I've been rather delayed in responding to the latest comments here. I'll try to do it in one go now, dividing my comment into segments on the "alt-World War I" scenario, on the "no World War I = Super-Russia" idea, and on the macrohistorical discussion.
Shades of Mackinder here...
Definitely. He had a point, even if we're allowed to critique many of the details. What's more, several key people at the time
also believed he had a point. I've mentioned Theodore Roosevelt in another thread on this site, noting that he firmly believed that any that could achieve hegomony over the Eurasian heartland would be a contender for world domination -- and thus a natural threat to America. This led him to the geopolitical strategy of "America must support the Eurasian periphery versus the Eurasian heartland". In practice, this meant fighting Germany (twice, as it happened) and then backing a rebuilt Germany as part of a European coalition against Russia (or rather, the USSR).
In other words: T.R. pretty much grasped the shape of the twentieth century, and he did it before World War I even broke out.
In a similar vein, there were German thinkers (and war planners, even), who though along the same lines. Colmar von der Goltz kept insisting that the "coming war" would be the last chance for Germany to effectively exploit its then-existing industrial superiority over Russia. Once Russia truly industrialised, disparity in size would doom the German efforts. Operation Barbarossa pretty much proved the point.
But would they make that offer? The more success they have on the East, the more pressure there will be for asking a lot from the French.
If Germany succeeds in the East, that'll give them more reason to be lenient in the West. Not less. This wouldn't be the end-of-the-line, to-the-bitter-end kind of situation we saw in the war's last days in OTL. What Germany wanted was
Mitteleuropa. It would have this. What Willy II wanted was
respect. He'd get that, or something close enough to it, by being the lordly victor who can offer a dignified peace. England wouldn't be at war, here. If he offers a white peae, he looks like the dashing hero. They'd finally see his
greatness. That's what he wanted.
Agreed that give actual French tactics they were going to have a disaster but did the Germans know what the French tactics were? It would be slow progress if properly supported attacks were made but is a potential problem in the longer term.
The Germans based their war plans on faulty assumptions, to be sure. Like everybody did. The key decision that would have to be made is not about France, but about Russia. If the argument "we need to defeat Russia immediately and decisively" wins out, we get an East First strategy. That argument
was made. At the very last minute, Falkenhayn grew to agree with it, even -- but by then it was too late.
Maybe a situation where fear of the ascendant Russian power is more acute (for some reason; can be as simple as an influential book being written) would suffice. someone like Schlieffen might latch onto that and turn his plan -- which served to support the need for a strong army -- into one that's aimed at Russia.
Yes Britain is likely to stay neutral for the moment but even if no invasion of Belgium, if its feared that there is a major shift in the balance of power, especially involving big gains for a clearly hostile Germany don't rely on this lasting.
There would certainly be major agitation in British politics, but we shouldn't forget that drumming up support for entry into the war was very tricky. Without the "rape of Belgium"? It's not happening. And if
France goes through Belgium? Britain will instead begin to very stridently support peace efforts, in an attempt to keep the war as limited and as short as possible.
The problem is getting this collapse when Russia is on the defensive rather than making attacks to ease pressure on their western allies. Getting deep enough into Russia to really weaken it, let alone force some sort of political collapse could require a bloody long way and a lot of fighting. Especially with the reduced technology and logistical capacity of the time. If Germany wants to remove Russia as a major threat rather than just delay matters for a decade or so it needs to go pretty deep or really break the Russia army and/or political system. Its a possibility but far from a certainty.
What I think Germany would intend, in this scenario, would not be to destroy Russia, but to critically weaken it. A key step would be limited its access to the Baltic. No less important would be shaving off the fertile Ukrainian heartland. Despriving Russia of these regions (from North-West to South-East: Karelia, the Baltic states, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine) would provide a strategic buffer, and would economically weaken Russia. Moreover, drawing these regions into a German-led economic union (and, no doubt, military defence pact) would
add their economic worth to the German side.
This would put Germany in a strong position, where any future conflicts are concerned. Basically, they'd have the German high-water mark of World War II as their
starting position in the ATL conflict.
Yes the German army was very good, although it showed some flaws. However OTL Russia, despite early losses in waging offensives and then taking a battering in 1915 help the northern Baltics until the army and regime pretty much collapsed. Ditto that they never got into the Ukraine before Lenin and Trotsky made such an advance very easy. Especially if Romania stayed neutral, which would shorten the line - its 1917 dow was a disaster for Russia given how quickly it was overrun.
With their main armies fighting in the east their going to get further faster but I think a Russian collapse will at the least be delayed. Its going to be very costly for Germany to make the gains your suggesting, even with A-H manpower helping them out. As I said elsewhere its not impossible but I think its far from certain.
(Quoting this one out of sequence, since it ties into the above directly.)
We must keep in mind that Germany achieved considerable success in the East in OTL, despite the fact that they intended for this front to be purely defensive (at least until France was defeated, go figure). On this basis, I think we shouldn't under-estimate what Germany would be able to achieve if the actual plan was to dedicate the bulk of its forces to the Eastern front right away, and to engage in an aggressive strategy.
The Germans are not supermen, of course, and they'll have limits. If they make an insane play for Moscow, they end like Nappy. That's for sure. But if they adopt a sensible "carve off peripheral regions and hold them" strategy, I don't see them failing. It would be bloody, of course, just as OTL was bloody. But the Russians would have to counter-attack, since attempts to lure the Germans in too deeply would not work (if they know what they're doing, they will refuse such bait). Then it comes down to a shit-fight, and I'm confident Germany wins that. After enough tactical victories, they amount to strategic success (just ask Julius Caesar, he mastered that approach).
This leaves us in a situation where Germany has by and large advanced as far as it's willing to go, and advanced just a bit more with every victory. Russia keeps throwing men at it, but the Germans keep advancing. Germany intends for simple peace terms: "we keep what we've conquered". The longer Russia stays in the war, the more constly it becomes, and the more Germany slowly nibbles away. Meanwhile, France is bogged down in the West. Nobody else is coming to help. So... how long until Russia throws in the towel to prevent things from getting ever worse?
----------------------------------------------------------
There was a large amount of economic modernisation but was the potential for political change there? Or a real clear out of the level of corruption and aristocratic privilege. Not saying they couldn't come but its far from certain that it would. Hopefully for Russia it would have meant a relatively minor level of disorder and violence but to succeed Russia needed a lot broader base in terms of what people could make a difference. OTL this happened for a short while before the Soviets built up their own bureacracy and aristocracy, but as you said at huge costs and after a brief while replacing the Romanov's with an even more autocratic and corrupt regime.
OTL was, in my opinion, the worst case scenario for Russia. They literally got the least effective system one
can get, and they ended up with the most thuggish criminals in charge. (Granted, there are minor differences that would not be all that important. Trotsky was at least as much of a monster as Stalin, so a hypothetical USSR led by Trotsky would be about as bad as what we got.)
The point is... the USSR still managed to be a pretty damn serious geopolitical threat to everybody else on the planet. Since I don't believe that any other plausible eventuality could have been
worse for Russia than OTL, the logical conclusion is that an ATL Russia would be more successful, wealthy, and thus powerful.
Even if the Romanovs end up being total dumb-asses who mis-manage everything, and we get a violent insurrection that either establishes a republic or enforces a constitutional monarchy... so what? That's still miles better than a communist dictatorship. My point is: if the worst case scenario produces the 20th century's lead rival (to the USA) for global hegemony... then any alternative is near-certain to produce a better result than that.
Not sure that Russia would have been in a position to conquer most of Europe as once they become clearly powerful enough to be a threat it creates a huge pressure to shift alliances. However as you say there is plenty of opportunity for stupidity among political and other leaders, as well as the general population. Hitler is a good example here as there were plenty of chances for his rise to power inside Germany and then him starting his conquests to be stopped but too many people made what turned out to be the wrong choices.
What might happen is that there is a very powerful Russia that ends up fighting a European alliance, possibly with US support. It might make limited gains but probably at very high costs. Then this prompts reforms inside Russia that does make it a lot more dangerous a generation or so later. Although once nukes come into play everything gets very fuzzy in terms of predictions.
Considering the realities of the 20th century and its political trends, I'd consider it highly probable that Russia would be able to get several European nations with an axe to grind on its side. A "united front" for all Europe has always been a mirage. Even after Hitler, the best that's been feasible is... the EU. Well. In the context of a world where the guns of August never roared, there would be plenty on continuity with late 19th century politics, and all the petty rivalries and dissatisfactions that entailed.
The scenario you propose is a possible one, although I''m pretty sure a non-communist Russia that got to continue developing without a First World War would already be plenty dangerous to begin with. If a war breaks out in the '30s, Russia is going to be marching very deeply into Europe, and much more rapidly than most would expect. The price of victory would be high, and just how much they grab would be an open question, of course. One also dependent on who their allies are. (Ironically, a realistic potential ally is of course France. Which would mean the axis Germany-Britain versus the axis Russia-France.)
----------------------------------------------------------
d) Cyclic history
As I say I'm unwilling to accept the idea we can do nothing to more than at best delay a collapse a little but that's a matter of belief as much as evidence I will admit. Have read some very worrying stuff that questions the very existence of a sense of identity and self which could make for a very, very dark future.
History has shown us very few things that are eternal. That being said, every collapse is also a rebirth. I see no reason to expect sudden exceptions, but neither do I see reason to despair. I don't think the coming decades are going to be among the pleasant ones, though.
e) America as an empire
That is a distinct possibility, more so than many would have said although it may come at enough of a cost, or too long a duration that its not the basis for the core of the universal empire. It would also depend on how desperate other nations were and what measures such an empire would use to expand its power. Which again gets very uncertain give modern technology and what could come.
Things can always go wrong, but I don't think that it's likely that there would be "too long a duration". Power, like nature, abhors a vacuüm. If the current world-order ceases to function, as I expect it will, a new order will need to be established. Someone is going to do it. America has the immense -- and I truly mean
staggering -- advantage that its population believes in being American. In Europe, matters of creed and identity divided the white population from virtually all newcomers. The notion of the autochthonous masses finding common cause with the Islamic population is implausible. But in America, the strategy of division has limited viability. Even if racial division is actively being stirred up now, the masses have more in common with each other than with the establishment.
Rome had to grant citizenship to the Socii before it could truly actualise is potential. The same holds true for America. Once the populist insurrection ceases to be a near-exclusively white affair, and absorbs the equally mistreated black and hispanic populations into its ranks... then we will see a great turning point.
Especially since there would be really no external powers, a universal empire with modern technology is likely to be the end of most of what we know as humanity. Especially since its final destruction is probably going to be hugely destructive.
I'd expect it to be universal in and over the West. I don't think it will include China or India, for instance. There will be external powers. Regarding destructive potential: we should keep in mind that every Universal Empire encompasses its own "world" (meaning its civilisational sphere). The fall of the Empire is
always "the end of the world".
But as I mentioned above... the end is also the new beginning. Every post-cultural period is also the pre-cultural period for what comes next. It's a dark age, for sure. Chaotic. Brutish. And much will be lost. But new things will rise, too. I think history can be summed up by the parable of the Persian monarch (often glossed to be King Solomon instead, but that's a later adaptation) who asks his court philosophers to fashion him something that will make him happy when he is sad, and sad when he is happy.
And they return to him with a ring, with the phrase on it:
This, too, shall pass.
That's it. That's the very core of historical reality. And yes, this is tragic, because nothing good lasts forever. But it is also joyous, because nothing terrible lasts forever. Death and rebirth. A cycle. A ring.
Macedon came from nothing. It was an arse end of nowhere, backwards little Kingdom that sometimes expanded, but mostly shrank. Even Athens, diminished by the Peloponnesian war, looked down its nose at Macedon. Indeed, when Philip II came to the throne, his brother had just been killed in battle by the Illyrians and most of the army destroyed. His finances were fucked, half the Kingdom didn't really listen to him, and in a matter of decades he turned Macedonia into the master of Greece and a challenger to Achaemenid Persia.
A testament to his skill, certainly. I'm rather fond of pointing out that he wasn't an isolated example. Just before the Macedonian ascendancy, there was Jason of Pherae. He carried out similar military reforms in Thessaly, and was planning to invade Persia. He died in an assassination plot before he could carry out his plans.
What I mean is: cometh the hour, cometh the man. And I think that's because particular periods in history --particular circumstances that arise at certain junctures -- lead that type of man to flourish.
On the subject of the theme of Rome, that works too. Post the 390 BC sack, Rome was on the brink of extinction, most of the populace wanted to abandon the city and it was getting gang banged by all its neighbours (colonies and allies included). And yet the destiny of the Romans, to be lords and masters of the world, was never to be denied.
I'm inclined to think of America after the War of 1812, with the White House a smouldering ruin, but a new era set to begin. And a new sense of self. (Hell, the national anthem came out of that ordeal.)
Is Russia's current position anywhere near as precarious?
I think Russia is in a very precarious position, currently being held up by Putin. Whoever ends up succeeding him will have a tough job. However, I don't see how this matters. I'm certainly not comparing Russia to Macedon -- or Rome. What Russia represents, to me, is a could-have-been-Parthia, if you will. A historical contender for the role of "Eastern rival" to the West, which failed to last.
But perhaps I used the wrong words. I specified "Parthia equivalent" because Parthia was never Rome's true match, yet still a superpower in her own right. She was large and strong enough to be way more trouble than she was worth, and Russia most certainly has what she needs to at least make a good attempt at that.
I think that, at most, Russia could make a play at being roughly the Mithridatic Pontus and/or the Artaxiad Armenia of our time. (I insert the 'and' there because I consider it quite possible that Western Russia, like Pontus, will end up in the Western sphere, while Eastern Russia, like Armenia, will end up in the Chinese sphere.)
]
