What If Italy fights smart in 1940

sillygoose

Well-known member
The Italian Army developed a sound and unique combined arms doctrine for mechanized warfare in 1938. This new doctrine was called the War of Rapid Decision. It involved the use of mechanized warfare in the Italian version of the blitzkrieg. This doctrine evolved from the lessons learned in the Italian-Ethiopian War of 1935 to 1936 and the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. With Italys entry into World War II, military operations ensued along the Libyan-Egyptian border between the Italian 10th Army and a much smaller British Western Desert Force. The Italian Army in Libya outnumbered the British Army in Egypt by a ratio of four to one. The setting seemed to be ideal for the employment of the War of Rapid Decisions. Moreover, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, who was the commander of the Italian 10th Army in North Africa during its first campaign in the western desert had pioneered this new from of mechanized warfare during the Ethiopian War. Surprisingly, the Italian forces in Libya did not employ their new doctrine, reverting instead to more conventional techniques of mass. It was Graziani's failure to utilize the doctrine which he had helped to develop that led to Italys embarrassing defeat in 1941.

I came across an interesting thesis about Italian 'blitzkrieg' doctrine and how it could have been applied in North Africa in 1940 for the invasion of Egypt and thought it would be an interesting what if scenario. P.83 in the above paper in the conclusion section has the what if scenario if anyone wants the details.

What if Graziani opted to invade Egypt with a mechanized corps instead of a large infantry army? The corps could be entirely motorized and mechanized as well as logistically sustainable all the way to the Nile and the British were not at all ready to stop them. The author of the paper makes the case that the Italians could have seized Alexandria quite quickly and forced the British to retreat across the Red Sea, which also would have deprived the British Mediterranean Fleet their main harbor in the region.

Assuming this all plays out and it is the British who get overrun early on in the war, the paper suggests August 1940 was viable for the start of Italian operations, well before the British were ready to launch Operation Compass, how does it impact the rest of the war? The Suez is now contested and Egypt has largely fallen; Alexandria is in Italian hands and able to be used as a port while the RN is evicted and has its supply lines via the Suez cut; the Italians can ship supplies in to Alexandria instead of having to move them overland; and Malta is now well out of supply.

Would this be enough to push the British over the edge into negotiations to end the war? If not how would the British recover their position? Would the Italians be more respected in the Axis alliance? How does the US react?
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Do the Axis conquer Palestine in this TL?
Doubtful given the logistics of what that would entail. Plus the Mediterranean would remain Italy's show, leaving Rommel out.
Greece probably doesn't happen ITTL, as Egypt is much more valuable and going to be an ongoing concern, especially as there is the need to link up with Italian East Africa and try and capture as much of Africa as they could, since with Egypt they'd could have a contiguous series of colonies from Libya to East Africa.

Malta might be abandoned by the British, as they apparently were thinking of doing so until Compass worked out so well. Question is does Britain quit if Egypt is overrun, as least enough to force out the RN and close the Suez and Nile.
 

WolfBear

Well-known member
Greece probably doesn't happen ITTL, as Egypt is much more valuable and going to be an ongoing concern, especially as there is the need to link up with Italian East Africa and try and capture as much of Africa as they could, since with Egypt they'd could have a contiguous series of colonies from Libya to East Africa.

If so, no 1941 Yugoslav coup, right? Which means a 12-day earlier start to Operation Barbarossa in 1941, possibly a decisive one?
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
If so, no 1941 Yugoslav coup, right? Which means a 12-day earlier start to Operation Barbarossa in 1941, possibly a decisive one?
You mean if Britain quits in 1940? There very well could be no Barbarossa here either. After all most of the biggest pressures that caused it was the food situation due to the British blockade, raw material shortages from the blockade, and the threat of a Soviet attack while Germany is tied down against Britain.

If you mean no Greece due to Italy being more involved in Africa then that had zero impact on Yugoslavia as that had a totally different cause; they were only tangentially linked due to Germany adding Yugoslavia to the hit list after the coup caused them to break the alliance with Germany, so the Greece invasion by Germany turned into Greece+Yugoslavia.

That said if Yugoslavia happens and Greece is neutral then yes the invasion is over by mid-May and forces are able to move back into place. Not just 12 days earlier, but the forces sent to Greece are instead used for Barbarossa with much less wear and tear.
That means 12th army attacks out of Romania on day 1 of the offensive rather than the weaker 11th army a week into the war but now with a panzer corps so they could try for a pincer move (utilizing the 2nd and 5th Panzer divisions, which were too occupied in Greece to participate in Barbarossa until Typhoon). Plus the paratroopers would also be available, so you could well see them utilized in Barbarossa, either initially to sieze Dvina river crossings or Riga and/or held back to take the Baltic islands quickly. Later they could even be used for the move on Leningrad, but depending on their dispositions that may mean that the transports instead get used to provide air supply for a panzer corps blitzing the city.

Either way all that coupled with Rommel and the units he led being used for Barbarossa means the invasion more likely succeeds than not.
 

ATP

Well-known member


I came across an interesting thesis about Italian 'blitzkrieg' doctrine and how it could have been applied in North Africa in 1940 for the invasion of Egypt and thought it would be an interesting what if scenario. P.83 in the above paper in the conclusion section has the what if scenario if anyone wants the details.

What if Graziani opted to invade Egypt with a mechanized corps instead of a large infantry army? The corps could be entirely motorized and mechanized as well as logistically sustainable all the way to the Nile and the British were not at all ready to stop them. The author of the paper makes the case that the Italians could have seized Alexandria quite quickly and forced the British to retreat across the Red Sea, which also would have deprived the British Mediterranean Fleet their main harbor in the region.

Assuming this all plays out and it is the British who get overrun early on in the war, the paper suggests August 1940 was viable for the start of Italian operations, well before the British were ready to launch Operation Compass, how does it impact the rest of the war? The Suez is now contested and Egypt has largely fallen; Alexandria is in Italian hands and able to be used as a port while the RN is evicted and has its supply lines via the Suez cut; the Italians can ship supplies in to Alexandria instead of having to move them overland; and Malta is now well out of supply.

Would this be enough to push the British over the edge into negotiations to end the war? If not how would the British recover their position? Would the Italians be more respected in the Axis alliance? How does the US react?

British was supported by FDR,so they woud not surrender.Germans would attack soviet erlier,but Hitler would find a way to not finish soviets,as he did in OTL.
Longer war in Africa without germans,but till 1943 italian would be driven off.
Soviets woud take less,Allies more - but war still end in 1945.

All in all - the same result,but if italians take Palestine and germans send jews there instead of genociding them,there woud be no Izrael after WW2.Becouse they would be german allies then.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
British was supported by FDR,so they woud not surrender.
Not really in 1940. The Brits had to prove they could hold out before the US would authorize any aid. Lend Lease didn't come about until March 1941. Even the destroyers for bases deal only came in September. Britain losing Egypt in August-September would be a massive blow to their international credibility and potential of US support, as the US didn't want to give arms to Britain for them to end up in German hands.
 

stevep

Well-known member
The basis issue is that Italy choose large infantry forces rather than developing smaller motorised forces and the former were basically impractical for deep advances in N Africa with the limited logistics available. Some Italian officers might have had ideas about mobile warfare but without the support of higher ranks and the industrial base its no a practical option, especially to develop such in only a couple of years.

If somehow the Italians did manage to get most of Egypt it might force Churchill's removal and a new government surrendering to the Axis. Which would be very, very bad for Europe as its likely the US would turn its back even more on Europe and Britain would, in the short/medium term have far too little power so deaths are going to be massively higher than OTL.

If Britain does hold out after losing Egypt Roosevelt will seek to 'support' it because the UK is doing a very important job for the US by keeping the Nazis at bay to some degree. L-L came about because Britain no longer had assets to sell for US supplies and keeping Britain fighting the Nazis was too valuable for Roosevelt to have them make peace.

Either way, and especially since an Italian occupation of Egypt and no invasion of Greece would mean no German involvement in N Africa, Barbarossa would still occur. Hitler wants those resources for his greater German empire and also to remove the Slavs, the Bolsheviks and the Jews all of which he had a deranged hatred of. Food wasn't a great issue as he was happy to starve Jews and later Slavs but he wanted the grain fields of Ukraine and the neighbouring steppes so he could have the food resources for the massive Germanic population he desired. Ditto with the mineral resources of other areas of the USSR, so that he could take on the US without the potential for being 'starved out' as Germany was in WWI. Despite the fact the primary reason for the hunger problems in Germany in WWI being misallocation of resources by the leadership. I say the US because with the richest parts of the USSR occupied - and largely depopulated - and France and Britain both broken as great powers the US would be the only possible challenge in the near term, whether talking of military or economic conflict.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
The basis issue is that Italy choose large infantry forces rather than developing smaller motorised forces and the former were basically impractical for deep advances in N Africa with the limited logistics available. Some Italian officers might have had ideas about mobile warfare but without the support of higher ranks and the industrial base its no a practical option, especially to develop such in only a couple of years.
The paper makes the case that they'd have to reorganize a bit and leave much of their infantry behind, but that enough equipment and supplies existed to form a motorized corps with tanks and to sustain some foot infantry to hold supply lines. The doctrine also existed for a 'war of rapid decision', which Graziani, one of the generals who helped devise it, nevertheless discounted. I think he was too cautious and thinking the British would be able to strike back harder than they actually were capable of. That and Mussolini telling him that all he needed to do was put a large number of boots on the ground for the negotiated peace deal that was assuredly coming shortly. That explains a large part of the rather silly Italian strategic maneuvers in 1940.

I get what you're saying about industry and sustainment, and largely agree with your point, but in this specific scenario/situation that isn't actually a problem if the general in charge was willing to reorganize the equipment of his armies in Libya to build the offensive force he needed to achieve a rapid decision. What was lacking wasn't the means, but rather than choice or mindset.

How about as a pretty standard option we have Italo Balbo not die in the friendly fire incident, so he retains command over the forces in Libya and Graziani doesn't show up and screw up.
Balbo sounds like the kind of guy who would go for a rapid decision rather than infantry heavy and in fact did reorganize both armies in Libya to attack Egypt as early as mid-July:
At the time of the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940, Balbo was the Governor-General of Libya and Commander-in-Chief of Italian North Africa (Africa Settentrionale Italiana, or ASI). He became responsible for planning an invasion of Egypt. After the surrender of France, Balbo was able to shift much of the men and materiel of the Italian Fifth Army on the Tunisian border to the Tenth Army on the Egyptian border. While he had expressed many legitimate concerns to Mussolini and to Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the Chief-of-Staff in Rome, Balbo still planned to invade Egypt as early as 17 July 1940.

Balbo had also been planning on war with British Egypt since 1935:
In 1935, as the "Abyssinia Crisis" worsened, Balbo began preparing plans to attack Egypt and Sudan. As Mussolini made his intentions to invade Ethiopia clear, relations between Italy and the United Kingdom became more tense. Fearing a "Mad Dog" act by Mussolini against British forces and possessions in the Mediterranean, Britain reinforced its fleet in the region and also its military forces in Egypt. Balbo reasoned that, should Britain choose to close the Suez Canal, Italian troop transports would be prevented from reaching Eritrea and Somalia. Thinking that the planned attack on Abyssinia would be crippled, Balbo asked for reinforcements in Libya. He calculated that such a gesture would make him a national hero and restore him to the centre of the political stage. The 7th Blackshirt Division (Cirene) and 700 aircraft were immediately sent from Italy to Libya. Balbo may have received intelligence concerning the feasibility of advancing into Egypt and Sudan from the famous desert researcher László Almásy.[26]
By 1 September 1935, Balbo secretly deployed Italian forces along the border with Egypt without the British knowing anything about it. At the time, British intelligence concerning what was going on in Libya was woefully inadequate. In the end, Mussolini rejected Balbo's over-ambitious plan to attack Egypt and Sudan and London learned about his deployments in Libya from Rome.[27]
By 1938 he was once again back at it:
The "Anglo-Italian Agreement" of April 1938 brought a temporary cessation of tensions between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Italy. For Balbo, the agreement meant the immediate loss of 10,000 Italian troops; it was characterised by renewed promises of undertakings that Mussolini had previously broken and he could easily break again. By the time of the "Munich Crisis", Balbo had his 10,000 troops back.[28]
At this time, Italian aircraft were making frequent overflights of Egypt and Sudan and Italian pilots were being familiarised with the routes and airfields. In 1938 and 1939, Balbo himself made a number of flights from Libya across the Sudan to Italian East Africa ('Africa Orientale Italiana', or AOI). He even flew along the border between AOI and British East Africa (now known as Kenya). In January 1939, Balbo was accompanied on one of his flights by German Colonel-General Ernst Udet.[28]

If somehow the Italians did manage to get most of Egypt it might force Churchill's removal and a new government surrendering to the Axis. Which would be very, very bad for Europe as its likely the US would turn its back even more on Europe and Britain would, in the short/medium term have far too little power so deaths are going to be massively higher than OTL.
In this event do you think FDR might even approach Stalin to see if he could be induced to back-stab Hitler?
I don't think Britain would surrender in the sense of conventional capitulation, not that that was really even being demanded by Hitler, just agree to a white peace with Germany (maybe old German colonies being returned) and having to make colonial concessions to Italy due to the facts on the ground.

Hypothetically what would happen internally in Britain after agreeing to this and facing defeat? Snap elections and a Labour victory? Feelers put out to Stalin for a deal against Hitler? Negotiations with the Americans to ensure Britain doesn't fall in the event Hitler attacks later (or economically to ensure that Britain doesn't have to knuckle under due to Berlin dictating trade pacts for the continent)?

If Britain does hold out after losing Egypt Roosevelt will seek to 'support' it because the UK is doing a very important job for the US by keeping the Nazis at bay to some degree. L-L came about because Britain no longer had assets to sell for US supplies and keeping Britain fighting the Nazis was too valuable for Roosevelt to have them make peace.
Without question, but FDR was rather mercenary with aid, so would still probably demand Britain be broke before they could get L-L.

Might Spain also enter if Italy is successful and it looks like Britain was on the ropes even more than IOTL? In that case even with US support and victory in the BoB could Britain even continue to hold out? The Mediterranean would be lost.

Either way, and especially since an Italian occupation of Egypt and no invasion of Greece would mean no German involvement in N Africa, Barbarossa would still occur. Hitler wants those resources for his greater German empire and also to remove the Slavs, the Bolsheviks and the Jews all of which he had a deranged hatred of. Food wasn't a great issue as he was happy to starve Jews and later Slavs but he wanted the grain fields of Ukraine and the neighbouring steppes so he could have the food resources for the massive Germanic population he desired.
Food was a problem, because even pre-war planning showed that assuming Ukraine was captured intact they would have to starve millions to solve their famine problem in the rest of Europe. As it was Stalin's Scorched Earth policy burned up or evacuated the grain and seed corn for next year as well as wrecked most of the agricultural tools, so the invasion only netted ashes and more mouths to feed. Which led to the Goebbel's diary entries about the food shortages in Germany as early as 1941. Certainly without the Mediterranean diversion Hitler was going east anyway, the question is whether the extra resources committed would ensure Moscow and/or Leningrad falls in 1941. In victory in 1941 the food situation would be effectively solved since the lack of resistance (relatively speaking compared to OTL) and situation with Britain could well mean the ending of the blockade in 1941 or '42 and the importing of seed corn and enough food to cover the gaps...though very likely far too late to save the millions of Soviet PoWs who starved in 1941.

Ditto with the mineral resources of other areas of the USSR, so that he could take on the US without the potential for being 'starved out' as Germany was in WWI.
If the US doesn't enter the war there really isn't an issue of 'taking on' the US. Contrary to US propaganda even pre-war there was no actual plan to fight the US, just the expectation and that US would be a competitor economically and might get aggressive with Germany since they would be cut out of Germany's trade bloc except when they could offer something lacking in Europe or the associated colonies.

Despite the fact the primary reason for the hunger problems in Germany in WWI being misallocation of resources by the leadership.
You trying to start a debate?

The primary issue was the blockade followed by the mobilization of farmers and horses. Germany had to import about 20% of her food needs in peacetime and mobilization only made that need greater. Organization was a very specific period that came mid-war.

Ludendorff made it worse for a period in mid 1916 to early 1917, but that was largely resolved organizationally by mid 1917 and of course thanks to the conquest of Romania and Ukraine in 1917 and 1918 respectively. The worst period of deaths from starvation came from the 1918-1919 blockade to force the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which was not an organizational issue, it was entirely due to the blockade and Allied armies living off of German farms during the Rhineland occupation.
C. Paul Vincent maintains that for the German people, they were the most devastating months of the blockade because "in the weeks and months following the armistice, Germany's deplorable state further deteriorated."[30]

C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915–1919, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, c1985ISBN 978-0-8214-0831-5, p. 145
Not included in the German government's December 1918 figure of 763,000 deaths were civilian deaths related to the famine in 1919. A recent academic study maintains that no statistical data exist for the death toll of the period immediately after the November 1918 armistice.[4] Dr. Max Rubner in an April 1919 article claimed that 100,000 German civilians had died from the continuation of the blockade of Germany after the armistice.[36] The British Labour Party antiwar activist Robert Smillie issued a statement in June 1919 condemning continuation of the blockade and claiming that 100,000 German civilians had died.[37][2]
In March 1919, Winston Churchill told the British House of Commons: "We are holding all our means of coercion in full operation or in immediate readiness for use. We are enforcing the blockade with vigor. We have strong armies ready to advance at the shortest notice. Germany is very near starvation. The evidence I have received from the officers sent by the War Office all over Germany shows first of all, the great privations which the German people are suffering, and secondly, the great danger of a collapse of the entire structure of German social and national life under the pressure of hunger and malnutrition. Now is therefore the moment to settle".[25]
The blockade was maintained for eight months after the November 1918 armistice. According to the New Cambridge Modern History, food imports into Germany were controlled by the Allies after the armistice until Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919.[26] From January 1919 to March 1919, Germany refused to agree to the demand by the Allies to surrender its merchant ships to Allied ports to transport food supplies. Germans considered the armistice a temporary cessation of the war and feared that if fighting broke out again, the ships would be confiscated outright.[27] In January, hoping to buy time, the German government notified an American representative in Berlin that the shortage of food would not become critical until late spring. Facing food riots at home, Germany finally agreed to surrender its fleet on 14 March 1919. The Allies allowed Germany, under their supervision, to import 300,000 tons of grain and 70,000 tons of cured pork per month until August 1919.[28] In April, the food from America arrived in Germany.[29] The restrictions on food imports were finally lifted on 12 July 1919 after Germany had signed the Treaty of Versailles.[26]
 
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Buba

A total creep
Interesting premise, for a motorised corps to be used instead of the normal PBI.

1 - How many Indian and ANZAC Divisions could the British put into the Nile Delta in 3Q40? Is a protracted campaign there possible?
If not into Egypt, then part of these forces go to Iraq. See #2

2 - Italy captures Egypt, maybe even Palestine, and ... then what?

Land campaign against Iraq? Good luck with the logistics of that. No RR, no roads, a desert, no shipping.

A push into the Red Sea? Even if - a big if - the Italians establish a naval link with Erytrea, then there will be Aden blocking the way. Not that Italians can go far without a fleet train of the sort the USN built for the Pacific ...

IMO the wise thing (after wrecking and mining the Suez Canal) would be to fall back to Iraq and Aden. But the British PM is the excitable "Easterner" who embodies the British ankle biting strategy - let us attack an island nobody heard about here, a peninsula there, an underbelly hither - to a tee.
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
Interesting premise, for a motorised corps to be used instead of the normal PBI.

1 - How many Indian and ANZAC Divisions could the British put into the Nile Delta in 3Q40? Is a protracted campaign there possible?
If not into Egypt, then part of these forces go to Iraq. See #2
None from what I can tell. The East African campaign started before this and sucked in whatever the British could throw at the problem. 1941 would be the earliest they could counterattack.

2 - Italy captures Egypt, maybe even Palestine, and ... then what?
Probably up to the Nile, but no further due to logistics and RN harassment.

Land campaign against Iraq? Good luck with the logistics of that. No RR, no roads, a desert, no shipping.
Exactly.

A push into the Red Sea? Even if - a big if - the Italians establish a naval link with Erytrea, then there will be Aden blocking the way. Not that Italians can go far without a fleet train of the sort the USN built for the Pacific ...
Everything would hinge on taking control over the Suez so they could push naval units and supplies through.
Probably small units hoping that land based air cover would make up for their lack of relative strength compared to the RN.

IMO the wise thing (after wrecking and mining the Suez Canal) would be to fall back to Iraq and Aden. But the British PM is the excitable "Easterner" who embodies the British ankle biting strategy - let us attack an island nobody heard about here, a peninsula there, an underbelly hither - to a tee.
Plus there is the political side of things; without some offensive success Churchill probably gets toppled by a vote of no confidence and parliament could demand a peace deal. The ankle biting strategy was also one of political necessity.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Thanks, dinnae know :)
BTW - IMO a needless campaign. The Italians, unprepared for war, are not going anywhere far ...
Seems to have been somewhat necessary given the Italian aircraft and small fleet stationed there which was interdicting movement through the Red Sea/Suez:
When threatening Britain's naval lifeline they will react quickly.

I grudgingly admit that you make a good point :)

Although I don't think Parliament would demand peace.
Aw shucks, you say such nice things. ;)
Right, I should have said the War Cabinet thanks to Halifax. It would seem he would be vindicated by the result of fighting on.
 

stevep

Well-known member
In this event do you think FDR might even approach Stalin to see if he could be induced to back-stab Hitler?
I don't think Britain would surrender in the sense of conventional capitulation, not that that was really even being demanded by Hitler, just agree to a white peace with Germany (maybe old German colonies being returned) and having to make colonial concessions to Italy due to the facts on the ground.

I doubt it as he wouldn't have the support for any such contact plus Stalin was still a de-facto ally at the time. Albeit he would be panicking at the quick collapse of the western democracies and being aware he was next on Hitler's target list.

Would agree it wouldn't be a total surrender but unless we get a skilled leadership its likely there would be attempts to limit Britain's ability to defend itself against a future attack, let alone defend its interests elsewhere in the world.

Hypothetically what would happen internally in Britain after agreeing to this and facing defeat? Snap elections and a Labour victory? Feelers put out to Stalin for a deal against Hitler? Negotiations with the Americans to ensure Britain doesn't fall in the event Hitler attacks later (or economically to ensure that Britain doesn't have to knuckle under due to Berlin dictating trade pacts for the continent)?

Would depend on the circumstances. The Tories had a sizeable majority in Parliament so they might still win the election that would almost certainly follow or it could be Labour. Without the trauma of OTL WWII its aims might be different and obviously whomsoever in Britain would need higher military spending than OTL post 1945. Although the advantage would be that Britain has a lot more resources without the 1941-45 conflict and probably no conflict in the Far East either.

Can't see any deal with Stalin as he's still technically a Nazi ally and provided its not a total appeaser in charge Britain would be looking towards how it could rebuild its position, ideally both militarily and economically/technologically.

Without question, but FDR was rather mercenary with aid, so would still probably demand Britain be broke before they could get L-L.

No doubt. It would probably be 1-2 years later here because without a war with Germany Britain has less of a crisis and we can look at better options than imports from the US because merchant shipping and its defence wouldn't be such an issue.

Might Spain also enter if Italy is successful and it looks like Britain was on the ropes even more than IOTL? In that case even with US support and victory in the BoB could Britain even continue to hold out? The Mediterranean would be lost.

Its a definite possibility. Although I think Franco would have to decide between such an Italian success in Egypt and Britain being forced to make peace. Which might be unlikely given the state of the Spanish economy and how cautious Franco was.

Food was a problem, because even pre-war planning showed that assuming Ukraine was captured intact they would have to starve millions to solve their famine problem in the rest of Europe. As it was Stalin's Scorched Earth policy burned up or evacuated the grain and seed corn for next year as well as wrecked most of the agricultural tools, so the invasion only netted ashes and more mouths to feed. Which led to the Goebbel's diary entries about the food shortages in Germany as early as 1941. Certainly without the Mediterranean diversion Hitler was going east anyway, the question is whether the extra resources committed would ensure Moscow and/or Leningrad falls in 1941. In victory in 1941 the food situation would be effectively solved since the lack of resistance (relatively speaking compared to OTL) and situation with Britain could well mean the ending of the blockade in 1941 or '42 and the importing of seed corn and enough food to cover the gaps...though very likely far too late to save the millions of Soviet PoWs who starved in 1941.

If the Soviets were able to do the burnt earth OTL then their likely to be able to TTL. Especially since they will have a clear warning here with no opposition to Germany in the west so its obvious what that massive German build-up in the east is for.

In a 41 victory the key issue would be would Germany have the resources and the will to feed tens of millions of people they don't want? For year after year? After all that would take a lot of shipping and money that Hitler would want committed to further expansion and probably also his grandiose building projects. Especially since the expectation was they would have to starve 30-40M Soviets anyway to be able to send the grain east. It definitely wouldn't save the millions of POWs or other 'undesirables' that the Nazis wanted rid off.

If the US doesn't enter the war there really isn't an issue of 'taking on' the US. Contrary to US propaganda even pre-war there was no actual plan to fight the US, just the expectation and that US would be a competitor economically and might get aggressive with Germany since they would be cut out of Germany's trade bloc except when they could offer something lacking in Europe or the associated colonies.

As I said whether Hitler decides at a later stage, possibly in aliance with Japan or not for war with the US or simply seeks economic competition with it, that was the reason why Hitler wanted a huge resource rich and depopulated continental empire.

You trying to start a debate?

The primary issue was the blockade followed by the mobilization of farmers and horses. Germany had to import about 20% of her food needs in peacetime and mobilization only made that need greater. Organization was a very specific period that came mid-war.

Ludendorff made it worse for a period in mid 1916 to early 1917, but that was largely resolved organizationally by mid 1917 and of course thanks to the conquest of Romania and Ukraine in 1917 and 1918 respectively. The worst period of deaths from starvation came from the 1918-1919 blockade to force the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which was not an organizational issue, it was entirely due to the blockade and Allied armies living off of German farms during the Rhineland occupation.

No just stating that Germany over-moblizied, especially since it preferred recruiting men from rural rather than urban areas. To a degree all the combatants did this but with access to world markets the western allies were able to do this deliberately. This became even worse after L&H took over as they virtually ignored domestic needs in preference for military production. The conquest and looting of Romania and Ukraine helped although I think there are doubts about how much they managed to get from the latter given the level of chaos and disruption there.

Anyway the match with Wales is just about to start and I'm visiting friends later so catch up tomorrow.

Steve
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
I doubt it as he wouldn't have the support for any such contact plus Stalin was still a de-facto ally at the time. Albeit he would be panicking at the quick collapse of the western democracies and being aware he was next on Hitler's target list.

Would agree it wouldn't be a total surrender but unless we get a skilled leadership its likely there would be attempts to limit Britain's ability to defend itself against a future attack, let alone defend its interests elsewhere in the world.
At least from the offers made in 1940 IOTL Hitler was only asking for a white peace with potentially a return of German 1914 colonies. Question is whether he'd also demand no alliances or security deals with the US or USSR.

As to Stalin it appears that there were contacts in 1940 with the Soviets and Brits with efforts to work out a deal. Stalin wasn't really an ally, he was a 'benevolent' neutral with Germany, much like the US was with the UK. The US wasn't an ally of the UK at the time despite their deals and Germany and the US still had diplomatic relations (to some degree) and dialogue despite FDR's hatred of Germany.

Would depend on the circumstances. The Tories had a sizeable majority in Parliament so they might still win the election that would almost certainly follow or it could be Labour. Without the trauma of OTL WWII its aims might be different and obviously whomsoever in Britain would need higher military spending than OTL post 1945. Although the advantage would be that Britain has a lot more resources without the 1941-45 conflict and probably no conflict in the Far East either.

Can't see any deal with Stalin as he's still technically a Nazi ally and provided its not a total appeaser in charge Britain would be looking towards how it could rebuild its position, ideally both militarily and economically/technologically.
I was just thinking that with the Tories getting the tar from losing the war Labour would get the boost. Question is whether Britain could afford that higher spending given their loss of foreign exchange over 1940. By 1941 they were gliding on South African and Belgian gold loans until L-L kicked in. Granted of course that without a shooting war finances would be different as would military spending, but with defeats in the Mediterranean and on the continent Britain has a LOT of rebuilding of forces to do and not a lot of free cash to do so especially if they lose most of the Mediterranean holdings.

So how much money could Britain generate with the loss of colonies and major trade routes, plus probably loss of trade with the continent as Berlin imposes a trade bloc negotiated through it rather than the pre-war trade system between individual nations?

No doubt. It would probably be 1-2 years later here because without a war with Germany Britain has less of a crisis and we can look at better options than imports from the US because merchant shipping and its defence wouldn't be such an issue.
Of course, but what does that mean for long term rebuilding? Having to enduring greater shipping costs from the colonies, even with imperial preference being maintained, still means means greater cost overall, as good still need to be paid for by Britain. How long could Britain remain in quasi-mobilization and maintain her economy?

Its a definite possibility. Although I think Franco would have to decide between such an Italian success in Egypt and Britain being forced to make peace. Which might be unlikely given the state of the Spanish economy and how cautious Franco was.
Decide in what way? If Egypt falls and Spanish entry then means Britain loses Gibraltar, which would mean Malta falls, then it is highly probably that a peace deal is worked out. So there is hardly any reason to be cautious and in fact a closing window to get any gains, rather than holding out for a wish-list of French colonies as happened IOTL in November 1940.

If the Soviets were able to do the burnt earth OTL then their likely to be able to TTL. Especially since they will have a clear warning here with no opposition to Germany in the west so its obvious what that massive German build-up in the east is for.
Of course. The Soviets might well end up acting quite differently in their war plans. But then I also don't put it past Stalin to make the same mistakes because he was not a particularly realistic military commander.
In a 41 victory the key issue would be would Germany have the resources and the will to feed tens of millions of people they don't want? For year after year? After all that would take a lot of shipping and money that Hitler would want committed to further expansion and probably also his grandiose building projects. Especially since the expectation was they would have to starve 30-40M Soviets anyway to be able to send the grain east. It definitely wouldn't save the millions of POWs or other 'undesirables' that the Nazis wanted rid off.
If Britain is out of the war? They wouldn't need to worry about feeding occupied Europe, the governments there would have to do so. France had $3 billion in gold so they could easily do so. Germany could import from the others while those governments imported from their colonies and the US for cash. Without an economic blockade the entire situation is very different. There very well could be no invasion of the USSR due to lack of political will to do so. Hitler was apparently convinced that in peacetime there could be no invasion of the USSR due to the Germany people wanting to avoid further wars after conquering Europe.

Also keep in mind Hitler was interested in exporting the Jewish populations with the British merchant fleet to Madagascar, so there would be a ton of projects, plus a major need to give the German people rewards for their success, as if there is one thing we can be certain of was Hitler's fixation on making sure he was popular with the public so they didn't overthrow him (or at least another faction in the military couldn't get away with it). That would mitigate more war plans. The invasion of the USSR does really seem to have been a plan only possible in the context of the war as well as Hitler feeling that Stalin was getting ready to attack him. Had he won Stalin would be pretty well scared into placating Hitler instead of trying to jockey for prime position while Hitler was distracted.

As I said whether Hitler decides at a later stage, possibly in aliance with Japan or not for war with the US or simply seeks economic competition with it, that was the reason why Hitler wanted a huge resource rich and depopulated continental empire.
I strongly disagree with that view. He was seeking a continental empire after the war started to ensure Europe's economy could function without wider trade in the world; both the war AND the Depression had convinced not only him, but the economic planners of Germany that the only way forward was a semi-planned economy and integrating Europe into a single cooperative economic unit rather than one of competing nations. Nor did he want a depopulated continent; if you actually read the so-called "Hunger Plan" document all it really is is a food planning memo that points out in the context of the war if the German army isn't fed off of Soviet grain entirely by the 3rd year of the war Germany would be starved out and lose the war. The deaths of Soviet citizens was mentioned as an unfortunate byproduct of that necessity rather than the goal.

It is shitty analysis of more recent historians who linked the Generalplan Ost proposals (none of which were actually started before the invasion of the USSR except for one small plan adopted in 1940 that displaced a few hundred thousand Poles to make room for a few hundred thousand ethnic Germans deported from the USSR in 1940-41 in the areas of west Poland that were annexed into Germany) to the Baeke memo, claiming that together they were proof of a genocidal conspiracy that underlaid the invasion of the USSR. None of that is actually accurate if you look at the surviving evidence, not least of which because the claimed version of the plan (there were 6 proposals, 5 of which dealing with the USSR were written up between July 1941 and 1942, none have any evidence of being adopted, and in 1943 Hitler cancelled all future planning so all of them were scrapped) as being proof only even started being worked on in July 1941 with no evidence that they were ever adopted, just talking about within Himmler's staff and perhaps 1 or 2 of them discussed with Hitler...not that there is direct evidence of that either.

No just stating that Germany over-moblizied, especially since it preferred recruiting men from rural rather than urban areas. To a degree all the combatants did this but with access to world markets the western allies were able to do this deliberately. This became even worse after L&H took over as they virtually ignored domestic needs in preference for military production. The conquest and looting of Romania and Ukraine helped although I think there are doubts about how much they managed to get from the latter given the level of chaos and disruption there.
Not like they had a choice but to mobilize as much as they did, otherwise they'd have lost the war sooner and been carved up even worse than after WW2 given Entente proposals. During the war they conscripted everyone; it was only in the pre-war standing army that they preferred rural to urban recruits because of the health differential; urban recruits had all sorts of health problems that farm boys didn't have due to pollution, poverty, and lack of exposure to sunlight.

Yes the Entente (other than Russia) were able to just import from the US, so didn't have to worry about mobilizing farmers. L&H were economic morons, goaded on by rich industrialists hungry for profit, but their contributions to the problems lasted about 6-8 months and then were largely fixed. The structural problems of mobilizing men and horses though could not be resolved via organization; the only way was importing food and that wasn't an option thanks to the blockade. Ukraine's contributions weren't much food for Germany proper, but they did allow 1 million soldiers in the east to be fed off the land, so that meant 1 million fewer mouths to feed so their rations could instead be used for civilians.

Anyway the match with Wales is just about to start and I'm visiting friends later so catch up tomorrow.

Steve
Have fun.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
What if Graziani opted to invade Egypt with a mechanized corps instead of a large infantry army? The corps could be entirely motorized and mechanized as well as logistically sustainable all the way to the Nile and the British were not at all ready to stop them. The author of the paper makes the case that the Italians could have seized Alexandria quite quickly and forced the British to retreat across the Red Sea, which also would have deprived the British Mediterranean Fleet their main harbor in the region.

Assuming this all plays out and it is the British who get overrun early on in the war, the paper suggests August 1940 was viable for the start of Italian operations, well before the British were ready to launch Operation Compass,

Very interesting idea @sillygoose. I'm glad you suggested the offensive under this "fight smart" alternative does not start until August 1940, and not kicking off right at the Italian declaration of June 10th, because that wouldn't have been plausible.

The fact was, Italy was declaring war not to *fight* a war but to nominally get *in* to a war it considered practically over so it could claim some booty at the peace conference. If it thought it would have to fight, it would not have joined it.

So, in this scenario, the Italians declare war for the same reasons and so they are also not ready to attack anywhere, except demonstratively, and badly, at the French border, in June. But pre-war, they invested in a somewhat different force mix. By a little into July the Italians figure the war is going to last a little longer and an offensive on their part to force a decision in Africa could help their politico-strategic objectives. They are prepared to get started with an offensive some time in the month of August, 4 to 6 weeks after this realization.

Now, the question becomes, have the Italian attackers gotten to make better use of this time between the Italian declaration of war and D-Day for the Italian desert offensive whenever it starts in August? On the one hand, Italy in this scenario has a force designed for this sort of thing and does not have its homeland threatened. Britain has X number of weeks to prepare defenses, but it may be spending all its command resources reorganizing the Dunkirk evacuees and preparing for the threat of Sea Lion and German air attack and not devote the time, planning, resources to getting ready for a defense of Egypt.

On the other hand, when the Italians declared war, since it was a snap, opportunistic decision, based on the sudden deterioration of France, much of Italy's merchant fleet was badly positioned, in Allied controlled ports, where it could be and was seized, rather than Italian and Italian Empire ports, which seriously cut down Italian sealift from the beginning of their war. Could the Italians get their armored forces and logistic all to their jump off points in Cyrenaica with their available shipping in time for an August D-Day?
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Very interesting idea @sillygoose. I'm glad you suggested the offensive under this "fight smart" alternative does not start until August 1940, and not kicking off right at the Italian declaration of June 10th, because that wouldn't have been plausible.

The fact was, Italy was declaring war not to *fight* a war but to nominally get *in* to a war it considered practically over so it could claim some booty at the peace conference. If it thought it would have to fight, it would not have joined it.

So, in this scenario, the Italians declare war for the same reasons and so they are also not ready to attack anywhere, except demonstratively, and badly, at the French border, in June. But pre-war, they invested in a somewhat different force mix. By a little into July the Italians figure the war is going to last a little longer and an offensive on their part to force a decision in Africa could help their politico-strategic objectives. They are prepared to get started with an offensive some time in the month of August, 4 to 6 weeks after this realization.

Now, the question becomes, have the Italian attackers gotten to make better use of this time between the Italian declaration of war and D-Day for the Italian desert offensive whenever it starts in August? On the one hand, Italy in this scenario has a force designed for this sort of thing and does not have its homeland threatened. Britain has X number of weeks to prepare defenses, but it may be spending all its command resources reorganizing the Dunkirk evacuees and preparing for the threat of Sea Lion and German air attack and not devote the time, planning, resources to getting ready for a defense of Egypt.

On the other hand, when the Italians declared war, since it was a snap, opportunistic decision, based on the sudden deterioration of France, much of Italy's merchant fleet was badly positioned, in Allied controlled ports, where it could be and was seized, rather than Italian and Italian Empire ports, which seriously cut down Italian sealift from the beginning of their war. Could the Italians get their armored forces and logistic all to their jump off points in Cyrenaica with their available shipping in time for an August D-Day?
This isn't my scenario, but a US army general staff masters thesis that proposes this action. Balbo was reorganizing the Italian forces in North Africa for this before the war started and in fact had personally been planning an invasion of Egypt since 1935. Assuming Graziani built off (since he innovated this exact sort of mechanized offensive in Ethiopia) of that instead of going for a mass invasion with infantry, then the British could do nothing because they were extremely weak and took months to even prepare for a recon in force in November after the Italian invasion in September. No reason they couldn't have gotten prepared by OTL September invasion if they wanted. In fact it might be just easier to pre-suppose that instead just to build in maximum plausible time to prepare given that Graziani (replacement for Balbo) was the general in the scenario in the thesis.


Edit:
One of the sources in the thesis has a wealth of information about this specific scenario. If you want me to post the relevant material let me know because it is a lot. The book is quite clear that by mid-August the Italians could have been assembled and easily outnumbered the British; the author (Knox, "Mussolini Unleashed") even thinks that the Egyptian army, which refused to declare war on the Axis, might turn on the British if the Italians invaded and were perceived to be winning.
 
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stevep

Well-known member
At least from the offers made in 1940 IOTL Hitler was only asking for a white peace with potentially a return of German 1914 colonies. Question is whether he'd also demand no alliances or security deals with the US or USSR.

Question would be if he tried to insist on any military or economic concerns. If so how well could Britain get around them. The empire would be an assistance here as forces based in many of the colonies would be outside German control or realistic supervision.

As to Stalin it appears that there were contacts in 1940 with the Soviets and Brits with efforts to work out a deal. Stalin wasn't really an ally, he was a 'benevolent' neutral with Germany, much like the US was with the UK. The US wasn't an ally of the UK at the time despite their deals and Germany and the US still had diplomatic relations (to some degree) and dialogue despite FDR's hatred of Germany.

I don't know. They agreed a deal for sharing out much of eastern Europe and then multiple trade deals to help both sides. Stalin also aided German ships using the NE route to the Pacific, albeit only a few made that route.

I was just thinking that with the Tories getting the tar from losing the war Labour would get the boost. Question is whether Britain could afford that higher spending given their loss of foreign exchange over 1940. By 1941 they were gliding on South African and Belgian gold loans until L-L kicked in. Granted of course that without a shooting war finances would be different as would military spending, but with defeats in the Mediterranean and on the continent Britain has a LOT of rebuilding of forces to do and not a lot of free cash to do so especially if they lose most of the Mediterranean holdings.

Given that they would also be blamed for the depression and the suffering of much of the country during this period then the failure to maintain peace and security the Tories are going to take a hit. However they had a lead of nearly 300 seats in the 1935_United_Kingdom_general_election. As such it could go either way. Or you could end up with a hung parliament with a coalition needed. One wide card is that Hitler might insist on Mosley being released from custody and being allowed to stand and a number of right wing elements could end up supporting him.

So how much money could Britain generate with the loss of colonies and major trade routes, plus probably loss of trade with the continent as Berlin imposes a trade bloc negotiated through it rather than the pre-war trade system between individual nations?

Without actual fighting then costs are a lot cheaper. Even with the building up of the home defence and development of new equipment and doctrine. Ships aren't being sunk and Britain bombed while the ending of the blackout would in itself give a boost to British economic efficiency. Without fighting in N Africa and if say Italy also added Palestine and Sudan to its empire then it has to garrison them rather than Britain. Which it could find less than pleasant once the Arabs realise that their probably going to have less power than they had under Britain.

The territories lost aren't in themselves great sources of funds and assuming there is peace then Britain should be able to use the Suez Canal.

Yes Germany will seek to control economic activity on the continent but Britain has no trade with it anyway, other than some neutrals such as Spain and Sweden. Which will be a lot easier now. Britain will probably have products that Germany or other states on the continent will need anyway.

Of course, but what does that mean for long term rebuilding? Having to enduring greater shipping costs from the colonies, even with imperial preference being maintained, still means means greater cost overall, as good still need to be paid for by Britain. How long could Britain remain in quasi-mobilization and maintain her economy?

I'm not sure the costs are that much greater. British shipping costs were a lot cheaper than US ones for instance and prior to the war there was a lot of trade with the colonies and places like Argentina which were replaced by N America during wartime simply because it took less shipping and hence also escorts.

Nations, when under direct threat can spend a lot on defence for a prolonged period. It will be costly but a hell of a lot less costly than waging a war, let alone one on multiple fronts.

Decide in what way? If Egypt falls and Spanish entry then means Britain loses Gibraltar, which would mean Malta falls, then it is highly probably that a peace deal is worked out. So there is hardly any reason to be cautious and in fact a closing window to get any gains, rather than holding out for a wish-list of French colonies as happened IOTL in November 1940.

He's got to decide before an Italian conquest of Egypt prompts the replacement of Churchill and Britain making peace. He's also concerned on the defence of Spanish possessions, especially the Canary's if he goes to war with Britain. It would probably only take a small pause and he could easily lose the opportunity.

Of course. The Soviets might well end up acting quite differently in their war plans. But then I also don't put it past Stalin to make the same mistakes because he was not a particularly realistic military commander.

Except that I was talking about what you say happened OTL.

If Britain is out of the war? They wouldn't need to worry about feeding occupied Europe, the governments there would have to do so. France had $3 billion in gold so they could easily do so. Germany could import from the others while those governments imported from their colonies and the US for cash. Without an economic blockade the entire situation is very different. There very well could be no invasion of the USSR due to lack of political will to do so. Hitler was apparently convinced that in peacetime there could be no invasion of the USSR due to the Germany people wanting to avoid further wars after conquering Europe.

Do they make peace with occupied nations such as France, the Netherlands etc? Difficult not to do so if they make peace with Britain. If so they would struggle to continue demanding massive occupation costs on those states or seizing food from them.

There will be an invasion of the USSR because its one of two major desires of Hitler, along with the removal of the Jews, one way or another from Europe. He's been proclaiming his crusade against the Bolsheviks and the Slavs and the need for 'living space' and the resources of the European USSR for ~20 years now. Plus to get the economic security he desires he also need to seize control of those lands and remove most of their population.

Also keep in mind Hitler was interested in exporting the Jewish populations with the British merchant fleet to Madagascar, so there would be a ton of projects, plus a major need to give the German people rewards for their success, as if there is one thing we can be certain of was Hitler's fixation on making sure he was popular with the public so they didn't overthrow him (or at least another faction in the military couldn't get away with it). That would mitigate more war plans. The invasion of the USSR does really seem to have been a plan only possible in the context of the war as well as Hitler feeling that Stalin was getting ready to attack him. Had he won Stalin would be pretty well scared into placating Hitler instead of trying to jockey for prime position while Hitler was distracted.

The so called Madagascar plan, to send the Jews to die there was one proposal. How seriously he considered it I don't know. However that would still leave many Jews in Soviet occupied territory, as well as his delusion that Jews were behind the USSR.
He relied on propaganda and repression to keep people in Germany happy. Their economic condition was a relatively low priority for him.

I strongly disagree with that view. He was seeking a continental empire after the war started to ensure Europe's economy could function without wider trade in the world; both the war AND the Depression had convinced not only him, but the economic planners of Germany that the only way forward was a semi-planned economy and integrating Europe into a single cooperative economic unit rather than one of competing nations. Nor did he want a depopulated continent; if you actually read the so-called "Hunger Plan" document all it really is is a food planning memo that points out in the context of the war if the German army isn't fed off of Soviet grain entirely by the 3rd year of the war Germany would be starved out and lose the war. The deaths of Soviet citizens was mentioned as an unfortunate byproduct of that necessity rather than the goal.

He wanted a German empire dominated by a Aryan population which would rule all others. Other nations and people would have a clearly subordinate role at best and given the desire for a much larger German population others would have to be removed in large numbers to achieve that.

Since Germany managed to extend the war into a 6th year without holding most of the Soviet grain-fields for more than a couple of years and for much of that time the nature of the regime and the level of conflict meant that access to its resources weren't unlimited that is obviously inaccurate.


Not like they had a choice but to mobilize as much as they did, otherwise they'd have lost the war sooner and been carved up even worse than after WW2 given Entente proposals. During the war they conscripted everyone; it was only in the pre-war standing army that they preferred rural to urban recruits because of the health differential; urban recruits had all sorts of health problems that farm boys didn't have due to pollution, poverty, and lack of exposure to sunlight.

Not really. They ran out of other materials long before they started running short of men so they could have reserved more assets, especially experienced men and horses for agriculture.

Yes the Entente (other than Russia) were able to just import from the US, so didn't have to worry about mobilizing farmers. L&H were economic morons, goaded on by rich industrialists hungry for profit, but their contributions to the problems lasted about 6-8 months and then were largely fixed. The structural problems of mobilizing men and horses though could not be resolved via organization; the only way was importing food and that wasn't an option thanks to the blockade. Ukraine's contributions weren't much food for Germany proper, but they did allow 1 million soldiers in the east to be fed off the land, so that meant 1 million fewer mouths to feed so their rations could instead be used for civilians.

The problems were seriously worsened in the last year or so of the war with Ludendoff's emphasis on war production above all else.

Except that last bit meant that they couldn't use those men elsewhere, either in the west or releasing them for civilian work because they were needed to hold down the new eastern empire so it was a minimal gain.

Have fun.

Well it was tense as the Walsh staged a late fight-back and we wasted too many chances earlier in the game but we won. Got two tough matches coming up against Ireland, in a fortnight and then the French who are the current favourites.

After that its the women's 6 Nations so another few weekends screaming at the TV to come yet. :eek:
 

Buba

A total creep
Hmm - OK - the Italian Corpo Armatta Motorizata dashes across the Western Desert, running rings around the 7th Armoured. Supply is by truck and coastal ships. There are not enough British troops to plug the narrows at El Alamein, hence the Italians get into the delta.
But I imagine that the British demolish the port in Alexandria. Getting it running to support a large(ish) force will take months. Clearing mines and wrecks (I envision sinkings) from the Suez canala - that's also many months.
So, the Italians will not be going anywhere from Egypt until mid 1941?
What about the Egyptians? Hostile? Or only annoyed? With Italian track record in Libya I'd not imagine anybody tossing flowers at Mussolini's troops ...
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Hmm - OK - the Italian Corpo Armatta Motorizata dashes across the Western Desert, running rings around the 7th Armoured.
Not that the 7th Armoured wouldn't have gone on to become a high quality division, but in August 1940 they had only 65 tanks and were deficient in all sorts of gear. The reinforcements that came in later in the year hadn't arrived yet. As of mid-summer the British are highly vulnerable due to lack of men and equipment as well as the need for occupation duties and disloyalty by the Egyptians.

Supply is by truck and coastal ships. There are not enough British troops to plug the narrows at El Alamein, hence the Italians get into the delta.
But I imagine that the British demolish the port in Alexandria. Getting it running to support a large(ish) force will take months.
Clearing mines and wrecks (I envision sinkings) from the Suez canala - that's also many months.
Maybe. This could all happen quickly enough and the British be unbelieving enough that the Italians could be so audacious that they only manage to inflict superficial damage. Plus if the Egyptians turn on them they might not even get the chance to do anything.

So, the Italians will not be going anywhere from Egypt until mid 1941?
With or without major sabotage they probably wouldn't be advancing East into the Sinai at all. If the Egyptians help the Italians then it is possible for an expedition up the Nile to try and link up with East Africa. Then they could use rail supply, but would have to strike south into the Sudan.

What about the Egyptians? Hostile? Or only annoyed? With Italian track record in Libya I'd not imagine anybody tossing flowers at Mussolini's troops ...
Apparently the Egyptians were so hostile to the British that they refused to declare war on the Italians and the garrison was concerned about an uprising against them.

Besides the British didn't have a great record in the region either:

The king was so pro-Axis the British had to finally remove him from most of his power in 1942:

But there were plenty of issues between the Egyptians and Brits leading up to the war:

At the same time in 1941 that Rommel was inflicting a series of defeats on the British in the Western Desert, Farouk wrote to Hitler promising him that when the Wehrmacht entered the Nile river valley, he would bring Egypt into the war on the Axis side.[95] The American historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that the fact that Farouk wanted to see his country occupied by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany was not a sign of great wisdom on his part and that he never understood "...that Axis rule of Egypt was likely to be far more oppressive than British".[94]
Owing to the continuing British occupation of Egypt, many Egyptians, Farouk included, were positively disposed towards Germany and Italy, and despite the presence of British troops, Egypt remained officially neutral until the final year of the war. Consequently, Farouk's Italian servants were not interned, and there is an unconfirmed story that Farouk told British Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson (who had an Italian wife), "I'll get rid of my Italians when you get rid of yours".
Serry knew that his government was likely to be defeated on a motion of no confidence when Parliament opened on 3 February 1942, and in the meantime demonstrations by students at Cairo University and Al-Azhar University had broken out, calling for a German victory.[98]
 

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