Yeah, I Am Going There (Cold War Gone Hot)

[CurtisLemay]

Well,
It's about time someone asked. And seeing as how this is the place to do it, I figure I'd ask, given eight potential flashpoints, and their potential for war, I figure I would ask, so, how do you think, if someone miscalculated, or worse, would a Third World War between the superpowers turn out in the following potential flashpoints:

1. 1948 (Berlin Crisis)
2. 1950 (Start of Korean War)
3. 1956 (Soviet Invasion of Hungary, Suez Crisis)
4. 1961-62 (2nd Berlin Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis)
5. 1968 (Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, Height of US involvement in Vietnam, and Sino-Soviet Border Clashes)
6. 1973 (Yom Kippur War)
7. 1983 (Able Archer War Scare)
8. 1989 (Collapse of the Warsaw Pact, assume Soviets apply "Tiananmen Solution" after coup overthrows Gorbachev)

I have my opinions, but I'd love to hear the take of others. And the more detailed your answers, the better?

 

[Husky_Khan]

We're going to need some orders of battle or something to look up all of the stats and have nerdgasms over them. Especially for the less common timelines (where I think the Redss have an even greater advantage like in... all of the conflicts except for the 1989 scenario ). Though the 1956 and 1961-62 era do sound interesting to analyze as well as the immediate postwar ones of 1948 and 1950... though I think the odds were still disproportionate.

The 1968 and 1973 scenarios seem like they would be rough due to the many issues with the US and Western militaries at the time with the Vietnam War and Hollow Army and whatnot going on along with the other Western social schisms that had knock on effects with Western militaries.

I must look into this if I ever get the time lol.

Did find a cool blog with 1989 Orders of Battle of course:

NATO's Central Army Group Wartime Order of Battle 1989

If the Cold War would have gone hot into a shooting war and the armored forces of the Warsaw Pact would have rolled West in an invasio...

coldwardecoded.blogspot.com

And this website with random scans of data

NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons

See how NATO and Warsaw Pact forces stacked up against each other throughout the Cold War.

www.nato.int

 

[Tiamat]

Well...the Soviets officially tested their first nuke in 1949, "RDS-1", so there was a narrow window of about 4 or so years between the end of WW2 and then where the US might have been able to win a nuclear war against the USSR, since they had no way to retaliate. The real Curtis Lemay wanted to basically saturate the USSR with nukes if it did indeed go hot...the only problem was conventionally the US and it's allies would have probably gotten steamrolled conventionally by the number of land divisions and sheer firepower the Soviets had around this time, so while the Soviets would theoretically just push West all the way to the English Channel, the American bombers are flying East and nuking everything from Kiev to Minsk to Moscow. Not really sure who "wins" that scenario...

Sadly, it's arguable the American and NATO forces didn't really have as much of a technical superiority advantage over the COMBLOC forces until the 1980's, and the numerical advantage of the Soviet and WARPA forces was always essentially a given.

 

[Husky_Khan]

Well,
It's about time someone asked. And seeing as how this is the place to do it, I figure I'd ask, given eight potential flashpoints, and their potential for war, I figure I would ask, so, how do you think, if someone miscalculated, or worse, would a Third World War between the superpowers turn out in the following potential flashpoints:

1. 1948 (Berlin Crisis)
2. 1950 (Start of Korean War)
3. 1956 (Soviet Invasion of Hungary, Suez Crisis)
4. 1961-62 (2nd Berlin Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis)
5. 1968 (Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia, Height of US involvement in Vietnam, and Sino-Soviet Border Clashes)
6. 1973 (Yom Kippur War)
7. 1983 (Able Archer War Scare)
8. 1989 (Collapse of the Warsaw Pact, assume Soviets apply "Tiananmen Solution" after coup overthrows Gorbachev)

I have my opinions, but I'd love to hear the take of others. And the more detailed your answers, the better?

Well it looks like 1948 isn't going to be that interesting. It'd be a steamroll. Same with 1950. But yeah, the adage that the US Army was terrible when it went into Korea and came out looking good and then the inverse happening with Vietnam kinda seems right.

1956 and 1961 are probably far more competitive then anything prior and the subsequent 1968 and 1973 showdowns. But even then, I'm assuming that 1956 and 1961 probably had disproportionate advantages with the Warsaw Pact. 1983 and 1989 will be far closer thanks to the advance of Western military largesse and technology.

 

[Husky_Khan]

https://history.army.mil/html/books/045/45-3-1/cmhPub_45-3-1.pdf

So according to this, in 1956...

With a West German contribution still in the planning stage, NATO counted at best eighteen full-strength divisions with some smaller formations. The Northern Army Group consisted of, north to south, the I Dutch Corps with two divisions, the I British Corps with four divisions, and the I Belgian Corps with two divisions. Canada and Luxembourg provided brigade-size contributions. In CENTAG, the five U.S. divisions of the V and VII Corps still constituted the main line of defense. Although the five divisions of the French First Army reinforced the line on paper, their contribution was becoming problematic. By June, the French had shifted the equivalent of two and one-half divisions from eastern France to Algeria.

The size of the Soviet Army and its mobilization potential remained stable, with 175 combat ready divisions and a capability to raise and equip an additional 125 from trained reserves and existing stocks of equipment. Analysts noted that, since World War II, Soviet production of modern weapons and equipment had continued at a much higher level than what the nation required to replace its losses. As a result, they said, the Soviets had accumulated sufficient stockpiles to support 175 divisions in combat for a period of one year without drawing from current production. In addition to stationing twenty-two of their own divisions in the German Democratic Republic, the Soviets provided modern tanks, armored vehicles, equipment, and training to an East German Army whose numbers exceeded one hundred thousand.

As if to demonstrate their good intentions, in June 1956, the Soviets announced major troop reductions throughout their entire armed forces and withdrawals from East Germany. The move included the elimination of sixty-three divisions and brigades and an overall reduction of approximately 1.2 million men. At the same time, allied leaders received formal invitations from the Soviets to observe the withdrawal of 33,500 troops from East Germany at the end of the month.2 Western analysts and military leaders, however, placed little stock in the partial demobilization. The massive Soviet ground force, they believed, could easily absorb such a reduction without losing any significant offensive capability.

Between the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the end of 1956, active Army strength had fallen from over 1.5 million to just over 1 million, and the doctrine of massive retaliation and its reliance on strategic nuclear forces had left the service with a steadily decreasing portion of the national defense budget.

...

Major cuts came twice in 1956. In May, the Department of the Army imposed an enlisted manning level of 92.2 percent of USAREUR’s authorized strength. This amounted to a reduction of more than eleven thousand troops. Six months later, the level fell to 85.3 percent of authorized strength. The USAREUR commander, General Hodes, applied the cuts equally over all units but exempted the five divisions of the Seventh Army: the 4th and 10th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Airborne Division, and the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions, and the 6th Infantry in Berlin. With the divisions exempted, the cuts fell heavily on headquarters and staff sections. Both USAREUR and the Seventh Army canvassed their extensive staff elements to identify where the cuts should occur. Then, on 1 January 1957, the Department of the Army reduced the USAREUR headquarters authorization from 2,971 spaces to 2,438, a cut of 15.8 percent in military personnel and 20.5 percent in civilians. Subsequent reductions by the Department of Defense lowered this figure even further, leaving USAREUR headquarters with an authorized strength of 1,929 by the end of 1957. The Seventh Army’s and the Communications Zone’s headquarters and staffs experienced similar reductions. In all, USAREUR fell from over 246,000 troops in July 1956 to around 224,000 by December 1957.

Good grief the US loves disarming themselves after every war.

Though I guess all of these facts and figures don't matter too much considering how all of this was intended for the ATOMIC BATTLEFIELD.

 

[Tiamat]

https://history.army.mil/html/books/045/45-3-1/cmhPub_45-3-1.pdf

So according to this, in 1956...









Good grief the US loves disarming themselves after every war.

Though I guess all of these facts and figures don't matter too much considering how all of this was intended for the ATOMIC BATTLEFIELD.

Sadly, it happens all the time. Only so much money to go around with budget priorities, and everyone's got their pet projects/causes/etc. The realities of just how deadly a nuclear battlefield was going to be hadn't really dawned on most people just yet, as nuclear warfare was still kind of in it's infancy and delivery systems hadn't fully developed and matured yet.

The U.S. just usually lucks out compared to some other countries because it has a higher GDP and taxable population than most other allied countries, thus more money to spend on defense and related R&D. The Soviets for their part were militarily obsessed and spent a ridiculous amount of their fortune on various military and NBC (nuclear/biological/chemical) decade after decade coupled with all their other problems, it started to bite them in the ass toward the end of the Cold War and...the rest is history.

 

[Husky_Khan]

I dunno. After a period of reflection I honestly don't see the US winning except maybe in 1945 (not counted) and 1989.

The Soviets would win conventionally (or at least non-strategic nuclearly) in every other scenario IMHO.

Then from increased competition to lack thereof...

1983 Able Archer: Technological Advancements and the developing doctrine of AirLand Battle and increasing investments into the military should make it more competitive then any earlier period. The Soviet Union had other minor distractions as well such as Afghanistan.

1956 Hungarian Revolution/Suez Crisis: Directly after the Korean War so while there was a drawdown both France and Britiain were a bit more militant. Plus France was no longer tied up in French Indochina and can provide more support in Europe. Plus the Atomic battlefield would be a horrifying equalizer.

1961-62 Cuban Missile Crisis: US Military was good there and bounced back from the downturn directly after the Korean War. But France had its Algerian distractions. Still pretty close to the 1956 era... the two might be interchangeable. Atomic Weapons on the battlefield might be less likely used but who knows.

1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovkia/Sino-Soviet Clashes: The Sino-Soviet Clashes might actually help in the Wests favor as China is a major nuclear armed distraction. But the US Forces in Europe are of very poor quality since the units in Vietnam were actually the cream of the US military at the time. Plus there was some brewing dissension in the United States as well. The use of tactical nuclear weapons might be limited (at least from NATO's side) and after he Cuban Missile Crisis there were safeguards in place in preventing a completely nuclear war.

1973 Yom Kippur War: US Military was still in recovery mode from the Vietnam War. France and Britain and the West in general was still in an economic malaise and various social and cultural revolutions (of a much less serious and deadly variety) so the Hollow Armies of the West would be ill challenged to take on the Reds even in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split.

1948 Berlin Crisis: A stompage of epic magnitude as the Soviets conventionally walk over everything... unless nukes start to drop. Nukes dropping would actually be quite the equalizer but Western forces are just so damn anemic.

1950 Start of the Korean War: Worse then above because more erosion since the end of WW2 and now the Soviets just got nukes and have been moving forward technologically and in their military capabilities since the end of WW2.

 

[PsihoKekec]

Another option for 1950/51 is the planned invasion of Yugoslavia, however with USA taking their armed forces seriously again, Stalin decided not to roll the dice.

1948 is problematic for the West because USA disarmed itself, continental countries were still pulling themselves together and remnants of British army were scattered all over the globe. The only advantage USA really has is nukes, but USAF has degenerated a great deal, in an exercise by SAC most of the crews failed to find the target and by the time the USAF remedied the problems, the Red Army might as well be at the Pyrenees. However, given the terrible state of the Soviet Union, long war is not in their interest, as they have no way of touching USA or conquering the UK, so it would be a limited objective war, followed by negotiations.

In 1950 USSR is in less terrible state, with USA starting to rearm itself and SAC relearning WWII skills, so they could find Soviet cities, but unescorted B-29 against MiG-15 is a poor match.

 

[Deleted member 88]

The soviets had conventional superiority from 1945 to the mid eighties. And even in the late eighties would not have been a cakewalk though western technology and doctrine began to leap ahead.

Nuclear weapons were the American trump card in the fifties and late forties. That if used liberally could have destroyed the Soviet Union and its satellites.

I’d say the Soviets best chance may have been in late sixties-they were closing in on nuclear parity at the time and the US’ military was hollowed out due to Vietnam and the populace was at its most anti war and discontented.

The late forties and early seventies were also when soviet conventional superiority would have been most impactful.

There is the issue that nukes were inaccurate in the 1945-1960 timeframe however the Soviets faced insurgencies in Eastern Europe at least until the fifties.

Late 45 or early 46 when the US nuclear arsenal was at its lowest and the army demobilizing-the Soviets probably could have made a break for the Atlantic if they were really lucky.

 

[Lanmandragon]

I am from Poland.you have problems with Europe history.so:

1.After WW1 Poland do nt get german lands,but polish lands occupied by prussia and later germany.
2.Our HQ during WW2 was mostly idiots, but they manage hold almost all of german army in Poland.If France attacked, war would end in few months, maybe weeks.
3.two times Germany started war in Europe, and twice USA must send soldiers there.Now, they are in Germany to prevent them from starting WW3.
4.Poland is capable of defeating russian attack,but not combined russia/ germany attack, or use of H bombs - becouse we do not have them.So,USA must stay here till we get enough nukes to prevent Putin from attack.Becouse russian do not stop with genociding us, but create with Germany european empire which threaten USA.
FDR toss us to soviets, becouse he thought that they only massacre us.They did it,but later they planned starting WW3 and destroing USA.
5.EU means Germany,and Germany want alliance with Putin,not war.
6.Turkey decided to become new Ottoman empire - so here you are right.

But you are right - USA should think about USA interest.And precisely for that interests keep both Poland and South Korea safe.

P.S we like USA in Poland,but we remember how they gave us to soviets for nothing.FDR was idiot,allies should be sold,not given for free.

Leaving you guys out to dry was pretty bogus. Apologise from an American

 

[ATP]

Leaving you guys out to dry was pretty bogus. Apologise from an American

Only FDR and his friends was responsible.Patton want help us, and probably get killed for it/very good book - Target Patton/
Besides, modern politics meant betraing allies when it is profitable,so my only problem is that USA betrayed us for nothing.FDR really thought,that if he gave Stalin everything,he would behave.Like one of his friends said, he treated caucasian bandit as if he was duke of Norfolk.

 

[Aaron Fox]

Only FDR and his friends was responsible.Patton want help us, and probably get killed for it/very good book - Target Patton/
Besides, modern politics meant betraing allies when it is profitable,so my only problem is that USA betrayed us for nothing.FDR really thought,that if he gave Stalin everything,he would behave.Like one of his friends said, he treated caucasian bandit as if he was duke of Norfolk.

No, the thing is that at the time the US and its allies didn't have the information we do today about soviet troop concentrations. We thought -at the time- they spammed divisions and brigades when in reality said brigades and divisions were as barebones as you can get. It should also be noted that the only real way to win against the USSR at the time is to do nuclear genocide as the monetary and manpower requirements for the conquest of the USSR is well out of NATO's reach even in the 1980s. Until post-Vietnam, NATO and friends were at a disadvantage to the point the only viable scenario is where nukes fly, and in the 1970s and 1980s, NATO and friends really focused on making WW3 a possibly conventional affair.

 

[ATP]

No, the thing is that at the time the US and its allies didn't have the information we do today about soviet troop concentrations. We thought -at the time- they spammed divisions and brigades when in reality said brigades and divisions were as barebones as you can get. It should also be noted that the only real way to win against the USSR at the time is to do nuclear genocide as the monetary and manpower requirements for the conquest of the USSR is well out of NATO's reach even in the 1980s. Until post-Vietnam, NATO and friends were at a disadvantage to the point the only viable scenario is where nukes fly, and in the 1970s and 1980s, NATO and friends really focused on making WW3 a possibly conventional affair.

Not really.Soviets was giant on Lend-lease legs.Half of trains was from USA.nightfighters and radars was from USA.radios for tanks and planes were from USA,soviets was enough only for commanders, so tank used banners, and planes flares in 1941.
most of Soviet fighters could not fight at 7.000m, where B.17 operated.
And soviet airforces were so shitty,that Rudel could use Ju87 against them in 1945.Soviet artillery operated in big units, becouse their crews was ill-trained, and could not coordinate fire.That concentration would be quickly levelled by B.17.

Patton said, that no matter how many millions soviet send, he still send them running,and he was right.

Even more important ,all oil come from Batu and Ploesti.Few visits of B.17,and soviets after month would stay with horses.
No mention, that soviet would surrender just like in 1941, when they get beaten and enemy would behave.Only reason why soviets stop mass-surrender in 1941, was becouse german decidet to genocide half of 4 million taken prisoners.

 

[Zachowon]

Not really.Soviets was giant on Lend-lease legs.Half of trains was from USA.nightfighters and radars was from USA.radios for tanks and planes were from USA,soviets was enough only for commanders, so tank used banners, and planes flares in 1941.
most of Soviet fighters could not fight at 7.000m, where B.17 operated.
And soviet airforces were so shitty,that Rudel could use Ju87 against them in 1945.Soviet artillery operated in big units, becouse their crews was ill-trained, and could not coordinate fire.That concentration would be quickly levelled by B.17.

Patton said, that no matter how many millions soviet send, he still send them running,and he was right.

Even more important ,all oil come from Batu and Ploesti.Few visits of B.17,and soviets after month would stay with horses.
No mention, that soviet would surrender just like in 1941, when they get beaten and enemy would behave.Only reason why soviets stop mass-surrender in 1941, was becouse german decidet to genocide half of 4 million taken prisoners.

Not really, the USSR had a very large amount of manpower the US and NATO could not fight reasonably right after the war. France and UK were nearly baren of troops. The US was still hurting, and would have had to keep sending troops over.

You forget that by 1945, the USSR had a very large stake of puppet states.
Also, by 1945 most equipment the USSR had was their own made, and were not really using US stuff anymore

 

[Aaron Fox]

Not really, the USSR had a very large amount of manpower the US and NATO could not fight reasonably right after the war. France and UK were nearly baren of troops. The US was still hurting, and would have had to keep sending troops over.

That really isn't the case, oddly enough. On paper, the USSR had far more divisions on the frontline, the problem is that all those divisions are barebones at best and the USSR was heavily reliant on US food and fuel supplies until the 1950s or so when they've managed to get their native production back up and running at capacity again.

The USSR was actually in a rather bad state manpower wise, we're talking near scraping the barrel here given how much of the Soviet population the Nazis killed.

 

[Zachowon]

That really isn't the case, oddly enough. On paper, the USSR had far more divisions on the frontline, the problem is that all those divisions are barebones at best and the USSR was heavily reliant on US food and fuel supplies until the 1950s or so when they've managed to get their native production back up and running at capacity again.

The USSR was actually in a rather bad state manpower wise, we're talking near scraping the barrel here given how much of the Soviet population the Nazis killed.

But we did not know that at the time, and equipment was their own, I never said they did not rely on our fuel

 

[Aaron Fox]

But we did not know that at the time, and equipment was their own, I never said they did not rely on our fuel

That is what I stated when I quoted ATP, we didn't know at the time and thus our only possible answer to Russian aggression was literally nuclear genocide...

 

[Zachowon]

That is what I stated when I quoted ATP, we didn't know at the time and thus our only possible answer to Russian aggression was literally nuclear genocide...

It was an option against non nuclear China during the Korea war

 

[Aaron Fox]

It was an option against non nuclear China during the Korea war

Until Truman went 'what the fuck are you smoking McArthur!' and fired McArthur when he and his posse wouldn't let up.

 

[Zachowon]

Until Truman went 'what the fuck are you smoking McArthur!' and fired McArthur when he and his posse wouldn't let up.

Truman was the one that kept it on the table, and had them place Nukes in Guam to be used if needed against China. McArthur just wanted to use them, and also push into China and take them out.