WI: Imperial Japan joins in Operation Barbarossa

[ATP]

There is a good chance that if the USN and IJN met in open sea in this period it could go pear shaped for either side, as Midway showed. If the US was trying to 'relieve' the Philippines my money would be heavily on the Japanese because that's a war their long been planning for and the USN would be sticking its head into a hornet's nest of defended island air bases and with their weaknesses in night fighting and lack of experience being further handicapped.



You under-estimate badly the Soviet forces by 1944-45. There were a lot of hardened veterans and a bitter hatred of foreigners after what the Nazis had done. A western demand for a Soviet withdrawal, which apart from anything else would have been in defiance of already agreed treaties, would have been seen as yet another attack on 'the motherland' by most of them even without any government propaganda.

I think if there had been a Soviet attack then, after heavy losses on both sides, probably going into at least 1946 the west is likely to win eventually. However given the political situation there's no way that the west could have started a war with the Soviets. Too much had been done in propaganda to make the Soviets acceptable allies and also the western powers were desperate to bring the wars to an end. Remember that Japan was still fighting and also that both Britain and the US had problems persuading troops in Europe after the German surrender to accept being transferred to the Far East. [Note that for the US forces here most would have had less than 9 months fighting so it wasn't a case of people who had been fighting for years as might have been the case with a lot of the Brits]. Also while signs were promising the atomic bomb was still a distinctly theoretical weapon.

As such the key point was that the US wasn't willing to start another war that would be hugely expensive, against a recent ally, while still fighting Japan for an undefined period in the future. Also that would have made the Japanese and Soviets potential allies while Washington was eager to get the Soviets as allies against Japan, which they did follow through on.

Similarly in Britain it was economically and psychologically exhausted. Even if Washington had been eager and given Churchill's willingness to consider war with the Soviets I doubt it would have been a popular war in Britain either. Don't forget Churchill lost heavily in the 1945 elections so his social and political position was unpopular and the suggest Britain start another war while still fighting Japan would have gone down like an Osmium balloon.

1.American Navy belived in their superiority over yellow race.If they go to battle without being beaten first,they would underestimate Japan and lost.

2.You could not wage modern war without oil - and Allies would remowed soviet rafineries in first 2 weeks.
And if soviet air forces was full of veterans,then how germans could use against them Ju87 during day when soviet had 10:1 numerical advantage?

Besides,even if that was true,planes need oil,too.And soviets do not have fighters capable of efficently engage at 7.000m/B17/ not mention 9.000m/B.29/
Their night fighters really was joke - german used Ju52 during night to supply their besieged cities.Practically without loses.

Which mean,that soviet could not attack during day,and during most nights Lancasters would massacred them,too.

Most important - soviets hated communism.They fought becouse german massacred them,too - once they undarstandt that there is no quick victory and that they could surrender and live,they would do that.

 

[Husky_Khan]

Despite having THREE QUARTERS of the Imperial Japanese Army tied up in China, Japan would now have to send forces to secure the paltry Sakhalin Island and its oil resources, and probably also be able to capture the Kuril Islands and maybe Vladivostok after an unexpectedly bloody battle. That would have a severe hampering effect on Lend Lease during the early years of 1941/42 most certainly and actually probably persist longer. But this also does mean that if the Japanese don't attack south, they're trading the Sakhalin Oil Resources for the much more juicy (pun intended I guess?) oil that could be gotten in the Dutch East Indies. If they avoid going South at all, that also means the Allies & America can still use ports in Burma and the like to supply the Chinese.

If the Japanese do move South though, I think the United States entering the war is almost an inevitability. The main thing is how unconditional the United States would be when it comes to wanting to prosecute the war with Japan. As per OTL it was pretty solid we wanted that unconditional surrender.

The Japanese Bombing Pearl Harbor in a surprise attack was a pretty big motivator for finishing off the Japanese once and for all, possessing the Americans with an animus towards Japan that surpassed that of Nazi Germany for the most part. A casus belli of going war with Japan because the Japanese struck the Dutch East Indies/Malaysia/Singapore isn't quite as powerful a motivating factor as a Surprise Attack on Pearl Harbor but it would be a cause for war nonetheless, and yes especially because FDR is in charge, though not due to psychopathy or to make the world safe for Communism IMHO.

Anyways, going to war on behalf of Britain and the Netherlands so to speak is one war of framing the war and it could work to the benefit of Japan but that would mean I feel that the Americans in this scenario would pursue war aims insofar as we will dismantle the Japanese Empire in the Pacific and China... but we're willing to recognize their sovereignty over their Home Islands as opposed to OTL of Completely Victory and Unconditional Surrender.

But even that has a caveat... mainly in the Japanese acting absolutely barbaric when it came to warfare. Just because they don't bomb Pearl Harbor doesn't mean Japan won't still get that animus if they do some Death Marches, false surrenders and massacring of prisoners and the like, which they truly indulged in doing at the time.

This is a common error I've seen in people's analysis.

Sakhalin Oil Fields are most offshore and the ones onshore are some of the deep in the world, inaccessible using 1930s or 1940s tech.

Those oil fields are completely undeveloped as of 1939. Development will take time, while creating an easy target for Soviet bombers.

Yeah there was some oil extraction in the Sakhalin. @stevep posted a link earlier (I think its broken but its archived here) but I didn't like that Question Mark after the 1200 in that graph so I did some digging and found this.

- Stephan, J. (1970). Sakhalin Island: Soviet Outpost in Northeast Asia. Asian Survey, 10(12).

Most of it just isn't accessible with 1940's technology for sure... and the estimates here are considerably lower then above which might make sense (or not) being wartime.

No, but the psychopaths in the FDR and Churchill admins were.

Why did Britain (and France) care so much about Nazi Germany taking over the entirety of Eastern Europe?



Oh right... because then Germany would have supremacy over all of Continental Europe. The fact they were fascist, ethnonationalist, authoritarian, militarist expansionists was just icing on the cake. And France's idea of containment of Germany via the use of Allies such as Romania, Poland, and Italy would be even more ridiculously failed then as per OTL so there's little reason for them to be cool with the situation either.

 

[stevep]

Yeah there was some oil extraction in the Sakhalin. @stevep posted a link earlier (I think its broken but its archived here) but I didn't like that Question Mark after the 1200 in that graph so I did some digging and found this.

Sorry about that must have had some finger trouble. Thanks for posting the correct one. Will update my link.

Steve

 

[Buba]

750K tons = ~5,5M barrels
If it could be done in 1945 I'd expect '42 not to be that much different.

 

[History Learner]

That assumes that Japan is able to build up the capacity at least as fast as the Soviets. There is a lot of difference between war preparations and actually fighting a war with all the additions burdens that poses.

Indeed, which is why Japan will develop it many times faster than the Soviets did. For one, the Soviet effort was dispersed upon many regions, especially the ones in the Western (European or adjacent areas) because of the logistics of transport and the fact they have larger capacity there. Even worse, by late 1941 over 40% of Soviet industry and manpower had been occupied by the Axis, which reduced the overall resource base to many times lesser than it was before. Japan has no need to disperse its resources in the same way because Northern Karafuto is there only real source, besides the ongoing efforts in Manchuria, and most certainly their homeland is unoccupied and even outside the range of bombing threats.

Probably because its now openly allied with the Germans so when Germany goes to war with the US its likely that either Japan will follow or that the US will declare was on Japan.

In one way that's a less bad option for Japan. Western sanctions could be applied once Japan attacks the Soviets. Its at least as much an aggressive act as the OTL trigger of the occupation of southern FIC. In that case Japan loses those vital supplies in June/July 41 while not in a position to attack south and while fighting a war in Siberia.

There is no reason to assume any of this. For one, the German declaration was tied to the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor, something which is not in existence here for the reasons outlined.

As for the U.S. angle, they have no political ability to do this either. Opinion polling bares this out, because in February of 1941 Gallup conducted a poll in which respondents were asked “Do you think the United States should risk war with Japan, if necessary, in order to keep Japan from taking the Dutch East Indies and Singapore?”. The response was Yes (39%), No (46%) and No opinion (15%). Given those regions contained actual American interests, as opposed to exactly zero in Siberia, do you really see a war or even sanctions coming about from that? As late as November of 1940, President Roosevelt had advised Pacific commanders that the United States would not go to war over a Japanese invasion of European colonies according to the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. Indeed, IOTL Roosevelt was greatly relieved that Japan had taken the step of triggering the conflict with Pearl Harbor, and that “In spite of the disaster at Pearl Harbor and the blitz warfare with the Japanese during the first few weeks, it completely solidified the American people and made the war upon Japan inevitable” (Roosevelt and Hopkins by Robert E. Sherwood, pg 335-336).

My point was that a link you said argued one thing actually argued the opposite.

Except it doesn't, at all. As I asked before, what real military value was derived from it? IJHQ being surprised is all well and good, but the Chinese fundamentally failed at all of their strategic goals and did not compromise the offensive capability of the IJA for that matter either; see the Hundred Regiments Offensive late in 1940 which crippled the CCP as as a fighting force for years.

Interesting that your claiming something I never said. Western, as well as Soviet aid reached China from shortly after the Japanese invasion started. However it was somewhat limited by politics as none of the other powers were either in conflict with Japan nor on a real way footing until Sep 39. [The latter being a narrow window anyway as with the fall of France and Britain being under partial blockade and threat of invasion was in limited position to supply anything. As you meant during that period Britain was pressurised to briefly shut the Burma Road].

As I actually said the road, even without it being upgraded to a railway would give a much greater capacity for supply to China than the OTL very wasteful flights "over the hump" from India to China. Furthermore once the US goes on a full war footing it would have a lot more resources to send, including at least some of that stuff that OTL can't go through Vladivostok to the Soviets. Hence the KMT could get a lot more equipment compared to OTL.

Given that from 1931 Japan was in effective control of Manchuria and from 1936 of much of NE China south of the Great Wall I very much doubt that a Japanese attack on the Soviet Far East provinces would cut off Soviet supply routes to China. How much the Soviets could spare would be an issue given their fighting a 2 front war here but that's a different issue from what you said.

The Soviets were on a war footing, and the French and British likewise switched into such starting from 1938 onward. As it were though, given the strategic conditions of the Soviets their means of supplying both the KMT and CCP have been eliminated, both by resource lackings given the two front war in of itself, but also from Japanese advances into Mongolia. The French Indochina route had already been solved in 1940, and thus by ATL 1941 we only have the Burma Road route open. It's worth noting said route was open in 1939 when the Chinese attempted their offensive, given it proceeded the strategic events of 1940 you listed nor did said events compromise the U.S. ability to resupply the KMT either.

That Japan isn't committing some of its army to scattered locations across the Pacific will help a bit but it will need to commit a lot, both in forces and in supply to the operations in Siberia so I wouldn't assume it would be easily able to handle a markedly stronger Chinese military, especially when all those supply short-falls start biting. Which isn't just oil don't forget.

Japan had 40 Divisions committed to China in 1941 OTL, and historically raised over 200 as well as massively expanded the IJAAF and the IJN. Here, they do not have to do latter but even leaving that aside and subtracting the Divisions earmarked for Strike North means there are at least 50-80 divisions available for duty in China, given the lack of the wild expansion across the Pacific. If the Chinese could not defeat 40 divisions, how exactly are they supposed to beat double that or even triple?

The key point is the date. It will take some time to 1st repair and then expand production. Also the IJN will still consume a substantial amount of fuel even while on a peace time footing which will end when Japan finds itself at war with the western powers, which I think is almost certain, probably within months of the US and Germany being at war that also ends.

Not to mention that ~22M barrels in 41 when Japan was still at peace outside China. It quickly rose to nearly 28M barrels in 1943, then declines as both supplies and Japanese military capacity dwindled. Here there is the additional fighting in Siberia to consider.

Of course if Japan doesn't end up at war with the US in 1942 then by the end of that year possibly before the Philippines are probably pretty much immune to Japanese attack and the US then can consider initialing either war itself or start supplying China directly and daring Japan to attack its ships.

Fuel consumption increased precisely because the Japanese had to sustain logistics and offensives as far away as Ceylon, Burma, New Guinea and Midway, across the largest ocean in existence; we are talking distances equal to two or three times the entire length of CONUS. None of that exists here and the IJN main battleline can safely remain in port or conducting minimal operations since it is not needed in the same way as historically so. Certainly 10 million barrels of fuel is more than sufficient to sustain the IJA and provide a ration to the civilian population in this context.

 

[stevep]

Indeed, which is why Japan will develop it many times faster than the Soviets did. For one, the Soviet effort was dispersed upon many regions, especially the ones in the Western (European or adjacent areas) because of the logistics of transport and the fact they have larger capacity there. Even worse, by late 1941 over 40% of Soviet industry and manpower had been occupied by the Axis, which reduced the overall resource base to many times lesser than it was before. Japan has no need to disperse its resources in the same way because Northern Karafuto is there only real source, besides the ongoing efforts in Manchuria, and most certainly their homeland is unoccupied and even outside the range of bombing threats.

They have an incentive to do so but that doesn't mean they can do so at the drop of an hat. Even or especially in totalitarian regimes logic often takes a rear seat to dogma or internal power struggles in the government.

There is no reason to assume any of this. For one, the German declaration was tied to the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor, something which is not in existence here for the reasons outlined.

The Japanese attack on the US was seen as an opportunity for Hitler but he was also being urged to go to war with the US so that the U boats could attack shipping in the western Atlantic, US coastal waters, the Caribbean etc, all of which were protected by the US Neutrality zone. Also Hitler was also frustrated by the increasing US involvement in the Atlantic battles and aid to the allies and Soviets.

Since you have repeatedly argued that Hitler didn't want war with the US - albeit without real backing evidence - why did Hitler declare war on the US OTL? He could so easily have allowed the US to concentrate on the war against Japan which would have reduced its aid to his opponents. After all Japan ignored calls from Berlin to join in the 'crusade' against the Soviets.

Also strictly speaking your grammatically wrong as well. Tied suggested that the Japanese attack forced a German dow or at least there was some treaty commitment to such. A small point possibly but it could explain some of your other loose thinking.

As for the U.S. angle, they have no political ability to do this either. Opinion polling bares this out, because in February of 1941 Gallup conducted a poll in which respondents were asked “Do you think the United States should risk war with Japan, if necessary, in order to keep Japan from taking the Dutch East Indies and Singapore?”. The response was Yes (39%), No (46%) and No opinion (15%). Given those regions contained actual American interests, as opposed to exactly zero in Siberia, do you really see a war or even sanctions coming about from that? As late as November of 1940, President Roosevelt had advised Pacific commanders that the United States would not go to war over a Japanese invasion of European colonies according to the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. Indeed, IOTL Roosevelt was greatly relieved that Japan had taken the step of triggering the conflict with Pearl Harbor, and that “In spite of the disaster at Pearl Harbor and the blitz warfare with the Japanese during the first few weeks, it completely solidified the American people and made the war upon Japan inevitable” (Roosevelt and Hopkins by Robert E. Sherwood, pg 335-336).

They obviously had the political ability to apply sanctions as the US did so OTL a few months after that poll. Not aware of massive US interests in southern FIC either? Once sanctions are applied then the clock is ticking for the Japanese war machine. Especially since such sanctions were connected to those from Britain and the Dutch. Even if the Japanese were able to develop N Sakhalin resources as rapidly as you suggest their going to have serious problems a lot earlier.

Plus OTL the sanctions were triggered by the extension of a Japanese region of control in Vichy French IC. It was a potential signal that Japan might go to war with western powers the US had an interest in aiding. Going to war with the Soviets and hence explicitly linking themselves to Nazi Germany is at least as big an issue to the US.

Also a single poll proves nothing. As I have mentioned before I have seen discussions on this subject and a lot depends on the circumstances and especially the exact wording of the question asked. You can get widely differing results by slight changes in the wording.

Except it doesn't, at all. As I asked before, what real military value was derived from it? IJHQ being surprised is all well and good, but the Chinese fundamentally failed at all of their strategic goals and did not compromise the offensive capability of the IJA for that matter either; see the Hundred Regiments Offensive late in 1940 which crippled the CCP as as a fighting force for years.

What you actually said was:

As for the Chinese, it's important to remember they did attempt a counter-attack in 1939-1940 and the end result was such a disaster that they did not attempt such again until 1945 as the IJA was in collapse everywhere.

then provided a link that actually says

Although this offensive failed to achieve its original objectives, some studies have shown that it came as a heavy blow to the Japanese forces, as well as a massive shock to the Japanese military command, which did not expect the Chinese forces to be able to launch an offensive operation on such a large scale.

As such while it might have failed to achieve its original objectives, which could well have been vastly overrated, it came as a heavy blow to the Japanese and a shock to them. There is no evidence it was a disaster and the lack of major Chinese attacks until the end of the war was probably more due to supply shortages, possibly also impacted by their loss of some of their best units in the attempt to aid the defence of Burma.

The Soviets were on a war footing, and the French and British likewise switched into such starting from 1938 onward. As it were though, given the strategic conditions of the Soviets their means of supplying both the KMT and CCP have been eliminated, both by resource lackings given the two front war in of itself, but also from Japanese advances into Mongolia. The French Indochina route had already been solved in 1940, and thus by ATL 1941 we only have the Burma Road route open. It's worth noting said route was open in 1939 when the Chinese attempted their offensive, given it proceeded the strategic events of 1940 you listed nor did said events compromise the U.S. ability to resupply the KMT either.

There's a difference between accepting that major rearmament is necessary to deter or defend against an hostile threat and actually being at war.

In terms of aid from the Soviets its likely to be limited by their own needs but geography isn't an issue. Unless your suggesting that the Japanese as well as parts of the Soviet Far East Provinces are going to advance through Mongolia and into Xinjiang. However in the proposed scenario its almost certain that the Burma link with be considerably expaned over what it was producing prior to the colonies conquest by the Japanese.

Japan had 40 Divisions committed to China in 1941 OTL, and historically raised over 200 as well as massively expanded the IJAAF and the IJN. Here, they do not have to do latter but even leaving that aside and subtracting the Divisions earmarked for Strike North means there are at least 50-80 divisions available for duty in China, given the lack of the wild expansion across the Pacific. If the Chinese could not defeat 40 divisions, how exactly are they supposed to beat double that or even triple?

The issue is less of men raised than the ability to transport and support them. Plus given that sooner or later Japan will almost certainly be at war with the western powers some forces will be needed in Japan itself and in fighting against the western powers.

Fuel consumption increased precisely because the Japanese had to sustain logistics and offensives as far away as Ceylon, Burma, New Guinea and Midway, across the largest ocean in existence; we are talking distances equal to two or three times the entire length of CONUS. None of that exists here and the IJN main battleline can safely remain in port or conducting minimal operations since it is not needed in the same way as historically so. Certainly 10 million barrels of fuel is more than sufficient to sustain the IJA and provide a ration to the civilian population in this context.

So they won't be using large numbers of a/c or motorised vehicles across much of the vast areas your assuming they overrun? And the IJN is willing to site quietly in port while its bitter rival/enemy the IJA is gaining all the prestige and resources? Their not going to be defending Japanese maritime trade or performing training operations, let alone trying to attack allied trade lines once their at war with the western powers.

Yes if the IJN is willing to play a distant 2nd fiddle to the army they can cut their oil consumption considerably but there will be costs and there will be limits to how much they can cut their total consumption.

 

[ATP]

Despite having THREE QUARTERS of the Imperial Japanese Army tied up in China, Japan would now have to send forces to secure the paltry Sakhalin Island and its oil resources, and probably also be able to capture the Kuril Islands and maybe Vladivostok after an unexpectedly bloody battle. That would have a severe hampering effect on Lend Lease during the early years of 1941/42 most certainly and actually probably persist longer. But this also does mean that if the Japanese don't attack south, they're trading the Sakhalin Oil Resources for the much more juicy (pun intended I guess?) oil that could be gotten in the Dutch East Indies. If they avoid going South at all, that also means the Allies & America can still use ports in Burma and the like to supply the Chinese.

If the Japanese do move South though, I think the United States entering the war is almost an inevitability. The main thing is how unconditional the United States would be when it comes to wanting to prosecute the war with Japan. As per OTL it was pretty solid we wanted that unconditional surrender.

The Japanese Bombing Pearl Harbor in a surprise attack was a pretty big motivator for finishing off the Japanese once and for all, possessing the Americans with an animus towards Japan that surpassed that of Nazi Germany for the most part. A casus belli of going war with Japan because the Japanese struck the Dutch East Indies/Malaysia/Singapore isn't quite as powerful a motivating factor as a Surprise Attack on Pearl Harbor but it would be a cause for war nonetheless, and yes especially because FDR is in charge, though not due to psychopathy or to make the world safe for Communism IMHO.

Anyways, going to war on behalf of Britain and the Netherlands so to speak is one war of framing the war and it could work to the benefit of Japan but that would mean I feel that the Americans in this scenario would pursue war aims insofar as we will dismantle the Japanese Empire in the Pacific and China... but we're willing to recognize their sovereignty over their Home Islands as opposed to OTL of Completely Victory and Unconditional Surrender.

But even that has a caveat... mainly in the Japanese acting absolutely barbaric when it came to warfare. Just because they don't bomb Pearl Harbor doesn't mean Japan won't still get that animus if they do some Death Marches, false surrenders and massacring of prisoners and the like, which they truly indulged in doing at the time.



Yeah there was some oil extraction in the Sakhalin. @stevep posted a link earlier (I think its broken but its archived here) but I didn't like that Question Mark after the 1200 in that graph so I did some digging and found this.

- Stephan, J. (1970). Sakhalin Island: Soviet Outpost in Northeast Asia. Asian Survey, 10(12).

Most of it just isn't accessible with 1940's technology for sure... and the estimates here are considerably lower then above which might make sense (or not) being wartime.



Why did Britain (and France) care so much about Nazi Germany taking over the entirety of Eastern Europe?



Oh right... because then Germany would have supremacy over all of Continental Europe. The fact they were fascist, ethnonationalist, authoritarian, militarist expansionists was just icing on the cake. And France's idea of containment of Germany via the use of Allies such as Romania, Poland, and Italy would be even more ridiculously failed then as per OTL so there's little reason for them to be cool with the situation either.

All valid questions.
1.Japan raised 200+ dyvisions in OTL - so they could take Syberia.And if they attacked only Dutch to get oil,then USA would must declare war on them.Considering USA attituda against yellow races,they would lost badly first few battles.
Without Pearl effect,USA public would nor want this war/why support colonial empires/ ,and FDR need to win elections in 1942.Peace on Pacyfic is plausible.
2.That is why Japan need attack Dutch first
3.Germany wonted to dominate Europe from the moment they were created by Prussia,so any Germany must be fought by any England,becouse England always fought those states who dominated Europe.
You are right here - Hitler personality made it easier fo fight his Germany.

 

[History Learner]

They have an incentive to do so but that doesn't mean they can do so at the drop of an hat. Even or especially in totalitarian regimes logic often takes a rear seat to dogma or internal power struggles in the government.

They did IOTL, so why exactly would they not here given your assertions about the fuel crisis being even worse? I understand you have a certain bias, but objectively, this is definitely true of the Japanese in terms of them realizing the situation and working effectively to fix it; you've posted your chart yourself which outlines this perfect.

The Japanese attack on the US was seen as an opportunity for Hitler but he was also being urged to go to war with the US so that the U boats could attack shipping in the western Atlantic, US coastal waters, the Caribbean etc, all of which were protected by the US Neutrality zone. Also Hitler was also frustrated by the increasing US involvement in the Atlantic battles and aid to the allies and Soviets.

All of which he rejected and instituted stricter rules upon the Kriegsmarine in the Fall of 1941 to reduce conflict.

Since you have repeatedly argued that Hitler didn't want war with the US - albeit without real backing evidence - why did Hitler declare war on the US OTL? He could so easily have allowed the US to concentrate on the war against Japan which would have reduced its aid to his opponents. After all Japan ignored calls from Berlin to join in the 'crusade' against the Soviets.

I don't recall specifically arguing that here and given you are the one making the claim here, good debate form calls for you to respond with your own evidence first to make your own case. As for your question, it's simple: the Japanese started their conflict with the United States. Hitler thought he had the Russians on the ropes and with the Japanese in, the economic balance of power would thus favor the Axis sufficient that he could risk a war with the United States.

Also strictly speaking your grammatically wrong as well. Tied suggested that the Japanese attack forced a German dow or at least there was some treaty commitment to such. A small point possibly but it could explain some of your other loose thinking.

If you're having to make grammar arguments, it's a pretty clear sign you have nothing to back your own argument up. As it were though, I have in the past given you a digital copy of Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, so I know you have access to the same exact sources I do to make my arguments, so forgive for being less than impressed here. If you feel I'm wrong in this, how about you actually cite something? Certainly if you feel your case is as self evident as you project, this would be easy for you to do.

They obviously had the political ability to apply sanctions as the US did so OTL a few months after that poll. Not aware of massive US interests in southern FIC either? Once sanctions are applied then the clock is ticking for the Japanese war machine. Especially since such sanctions were connected to those from Britain and the Dutch. Even if the Japanese were able to develop N Sakhalin resources as rapidly as you suggest their going to have serious problems a lot earlier.

They actually didn't apply them until August, six months after the poll and following the Japanese occupation of Southern Indochina; it wasn't out of the blue sanctions but directly tied to Japanese expansionism in Southeast Asia. It also wasn't FIC specifically, but the rather obvious utility of it to be used as a springboard into the rest of region, such as in Malay which was a very big source of U.S. rubber supplies.

And no, the Japanese aren't going to have serious issues; they have reserves sufficient to last until 1943 and thereafter would have Northern Karafuto sufficiently built up to alleviate any strains on the IJA itself and probably the IJN because by 1943 the IJA will definitely be on a defensive stance having concluded occupying the area it intended.

Plus OTL the sanctions were triggered by the extension of a Japanese region of control in Vichy French IC. It was a potential signal that Japan might go to war with western powers the US had an interest in aiding. Going to war with the Soviets and hence explicitly linking themselves to Nazi Germany is at least as big an issue to the US.

Not really, given the lack of economic interests in Siberia and latent Anti-Communism; you will recall that even after the Germans invaded the USSR, it took until November to extend the Lend Lease Act to the USSR.

Also a single poll proves nothing. As I have mentioned before I have seen discussions on this subject and a lot depends on the circumstances and especially the exact wording of the question asked. You can get widely differing results by slight changes in the wording.

Good thing I provided the exact wording of the poll and then followed it up with contemporary documentation concerning internal U.S. policy discussions among the political-military leadership in the case of Admiral Richardson and FDR, as well as provided modern historical research by historians which showed the great relief FDR felt even in December of 1941. I understand you have mentioned things, the problem is they don't match up with reality.

What you actually said was:


then provided a link that actually says


As such while it might have failed to achieve its original objectives, which could well have been vastly overrated, it came as a heavy blow to the Japanese and a shock to them. There is no evidence it was a disaster and the lack of major Chinese attacks until the end of the war was probably more due to supply shortages, possibly also impacted by their loss of some of their best units in the attempt to aid the defence of Burma.

Continously re-stating your premise does not advance your argument; the Japanese had such a heavy blow on them that they not only retained their conquests but actually were able to launch counter-attacks and the Chinese were so successful that launched a follow up attack...six years later. As I have said many times now, what is the military value of being surprised in a general sense?

As it were, however, your supply argument makes no sense; the attack was in late 1939 into early 1940. The Burma Road wasn't closed until 1942 in full and FIC was open until Mid-1940. Care to explain how almost two years of supply access failed to translate into further attacks?

There's a difference between accepting that major rearmament is necessary to deter or defend against an hostile threat and actually being at war.

In terms of aid from the Soviets its likely to be limited by their own needs but geography isn't an issue. Unless your suggesting that the Japanese as well as parts of the Soviet Far East Provinces are going to advance through Mongolia and into Xinjiang. However in the proposed scenario its almost certain that the Burma link with be considerably expaned over what it was producing prior to the colonies conquest by the Japanese.

The issue is less of men raised than the ability to transport and support them. Plus given that sooner or later Japan will almost certainly be at war with the western powers some forces will be needed in Japan itself and in fighting against the western powers.

Somehow Japan was able to supply them across the largest ocean in existence but can't do so here despite having access to a railway network that will not be bombed nor can be intercepted by American submarines?

So they won't be using large numbers of a/c or motorised vehicles across much of the vast areas your assuming they overrun? And the IJN is willing to site quietly in port while its bitter rival/enemy the IJA is gaining all the prestige and resources? Their not going to be defending Japanese maritime trade or performing training operations, let alone trying to attack allied trade lines once their at war with the western powers.

Yes if the IJN is willing to play a distant 2nd fiddle to the army they can cut their oil consumption considerably but there will be costs and there will be limits to how much they can cut their total consumption.

I'm sure the IJN will be doing all of that and the IJA is definitely going to be using their motor pool. This is still ahead of OTL, because you aren't fighting fleet engagements or operating from FOBs in the Southwest Pacific, Indian Ocean, etc.

 

[Buba]

Looking at that map - IMO anything beyond #1 is Operation Sea Lion territory ...
Operations through empty steppes/deserts or along a single RR through forested mountains.
Good luck!

 

[Jaenera Targaryen]

Looking at that map - IMO anything beyond #1 is Operation Sea Lion territory ...
Operations through empty steppes/deserts or along a single RR through forested mountains.
Good luck!

You're right. And the best part of it all, after Zhukov successfully bluffed them at Khalkin Gol, the Japanese realized this too. The final plan for Hokushin-ron focused only on #1.

 

[gral]

Looking at that map - IMO anything beyond #1 is Operation Sea Lion territory ...
Operations through empty steppes/deserts or along a single RR through forested mountains.
Good luck!

The northern part of #2 might be feasible(in fact, I would really try to anchor my defensive line on those mountain ranges). But anything else isn't.

 

[ATP]

The northern part of #2 might be feasible(in fact, I would really try to anchor my defensive line on those mountain ranges). But anything else isn't.

Indeed.Lake Baikal would be good buffer,too.Anything more - not with their technology.

 

[stevep]

They did IOTL, so why exactly would they not here given your assertions about the fuel crisis being even worse? I understand you have a certain bias, but objectively, this is definitely true of the Japanese in terms of them realizing the situation and working effectively to fix it; you've posted your chart yourself which outlines this perfect.



All of which he rejected and instituted stricter rules upon the Kriegsmarine in the Fall of 1941 to reduce conflict.



I don't recall specifically arguing that here and given you are the one making the claim here, good debate form calls for you to respond with your own evidence first to make your own case. As for your question, it's simple: the Japanese started their conflict with the United States. Hitler thought he had the Russians on the ropes and with the Japanese in, the economic balance of power would thus favor the Axis sufficient that he could risk a war with the United States.



If you're having to make grammar arguments, it's a pretty clear sign you have nothing to back your own argument up. As it were though, I have in the past given you a digital copy of Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, so I know you have access to the same exact sources I do to make my arguments, so forgive for being less than impressed here. If you feel I'm wrong in this, how about you actually cite something? Certainly if you feel your case is as self evident as you project, this would be easy for you to do.



They actually didn't apply them until August, six months after the poll and following the Japanese occupation of Southern Indochina; it wasn't out of the blue sanctions but directly tied to Japanese expansionism in Southeast Asia. It also wasn't FIC specifically, but the rather obvious utility of it to be used as a springboard into the rest of region, such as in Malay which was a very big source of U.S. rubber supplies.

And no, the Japanese aren't going to have serious issues; they have reserves sufficient to last until 1943 and thereafter would have Northern Karafuto sufficiently built up to alleviate any strains on the IJA itself and probably the IJN because by 1943 the IJA will definitely be on a defensive stance having concluded occupying the area it intended.



Not really, given the lack of economic interests in Siberia and latent Anti-Communism; you will recall that even after the Germans invaded the USSR, it took until November to extend the Lend Lease Act to the USSR.



Good thing I provided the exact wording of the poll and then followed it up with contemporary documentation concerning internal U.S. policy discussions among the political-military leadership in the case of Admiral Richardson and FDR, as well as provided modern historical research by historians which showed the great relief FDR felt even in December of 1941. I understand you have mentioned things, the problem is they don't match up with reality.



Continously re-stating your premise does not advance your argument; the Japanese had such a heavy blow on them that they not only retained their conquests but actually were able to launch counter-attacks and the Chinese were so successful that launched a follow up attack...six years later. As I have said many times now, what is the military value of being surprised in a general sense?

As it were, however, your supply argument makes no sense; the attack was in late 1939 into early 1940. The Burma Road wasn't closed until 1942 in full and FIC was open until Mid-1940. Care to explain how almost two years of supply access failed to translate into further attacks?

Somehow Japan was able to supply them across the largest ocean in existence but can't do so here despite having access to a railway network that will not be bombed nor can be intercepted by American submarines?



I'm sure the IJN will be doing all of that and the IJA is definitely going to be using their motor pool. This is still ahead of OTL, because you aren't fighting fleet engagements or operating from FOBs in the Southwest Pacific, Indian Ocean, etc.

Interesting set of misdirections and basically ignoring what's actually been said. As well as claiming serious memory failure on your part. You can't even accept when your clearly been shown to be in the wrong.

One person in the past, on another site supplied me with an electronic copy of Wages of Destruction but that wasn't you on this site. I did ask a couple of times early on whether we had met before on another site but you never answered that question and one time when I mentioned that site on another matter you claimed not to know about it.

Its weird that you mention WoD when you can claim it supports your case then ignore or claim its rubbish when it - far more of the time - is directly disagreeing with your arguments.

 

[History Learner]

Had this pointed out to me on another forum, so I thought I'd share it here. Likewise, apparently in late 1942 the combined fleet was using around 305,000 tons of fuel a month. So I wanted to run a thought exercise based on that:

305,000 tons x 6 months = 15,463,500 barrels

Okay, first, holy shit at that fuel consumption.

Now, considering this war between Japan and the USSR would be predominantly land based, with the IJN largely limited to suppressing Vladivostok and conducting training missions, I think it would be fair to say the IJN would be consuming far less resources; they aren't projecting the Kido Butai at Midway or duking it out in the Solomons, for example. So let's say monthly consumption is 150,000 tons per month in the second half 1942, and further assuming oil consumption late 1941-early 1942 is OTL. We'll also round off to 15 million barrels in saving.

In short, Japan is fuel sufficient here, thanks to Sakhalin and reduced naval consumption.