a longtime enemy of Wirtz who would be only too pleased to snatch his project away from him. Wirtz urged Johnson to see federal officials immediately to make sure that the dam would not be enlarged. (Even before the Rotary meeting, the alliance between the Browns and the two politicians had grown shaky. Wirtz’s plan to use the 2,000 construction jobs at Marshall Ford as the payroll of a Wirtz-Johnson political organization had been defeated by Brown’s refusal to cooperate; Bunger had received quiet instructions from his superiors at the Bureau of Reclamation not to hire anyone unless they bore a “paper from [Wirtz and Johnson] saying they were approved,” but Brown refused to accept this; “he moved ’em off,” Bunger would recall. “Herman could be rough. On a Herman Brown job, you earned your money.”)


But a dispute with Herman Brown would not be in Johnson’s interest; his ambition dictated the avoidance of a dispute, and, as always, his passions were at ambition’s command. By the time—a week after the Rotary luncheon—that he wrote his first letter on the subject of the high dam (a reply to T. H. Davis of the Austin National Bank, who had written him to “wonder … why the present Dam, now well under way, if it be so inadequate, was ever contracted for”), his anger was banked, the letter diplomatic. Had he already realized that the support of Herman Brown was necessary for the attainment of his great goal?


Seemingly insurmountable problems stood in the way of a high dam, however. The additional $17 million could not come from the LCRA; for not only had the Authority used up all its authorized borrowing power, even if it was authorized to borrow more, it would not be able to pay the interest on new bonds; every cent of possible revenue that could be generated from the sale of power was already pledged to pay the interest on the existing bonds. And how could the money come from the Bureau of Reclamation? The Bureau could build, out of its own funds, only the flood-control part of the dam; any money spent on a dam, or that part of a dam, designed to provide power, had to be reimbursable. And how could the Bureau maintain that the high dam was not for the purpose of providing power? It had said the low dam was for flood control—and the low dam was funded. Any additional funds would have to be for power, would have to be reimbursed—and there was no possible source of reimbursement.


The wily Wirtz was working on a solution. Under it, the existing 190-foot-high dam would no longer be a flood-control dam; it would, with a stroke of a pen, be designated a power dam. The flood-control portion of the dam would be the part not yet built—the additional 78 feet—and therefore the Bureau of Reclamation could legally pay for it. But Wirtz’s solution, while ingenious, did not provide a rationale for changing the nature of the 190 feet already built, and it left unsolved another major problem—a result of the fact that the dam was in reality meant primarily for power production. This reality could not be blinked because there was a recognized, accepted, standard formula for determining what portion of a dam was to be allocated to flood control and what portion to power production. By the most generous estimate possible under this formula, no more than $14,850,000 of the cost of the Marshall Ford Dam could be allocated to flood control; the rest had to be chargeable to power production. But it could not be charged to power production, because the power-production portion was reimbursable, and the LCRA had no further capacity for reimbursement beyond the $9,515,000 it had already agreed to pay. And the two figures—$14,850,000 plus $9,515,000—totaled $24,365,000. The dam would cost at least $27 million, so there was at least a $2,635,000 gap that could not be filled by either of the two agencies connected with its construction. Standing in the path of Herman Brown’s ambition was an intricate legal tangle. Brown could see no way to cut through that knot. Nor could Wirtz or Corcoran. So, Corcoran says, “it [the problem] was turned over to Abe Fortas.”


Johnson telephoned the Browns to report on the situation. As George Brown recalls it, “On his [Fortas’] desk was where the Reclamation thing [had] landed. … He was the key to the whole thing. … If he said it [Wirtz’s scheme] was illegal, it was dead.” Aware of the weaknesses of his case, Brown felt it would be “touch and go,” but Johnson told him that if any lawyer in the world could solve the problem, Fortas could.


And, in fact, Fortas did. He worked out an elaborate rationale for Wirtz’s plan, and he bridged the $2,635,000 gap. Since that money could not be provided by either of the two agencies building the dam, Fortas proposed that it be provided by a third agency: the Public Works Administration. At first glance, legal barriers stood in the way of this solution, too. The PWA was not authorized to build flood-control structures. And it was not authorized to build dams for the production of power, either. But Fortas reasoned—in an elaborately structured memo to PWA Administrator Ickes—that it could build a portion of the dam whose purpose might be defined as neither flood control nor power, because its purpose would be both flood control and power. This dual purpose would be accomplished by designating 33 feet of the dam—the first 33 feet to go atop the original 190 feet—as a “joint-use pool.” The water entrapped by these 33 feet would be available for power use until the floodgates were opened. But since the floodgates would not customarily be open, that water could be used most of the time for power. The 33 feet of dam—the 33 feet whose cost just happened to be about $2.5 million—would, therefore, be built for power production—but the LCRA would not have to pay for its construction. As LCRA board member Tom Ferguson explains: “The Bureau of Reclamation said it would pay for the top forty-five feet [of the 268-foot dam]. But it couldn’t pay for any more, and the LCRA didn’t have enough money to get up to that top forty-five feet. So the PWA would build the part in between, and the Bureau of Reclamation would build it from where the PWA’s money ran out.”


Ickes bought it. He had already discovered Fortas’ legal abilities—Fortas would be only twenty-eight years old when Ickes appointed him general counsel, chief legal officer, of the PWA—and while Ickes was not yet prepared (he would be soon) to grant intimacy to a man younger than his own sons, he had already learned to put his faith in that man’s mind. Fortas told Ickes that the solution was legal. “I don’t think it was a matter of persuading [Ickes],” Fortas says. “It was a matter of working out the legal theory.”


The Browns understood the significance of what Fortas had done for them. “If it hadn’t been for Abe …,” George Brown says. “He was the first hitch we had to get by. If he didn’t say it was legal, it wasn’t. [But] Abe wrote the memo to Ickes and he put it in the right light.”


And George Brown, who had seen Johnson and Fortas together, felt he understood why Fortas had done it. He touches on a number of reasons. “He [Fortas] came to Washington wanting to help people,” he says. And, he says, there was also a friendship (“Friendship plays so big a role in these things. … We used to go to his house and take off our shoes and socks and drink some”). But it was not Fortas’ friendship for him that played the crucial role, he says, but Fortas’ friendship for Lyndon Johnson. “He liked Johnson,” Brown says. “Johnson made him like him.”


Goldschmidt was not the sharpest tool; he would not rise to great heights in Washington. But, easy-going and not as intensely fired by personal ambition as the other members of this group, he was malleable material in Johnson’s hands. He was, in addition, passionately idealistic, and the focus of his passion was public power. When Johnson put the case for the Marshall Ford Dam in those terms, Goldschmidt believed him—and was willing to do anything he could to advance the cause of the dam.


Johnson knew how to make the most of such willingness. He had been assiduously cultivating Clark Foreman, director of Interior’s Division of Public Power—the agency whose approval on a thousand pieces of paper was necessary for so large and complicated a project. Painting for Foreman a harrowing picture of how the LCRA’s programs were being snarled in bureaucratic red tape, he asked Foreman to assign a single official to handle and be familiar with LCRA problems. And Johnson said he knew just the man: “Why don’t we get Tex over there?” he asked. Foreman agreed. Construction of the dam would take almost three more years; during that time, many rulings from Interior on LCRA requests would be expedited by the malleable Goldschmidt.


The little group of which Johnson was a part was an unusual group. Two of its members—Douglas and Fortas—would sit on the highest court in the country. Others—Corcoran and Rowe—would be part (as, indeed, Douglas and Fortas, too, would be part) for decades to come of the nation’s highest political councils. In the years immediately after Johnson came to Washington as a Congressman, they were already young men on the rise. But, as one of them—Corcoran—says with a smile, “Gradually, these guys found they were working for Lyndon Johnson.” Working for Johnson, Corcoran says, “on projects for his district”—and, in particular, on one project: that huge dam being built in that isolated gorge in faraway Texas.


FOR THE HIGH DAM, Johnson needed help on Capitol Hill—help of a dimension far greater than any of the young New Dealers could provide. For the dichotomies in the project’s financing that Fortas had managed to paper over for Harold Ickes—because Ickes was disposed to favor the project—could not be papered over for Congressmen who had no feelings about it one way or the other. As soon as the necessary legislation was brought before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, the lack of logic—or legality—in the arguments became apparent. And when the subcommittee’s chairman, Representative Charles H. Leavy of the state of Washington (who had apparently been enlisted in the dam’s cause without fully understanding its problems), introduced the necessary amendment, to increase the Marshall Ford allocation, and make the increase non-reimbursable, before the full House of Representatives, which was sitting as the Committee of the Whole, members of the subcommittee attempted to make these issues public.


The amendment was to the Rivers and Harbors Bill, which stated clearly that all projects built by the Bureau of Reclamation were “to be reimbursable under the reclamation law.” The clerk droned out the words: “Amendment offered by Mr. Leavy after the word ‘reimbursable,’ insert, ‘except to the Colorado Project, Texas.’”


Immediately, there was an objection, from the conservative Republican John Taber of New York. “Mr. Chairman,” he said, “I make a point of order against the amendment. … It excepts the Colorado River project from reimbursing its cost to the Government. It is a general provision of these reclamation acts that these things shall be reimbursable to the Treasury.”


Leavy replied that “it is not a reclamation project in any sense; it is a flood-control project. It is authorized in the Flood Control Act.”


Others were ready to jump in. Robert F. Rich,* a Pennsylvania Republican, started to ask the questions that would expose the contradictions. Hadn’t the government given $10 million for the Colorado River Project “with the expectation that [the] money was to be paid back out of the sale of power …?” Leavy said that was true. Well, Rich demanded, wasn’t the government now being asked to provide $2 million more for the same project? “If this [$10 million] money that was lent has to be paid back from power so generated, then tell me why they should not pay this $2,050,000 added to the [$10 million] that they have previously agreed to pay back? If the gentleman can explain that to the House and to the Members of this Congress, then I would like him to do it.”


“I do not know whether I can do it in the limited time I have left at my disposal,” Leavy said. In fact, he could not do it at all, for the amendment violated not only law—under the law, every Bureau of Reclamation project was reimbursable—but logic. As Leavy attempted to explain it, he floundered.


But Johnson had prepared for this situation. In case of a demand for a roll call, he was to tell Wirtz, “I had at least nineteen members of the Texas delegation with me.” If “any questions were raised, Judge Mansfield was going to tell of the dangerous floods in past years on the Colorado River.” Texas’ amenable Marvin Jones was in the chair. These preparations might not have been sufficient, given the violations of law and logic involved in the amendment, but law and logic could not stand on Capitol Hill against raw power—and Johnson had power on his side.


Years later, another Representative, Richard Boiling of Missouri, would describe the crucial moment in the fight he had had to make—in 1951, during the first months of his first term in Congress—for a dam in his district. The dam had been defeated in committee. Boiling had brought the proposal up again before the full House, but knew he didn’t have the votes there, either. Although Rayburn, at the instance of his friend, Harry Truman of Missouri, had been friendly to Boiling, the new Congressman hadn’t understood what Rayburn’s friendship could mean, and he had not asked him for help on the dam bill. But, Boiling says, as he was sitting nervously on the House floor, “I felt someone sit down beside me. I didn’t pay any attention to who it was,” but when Boiling stood up to speak in support of the dam, the figure beside him stood up, too—and it was Sam Rayburn. Rayburn didn’t say a word, Boiling recalls. He didn’t have to. The fact that he was standing beside Boiling meant that Sam Rayburn wanted the bill passed—and the House passed it.


In 1951, Sam Rayburn would be Speaker of the House. In 1938, he was only Majority Leader. But he was Sam Rayburn. As Leavy fumbled for an explanation, Rayburn stood up and walked forward to stand beside him. As Leavy finished a sentence, Sam Rayburn said: “The gentleman is correct, yes.” He stood there beside Leavy until Marvin Jones banged down his gavel and called the question, and the House agreed that Leavy was correct.


“After … Marvin Jones, who was acting as chairman, ruled,” Johnson exulted in a letter to Wirtz that night, “we knew we had won and the less we said, the better. We got Sam Rayburn to answer one of Rich’s questions in order to indicate to all Democrats that the Majority Leader favored the amendment and when Sam got in the Record we took a vote and called it a day.” A jubilant Wirtz wrote back that Johnson had accomplished “the impossible.” (Wirtz received another letter as well. “Dear Alvin,” Sam Ray-burn wrote, “I am mighty glad that Lyndon could get through the additional appropriation for Marshall Ford Dam. Whatever little help I was able to give him was given freely and gladly, as I think Lyndon is one of the finest young men I have seen come to Congress. If the District will exercise the good judgment to keep him here, he will grow in wisdom and influence as the years come and go.”)

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Marduk said:

Ok, no dice, i forgot myself and was too nice to you trying to answer instead mocking you for the very nature of the question you have asked.
So, correction:

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Marduk said:

And now i'm asking you to go fuck yourself. Consider the very correct phrasing you used there, regarding a non-historical situation and the nature of such information.
Show me someone who can give you "concrete statistics" on that, and he will probably tell you that he can't legally show you that.

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Marduk said:

A matter of time inherently.

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Marduk said:

As i said, ranchers more interested in politics than ranching can troll around that, but that's also not forever. And paid off... Well taking cartel money for favors is one way to end up in US prison system.

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CHATTANOOGA, Tenn. – A former Tyson Foods employee pleaded guilty to conspiracy Monday, admitting he smuggled illegal immigrants into the country to work for the poultry giant and provided them with fraudulent identification.

Amador Anchondo-Rascon could face a maximum sentence of five years in prison, a $250,000 fine and forfeiture of any gains from the alleged conspiracy with Tyson that prosecutors say started in 1994.

U.S. Attorney John MacCoon declined to say if the 43-year-old native of Mexico would testify against six Tyson executives indicted last month on charges of conspiring to smuggle immigrants to work at the company's poultry processing plants.

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Foods is stepping up its effort to support immigrant workers who wish to become U.S. citizens.

According to census data compiled by the Economic Policy Institute, many workers in the meat processing industry come from places such as Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Burma or Cuba; work for low wages in difficult conditions; and are classified as noncitizens.

To help workers on their path to becoming U.S. citizens, Tyson set up a program that offers immigrants legal services and resources, with help from nonprofit organizations. In the past year, the Tyson Immigration Partnership has helped more than 500 workers at the seven locations where the program was offered.

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