raharris1973
Well-known member
What if post-Feb 1917 revolution/Provisional Government Russia is ISOT *forward* in time?
Imagine if it is pretty much the entirety of Russia, those parts unoccupied by Central Powers, from May 1st 1917. The "governance" situation, such as it is, actually "dual power" between the Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet. As Premier of the Provisional Government, it is actually not yet Alexander Kerensky, the first leader to come to mind - Prince Georgi Lvov is Premier. Lenin arrived back in the country about two weeks earlier.
I am imagining two different version of the scenario of how far forward into the future this Russia goes to:
Scenario A: This Russia goes forward exactly one year to May 1st, 1918, to the astonishment of the receiving world. Central Powers and Entente (& Associated) Powers are equally amazed at the supernatural event. The Bolshevik Revolution and Peace of Brest-Litovsk have been undone, by act of G-d or something supernatural or inexplicable, while the Germans are still in the middle of the spring 1918 western offensive.
Good news for the Entente & Associated Powers: They have an ally on the eastern front once more, in place of the defecting, faithless revolutionary regime that exposed embarrassing diplomatic secrets. Bad news- Any envoys, diplomats, emissaries or interventionary troops (not many yet), or forces activated like the Czech Legion, are "overwritten" by 1917 history and disappear.
Bad news for Central Powers: They have just lost all the territories conceded to them as occupation zones or puppet states by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk from Russia, except which they held as of May 1, 1917, plus any occupation forces east or north of the battle lines of that day.
Good news for Russia: They exist in May 1, 1918 without a Bolshevik takeover or Civil War, with German and Austrian and Ottoman lines in front of them that are not especially strong (because in 1918 they were not the front lines any more), and with the great bulk of German forces committed to the western front and Austrian forces committed to the Italian and Balkan fronts, against Allied forces whose American and British Empire components are ever growing.
Bad news for Russia: Russia is still deposited in the middle of WWI actively going on. May 1918 is closer to the war's November 1918 end than May 1917 is for sure, but it is still far from clear that Russia has six more months of war endurance left in it, or even four or five months [because its sudden reappearance will be bad for CP morale and quite probable hasten CP collapse]. The more moderate Socialists in control of the May 1917 version of the Petrograd Soviet, and the May 1917 leaders of the Provisional Government, can also be made rapidly aware, by uptime western interlocutors, of Lenin's takeover tactics, his Bolsheviks' dispersal of the vaunted Constituent Assembly in Jan 1918, and the humiliating concessions to Germany they made at Brest-Litovsk and the outbreak of Civil War, which should make Lenin and the Bolsheviks *very unpopular* to Russians with a May 1917 frame of mind. They would also become aware of the improprieties of others, like Lavr Kornilov.
What happens in the months after this May 1918, with Provisional Government Russia's second chance? Can Russia avoid a second, radical revolution, Leninist Bolshevik or otherwise? Can it stay in the war until Central Powers capitulation? When in 1918 would Central Powers capitulation occur?
What happens differently postwar?
And now for the second:
Scenario B: This Russia (from May 1, 1917) goes forward four years, to May 1, 1921, just a little while after the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish Peace of Riga and Soviet reincorporation of Georgia.
Geographically speaking, the May, 1917 Russia portions only come forward to "overwrite" territory that had become Soviet as of May 1921, not areas that had become successor states inheriting outlying pieces of former Russian Empire territory, like the Second Polish Republic, Finland, the Baltic States, Romania, Ataturk's Republic of Turkey, etc.
Good news for Russia/USSR's interwar neighbors: They get to exist, at least for the moment, with their territory intact.
Good news for the Russian Provisional Government: Through this ISOT, it has "fast-forwarded" to a Europe and globe that is more generally at peace, with WWI definitely over, and not have that millstone around its neck as a major stressor. Bad news - It has lost some territory and frontline troops who do not fit within the ISOT'ed "footprint". It should be able to proceed with the Constituent Assembly and desired domestic reforms with all deliberate speed. The Constituent Assembly of OTL overwhelmingly elected parties within a Socialist spectrum. How would Socialist politics fare under peacetime condition? Would Russia be completely safe from radical leftist dictatorial revolution/takeover in a situation where the WWI factor has been made irrelevant?
Imagine if it is pretty much the entirety of Russia, those parts unoccupied by Central Powers, from May 1st 1917. The "governance" situation, such as it is, actually "dual power" between the Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet. As Premier of the Provisional Government, it is actually not yet Alexander Kerensky, the first leader to come to mind - Prince Georgi Lvov is Premier. Lenin arrived back in the country about two weeks earlier.
I am imagining two different version of the scenario of how far forward into the future this Russia goes to:
Scenario A: This Russia goes forward exactly one year to May 1st, 1918, to the astonishment of the receiving world. Central Powers and Entente (& Associated) Powers are equally amazed at the supernatural event. The Bolshevik Revolution and Peace of Brest-Litovsk have been undone, by act of G-d or something supernatural or inexplicable, while the Germans are still in the middle of the spring 1918 western offensive.
Good news for the Entente & Associated Powers: They have an ally on the eastern front once more, in place of the defecting, faithless revolutionary regime that exposed embarrassing diplomatic secrets. Bad news- Any envoys, diplomats, emissaries or interventionary troops (not many yet), or forces activated like the Czech Legion, are "overwritten" by 1917 history and disappear.
Bad news for Central Powers: They have just lost all the territories conceded to them as occupation zones or puppet states by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk from Russia, except which they held as of May 1, 1917, plus any occupation forces east or north of the battle lines of that day.
Good news for Russia: They exist in May 1, 1918 without a Bolshevik takeover or Civil War, with German and Austrian and Ottoman lines in front of them that are not especially strong (because in 1918 they were not the front lines any more), and with the great bulk of German forces committed to the western front and Austrian forces committed to the Italian and Balkan fronts, against Allied forces whose American and British Empire components are ever growing.
Bad news for Russia: Russia is still deposited in the middle of WWI actively going on. May 1918 is closer to the war's November 1918 end than May 1917 is for sure, but it is still far from clear that Russia has six more months of war endurance left in it, or even four or five months [because its sudden reappearance will be bad for CP morale and quite probable hasten CP collapse]. The more moderate Socialists in control of the May 1917 version of the Petrograd Soviet, and the May 1917 leaders of the Provisional Government, can also be made rapidly aware, by uptime western interlocutors, of Lenin's takeover tactics, his Bolsheviks' dispersal of the vaunted Constituent Assembly in Jan 1918, and the humiliating concessions to Germany they made at Brest-Litovsk and the outbreak of Civil War, which should make Lenin and the Bolsheviks *very unpopular* to Russians with a May 1917 frame of mind. They would also become aware of the improprieties of others, like Lavr Kornilov.
What happens in the months after this May 1918, with Provisional Government Russia's second chance? Can Russia avoid a second, radical revolution, Leninist Bolshevik or otherwise? Can it stay in the war until Central Powers capitulation? When in 1918 would Central Powers capitulation occur?
What happens differently postwar?
And now for the second:
Scenario B: This Russia (from May 1, 1917) goes forward four years, to May 1, 1921, just a little while after the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish Peace of Riga and Soviet reincorporation of Georgia.
Geographically speaking, the May, 1917 Russia portions only come forward to "overwrite" territory that had become Soviet as of May 1921, not areas that had become successor states inheriting outlying pieces of former Russian Empire territory, like the Second Polish Republic, Finland, the Baltic States, Romania, Ataturk's Republic of Turkey, etc.
Good news for Russia/USSR's interwar neighbors: They get to exist, at least for the moment, with their territory intact.
Good news for the Russian Provisional Government: Through this ISOT, it has "fast-forwarded" to a Europe and globe that is more generally at peace, with WWI definitely over, and not have that millstone around its neck as a major stressor. Bad news - It has lost some territory and frontline troops who do not fit within the ISOT'ed "footprint". It should be able to proceed with the Constituent Assembly and desired domestic reforms with all deliberate speed. The Constituent Assembly of OTL overwhelmingly elected parties within a Socialist spectrum. How would Socialist politics fare under peacetime condition? Would Russia be completely safe from radical leftist dictatorial revolution/takeover in a situation where the WWI factor has been made irrelevant?