Thoughts on consequences of a total Polish defeat in the Soviet war of 1920

Will a Communist Poland make it easier for France and Russia to coordinate v Germany in long run

  • Yes

    Votes: 4 50.0%
  • No

    Votes: 4 50.0%

  • Total voters
    8

raharris1973

Well-known member
A scenario occasionally raised is a different outcome for the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, sometimes what if Poland did better, or what if the Soviets marched to the Curzon line, but most often, and most dramatically, what if the Red Army conquered Warsaw and liquidated the second Polish Republic. This is usually followed by a discussion of where the border ends up- a restoration of the 1914 Russo-German border like the Reichswehr hoped, a continued Red Army advance and revolutionary wave into Europe, etc.

I'll pose a few questions and offer a few thoughts on some of the immediate and longer term consequences, including aspects that I don't think have gotten covered before, and put them out there for discussion:

1. Would conquering the Polish Republic and Polish Army open the door to Red revolution in Germany or Europe as a whole?

No. The last, best chance, for Red revolution, if it even was a chance, died with the Freikorps suppression of the Spartakist revolt. The broad coalition from militarists and Freikorps and civil servants and Social Democratic politicians and unionized workers were all against a Boleshevik path for Germany. If anything, Germany is likely to inherit back some territory from defeated Poland, de jure or de facto, to establish territorial contiguity with its now exposed, but very conservative, province of East Prussia.

2. If not sparking a German revolution, would the Red conquest of Poland at least lead to an early Soviet Communist conquest and sphere of influence over the Central European countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and Balkan countries south of Poland and Russia, like after WWII?

No. The Soviets completely defeating the Polish republic is not an easy outcome to achieve with just one single battle, the Red Army has its limitations.

If the Reds, with a little better planning and preparation, or the Poles with some worse, and the Reds have reasonable good fortune and the Poles have reasonable bad fortune, the Poles can lose, but the Red Army won't be in shape to go conquering additional countries.

About the only additional countries or "dominoes" that a Soviet conquest of Poland in 1920 makes it significantly easier for the Soviets to conquer or revolutionize are the three Baltic Republics, that's about it, in my view.

3. Would Poland become a Union Republic within the eventual Soviet Union, or formally separate, non-federated puppet Communist state, like after WWII?

My answer - Probably a separate, allied, puppet Communist state, like Outer Mongolia was.

Lenin may have had a preference for a transnational socialist federation, but Stalin, who was soon head of nationalities policy, strongly felt that national feeling was too strong among nationalities like Germans and Poles for their to be a shared sovereignty.

4. Will Communist takeover of Warsaw and Poland frighten and anger many people in Germany, France, Britain, Italy?

Yes. The Bolsheviks will appear stronger and more threatening.

5. Will European fear and anger about the takeover of Poland lead to an all Europe coalition to invade and liberate Poland and overthrow the Communist regime?

No. In OTL workers in the west often opposed and went on strike against sending aid to Poland. Nobody wanted another war, and trying to mobilize for one would fuel mass unrest. Sure there will be more hawks ‘saying’ or thinking this is necessary, but no government in the 1920s is going to do it.

6. Will the bigger, scarier Soviet-Polish bloc scare Germany and France into an earlier, reconciliation, EU, and collaborative defense against the common threat to the East?

Maaaaaayyyyybbbbeeee, but I really, really doubt it. Seems optimistic.

I actually think that in the short run Germany will be happy to destroy Poland and get some land back. In the long run as Soviet Russia and Poland get stronger, Germany will get less happy.

In the short run, France will be very disappointed to see Poland fall and be more frightened and angry at Bolesheviks and more reliant on the Little Entente powers and interested in cooperation with Italy and Britain.

France won’t want red revolution exported to Germany and may tolerate some build up of its defense in the east. But it won’t give up on reparations or the Rhineland occupation zones.

In the longer run, and this part I don’t think anybody discussed before, a Soviet aligned Communist interwar Poland will make it much *easier* not harder for France and the USSR to coordinate plans and actions to contain and counter a right wing revanchist Germany that rearms, compared with the interwar Polish situation of OTL
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Britain and the US would freak out and ensure Germany could wiggle out of the ToV ASAP. Forget reparations France be damned, as it was economically at the mercy of the Anglo-American bloc:
Though the French succeeded in making their occupation of the Ruhr pay, the Germans, through their passive resistance in the Ruhr and the hyperinflation that wrecked their economy, won the world's sympathy, and under heavy Anglo-American financial pressure (the simultaneous decline in the value of the franc made the French very open to pressure from Wall Street and the City), the French were forced to agree to the Dawes Plan of April 1924, which substantially lowered German reparations payments.[21]

Germany had already been slipping into high inflation and global public opinion was on Germany's side, not France's during the Ruhr occupation. If France raises any problems they kill off the Anglo-French entente and with it ensure Germany and Britain become de facto allies against the USSR and France assuming France still wants to go that route.

It makes any coordination against Germany very difficult for France given their economic dependence on playing nice with the Anglo-Americans. Without German reparations France is probably not going to be able to build the Maginot line or spend on their military like they wanted to going forward, especially since the US wanted to be paid back for the war loans. Ironically if the US feels Germany needs to be stabilized more so they could militarily resist the USSR French loan payments might end up helping finance US loans to Germany to help their economy recover.

Since Germany, not Poland, would now be the shield of Europe from the USSR even the French are going to be more open to bearing the release of Germany from the ToV. Since the little countries of Central/Eastern Europe+the Balkans cannot handle the USSR on their own Germany is the only nation that could really be the bulwark around which they could all rally once Poland falls.

If anything the Little Entente turns to Germany to protect them as France is far away, needs Germany to even got to help them, and has more manpower to actually do something given how bleed out France was from the Great War. Right wing Germany is not even considered a threat once the Soviets conquer Poland given how terrified Europeans were about Communism at the time.

The US too was very concerned historically especially given the Republican administration in power at the time; if anything the US pivots to funding Germany's recovery quickly to ensure they are strong enough to resist, because absolutely no one wants to deal with a Communist Germany as well. Despite us knowing today that the Soviets were at the end of their strength when advancing into Poland that was not known at the time, so overreaction in favor of Germany would be the most likely response even after it becomes clear that the Soviets have been stopped.

As to where the border would fall with Poland falling the border falls as far East as Germany could march. Given that in 1920 the German army hadn't fully demobilized to Reichsheer levels yet it would still be able to call up large reserves with left over WW1 equipment relatively quickly. So the 1914 borders are the minimum Germany would be able to take.

As to the Baltic states they'd probably be safe at this point as the Soviets are in no position to go after them and even despite the efforts they made IOTL the small countries didn't fall to Soviet domination until 1940.

Question is whether Germany and the USSR coordinate like they did IOTL or not. We could potentially see a secret Germany-Soviet accord even if the ToV is basically a dead letter.
 
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Buba

A total creep
As to "Red Army take Warsaw" - actually Tukhachevsky was bypassing it and heading for Germany. His orders and other documents say so. It is the Polish side which was convinced that he was after the city. And as it are the victors who write history books - the Poles sold their version :)

How did Tukhachevsky plan to get to Germany without any latitudinal railway linking e.g. Belostok (the point to which the re-gauging back to 1524mm had reached) and the middle Vistula - where he planned to cross - is anybody's guess.
Map of RR in 1914 (I have no idea what the red lines represent). By 1920 little had changed, a few crossings of the former borders (dirty grey areas) having been constructed. But nothing W-E between Warsaw and East Prussia had been added.

0002NEV5XJY87C4L-C116-F4.jpg
 
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stevep

Well-known member
Given how stretched the Soviets were at that point and how much the Poles hated and feared both Russian rule and communism its difficult to see the country not being endlessly in turmoil against any Soviet rule if they did somehow overrun the bulk of the Polish republic.

If however they did then a lot would depend on reactions in assorted places, especially France and Germany but also Britain and the US.

Will France and Germany seek to work together against the common threat? France has plenty of reason to fear Germany at least as much as the Soviets so it would be deeply worried about the almost inevitable German rearmament that would probably result. At the same time will Germany be willing to work with France or would its own right wing become dominant again? What sort of agreement could be worked out??

If the two do sort out an agreement then they would have the strength to thrown back the Soviets, although would Germany be willing, unless it got some of the Polish lands it had lost in 1919?

If France and Germany can't come to an agreement can France and Britain do so? Possibly some deal in which Britain supports France in eastern Europe and France backs - or at least doesn't oppose Britain over the straits issue? Of course that could mean overstretch for both given the drain from the war and the internal social issues, especially in Britain. Plus it creates a possibility of an earlier Soviet-German alignment if Germany isn't also involved and looks to regain lost lands in the east.

The US is possibly less of a factor given its isolationism other than that its desire to keep Britain and France weak could mean it tries to hinder any agreement between the two.

Overall things are likely to be very messy, even compared to OTL with even a short term Soviet victory over the Poles. The Treaty of Versaillies will be brought under question, which will further increase stability. If Germany escapes even more from reparation payments then France and Belgium especially are going to have an even harder recovery than OTL which will further destablise the continent. If there is an even partially rearmed Germany then how independent will places like Poland and the Baltic's be and how much bigger a military will other nations need to maintain?
 

ATP

Well-known member
A scenario occasionally raised is a different outcome for the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, sometimes what if Poland did better, or what if the Soviets marched to the Curzon line, but most often, and most dramatically, what if the Red Army conquered Warsaw and liquidated the second Polish Republic. This is usually followed by a discussion of where the border ends up- a restoration of the 1914 Russo-German border like the Reichswehr hoped, a continued Red Army advance and revolutionary wave into Europe, etc.

I'll pose a few questions and offer a few thoughts on some of the immediate and longer term consequences, including aspects that I don't think have gotten covered before, and put them out there for discussion:

1. Would conquering the Polish Republic and Polish Army open the door to Red revolution in Germany or Europe as a whole?

No. The last, best chance, for Red revolution, if it even was a chance, died with the Freikorps suppression of the Spartakist revolt. The broad coalition from militarists and Freikorps and civil servants and Social Democratic politicians and unionized workers were all against a Boleshevik path for Germany. If anything, Germany is likely to inherit back some territory from defeated Poland, de jure or de facto, to establish territorial contiguity with its now exposed, but very conservative, province of East Prussia.

2. If not sparking a German revolution, would the Red conquest of Poland at least lead to an early Soviet Communist conquest and sphere of influence over the Central European countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and Balkan countries south of Poland and Russia, like after WWII?

No. The Soviets completely defeating the Polish republic is not an easy outcome to achieve with just one single battle, the Red Army has its limitations.

If the Reds, with a little better planning and preparation, or the Poles with some worse, and the Reds have reasonable good fortune and the Poles have reasonable bad fortune, the Poles can lose, but the Red Army won't be in shape to go conquering additional countries.

About the only additional countries or "dominoes" that a Soviet conquest of Poland in 1920 makes it significantly easier for the Soviets to conquer or revolutionize are the three Baltic Republics, that's about it, in my view.

3. Would Poland become a Union Republic within the eventual Soviet Union, or formally separate, non-federated puppet Communist state, like after WWII?

My answer - Probably a separate, allied, puppet Communist state, like Outer Mongolia was.

Lenin may have had a preference for a transnational socialist federation, but Stalin, who was soon head of nationalities policy, strongly felt that national feeling was too strong among nationalities like Germans and Poles for their to be a shared sovereignty.

4. Will Communist takeover of Warsaw and Poland frighten and anger many people in Germany, France, Britain, Italy?

Yes. The Bolsheviks will appear stronger and more threatening.

5. Will European fear and anger about the takeover of Poland lead to an all Europe coalition to invade and liberate Poland and overthrow the Communist regime?

No. In OTL workers in the west often opposed and went on strike against sending aid to Poland. Nobody wanted another war, and trying to mobilize for one would fuel mass unrest. Sure there will be more hawks ‘saying’ or thinking this is necessary, but no government in the 1920s is going to do it.

6. Will the bigger, scarier Soviet-Polish bloc scare Germany and France into an earlier, reconciliation, EU, and collaborative defense against the common threat to the East?

Maaaaaayyyyybbbbeeee, but I really, really doubt it. Seems optimistic.

I actually think that in the short run Germany will be happy to destroy Poland and get some land back. In the long run as Soviet Russia and Poland get stronger, Germany will get less happy.

In the short run, France will be very disappointed to see Poland fall and be more frightened and angry at Bolesheviks and more reliant on the Little Entente powers and interested in cooperation with Italy and Britain.

France won’t want red revolution exported to Germany and may tolerate some build up of its defense in the east. But it won’t give up on reparations or the Rhineland occupation zones.

In the longer run, and this part I don’t think anybody discussed before, a Soviet aligned Communist interwar Poland will make it much *easier* not harder for France and the USSR to coordinate plans and actions to contain and counter a right wing revanchist Germany that rearms, compared with the interwar Polish situation of OTL

1.Yes ,but actually no.
German in OTL was stupid enough to cooperate with soviets becouse they thought that soviets could be allies against France.So,they would destroy Poland,go for France when socialists and masons was waiting for revolution,take it,and after that soviets would take over germany,too.

2.Czech was idiots who welcomed soviet as allies,so soviets would take them from within.Hungary - not so,but they would not hold when France and Germany fall.

3.Just like any other countries in Europe.they are become voluntarily soviet republics.

4.No,they would welcome revolution,and realise their mistake when their country would be taken over.But that would be too late then.Till then they would be happy that bad poles fall - till they meet them in gulags.
Remember - only country which population supported Poland in 1920 was Hungary.

5.Nope.No help.

6.Germany waited for revenge against France,use soviets as tool for such revenge,and get destroyed by them when France fall.
France would face soviet-german alliance supported unoficially by England,and from within by socialists,masons and jews.They would fall.

So,Europe would fall - not becouse of soviet might,becouse they were weak,but becouse german stupidity and traitors in France.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Given how stretched the Soviets were at that point and how much the Poles hated and feared both Russian rule and communism its difficult to see the country not being endlessly in turmoil against any Soviet rule if they did somehow overrun the bulk of the Polish republic.
The Soviet military was, but the Checka was another story:

Soviet repression with the aid of Polish Communists was brutally effective. In 1920 the army would help and Poland was hardly a state by that point, so could be relatively easily picked apart.

If however they did then a lot would depend on reactions in assorted places, especially France and Germany but also Britain and the US.
Generally we know from the attitudes at the time at they would freak out and probably rely on Germany to be the bulwark in Central Europe. Question is whether the various expeditionary missions in Russia would be renewed instead of ended in 1920. The Polish victory was a big help in convincing the west that the Soviets could be contained without major involvement by them.

Will France and Germany seek to work together against the common threat? France has plenty of reason to fear Germany at least as much as the Soviets so it would be deeply worried about the almost inevitable German rearmament that would probably result. At the same time will Germany be willing to work with France or would its own right wing become dominant again? What sort of agreement could be worked out??
Probably not. France will probably be strong armed into dropping the ToV by the US and Britain. A Germany focused on the Soviet threat on their border would be a minor threat to France, which is why France set up the Little Entente anyway. The French fear might well end up being that the remainder of the Little Entente would gravitate towards Germany for protection, much like an early anti-comintern pact.

I guess the question is how do Franco-British/American relations work out after everyone basically turns to Germany to stop Lenin. What does the French Left do or do the French get pissed and work out a deal with the Soviets?

If the two do sort out an agreement then they would have the strength to thrown back the Soviets, although would Germany be willing, unless it got some of the Polish lands it had lost in 1919?
Probably not. It would of course want the 1914 border in the East and no ToV reparations or restrictions for anything. Which they probably could have gotten due to British and American fears of the spread of Communism (remember the 1920s Red Scare in the US). Honestly short of a French invasion Germany would be strong enough (or rather the Soviets weak enough) in 1920 to fight the Soviets in Poland after the defeat of the Polish army and seize back the 1914 border+additional territory.

If France and Germany can't come to an agreement can France and Britain do so? Possibly some deal in which Britain supports France in eastern Europe and France backs - or at least doesn't oppose Britain over the straits issue? Of course that could mean overstretch for both given the drain from the war and the internal social issues, especially in Britain. Plus it creates a possibility of an earlier Soviet-German alignment if Germany isn't also involved and looks to regain lost lands in the east.
No way that either would commit the necessary troops to do so given their continued occupation of the Rheinland. Or the economic situation, which was already being disrupted by labor groups in both countries which support the Soviets. They were striking and IOTL prevented supplies from being shipping to Poland during the war. France is too bled out for military intervention and Britain has too many commitments to do much; politically the US was against further direct interventions abroad, but was fine with financing things. Plus the US was already committed to the Rheinland occupation until 1923.

Actually Germany is in the power position since they could play off the Soviets and western powers against one another looking for the best deal while being able to reoccupy lost territories with Polish tacit acceptance to avoid Soviet occupation. Plus there are going to be waves of Polish refugees to Germany in this scenario which will create all sorts of issues.

The US is possibly less of a factor given its isolationism other than that its desire to keep Britain and France weak could mean it tries to hinder any agreement between the two.
Why? The US was terrified of Soviet expansion:

Overall things are likely to be very messy, even compared to OTL with even a short term Soviet victory over the Poles. The Treaty of Versaillies will be brought under question, which will further increase stability. If Germany escapes even more from reparation payments then France and Belgium especially are going to have an even harder recovery than OTL which will further destablise the continent. If there is an even partially rearmed Germany then how independent will places like Poland and the Baltic's be and how much bigger a military will other nations need to maintain?
Likely the US would have to seriously cut down on payment demands or spread them out overtime to get the British and French on board for doing what was necessary in Europe. The Baltic states had little to fear from Germany at that time other than Lithuania over Memel, though they'd likely end up economic satellites and probably military client states due to Germany being their only real protection from the Soviets. Poland would be gone as a state if the Soviets win the battle of Warsaw and likely cut a deal, even tacitly, to split up what remained of the state given Soviet power hitting its limit and Germany being too weak and unwilling to actually eject them from Poland.

Question is what about Czechoslovakia and Austria if Germany is let out of the ToV? Given how the Austrian economy was in collapse that could be a huge issue going forward:
The landlocked Austria was barely able to support itself with food and lacked developed industrial basis. In addition, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy had imposed trade blockade and refused to sell food and coal to Austria, which eventually was saved by aid and support from the Western Allies. By 1922 one USA dollar was worth 19,000 kronen and half the population was unemployed.[3]

Seems ripe for further revision of the ToV restrictions. Britain might even do an about-face and even go all in on Germany as their continental proxy, so long as they had a restricted navy.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
1.Yes ,but actually no.
German in OTL was stupid enough to cooperate with soviets becouse they thought that soviets could be allies against France.So,they would destroy Poland,go for France when socialists and masons was waiting for revolution,take it,and after that soviets would take over germany,too.
What are you talking about?

2.Czech was idiots who welcomed soviet as allies,so soviets would take them from within.Hungary - not so,but they would not hold when France and Germany fall.
Not at this time. The Czechs didn't recognize the Soviets until the 1930s. In fact they fought the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War:
 

ATP

Well-known member
What are you talking about?


Not at this time. The Czechs didn't recognize the Soviets until the 1930s. In fact they fought the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War:

1.Locarno.But german elites hated Poland before that,and they would jump at chance to revenge on France.With french socialists,masona,jews and other usefull idiots help it would be easy,and England led by Llyold George would unoficially support that.
Then soviets would:
A.take Germany from within
B.send german elites and french idiots to the same gulags where surviving poles would wait for them.

Remember,that idiot german keep trying to made agreement with Moscow over Poland from the moment we become free again.Idiots forget,that crime of Partition was possible only becouse Russia was ruled by german tsars.Only other Russia would help Germany steal Poland - but only to kill germans,too.

2.In 1920 czech stopped hungarian military aid for Poland,becouse they prefered soviets as neighbours.Well,they would join hated poles in gulags.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
1.Locarno.But german elites hated Poland before that,and they would jump at chance to revenge on France.With french socialists,masona,jews and other usefull idiots help it would be easy,and England led by Llyold George would unoficially support that.
How was Locarno stupid for the Germans? I also highly doubt the Germans wanted another go around with France so soon, especially ITTL with the Soviets knocking. Locarno as well was under VERY different circumstances to TL.

Then soviets would:
A.take Germany from within
B.send german elites and french idiots to the same gulags where surviving poles would wait for them.
How? Communists were largely crushed by 1919 after the Spartakist revolts failed. The Soviets were in no position to continue attacking for many years after the war with Poland.

Remember,that idiot german keep trying to made agreement with Moscow over Poland from the moment we become free again.Idiots forget,that crime of Partition was possible only becouse Russia was ruled by german tsars.Only other Russia would help Germany steal Poland - but only to kill germans,too.
Sure, from their (both Russian and German) perspective getting rid of Poland benefits them. How does that make them idiots? Assholes for sure.
Didn't Prussia engineer the partition of Poland (with lots of foreign and internal help) to deal with the rise of Russian power? I highly doubt Catherine the Great really thought of herself as a friend of Prussia or Austria even if the former and Russia were allied at the time.

2.In 1920 czech stopped hungarian military aid for Poland,becouse they prefered soviets as neighbours.Well,they would join hated poles in gulags.
Given that the Czechs and Poles were fighting over control of border territory it is hardly surprising that they'd take advantage of Poland's distraction to seize control over an area with majority Czech population. Similarly Poland helped Germany pick apart the Czechs in 1938 with Hitler...how did that go for Poland?
The Czechs ended up in Gulags?

ITTL the Czechs could seize what they wanted from Poland, but that doesn't mean they liked the Soviets or wanted them on their borders, likely they wanted a relatively friendly Slavic state to counterbalance Germany, especially given that they had over 3 million Germans who didn't want to be in the country to keep control of. With a collapsed ToV they'd be especially worried.
 

ATP

Well-known member
How was Locarno stupid for the Germans? I also highly doubt the Germans wanted another go around with France so soon, especially ITTL with the Soviets knocking. Locarno as well was under VERY different circumstances to TL.


How? Communists were largely crushed by 1919 after the Spartakist revolts failed. The Soviets were in no position to continue attacking for many years after the war with Poland.


Sure, from their (both Russian and German) perspective getting rid of Poland benefits them. How does that make them idiots? Assholes for sure.
Didn't Prussia engineer the partition of Poland (with lots of foreign and internal help) to deal with the rise of Russian power? I highly doubt Catherine the Great really thought of herself as a friend of Prussia or Austria even if the former and Russia were allied at the time.


Given that the Czechs and Poles were fighting over control of border territory it is hardly surprising that they'd take advantage of Poland's distraction to seize control over an area with majority Czech population. Similarly Poland helped Germany pick apart the Czechs in 1938 with Hitler...how did that go for Poland?
The Czechs ended up in Gulags?

ITTL the Czechs could seize what they wanted from Poland, but that doesn't mean they liked the Soviets or wanted them on their borders, likely they wanted a relatively friendly Slavic state to counterbalance Germany, especially given that they had over 3 million Germans who didn't want to be in the country to keep control of. With a collapsed ToV they'd be especially worried.
1.Locarno - suicidal stupid for germans,becouse after taking Poland soviets would take them next.
And why go for another round with France in 1920 after Poland fall? becouse with how messed french masons and socialist was,it would be easy fight.

2.they would be allies ,so communist would be strong enough to take on Germany from both within and soviet army after France fall.

3.Prussians was actually smart,becouse once they destroyed Poland they had 119 years of peace with Russia becouse Russia was ruled by german tsars.
Germans after 1918 who try made the same deal was suicidal idiots,becouse any other Russia ruler would first destroy Poalnd with germans help,and later take Germany.
Remember - you could have stable deal with Russia,but only ruled by germans.

4.Lack of information on your part.Cieszyn was mostly populated by poles in 1919,when czech attacked us.
And we do not allied Hitler in 1938,like soviets allied germans in 1938.
But yes,we should help Czech,polish nationalists wonted that,unfortunately ruling junta belived that we are superpower,and retake Cieszyn without any alliance with Hitler.After that we had no other logical choice then to become german vassal state like Hungary,but we choosed die for England in 1939.

Back to Czech - Masaryk told that he prefered soviets over poles as neighbours in 1920,so helped them.Hungarian wonted gave us no only ammo and rifles/which come through Romania later/,but also few dyvisions.
Czech blocked all of that,which made them de facto soviet allies.


Of course,as a result all those smart czech,german and french who supported soviets would end in gulags - but that is how useful idiots ended in all countries taken by soviets.
 

stevep

Well-known member
The Soviet military was, but the Checka was another story:

Soviet repression with the aid of Polish Communists was brutally effective. In 1920 the army would help and Poland was hardly a state by that point, so could be relatively easily picked apart.


Generally we know from the attitudes at the time at they would freak out and probably rely on Germany to be the bulwark in Central Europe. Question is whether the various expeditionary missions in Russia would be renewed instead of ended in 1920. The Polish victory was a big help in convincing the west that the Soviets could be contained without major involvement by them.


Probably not. France will probably be strong armed into dropping the ToV by the US and Britain. A Germany focused on the Soviet threat on their border would be a minor threat to France, which is why France set up the Little Entente anyway. The French fear might well end up being that the remainder of the Little Entente would gravitate towards Germany for protection, much like an early anti-comintern pact.

I guess the question is how do Franco-British/American relations work out after everyone basically turns to Germany to stop Lenin. What does the French Left do or do the French get pissed and work out a deal with the Soviets?


Probably not. It would of course want the 1914 border in the East and no ToV reparations or restrictions for anything. Which they probably could have gotten due to British and American fears of the spread of Communism (remember the 1920s Red Scare in the US). Honestly short of a French invasion Germany would be strong enough (or rather the Soviets weak enough) in 1920 to fight the Soviets in Poland after the defeat of the Polish army and seize back the 1914 border+additional territory.


No way that either would commit the necessary troops to do so given their continued occupation of the Rheinland. Or the economic situation, which was already being disrupted by labor groups in both countries which support the Soviets. They were striking and IOTL prevented supplies from being shipping to Poland during the war. France is too bled out for military intervention and Britain has too many commitments to do much; politically the US was against further direct interventions abroad, but was fine with financing things. Plus the US was already committed to the Rheinland occupation until 1923.

Actually Germany is in the power position since they could play off the Soviets and western powers against one another looking for the best deal while being able to reoccupy lost territories with Polish tacit acceptance to avoid Soviet occupation. Plus there are going to be waves of Polish refugees to Germany in this scenario which will create all sorts of issues.


Why? The US was terrified of Soviet expansion:


Likely the US would have to seriously cut down on payment demands or spread them out overtime to get the British and French on board for doing what was necessary in Europe. The Baltic states had little to fear from Germany at that time other than Lithuania over Memel, though they'd likely end up economic satellites and probably military client states due to Germany being their only real protection from the Soviets. Poland would be gone as a state if the Soviets win the battle of Warsaw and likely cut a deal, even tacitly, to split up what remained of the state given Soviet power hitting its limit and Germany being too weak and unwilling to actually eject them from Poland.

Question is what about Czechoslovakia and Austria if Germany is let out of the ToV? Given how the Austrian economy was in collapse that could be a huge issue going forward:


Seems ripe for further revision of the ToV restrictions. Britain might even do an about-face and even go all in on Germany as their continental proxy, so long as they had a restricted navy.

Sillygoose

What your basically saying is that the results of WWI are reversed with Germany re-emerging as the dominant power in Europe, markedly more so than in 1914. I'm not sure that the allies - both Britain and France and probably also Belgium and some other smaller states can afford that? A collapse of the TOV and of getting even as little as they did OTL in terms of reparations would be crippling for France and Belgium especially. Especially since as you point out the hard line militarists are going to gain influence even faster than OTL with probable events in Germany.

I can't see the US reducing/delaying debt repayments at all as it totally refused to OTL no matter the problems they caused. They refused OTL in part because they saw it as a way of keeping the allies weak as they were seen as the primary economic rivals with Germany apparently reduced. However in a TL where the ToV is ended and Germany is rearming then France and Britain will have to do likewise so its probable that they would have to cancel repayments earlier, albeit their likely to try and pay for several years at least.

At least until 1919-20 I think there were significant German forces still in the Baltic states and British support of independence movements there were aimed at the Germans as much as the Soviets. They are likely to end up as the puppet of either power and would be better off under German rather than Soviet control but its probably not going to be an happy situation for them.

Possibly the most stable situation would be with a re-militarised Germany and the Soviets standing off at each other while the western powers seek to form a defensive alliance and hoping the two will restrain each other enough that neither can do anything aggressive to other powers until the democracies can recover some economic health.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Sillygoose

What your basically saying is that the results of WWI are reversed with Germany re-emerging as the dominant power in Europe, markedly more so than in 1914. I'm not sure that the allies - both Britain and France and probably also Belgium and some other smaller states can afford that? A collapse of the TOV and of getting even as little as they did OTL in terms of reparations would be crippling for France and Belgium especially. Especially since as you point out the hard line militarists are going to gain influence even faster than OTL with probable events in Germany.
The Soviets pretty much upturned the post war order ITTL by expanding into Central Europe.
Of course Britain, France, and Belgium wouldn't want to accept that, but given their utter terror of the Soviets at this point (there is a reason they and the US invaded Russia from 1918-1920 to help the Whites and when that failed staged several major evacuations). Fear of the Soviets (especially in an ATL where they were successfully expanding) was more profound than that of a defeated Germany given their own internal labor movements supporting the Soviets.
Without question the US would have to seriously change their approach to war debt payments; they'd probably have to forgive much of it as a reward for not opposing Germany wiggling out of the ToV payments and restrictions so they could oppose the Soviets.

France and Belgium didn't rely on the reparations to rebuild, they used them to partially pay their war debts. Of course in the case of France not building the Maginot Line or dramatically expanding their gold holdings they'd have plenty of cash to rebuild and make debt payments. I'd think it'd be likely they could keep the Saar coal mines per the treaty though, especially if Germany gets Upper Silesia back. That would help France considerably.

I also don't think you understand just how anti-Soviet/communist the French government was at this point, since France was furious the Bolsheviks dropped out of the war and repudiated Czarist war debts. Not to mention destroyed their main ally in the East, Poland, ITTL as well as gave Germany a reason to get out of the ToV.

The Bolsheviks opted for peace with Germany in 1917 and refused to recognize the czarist loans. In December 1917 France broke relations and Supported the anti-Bolshevik cause. It supported the White Guard in the Civil War, and supported Poland in the war of 1920. The operations failed, and France switched from a diplomacy of opposition to one of containment of communism, with sharply reduced contacts. French communist continue to visit Moscow, and promote communism in France, but there was no official presence.

France was heavily committed to the containment of the Soviets.

I can't see the US reducing/delaying debt repayments at all as it totally refused to OTL no matter the problems they caused. They refused OTL in part because they saw it as a way of keeping the allies weak as they were seen as the primary economic rivals with Germany apparently reduced. However in a TL where the ToV is ended and Germany is rearming then France and Britain will have to do likewise so its probable that they would have to cancel repayments earlier, albeit their likely to try and pay for several years at least.
OTL was where the Soviets were contained. The US was gripped with the fear of communism expanding in Europe, so this would probably be enough to get them to change their tune; IOTL they could use the war debt issue as leverage, but when it would be faced with the collapse of capitalism in Europe it would likely change it's tune for fear of not getting paid back on anything given that further expansion would see those communist states renounce their war debt as the Bolsheviks had.

As to OTL US motivations for continuing it as an issue, you're really not getting US motives. The post-Wilson government had to deal with a US society extremely pissed off by the way WW1 turned out and felt like they were manipulated by the Entente powers. Isolationism was one facet of that public outrage, war debt was another to make the Entente pay for everything they got. However with the POD here the situation would impact the US public differently, as they were also terrified of communism, so we'd likely seem more political tolerance for war debt renegotation. Remember to the Republicans were in charge and the only thing that motivated them to more intervention was fear of communism.

At least until 1919-20 I think there were significant German forces still in the Baltic states and British support of independence movements there were aimed at the Germans as much as the Soviets. They are likely to end up as the puppet of either power and would be better off under German rather than Soviet control but its probably not going to be an happy situation for them.
Right, but by the Polish-Soviet war in 1920 they were gone AFAIK.
Not sure if they'd really be puppets, but they'd certainly be German allies for fear of the Soviets. I doubt the British and French would be all that motivated to intervene to help them ITTL given the issues with things like war debts.

Possibly the most stable situation would be with a re-militarised Germany and the Soviets standing off at each other while the western powers seek to form a defensive alliance and hoping the two will restrain each other enough that neither can do anything aggressive to other powers until the democracies can recover some economic health.
Pretty much what was tried in the 1930s, so it would make sense that they do that ITTL. Question is does Britain favor Germany over France if the naval and colonies issue is settled and Soviet expansion was on the table? IOTL they favored Germany in the reparations issue as of 1923, so it is hardly inconceivable that they sign up with Germany to orient them east instead of France, which is of little utility to them after the failed intervention in Russia. Don't forget too that both France and Britain had a trade deficit with Germany as of the 1920s even with reparations, so that relationship had powerful ties as well, especially when politics is a factor (and ideology vis a vis communism).
 

stevep

Well-known member
The Soviets pretty much upturned the post war order ITTL by expanding into Central Europe.
Of course Britain, France, and Belgium wouldn't want to accept that, but given their utter terror of the Soviets at this point (there is a reason they and the US invaded Russia from 1918-1920 to help the Whites and when that failed staged several major evacuations). Fear of the Soviets (especially in an ATL where they were successfully expanding) was more profound than that of a defeated Germany given their own internal labor movements supporting the Soviets.
Without question the US would have to seriously change their approach to war debt payments; they'd probably have to forgive much of it as a reward for not opposing Germany wiggling out of the ToV payments and restrictions so they could oppose the Soviets.

Except that the Soviets are still a fairly distant potential threat while a re-militarised Germany is right on their doorstep and has very recently shown how huge a threat it was to the western powers. France is still struggling to rebuild its shattered eastern territories and isn't going to be happy with the idea of a rearmed Germany running rampant. Especially given that Germany didn't suffer the material damage that France and Belgium did and that there's now no eastern counter to tie down German forces other than a fragile - albeit dangerous looking - Soviet state.

Plus all the evidence suggests your wrong on this 2nd point. All the time the US were seeking to delay and cut reparations to the allies from Germany they point blank refused to have the issue linked to the debt repayment crisis. There is hostility towards Bolshivikism as it was called at the time but it was a distant threat, largely in terms of potential labour unrest. However this then or in the situation suggested now is unlikely to affect their hostility towards any debt repayment settlement.

France and Belgium didn't rely on the reparations to rebuild, they used them to partially pay their war debts. Of course in the case of France not building the Maginot Line or dramatically expanding their gold holdings they'd have plenty of cash to rebuild and make debt payments. I'd think it'd be likely they could keep the Saar coal mines per the treaty though, especially if Germany gets Upper Silesia back. That would help France considerably.

So they rebuilt without spending any money? They had to spend a lot to repair the war damage and some of that would have come from what they got in reparations. Some of it also went on repaying debts to the US because the latter insisted on that.

The French built up their gold reserves because without them they suffered from US fiscal pressure. The Maginot line wasn't even started until 1930 and was due to the desire to protect their eastern border against a markedly larger and more powerful Germany and its likely if anything that - assuming that France doesn't maintain an occupation of the Rhineland in the proposed scenario something like it would be started ASAP in the 1920's as France would have no other option.

I also don't think you understand just how anti-Soviet/communist the French government was at this point, since France was furious the Bolsheviks dropped out of the war and repudiated Czarist war debts. Not to mention destroyed their main ally in the East, Poland, ITTL as well as gave Germany a reason to get out of the ToV.



France was heavily committed to the containment of the Soviets.

It was anti-communist in part for the reason you mentioned but also because of the Soviet links with the Germans during and after the war and the desire to try and get a friendly government back into power in Russia to act as a counter to Germany. After this failed they supported Poland as a eastern counter to German power and this would also have failed. Coupled with the idea of a rearmed Germany France would recognise that as by far the greatest threat to itself.


OTL was where the Soviets were contained. The US was gripped with the fear of communism expanding in Europe, so this would probably be enough to get them to change their tune; IOTL they could use the war debt issue as leverage, but when it would be faced with the collapse of capitalism in Europe it would likely change it's tune for fear of not getting paid back on anything given that further expansion would see those communist states renounce their war debt as the Bolsheviks had.

As said above the hostility towards communism was largely related to labour issues and it didn't stop the US sending huge amounts of aid to the early USSR, possibly preventing its collapse by some sources. Also probably an element of isolationism and American exceptionalism with an idea "its a foreign/Europe presence so keep it away". It would have been logical to trade war debts for reparations but the US failed totally to do that OTL and given there was no real probability of communism taking over Britain or France there's no great incentive here either.

As to OTL US motivations for continuing it as an issue, you're really not getting US motives. The post-Wilson government had to deal with a US society extremely pissed off by the way WW1 turned out and felt like they were manipulated by the Entente powers. Isolationism was one facet of that public outrage, war debt was another to make the Entente pay for everything they got. However with the POD here the situation would impact the US public differently, as they were also terrified of communism, so we'd likely seem more political tolerance for war debt renegotiation. Remember to the Republicans were in charge and the only thing that motivated them to more intervention was fear of communism.

Given that the US got the vast bulk of what it desired in the peace treaty and left an unstable mess that suggests the prime aim was ignorance and bigotry. Which is unlikely to change here.


Right, but by the Polish-Soviet war in 1920 they were gone AFAIK.
Not sure if they'd really be puppets, but they'd certainly be German allies for fear of the Soviets. I doubt the British and French would be all that motivated to intervene to help them ITTL given the issues with things like war debts.

Given the assumption that the Poles are crushed and the problems the allies were facing the Baltics will be occupied by the Soviets unless their occupied by a rearmed Germany. Britain and France would have little capacity to help them in the face of threats by both Russia and Germany and is running out of will to continue trying to maintain order everywhere. The continuation of demands for debt repayments by the US is only going to make that a worse issue.


Pretty much what was tried in the 1930s, so it would make sense that they do that ITTL. Question is does Britain favor Germany over France if the naval and colonies issue is settled and Soviet expansion was on the table? IOTL they favored Germany in the reparations issue as of 1923, so it is hardly inconceivable that they sign up with Germany to orient them east instead of France, which is of little utility to them after the failed intervention in Russia. Don't forget too that both France and Britain had a trade deficit with Germany as of the 1920s even with reparations, so that relationship had powerful ties as well, especially when politics is a factor (and ideology vis a vis communism).

Did they favour Germany in 1923 or think that France and Belgium had gone further than they were willing to support them? In this scenario Britain will have to support France against Germany. Its the last buffer against the continental empire the German right still desire. How much such a rampant Germany would be distracted fighting the Soviets for empire in the east would be the key issue.

Possibly the idea option, although not sure how likely it would be is that Germany escapes the ToV restrictions, although possibly the allies still keep bases in the Rhineland for the moment. The rearmed Germany defeats the Soviets then the military gets too overconfident and seek a wider war to displace the Soviets and possibly even 'regain' the eastern conquests of 1918 but overstretch. A weakened USSR survive but a still war weary Germany turns against such ideas and while they make territorial gains in the east their not massive and Germany seeks a weakening of militaristic influence.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Except that the Soviets are still a fairly distant potential threat while a re-militarised Germany is right on their doorstep and has very recently shown how huge a threat it was to the western powers.
I'm assuming you mean France. A defeated, but partially remilitarized Germany is less of a threat than a Communist one allied with the USSR bent on world revolution.

France is still struggling to rebuild its shattered eastern territories and isn't going to be happy with the idea of a rearmed Germany running rampant. Especially given that Germany didn't suffer the material damage that France and Belgium did and that there's now no eastern counter to tie down German forces other than a fragile - albeit dangerous looking - Soviet state.
Running rampant? France would still have its position on the Rhine as well as the Saar and Germany would be concerned with defending its eastern border. Germany just had a communist revolution and is now facing a major threat of a communist state on its border that just conquered the eastern neighbor. We know with hindsight how weak the USSR was, but ITTL it would appear that the Soviet Union is a juggernaut that just overran France's main ally in the east. I'm not sure how you can even think the USSR wouldn't be considered no counter here.

Plus all the evidence suggests your wrong on this 2nd point. All the time the US were seeking to delay and cut reparations to the allies from Germany they point blank refused to have the issue linked to the debt repayment crisis. There is hostility towards Bolshivikism as it was called at the time but it was a distant threat, largely in terms of potential labour unrest. However this then or in the situation suggested now is unlikely to affect their hostility towards any debt repayment settlement.
You do know we're talking about an ATL where Poland was conquered by the USSR, right? No shit that IOTL the US didn't want to let the Entente out of their debts, especially after the USSR repudiated Russia's debts. The reason they did the Dawes Plan, which you badly mischaracterize, was because of the collapse of the German economy during the French occupation of the Ruhr, which then hurt the British economy (there is a reason the British backed the US not France) and its ability to repay debt. The Dawes Plan actually transferred Entente war debt on to Germany via the loans that allowed them to pay reparations, which were then used to pay war debts. They avoided overt linkage, but accepted de facto linkage from 1924 onwards. Also they were interested in rehabilitating the German economy for trade purposes and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism:
President Thomas W. Wilson claimed that only high developed Germany, with the strong middle class, would be able to pay back reparations and resist the danger of the Bolshevik revolution. During the Paris Peace Conference he proposed establishing the amount of reparations according to the conditions of German economy. The main reasons of that standpoint were close economic ties linking the United States with Germany.

As to the threat of Bolshevism, the US and other Allied powers invaded Russia to stop the rise of Bolshevism and had a panic at home about the expansion of the USSR. The only reason that fell off after 1920 was the defeat of the USSR by Poland and its containment in Eastern Europe. If Poland falls and it looks like revolution will be expanded by conquest into Central Europe all bets are off, because if the US was willing to leverage its economic power against France for the Ruhr Occupation it will certainly go quite a bit further to ensure Germany doesn't fall to Communist invasion, as the consequences of that for everyone would be unthinkable. Now we know in hindsight that the Soviets were too weak to really do that and the remnants of the Polish army and limited German army would be enough to stop them from crossing the Warthe, but at the time it was not known how weak the Soviets actually were. It would just appear that they were capable of overrunning a vibrant new state and would likely be able to exploit the very recent civil war in Germany, already prostrate from losing WW1 and the blockade of 1918-19, to advance deep into the country.

So they rebuilt without spending any money? They had to spend a lot to repair the war damage and some of that would have come from what they got in reparations. Some of it also went on repaying debts to the US because the latter insisted on that.
I thought war debt payments were so crippling that all reparations had to go to servicing them? What is it? Were war debts so onerous that they prevented rebuilding or were reparations so high that they easily covered war debts and rebuilding the country plus continual financing for French military expansion and colonial conflicts?

BTW it turns out the US did lower French war debts:
While the war debt taken out in the United States was considerably reduced, the French authorities treated this subject as the political one. They wanted the Americans to cancel it as they claimed the United States should have regarded it not as the money borrowed, but their contribution to the victory – the common aim of the allied nations.
...
The French-American debt agreement was signed on April 29, 1926. As the result, the French obtained more favorable conditions of its repayment. The debt had been reduced by approximately 60%, spread over 62 years, and the average interest rate was 1.64%.10 Despite the fact the agreement was beneficial for France, the Chamber of Deputies refused its ratification. The surprised Americans announced that he United States would cease the financial assistance for France. Therefore the French government decided to pay off the debt from December 1926, even though the standpoint of the Chamber of Deputies reminded unchanged.

France got a sweet deal from the US.

The French built up their gold reserves because without them they suffered from US fiscal pressure. The Maginot line wasn't even started until 1930 and was due to the desire to protect their eastern border against a markedly larger and more powerful Germany and its likely if anything that - assuming that France doesn't maintain an occupation of the Rhineland in the proposed scenario something like it would be started ASAP in the 1920's as France would have no other option.
The French had financed WW1 by printing money and instead of contracting the supply of cash sought to deal with inflation buying up gold when they repegged their currency to it in 1926 (right after the deal with the US on war debts).
The Maginot Line was financed before it started construction because there is a vast amount of work that needs to be done before you can break ground on construction projects. Again possible because the US wrote off 60% of French war debts and gave them a very small interest rate. If Germany is tied down in the East dealing with the USSR France's reason for the building the Maginot Line doesn't even exist.

France would probably maintain an occupation of the Rhineland here due to the ToV being partially kept in place to mollify the French and Belgians as well as support their occupation of the Saar.

It was anti-communist in part for the reason you mentioned but also because of the Soviet links with the Germans during and after the war and the desire to try and get a friendly government back into power in Russia to act as a counter to Germany. After this failed they supported Poland as a eastern counter to German power and this would also have failed. Coupled with the idea of a rearmed Germany France would recognise that as by far the greatest threat to itself.
There weren't any significant links during the war and after the war that came specifically as a result of Germany and the USSR both being treated as pariah states not even allowed in the LoNs. They worked together out of necessity forced on them by the Allies. Here if the Allies play their cards well they can ensure Germany remains hostile to the USSR by removing the political barriers that marred Allied-German relations post-war.

France supported Poland during the invasion of Russia starting in 1918:

It was a big factor in helping Poland defeat the USSR.

Again if Poland fell it would appear the USSR is unstoppable given that it defeated the Whites and all the other various color factions in the RCW, was able to defeat the Allied intervention in said CW, and then go on to conquer Poland. Germany meanwhile can't make reparations payments, suffered horribly under the extended blockade, the Rhineland and Saar are occupied, there had been a civil war in Germany as well as the Kapp Putsch, and Germany lost land to the Allies while having already turned over most of its military equipment. It is a basket case by 1920 relative to the USSR.

Germany was to demobilize sufficient soldiers by 31 March 1920 to leave an army of no more than 100,000 men in a maximum of seven infantry and three cavalry divisions.
On 1 October 1920, the brigades were replaced by regiments and the manpower was now only 100,000 men as stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles.[2]
So around the Battle of Warsaw the German army was only 100,000 men with sufficient equipment only for those men and police forces. The French ensured the German army lacked heavy artillery, tanks, most armored cars, most aircraft, etc.

Germany was given two months to surrender all prohibited war material. Disarmament began under the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission on 10 January 1920. The Allies created a list of war material that included flamethrowers, shells, rifles, grenades, armored cars, artillery, fuses and detonators. The list broadly included uniforms, field ambulances, telephones, gas masks, signalling equipment and optical instruments. This published list was called the "Blue Book".[1]

The German government objected to the broad scope of the Blue Book, which had defined war material so expansively as to include cooking utensils and vehicles needed for basic economic activity and transportation. Responding to this complaint, the Allies decided to sell non-military goods and credit the proceeds as reparations. The Fehrenbach government complained again in January 1921, but the IAMCC would not alter the list, and even expanded it once again in August 1921 to include German uniforms, pants, backpacks, jackets and tents, which were sold, and helmets, which were destroyed.[1]

There probably would be continued restrictions in the west to mollify France, but the army would have to probably trebled at a minimum to deal with the USSR as well as be permitted modern vehicles and machines of war.

Maybe we see the French only allowing for a von Seecktian 300,000 men army, but one with a lot of firepower and mobility and a focus on defensive capabilities. Effectively not much different in conception than the Bundeswehr during the Cold War.

As said above the hostility towards communism was largely related to labour issues and it didn't stop the US sending huge amounts of aid to the early USSR, possibly preventing its collapse by some sources. Also probably an element of isolationism and American exceptionalism with an idea "its a foreign/Europe presence so keep it away". It would have been logical to trade war debts for reparations but the US failed totally to do that OTL and given there was no real probability of communism taking over Britain or France there's no great incentive here either.
Humanitarian aid to prevent millions of civilians from starving to death. Organized by later president Hoover, who had started such aid during WW1 to help the Belgians.
The fear was that, if Central Europe succumbed to Bolshevism, it would be hard to save the rest of Europe from the same fate. Thus on April 25, 1919, in the midst of the crisis, Hoover wrote: “Of course, the prime objective of the United States in undertaking the fight against famine in Europe is to save the lives of starving people. The secondary object, however, and of hardly less importance, [is] to defeat Anarchy, which is the handmaiden of Hunger.”
As this quote indicates, the words “anarchy” and “Bolshevism” were used synonymously at the time. Hoover was referring to ongoing events in Central Europe, beginning with a failed uprising in Berlin by the radical Spartacist League, the establishment of short-lived Soviet regimes in Munich and Budapest, and an abortive communist rising in Vienna.
Although Europe did not go Bolshevik, there was still a Bolshevik Russia. In 1919 and 1920, Hoover tried without success to negotiate his ARA into Lenin’s Russia. But catastrophic events intervened. A devastating famine descended on Russia in 1921. More than 25 million people were threatened by starvation and hunger-related diseases. The famine was centered in and beyond the Volga River valley and also in southern Ukraine. The United States, led by Hoover and his ARA, responded with a massive two-year relief campaign that battled starvation and disease and saved millions of lives. The best estimates of the death toll from the Great Famine of 1921 run from 5 million to 10 million people. But that total would have been much higher had the ARA not intervened with food and medical supplies. This is all the more remarkable because the United States, alone among the major powers, had no diplomatic relations with Bolshevik Russia.
From the outset there was a good deal of suspicion about Hoover’s true motives for going into Russia. Obviously he had no desire to rescue the Soviet government. So, was America’s great anti-Bolshevik hoping to bring about regime change in Moscow? Certainly Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership feared this. Soviet diplomat Maxim Litvinov, in negotiating an agreement with the ARA in Riga, Latvia, in August 1921, kept repeating to the Americans somewhat nervously, “Gentlemen, food is a weapon.”
But Hoover was playing this entirely straight. The idea that his relief workers themselves should attempt to influence Russian politics was unacceptable to him. They had strict orders to avoid even discussing politics. Hoover did indeed intend to use food as a weapon in Russia, but not in the crude way his critics imagined. His plan was to accomplish political ends in Russia not under the guise of famine relief, as they suspected, but rather by means of it. Hoover believed that if he could only relieve the Russians’ hunger, they would return to their senses and recover the physical strength to throw off their Bolshevik oppressors. The ARA example of energy and efficiency would also serve to discredit in the eyes of the Russian people what Hoover called the “foolish” Soviet economic system. Sooner or later, the Bolsheviks were going to fall, so why not help the process along?
It turned out that Hoover was wrong about the staying power of Soviet communism. Despite the famine, Lenin’s regime stayed firmly in control, with no organized opposition to challenge it. The irony, then, is that American relief served in the end to help stabilize the Soviet economy and thus Bolshevik rule.

It was intended though that the aid would turn the people of Russia against the Bolsheviks by having a capitalist power feed them instead of the Bolsheviks.

Bolshevism wouldn't take over organically in Europe, but the Soviets exporting it militarily would look like a major problem if Poland fell and the main US concern was to prevent the spread of the ideology. Perhaps though ITTL the US wouldn't offer food aid?

Given that the US got the vast bulk of what it desired in the peace treaty and left an unstable mess that suggests the prime aim was ignorance and bigotry. Which is unlikely to change here.
Huh? The Entente got what they wanted, the US never ratified the treaty because they disagreed with it:

Wilson might have wanted the treaty, but didn't have enough support to pass it in Congress.

They signed a seperate treaty with Germany in 1921:

Ignorance and bigotry as reasons are really strong charges, you'll really have to work to support that claim.

Given the assumption that the Poles are crushed and the problems the allies were facing the Baltics will be occupied by the Soviets unless their occupied by a rearmed Germany. Britain and France would have little capacity to help them in the face of threats by both Russia and Germany and is running out of will to continue trying to maintain order everywhere. The continuation of demands for debt repayments by the US is only going to make that a worse issue.
If the Poles are defeated given that the Bolshevik armies occupied parts of Lithuania they might well just invade the Baltic states well before Germany is capable of doing anything but defending its territories. Memel likely reverts to Germany as Lithuania is overrun. I'm thinking that assuming the POD is a Polish defeat in the Battle of Warsaw the remnants of the Polish army flee west of the Warthe and the Allies allow Germany to intervene and call up reserves as well as have back some military equipment to secure their 1914 border and beyond to the best of their ability in conjunction with the Poles. At that point the Bolsheviks have to stop advancing at least beyond the Warthe due to logistics, but then they threaten East Prussia and the Baltic states. Given that there is likely to be some collusion with the German army and the Bolsheviks as it does appear at this time there were secret correspondence to avoid direct conflict, as both sides realized they were too weak for major confrontations, that gives the Soviets a chance to turn north, deal with the Baltic states, and effectively reclaim the Russian Empire but for a few places like Bessarabia and Finland.

So the Baltic states are probably shortly lost before any help of significance can arrive, which aids Germany even more since they will then look like the only hope to stop the Soviets, while on the Soviet end by divvying up the East clandestinely they can ensure their western border is secure. I'm not sure what happens to the Poles ITTL; they could well end up migrating to France to avoid having to deal with German domination or perhaps those who refuse to leave end up as a Polish Legion under the German banner. Seems highly unlikely Germany would accept even a Polish rump state at that point.

That then sets up other issues like the status of Finland and Romanian-Soviet relations.

Did they favour Germany in 1923 or think that France and Belgium had gone further than they were willing to support them? In this scenario Britain will have to support France against Germany. Its the last buffer against the continental empire the German right still desire. How much such a rampant Germany would be distracted fighting the Soviets for empire in the east would be the key issue.
Both.
Why would Britain have to support France against Germany? British-French interests are diverging quite a bit post-war. British interests are extremely strongly aligned with Germany not falling to the USSR or any more of Eastern Europe falling to the Soviets, which is going to only be heightened when the Baltic states fall. Really British-Germany friction is ended by the end of the German fleet, which won't need to have restrictions ended on it.

Likely there won't be much fighting between the Soviets and Germans after Poland falls given the clandestine coordination von Seeckt and the Soviets had to avoid ruinous fighting for both sides that did happen during the OTL Polish-Soviet war, but it would create an international terror of further Soviet expansion, so restriction end up being eased.

BTW von Seeckt wasn't interested in a huge army or expansion against France or in the west in general. He was thinking of a 300,000 man standing army that would be qualitatively the best with a limited mass conscript army (equivalent to the British territorial army or US national guard) to support them, so likely we're not going to see a major expansion of German armed forces ITTL if he gets his way.

With a still limited, though high tech German standing army and one focused on quick operational victories and tactical air units, does France really freak out ITTL? They'd likely get the write down from the US as compensation for the end of reparations, so could make their Maginot Line. I do wonder how the Depression would play out ITTL if the Germans recover quickly and avoid the 1923 occupation and hyperinflation. They'd if anything calm down quite a lot given the collapse of Versailles and Poland so that they recover lost territories very quickly. The fear of Germany very well might end up unfounded and if anything France and Germany might be in a position to reconcile without the bleeding ulcer in their relations regarding the Ruhr occupation and suffering/humiliation in general beyond 1920. Plus with the public fearing the Soviets on their border (unlikely that anyone in the known would reveal cooperation with the Soviets) reconciling with the French very well could be much more possible than you'd think, especially given the OTL work of Stresseman and Briand in the 1920s. So long as the French don't overreact to the new post-1920 order. Though Austria could end up a friction point eventually as it did after the 1929 stock market disaster and the effort to stabilize the Austro-German economies by a customs union.

Possibly the idea option, although not sure how likely it would be is that Germany escapes the ToV restrictions, although possibly the allies still keep bases in the Rhineland for the moment. The rearmed Germany defeats the Soviets then the military gets too overconfident and seek a wider war to displace the Soviets and possibly even 'regain' the eastern conquests of 1918 but overstretch. A weakened USSR survive but a still war weary Germany turns against such ideas and while they make territorial gains in the east their not massive and Germany seeks a weakening of militaristic influence.
I'd be surprised if they don't keep them. Germany being let off the hook is still only to a limited degree, as the naval restriction would likely remain, same with heavy bombers and chemical weapons, same with forts in the west and in the north for naval matters. The Rhine would undoubtedly remained internationalized. The Saar coalfields would have to remain French too.

As I said above given the correspondence between von Seeckt and the Soviets via Enver Pasha in 1920 during the Soviet advance likely there is only very limited Soviet-German fighting and probably a remnant Polish army still clashing with the Soviets. Given the weakness of the German army at this point offensively they could do little beyond defend their borders and use the Poles as their proxy army. They'd probably set a line that neither side would cross (I'm thinking probably a little beyond the German 1914 border to the Warthe river), while the Soviets then could reoccupy the Baltic states in the aftermath of defeating Poland. Both sides get what they want, but once sharing a border probably aren't as friendly as you'd think especially given public opinion in Germany. They'd likely have some sort of understanding, but given how hard the US and British would be courting Germany as their proxy in the region Germany would have incentive not to cooperate with the Soviets nearly as much as IOTL (no need really). Though eventually they reestablish their trade relationship given how important each was to the other pre-war.

BTW after all the talk of von Seeckt, he was only a single voice on the issue.
The Russian question became urgent during the very same months that the Kapp Putsch was being liquidated. Having managed, in the course of I9I9, to rid itself of the Allied-sponsored interventionist armies, Russia clashed with Poland. In the summer of I920 it even succeeded in taking the offensive, which, however, came to a standstill on August 20, when the Soviet troops reached the gates of Warsaw. In view of the rising Bolshevist danger, certain Entente circles, in spite of their hostility to the Reich, would not have been unhappy to see it wage war against the Soviets in order to save the Western world. Inside Germany such thoughts were endorsed by men like the potash-industrialist, Arnold Rechberg, and General Max Hoffmann,6 who, in spite of his bitterness toward Ludendorff, shared the latter's anti-Russian ideas.

Seeckt remained firmly opposed to this policy, just as he had been during the liquidation of the Baltic adventure, when this question first came up. "Since the future understanding with Greater Russia" was to be, he wrote early in I920,7 "the permanent target of Germany's foreign policy,"he found it "inappropriate to antagonize Russia's masters." For this reason, he stated, he was opposed to Poland and the Baltic border states and to helping Poland against bolshevism. Germany should not prevent Russia from regaining its old boundaries. Should bolshevism endeavor to fight for its national goals with military means, Germany would have to stop it at the German frontier. Hence, a "reasonable inner policy, backed by sufficient armed might," would be necessary. The Reich should be prepared to fight bolshevism in its own interest. In order to do so, the Allies would have to let the Germans buy the necessary weapons. It was a diabolically clever program and was later carried out to the letter. On the one side, the Germans, following Seeckt's initiative, came to an understanding with the Russians which enabled them to start their secret rearmament.

On the other side, Germany knew how to exploit the Allied fear of bolshevism to such an extent that it could finally transfer the main theater of rearmament from Russia to German soil.8 In I920, when Seeckt formulated his twofaced program, the prospects for its success were still modest. Russia's defeat by Pilsudski and Weygand in the summer of I920 and the conclusion of the Russo-Polish peace treaty which ensued tipped the scale once more in favor of the Allies, to the great disappointment of the head of the reichswehr who had been confident that Russia would win. Both events determined the history of Europe for several years to come. They forced the Russians, as the beaten power, to look for German help rather than vice versa. They removed all prospects of immediate Allied concessions to the Reich. And they exposed the Germans, without cover, weapons, or friends, to the roughness of the political tempests that were to hit them in the period from I92I to I923, both in the east and in the west.

Once the issue of Poland was dealt with von Seeckt, though powerful, was only a single voice and one that could well shift if the political winds changed in Europe and opposing the Soviets became better policy for German interests. Certainly several powerful people were quite anti-Soviet at the same time Seeckt was trying to work with the Soviets.

The Seeckt wikpedia entry has some interesting stuff about the internal politics that he dealt with as well, including those politicians who favored a pro-British policy and avoiding deals with the Soviets so as not to alienate Britain and cause her to side with France.
 
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stevep

Well-known member
Not a lot of time so will respond briefly.

I'm assuming you mean France. A defeated, but partially remilitarized Germany is less of a threat than a Communist one allied with the USSR bent on world revolution.


Running rampant? France would still have its position on the Rhine as well as the Saar and Germany would be concerned with defending its eastern border. Germany just had a communist revolution and is now facing a major threat of a communist state on its border that just conquered the eastern neighbor. We know with hindsight how weak the USSR was, but ITTL it would appear that the Soviet Union is a juggernaut that just overran France's main ally in the east. I'm not sure how you can even think the USSR wouldn't be considered no counter here.

A partially remilitarised one is less of a threat. However you talked of the ToV basically being dropped. In that case and especially if Germany escapes reparations totally what restraints are there on Germany rearming to a much larger scale. Yes if the Rhineland stays demilitarised and with a minimal allied force there that's a different matter. However from what I understood you to be saying what check would there have been on German re-militarisiation, especially since hard light right wingers have played a major part in suppressing the hard left.

Note that in your initial post you said
France will probably be strong armed into dropping the ToV by the US and Britain
& on Germany
Probably not. It would of course want the 1914 border in the East and no ToV reparations or restrictions for anything. Which they probably could have gotten due to British and American fears of the spread of Communism (remember the 1920s Red Scare in the US). Honestly short of a French invasion Germany would be strong enough (or rather the Soviets weak enough) in 1920 to fight the Soviets in Poland after the defeat of the Polish army and seize back the 1914 border+additional territory.


France has a neighbour with a recent history of aggression to it, a markedly larger population and twice the economic size on its immediate border and a disorganised and chaotic state far to the east. True the latter also looks powerful at the moment but which is going to cause the most concern to Paris? At the very least France is going to be worried about German rearmament, especially with no real check on its limits which is likely to be feared to be the case. Couple that with ending reparations and almost certainly the US continuing to demand debt repayments and France is going to be limited in its capacity to defend itself. If France keeps control of the Rhineland then this is substantially reduced but that wasn't what it sounded like your talking about.

Also yes Poland was France's main ally in the east. That a only recently recreated state, with minimal industrial resources and little time to actually create a state let alone a formal army shows how desperate the French position was.

You do know we're talking about an ATL where Poland was conquered by the USSR, right? No shit that IOTL the US didn't want to let the Entente out of their debts, especially after the USSR repudiated Russia's debts. The reason they did the Dawes Plan, which you badly mischaracterize, was because of the collapse of the German economy during the French occupation of the Ruhr, which then hurt the British economy (there is a reason the British backed the US not France) and its ability to repay debt. The Dawes Plan actually transferred Entente war debt on to Germany via the loans that allowed them to pay reparations, which were then used to pay war debts. They avoided overt linkage, but accepted de facto linkage from 1924 onwards. Also they were interested in rehabilitating the German economy for trade purposes and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism:

The Russian cancelling of war debts of course hit the allies hard, which made it even harder for them to meet US demands. The dawes plan prompted a delay in paying reparations and also, if its the treaty I'm thinking of put repayment of loans from the US on a higher priority to payment of reparations.

By 1923 the fear of Bolshevik expansion had largely disappeared, in part because the Polish victory at Warsaw and the resultant treaty had shown how weak they actually were at the time.

As to the threat of Bolshevism, the US and other Allied powers invaded Russia to stop the rise of Bolshevism and had a panic at home about the expansion of the USSR. The only reason that fell off after 1920 was the defeat of the USSR by Poland and its containment in Eastern Europe. If Poland falls and it looks like revolution will be expanded by conquest into Central Europe all bets are off, because if the US was willing to leverage its economic power against France for the Ruhr Occupation it will certainly go quite a bit further to ensure Germany doesn't fall to Communist invasion, as the consequences of that for everyone would be unthinkable. Now we know in hindsight that the Soviets were too weak to really do that and the remnants of the Polish army and limited German army would be enough to stop them from crossing the Warthe, but at the time it was not known how weak the Soviets actually were. It would just appear that they were capable of overrunning a vibrant new state and would likely be able to exploit the very recent civil war in Germany, already prostrate from losing WW1 and the blockade of 1918-19, to advance deep into the country.

Actually they invaded Russia to secure allied resources, especially military supplies and in the hope of establishing a friendly Russian government that would re-establish an eastern front against the Germans. This made them hostile to the Bolsheviks because from the start the latter were determined on peace with Germany. There was also fear of revoilutionary 'ideas' and behaviour, especially with reports of massacres but that was not an high priority for the US, sitting an ocean away from all this. That's why the US, especially under Wilson but also afterwards opposed such interventions.


I thought war debt payments were so crippling that all reparations had to go to servicing them? What is it? Were war debts so onerous that they prevented rebuilding or were reparations so high that they easily covered war debts and rebuilding the country plus continual financing for French military expansion and colonial conflicts?

Debt repayments were crippling. I never made the statement your allegding above but it caused serious problems for the already struggling allies, especially France and Belgium which had seen so much material destruction. That as much as war losses was why France's military power was greatly reduced over its pre-1914 levels.


BTW it turns out the US did lower French war debts:


France got a sweet deal from the US.


The French had financed WW1 by printing money and instead of contracting the supply of cash sought to deal with inflation buying up gold when they repegged their currency to it in 1926 (right after the deal with the US on war debts).
The Maginot Line was financed before it started construction because there is a vast amount of work that needs to be done before you can break ground on construction projects. Again possible because the US wrote off 60% of French war debts and gave them a very small interest rate. If Germany is tied down in the East dealing with the USSR France's reason for the building the Maginot Line doesn't even exist.

France would probably maintain an occupation of the Rhineland here due to the ToV being partially kept in place to mollify the French and Belgians as well as support their occupation of the Saar.

If Germany is tied down in the east, although that's probably a big IF AND ALSO France continues to occupy the Rhineland then that's a different matter but that was unclear from your previous post. Even then I can't see France leaving its eastern border totally undefended.


There weren't any significant links during the war and after the war that came specifically as a result of Germany and the USSR both being treated as pariah states not even allowed in the LoNs. They worked together out of necessity forced on them by the Allies. Here if the Allies play their cards well they can ensure Germany remains hostile to the USSR by removing the political barriers that marred Allied-German relations post-war.

Lets see:
a) The Bolshevik coup only occurred because Germany aided/encouraged Lenin and some of his supporters to return to Russia through their territory in the expectation they would stir up problems for the Provisional Government.
b) Once the coup occurred this pretty much ended the eastern front as a major drain on German resources as Lenin had no desire for a continuation of the war - and furthermore his own propaganda had seriously undermined further Russian morale. It took ~ 6 months for the two powers to agree terms - which were hugely favourable to the Germans in part because of Soviet incompetence but a lot of the pressure in the east ended with Lenin seizing power.
c) You yourself mentioned agreements between von Seeckt and the Soviets at this point.

By removing Germany's pariah status what you mean is that there are no external checks on German policy and also no reparations - because that is what many in Germany demand. This leaves it basically as the winner of WWI, with no serious threat to the east - unless as I say it goes for deep conquests as OTL in 1917-18 and overstretches itself while the allied powers are exhausted and without an eastern balancing power vulnerable. The only counter to this would be a defensive alliance of Britain, France and the US which Washington rejected and the idea of trading off reparations with war debts which the US also rejected.




Again if Poland fell it would appear the USSR is unstoppable given that it defeated the Whites and all the other various color factions in the RCW, was able to defeat the Allied intervention in said CW, and then go on to conquer Poland. Germany meanwhile can't make reparations payments, suffered horribly under the extended blockade, the Rhineland and Saar are occupied, there had been a civil war in Germany as well as the Kapp Putsch, and Germany lost land to the Allies while having already turned over most of its military equipment. It is a basket case by 1920 relative to the USSR.



So around the Battle of Warsaw the German army was only 100,000 men with sufficient equipment only for those men and police forces. The French ensured the German army lacked heavy artillery, tanks, most armored cars, most aircraft, etc.



There probably would be continued restrictions in the west to mollify France, but the army would have to probably trebled at a minimum to deal with the USSR as well as be permitted modern vehicles and machines of war.

Maybe we see the French only allowing for a von Seecktian 300,000 men army, but one with a lot of firepower and mobility and a focus on defensive capabilities. Effectively not much different in conception than the Bundeswehr during the Cold War.

Actually its in a much better condition than the USSR in 1920, albeit that this isn't that clear at this point. Its not been ravaged by war, has a large industrial base and of course the blockade is over by now. It had a hell of a lot of men with military experience that can be recalled quickly and a fair number of them are already under arms in the assorted Free-Korps groups. Yes they would need better weapons to be a formidable force but that could be done relatively quickly and the Red Army isn't that well equipped either at this point.

The issue is that how do the allies check a Germany that rearms, especially since its almost certain going to the OTL circumstances to exceed any agreed limits and go back to a full sized military? Again if the allies continue to occupy the Rhine west bank then that provides some security to them? After all if you allow some tanks and a/c etc then having an accurate idea of numbers is a lot more difficult. If there are no such limits on German actions then things could spiral badly very quickly.

I think you will find the Bundeswehr had a hell of a lot more than 300,000 men during the cold war.



Humanitarian aid to prevent millions of civilians from starving to death. Organized by later president Hoover, who had started such aid during WW1 to help the Belgians.


It was intended though that the aid would turn the people of Russia against the Bolsheviks by having a capitalist power feed them instead of the Bolsheviks.

Bolshevism wouldn't take over organically in Europe, but the Soviets exporting it militarily would look like a major problem if Poland fell and the main US concern was to prevent the spread of the ideology. Perhaps though ITTL the US wouldn't offer food aid?

Well that didn't work did it? Although I can see why it was tried.

As stated the main US concern wasn't to prevent the spread of the ideology. That's why the US repeated opposed the earlier intervention.


Huh? The Entente got what they wanted, the US never ratified the treaty because they disagreed with it:

Wilson might have wanted the treaty, but didn't have enough support to pass it in Congress.

The US never ratified the treaty because their government changed and decided to oppose what the previous President wanted. The US go pretty much everything they wanted. The allies got limitations of German power but also a mess across much of eastern and SE Europe because of Wilson's ideas, crippling debts and continued actions by the US to prevent the Europeans stablising the continent.


Ignorance and bigotry as reasons are really strong charges, you'll really have to work to support that claim.

As I've said elsewhere on this issue it was definitely stupidity to insist on full repayment of war debts. Britain suggested that both it and the Us do what Britain had done in 1815 in terms of cancelling all war loans. Simply because impoverished people make very poor customers. Unfortunately the US rejected that idea.

In the immediate post war period there was a lot of bigotry in the US. There was not only the revival of the KKK, which wasn't just directed against blacks but also strict limits on immigration which had a strong racial characteristic and the phobia about not just communism but virtually all socialist ideas. A lot of this was painted as threats from European ideas and seems to be a classic case of American exceptionalism rearing its ugly head again.


If the Poles are defeated given that the Bolshevik armies occupied parts of Lithuania they might well just invade the Baltic states well before Germany is capable of doing anything but defending its territories. Memel likely reverts to Germany as Lithuania is overrun. I'm thinking that assuming the POD is a Polish defeat in the Battle of Warsaw the remnants of the Polish army flee west of the Warthe and the Allies allow Germany to intervene and call up reserves as well as have back some military equipment to secure their 1914 border and beyond to the best of their ability in conjunction with the Poles. At that point the Bolsheviks have to stop advancing at least beyond the Warthe due to logistics, but then they threaten East Prussia and the Baltic states. Given that there is likely to be some collusion with the German army and the Bolsheviks as it does appear at this time there were secret correspondence to avoid direct conflict, as both sides realized they were too weak for major confrontations, that gives the Soviets a chance to turn north, deal with the Baltic states, and effectively reclaim the Russian Empire but for a few places like Bessarabia and Finland.

So the Baltic states are probably shortly lost before any help of significance can arrive, which aids Germany even more since they will then look like the only hope to stop the Soviets, while on the Soviet end by divvying up the East clandestinely they can ensure their western border is secure. I'm not sure what happens to the Poles ITTL; they could well end up migrating to France to avoid having to deal with German domination or perhaps those who refuse to leave end up as a Polish Legion under the German banner. Seems highly unlikely Germany would accept even a Polish rump state at that point.

That then sets up other issues like the status of Finland and Romanian-Soviet relations.

So your saying that Germany would probably be larger after the war with the Soviets than in 1914? Quite possibly all of Congressional Poland and a good chance of the Baltics coming under their control. With the bulk of the Poles either deported to France or forced into being a puppet army for Germany, but presumably with very little in the way of heavy weapons in case they rebel.

Both.
Why would Britain have to support France against Germany? British-French interests are diverging quite a bit post-war. British interests are extremely strongly aligned with Germany not falling to the USSR or any more of Eastern Europe falling to the Soviets, which is going to only be heightened when the Baltic states fall. Really British-Germany friction is ended by the end of the German fleet, which won't need to have restrictions ended on it.

Because a Germany with little/no constraints on its power and controlling at least its 1914 lands - other than A-L - is at least as great a threat as in 1914 and there's now an exhausted France and no ally to the east to counter it. Unless your suggesting that Britain and France seek to ally with the Soviets!

Likely there won't be much fighting between the Soviets and Germans after Poland falls given the clandestine coordination von Seeckt and the Soviets had to avoid ruinous fighting for both sides that did happen during the OTL Polish-Soviet war, but it would create an international terror of further Soviet expansion, so restriction end up being eased.

BTW von Seeckt wasn't interested in a huge army or expansion against France or in the west in general. He was thinking of a 300,000 man standing army that would be qualitatively the best with a limited mass conscript army (equivalent to the British territorial army or US national guard) to support them, so likely we're not going to see a major expansion of German armed forces ITTL if he gets his way.

With a still limited, though high tech German standing army and one focused on quick operational victories and tactical air units, does France really freak out ITTL? They'd likely get the write down from the US as compensation for the end of reparations, so could make their Maginot Line. I do wonder how the Depression would play out ITTL if the Germans recover quickly and avoid the 1923 occupation and hyperinflation. They'd if anything calm down quite a lot given the collapse of Versailles and Poland so that they recover lost territories very quickly. The fear of Germany very well might end up unfounded and if anything France and Germany might be in a position to reconcile without the bleeding ulcer in their relations regarding the Ruhr occupation and suffering/humiliation in general beyond 1920. Plus with the public fearing the Soviets on their border (unlikely that anyone in the known would reveal cooperation with the Soviets) reconciling with the French very well could be much more possible than you'd think, especially given the OTL work of Stresseman and Briand in the 1920s. So long as the French don't overreact to the new post-1920 order. Though Austria could end up a friction point eventually as it did after the 1929 stock market disaster and the effort to stabilize the Austro-German economies by a customs union.


I'd be surprised if they don't keep them. Germany being let off the hook is still only to a limited degree, as the naval restriction would likely remain, same with heavy bombers and chemical weapons, same with forts in the west and in the north for naval matters. The Rhine would undoubtedly remained internationalized. The Saar coalfields would have to remain French too.

As I said above given the correspondence between von Seeckt and the Soviets via Enver Pasha in 1920 during the Soviet advance likely there is only very limited Soviet-German fighting and probably a remnant Polish army still clashing with the Soviets. Given the weakness of the German army at this point offensively they could do little beyond defend their borders and use the Poles as their proxy army. They'd probably set a line that neither side would cross (I'm thinking probably a little beyond the German 1914 border to the Warthe river), while the Soviets then could reoccupy the Baltic states in the aftermath of defeating Poland. Both sides get what they want, but once sharing a border probably aren't as friendly as you'd think especially given public opinion in Germany. They'd likely have some sort of understanding, but given how hard the US and British would be courting Germany as their proxy in the region Germany would have incentive not to cooperate with the Soviets nearly as much as IOTL (no need really). Though eventually they reestablish their trade relationship given how important each was to the other pre-war.

BTW after all the talk of von Seeckt, he was only a single voice on the issue.


Once the issue of Poland was dealt with von Seeckt, though powerful, was only a single voice and one that could well shift if the political winds changed in Europe and opposing the Soviets became better policy for German interests. Certainly several powerful people were quite anti-Soviet at the same time Seeckt was trying to work with the Soviets.

The Seeckt wikpedia entry has some interesting stuff about the internal politics that he dealt with as well, including those politicians who favored a pro-British policy and avoiding deals with the Soviets so as not to alienate Britain and cause her to side with France.

As you say Seeckt was only a single figure. There were a lot more other people who might emerge as potential leaders and one of them who was an ardent militarist later became President of Germany! Even worse his subordinate - although he seems to have been the dominant member of the couple - Ludendorff is also still about. Can you imagine the impact in Paris and London if either of them become dominant political or military figures? :eek:
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Not a lot of time so will respond briefly.
No problem, I typed out much more than intended. Too much coffee.

A partially remilitarised one is less of a threat. However you talked of the ToV basically being dropped. In that case and especially if Germany escapes reparations totally what restraints are there on Germany rearming to a much larger scale. Yes if the Rhineland stays demilitarised and with a minimal allied force there that's a different matter. However from what I understood you to be saying what check would there have been on German re-militarisiation, especially since hard light right wingers have played a major part in suppressing the hard left.
Basically dropped, not entirely dropped. Demilitarization of the Rhineland and Rhine, continued to use of the Saar coal fields, and maintained Allied occupation troops were going to have to remain even with the majority of the ToV dropped (manpower restrictions to a point, weapon type/research restrictions, obviously reparations and the eastern border, perhaps even Austria might get to join Germany to stabilize it and dilute the Junkers/Prussian influence though that is debatable, probably entry into the LoNs, etc.).

What would constrain Germany, besides the demilitarization in the west, is the economy given that they're short some 2.5 million men vs. 1914, plus of course not having the Saar coal. Militaries are expensive, as France found out after WW1. Germany was hungry and didn't have fully access to pre-war markets. Let's also not forget the problem of inflation, which started during WW1 and was rising (thanks to reparations) right up to the Ruhr occupation that ultimately kicked things off a cliff. Here it wouldn't be nearly as bad without reparations from 1920 onwards, but it was going to be a serious issue especially if Germany resumes the gold standard and doesn't get as many loans from the US without the Dawes and Plan.

Ultimately yes Germany wouldn't have nearly as many restrictions on her military, but there are major economic and manpower limits after the war and a large, looming threat in the East if they share a border. Plus even though Lenin was willing to work with Germany when convenient he was openly preaching inevitable war with German conservatives.

Note that in your initial post you said

& on Germany

France has a neighbour with a recent history of aggression to it, a markedly larger population and twice the economic size on its immediate border and a disorganised and chaotic state far to the east. True the latter also looks powerful at the moment but which is going to cause the most concern to Paris? At the very least France is going to be worried about German rearmament, especially with no real check on its limits which is likely to be feared to be the case. Couple that with ending reparations and almost certainly the US continuing to demand debt repayments and France is going to be limited in its capacity to defend itself. If France keeps control of the Rhineland then this is substantially reduced but that wasn't what it sounded like your talking about.
Concern or not France has really no choice given the British+US opinions on the matter and their own weakness as well as the failure of their Polish proxy. Since they will likely got the sops of elements of the ToV being maintained and probably some sort of claims of renegotiation in the future for 'temporarily suspended' provisions (which like after the OTL Hoover Moratorium would never come back) they will probably be able to tolerate it and get the 1926 write down of their debts early or a temporary suspension of payments until the situation stabilizes and they can get the write down later on. France being limited in it's military capacity wouldn't necessarily be a problem especially with Germany continually tied down in the East against an ideological enemy. That would help confirm them as a region rather than Great power, which would actually help avoid future conflict in Europe as it stops trying to militarily confront Germany and has to acknowledge it has to work with Germany as a greater power. The problems between them were more of France still feeling they were more powerful than they were and trying to play the game of power politics rather than peace making, apparently never having accepted their defeat in 1870-71.

And yes my thinking has evolved on this issue from the first post once we started getting into details and I started reading more about the political/economic situation IOTL. Though I don't even think I meant that the ToV would entirely go away, just the most important restrictions that would prevent Germany from countering the USSR.

Also yes Poland was France's main ally in the east. That a only recently recreated state, with minimal industrial resources and little time to actually create a state let alone a formal army shows how desperate the French position was.
Not sure why you would infer that, Poland was part of the Little Entente and a historical goal of France to weaken the Austro-Germans (and Russians since the Duchy of Warsaw sided with Napoleon), so it makes total sense why the French opted to rely on Poland as their centerpiece with Germany and Russia prostrate. Not only that, but the Poles were winning battle after battle from 1918 on, so looked much more powerful than they turned out to be.

The Russian cancelling of war debts of course hit the allies hard, which made it even harder for them to meet US demands. The dawes plan prompted a delay in paying reparations and also, if its the treaty I'm thinking of put repayment of loans from the US on a higher priority to payment of reparations.
Huh? The entire point of the Dawes plan was to get the Germans to start paying reparations again. They realized that was only possible with US loans:
In an agreement of August 1924, the main points of The Dawes Plan were:
  1. The Ruhr area was to be evacuated by foreign troops
  2. Reparation payments would begin at one billion marks the first year, increasing annually to two and a half billion marks after five years
  3. The Reichsbank would be re-organized under Allied supervision
  4. The sources for the reparation money would include transportation, excise, and customs taxes
  5. Germany would be loaned about $200 million, primarily through Wall Street bond issues in the United States[7]
Considering the reason the Dawes Plan even happened was German inability to pay it ended up being a great thing for the French and British, especially since it removed the cost for France to occupy the Ruhr and calmed down the political disagreements between Britain and France, while eventually leading to the 1926 war debt write down by 60% and lowering of the interest rate. That ensured the France and British would continue making payments on their war debt. It was only a good thing for the European Allies.

ITTL without reparations or a majorly written down version of it including the Saar coal field exploitation as part of it my gut says the French either get more loans to help them recover and finance their military or Germany gets loans to pay off reparations like in the Dawes Plan as soon as it is politically acceptable.

Likely IMHO reparations are officially put on hold except for the Saar coal region, which became French totally until 1935 per the TOV and was already implemented by the time of the POD:

The German article is much more detailed than the English one. Google translate is decent for that one.

Eventually given the situation the ToV reparations payments either do not restart due to the situation and/or there is some sort of deal equivalent to the Dawes plan to help Germany with inflation and more limited reparations payments coupled with a write down of war debts.

By 1923 the fear of Bolshevik expansion had largely disappeared, in part because the Polish victory at Warsaw and the resultant treaty had shown how weak they actually were at the time.
IOTL due to the defeat against Poland and the Soviet economic issues. ITTL there wouldn't be the issue of defeat and in fact an economic boost due to recovering Poland and probably rapidly the Baltic states. Then they'd have the NEP started, which would help the economy considerably. IOTL when Stalin took a fraction of Poland and the Baltic states the USSR had a pretty substantial economic increase, IIRC around 10%. So if the Soviets are able to retake Poland and the Baltics they'd look entirely different as a threat by 1923 than IOTL.

Debt repayments were crippling. I never made the statement your allegding above but it caused serious problems for the already struggling allies, especially France and Belgium which had seen so much material destruction. That as much as war losses was why France's military power was greatly reduced over its pre-1914 levels.
Do you have a source about the crippling debt repayments? I've never heard that that was actually the case for the Allies.
Yes they had destruction in their countries, but their colonies, especially those of Belgium, funded their reconstruction and in fact they were able to build up infrastructure quite heavily in the 1920s there.

France was the strongest army on the continent from the 1919 to 1940 bar none, so I don't know why you think their military power was in any way diminished by the war. If anything it was enhanced to the point that they alone outnumbered Germany even as late as 1940. Now granted ITTL that would be different, but then Germany would have to fight or at least oppose the USSR from 1920 on, which only makes France more secure.

Maybe there would be much more pressure for an early EU structure for Europe that Astride Briand wanted since they couldn't rely on the ToV to weaken Germany.

If Germany is tied down in the east, although that's probably a big IF AND ALSO France continues to occupy the Rhineland then that's a different matter but that was unclear from your previous post. Even then I can't see France leaving its eastern border totally undefended.
France wouldn't have to leave its Eastern Border undefended. I don't see how Germany wouldn't be tied down against the USSR even if they do have trade deals. Once Poland and the Baltics as well as most of the TOV restrictions are gone there really aren't many reasons for the Soviets and Germans to work together and both sides seemed to realize that even in 1920.

Lets see:
a) The Bolshevik coup only occurred because Germany aided/encouraged Lenin and some of his supporters to return to Russia through their territory in the expectation they would stir up problems for the Provisional Government.
b) Once the coup occurred this pretty much ended the eastern front as a major drain on German resources as Lenin had no desire for a continuation of the war - and furthermore his own propaganda had seriously undermined further Russian morale. It took ~ 6 months for the two powers to agree terms - which were hugely favourable to the Germans in part because of Soviet incompetence but a lot of the pressure in the east ended with Lenin seizing power.
c) You yourself mentioned agreements between von Seeckt and the Soviets at this point.
Allowing Lenin to transit through German territory doesn't make him a German agent. It was a move instigated by Lenin, not the Germans, they just allowed him through the country in a sealed train to go to Sweden and then it was on him to move from there since the Allied powers wouldn't let him out of Switzerland through their territory.

Uh...the October Revolution did little to stop the German commitments there, it was only the German offensive in February-March 1918 against Russia that forced the Bolsheviks to accept defeat and finally quit:
They were trying to wait out Germany, thinking a revolution of the proletariat was going to happen shortly.

The Bolsheviks were almost incidental to what was going on in Russia and won politically by default:
The Provisional Government, led by Socialist Revolutionary Party politician Alexander Kerensky, was unable to solve the most pressing issues of the country, most importantly to end the war with the Central Powers. A failed military coup by General Lavr Kornilov in September 1917 led to a surge in support for the Bolshevik party, who gained majorities in the soviets, which until then had been controlled by the Socialist Revolutionaries. Promising an end to the war and "all power to the Soviets", the Bolsheviks then ended dual power by suppressing the Provisional Government in late October, on the eve of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in what would be the second Revolution of 1917. Despite the Bolsheviks' seizure of power, they lost to the Socialist Revolutionary Party in the 1917 Russian Constituent Assembly election, and the Constituent Assembly was dissolved by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks soon lost the support of other far-left allies such as the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries after their acceptance of the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk presented by Germany.[12]
Kerensky had discredited himself, a military coup then failed, and the Bolsheviks were the last political group standing within the Soviets that had taken over Russia. Since they were the only group preaching peace the public sided with them. Of course as you can see above that worked against them and started the civil war.

There was no agreement between von Seeckt and the Soviets, just some letters exchanged about possible cooperation if the Soviet offensive ended up on the German border. His machinations were only his and didn't have the support of anyone else either, so there is no guarantee they'd actually end up working together in the end ITTL. At most it would only guarantee that the Soviets and Germans wouldn't directly fight since both sides were so weak and the Poles, even in defeat at Warsaw, would still need to be dealt with. Plus given that the Germans were in no position to help the Baltic states and that said states only were able to survive due to Poland, any agreement would simply free up the Soviets to recover Russian Imperial territories.

After that all bets are off.

By removing Germany's pariah status what you mean is that there are no external checks on German policy and also no reparations - because that is what many in Germany demand. This leaves it basically as the winner of WWI, with no serious threat to the east - unless as I say it goes for deep conquests as OTL in 1917-18 and overstretches itself while the allied powers are exhausted and without an eastern balancing power vulnerable. The only counter to this would be a defensive alliance of Britain, France and the US which Washington rejected and the idea of trading off reparations with war debts which the US also rejected.
The external check is Germany being allowed to trade with the world (remember naval blockades and economic sanctions?), eventually getting back the Saar, and access to US loans. If anything ending Germany's pariah status simply brings the nation back into the international fold and limits any desire to overturn an existing order that favors them with some minor quibbles that will be worked out in time (Rhine stuff, Saar). As it is Germany is guaranteed to be the British proxy against the Soviets and organizing point for the rest of Central Europe/the Balkans to resist Lenin. Plus US economic interests ensure that they'd want Germany locked into the existing system; once Germany had something to lose that they valued, they'd be much less interested in messing around. Hitler IOTL was able to do what he did with national support because of the existing system that disadvantaged Germany in Europe, which would not be the case here.

Question is what do the Czechs do and what happens after 1929.

Why do you not see the USSR as a serious threat in the East? Just because Germany and the Soviets had a temporary common interest in resetting the border back to 1914 between them doesn't mean the pre-existing Russo-German issues aren't still there but now with a major ideological issue exacerbating things.

The Allied powers are less exhausted than Germany except for France. Britain too IOTL in the 1920s was all for rehabilitating Germany except for things like naval matters, but without Poland and a USSR that has calmed down after defeat Britain is going to go all Chamberlain on things given the British ideological panic over the USSR.


Let's not forget old Churchill either, who was dead set on ending the USSR ASAP.

Actually its in a much better condition than the USSR in 1920, albeit that this isn't that clear at this point. Its not been ravaged by war, has a large industrial base and of course the blockade is over by now. It had a hell of a lot of men with military experience that can be recalled quickly and a fair number of them are already under arms in the assorted Free-Korps groups. Yes they would need better weapons to be a formidable force but that could be done relatively quickly and the Red Army isn't that well equipped either at this point.
Germany is incredibly weak militarily and economically in 1920 due to reparations, inflation, dismantling the army, the civil war aftermath, etc. Russia is quite powerful still even with the its large armies in the field, which were several times the size of the Reichswehr. After all they had the strength to invade Poland while still wrapping up the civil war, while Germany did not despite having wrapped theirs up. The number of German men with military experience doesn't really matter given that they needed to work in the factories as they were short about 2.5 million workers and thanks to the Allied disarmament commission Germany didn't have the arms to equip more than 100,000 men. Sure they could gather civilian arms or whatever they could hide, but that would take time and even then would mean they could equip only militias. Not all that helpful against larger numbers of Russians with artillery, tanks, and cavalry. Against the Allies they wouldn't last long.

How could it be done quickly to build modern arms and equipment when the Allies had dismantled German war industries? It took 1930s Germany 5 years to be able to rebuild their industry and trained manpower to have a semi-credible army of 400,000 men. They had only 600,000 men in the standing army by 1939 and even that only thanks to capturing all the arms and industry of Czechoslovakia intact. So no it is not like flipping a light switch to rebuild the army even with veteran manpower still around.

The issue is that how do the allies check a Germany that rearms, especially since its almost certain going to the OTL circumstances to exceed any agreed limits and go back to a full sized military? Again if the allies continue to occupy the Rhine west bank then that provides some security to them? After all if you allow some tanks and a/c etc then having an accurate idea of numbers is a lot more difficult. If there are no such limits on German actions then things could spiral badly very quickly.
Briand's European Union. He came up with it because it was already clear IOTL in the late 1920s that Germany couldn't be constrained even with the ToV in place. Could spiral when they have to devote everything to dealing with the potential Soviet threat?

I think you will find the Bundeswehr had a hell of a lot more than 300,000 men during the cold war.
It was about 300k men as of the early/mid-1960s. They peaked at 495k in the 1980s-90s. Seems like their growth was fueled by increased US presence in Vietnam and a draw down in Europe. Also remember the Red Army of the Cold War was much larger than they were in the 1920s. Plus again I was talking about the professional standing element, not everyone; reservists would have made it substantially larger in wartime.


As stated the main US concern wasn't to prevent the spread of the ideology. That's why the US repeated opposed the earlier intervention.
What do you call trying to help the Whites in the war and preventing any non-White Russia from having access to supplies in ports? The US opposed interventions because the public felt they had been used by the Entente to fight their war for them and for warmongering industrialists/bankers that wanted to get rich. Intervention in Russia had little to do with that.

The US never ratified the treaty because their government changed and decided to oppose what the previous President wanted. The US go pretty much everything they wanted. The allies got limitations of German power but also a mess across much of eastern and SE Europe because of Wilson's ideas, crippling debts and continued actions by the US to prevent the Europeans stablising the continent.
In part, but you have elections to find out what the people wanted. The reason the government changed is that they wanted something different than what Wilson and the Democrats were offering. It wasn't like there was a groundswell of support for Wilson despite the Republicans opposing him.

Wilson got what he wanted, the US public did not hence why the treaty was not ratified. In contrast to Britain the US had a more expansive electorate, so congress represented the will of the public. Since the president wasn't a dictator he simply couldn't force his vision on the US public.

Mess across eastern and southeastern Europe? Not really, that was the fault of the Entente nations who insisted Germans didn't get self determination, only punishment for losing. The way Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc. turned were all Entente initiatives to weaken Germany. That's not even getting into the shit-show that was and is the Middle East courtesy of British and French imperialism. Don't blame America for Britain fuck ups.

Crippling debt was also an Entente initiative to win at all costs regardless of what was actually in their interests. If the fucking Entente had had a brain to share between them they would have heeded Wilson's offers to negotiate and make peace short of total victory to prevent all the bad blood that led to WW2. The ToV was an Entente peace and we got WW2 for helping you lot get what you wanted. How dare America ask you to pay your bills after getting exactly what you wanted? /s

As I've said elsewhere on this issue it was definitely stupidity to insist on full repayment of war debts. Britain suggested that both it and the Us do what Britain had done in 1815 in terms of cancelling all war loans. Simply because impoverished people make very poor customers. Unfortunately the US rejected that idea.
Why? What was stupid was offering unsecured loans to help you win the victory you demanded, rather than the one you should have gotten. Of course Britain didn't want to pay the debts it racked up for total victory, but you should have paid in full, no write downs, and have borne the full consequences of your bad policies. Britain wasn't good customers, the US by 1924 favored Germany for a reason.

In the immediate post war period there was a lot of bigotry in the US. There was not only the revival of the KKK, which wasn't just directed against blacks but also strict limits on immigration which had a strong racial characteristic and the phobia about not just communism but virtually all socialist ideas. A lot of this was painted as threats from European ideas and seems to be a classic case of American exceptionalism rearing its ugly head again.
As if there wasn't all of that in Britain? You should read about American soldiers' impression of the racial hierarchy in India the British set up that was still in force in the 1940s. Or how you treated the Irish. Remember the Black-and-Tans or your use of chemical weapons against civilians in the Middle East and other colonies that dared rebel and demand indepedence?

Or the Nazi-level shit Britain did in Kenya in the 1950s?

The point I was making was there was very real public fears of communism, just like in Britain and France at that time IOTL. If you want to start pointing fingers about bigotry in the 1920s and beyond British blokes should be very careful.

So your saying that Germany would probably be larger after the war with the Soviets than in 1914? Quite possibly all of Congressional Poland and a good chance of the Baltics coming under their control. With the bulk of the Poles either deported to France or forced into being a puppet army for Germany, but presumably with very little in the way of heavy weapons in case they rebel.
The 1914 border could potentially be yes. Overall no given the losses elsewhere.
Congress Poland? No. Where are you getting that from? If the Soviets win the Battle of Warsaw they get Congress Poland. All Germany might potentially get is a small extra sliver of territory west of the Warthe river. The Baltics would fall to the Soviets, as von Seeckt and pretty much everyone else had no interest in taking them. The Freikorps were defeated and von Seeckt was fine with the Soviets taking back Russian imperial territory if he got the 1914 border in the East.

Who said anything about deported Poles? They'd either stay in the Polish majority areas of Prussia or move to France to get away from Germany and the Soviets. If they remain armed yes they'd probably not be fully armed though they could well just fight it out with the Soviets until the Germans show up. They might well end up destroyed in the follow battles to Warsaw.

Because a Germany with little/no constraints on its power and controlling at least its 1914 lands - other than A-L - is at least as great a threat as in 1914 and there's now an exhausted France and no ally to the east to counter it. Unless your suggesting that Britain and France seek to ally with the Soviets!
There is the Eupen-Malmedy territory and Schlewig-Holstein areas as well. There are going to be pretty big constraints given the Rhine bridgeheads, demilitarization in the west and internationalization of the Rhine, plus Franco-British control over the Saar. Germany is exhausted and demilitarized by August 1920, more so than France. Plus it has the USSR to worry about. Britain never would ally with the USSR, France wouldn't in the 1920s. Actually no one would until the 1930s. France has far too much to worry about economically to attempt to ally with the Soviets, who were more inclined to temporarily work with Germany. Plus France is pretty concerned with WW1 and pre-WW1 debts Russia owes, which the USSR was not inclined to pay on until Stalin took over.

As you say Seeckt was only a single figure. There were a lot more other people who might emerge as potential leaders and one of them who was an ardent militarist later became President of Germany! Even worse his subordinate - although he seems to have been the dominant member of the couple - Ludendorff is also still about. Can you imagine the impact in Paris and London if either of them become dominant political or military figures? :eek:
Hindenburg is a non-factor at this time, same with the exiled Luddendorf. He is in Sweden at this point IIRC. No f-ing way he ever gets into any position of influence.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
That's not even getting into the shit-show that was and is the Middle East courtesy of British and French imperialism. Don't blame America for Britain fuck ups.

The Ottomans fucked up first when they decided to jump in on a private Christian-on-Christian knife fight to the death (WWI) and started attacking Suez. What did they expect, candy and roses?

The Young Turks might have been young, but they weren't children. They were every bit the adults British, German and Entente leaders were by pretty much anybody's legal definition.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
The Ottomans fucked up first when they decided to jump in on a private Christian-on-Christian knife fight to the death (WWI) and started attacking Suez. What did they expect, candy and roses?
What does that have to do with what I was talking about? Total non-sequitor.
Ottoman actions have little to do with how the Entente drew lines on a map to carve up the Middle East in the middle of the war, the fallout of which we've been dealing with ever since:

The Ottoman decision to enter the war was based on knowing that if they didn't pick a side they'd be devoured after the war by the victor. Plus it isn't like Britain, Italy, France, and Russia hadn't been picking apart the Ottoman Empire for over a hundred years by that point and forcing all sorts of concessions on her:

The Young Turks might have been young, but they weren't children. They were every bit the adults British, German and Entente leaders were by pretty much anybody's legal definition.
Again, what does that have to do with what I was talking about? I was talking about the Entente creating a bunch of artificial borders and regimes in the region to expand their empires in and the fallout of which remains with us today. Ottoman actions have little to do with what the Entente created for the Arab inhabitants of the region to service their imperial agendas.
 

stevep

Well-known member
No problem, I typed out much more than intended. Too much coffee.


Basically dropped, not entirely dropped. Demilitarization of the Rhineland and Rhine, continued to use of the Saar coal fields, and maintained Allied occupation troops were going to have to remain even with the majority of the ToV dropped (manpower restrictions to a point, weapon type/research restrictions, obviously reparations and the eastern border, perhaps even Austria might get to join Germany to stabilize it and dilute the Junkers/Prussian influence though that is debatable, probably entry into the LoNs, etc.).

What would constrain Germany, besides the demilitarization in the west, is the economy given that they're short some 2.5 million men vs. 1914, plus of course not having the Saar coal. Militaries are expensive, as France found out after WW1. Germany was hungry and didn't have fully access to pre-war markets. Let's also not forget the problem of inflation, which started during WW1 and was rising (thanks to reparations) right up to the Ruhr occupation that ultimately kicked things off a cliff. Here it wouldn't be nearly as bad without reparations from 1920 onwards, but it was going to be a serious issue especially if Germany resumes the gold standard and doesn't get as many loans from the US without the Dawes and Plan.

Ultimately yes Germany wouldn't have nearly as many restrictions on her military, but there are major economic and manpower limits after the war and a large, looming threat in the East if they share a border. Plus even though Lenin was willing to work with Germany when convenient he was openly preaching inevitable war with German conservatives.


Concern or not France has really no choice given the British+US opinions on the matter and their own weakness as well as the failure of their Polish proxy. Since they will likely got the sops of elements of the ToV being maintained and probably some sort of claims of renegotiation in the future for 'temporarily suspended' provisions (which like after the OTL Hoover Moratorium would never come back) they will probably be able to tolerate it and get the 1926 write down of their debts early or a temporary suspension of payments until the situation stabilizes and they can get the write down later on. France being limited in it's military capacity wouldn't necessarily be a problem especially with Germany continually tied down in the East against an ideological enemy. That would help confirm them as a region rather than Great power, which would actually help avoid future conflict in Europe as it stops trying to militarily confront Germany and has to acknowledge it has to work with Germany as a greater power. The problems between them were more of France still feeling they were more powerful than they were and trying to play the game of power politics rather than peace making, apparently never having accepted their defeat in 1870-71.

And yes my thinking has evolved on this issue from the first post once we started getting into details and I started reading more about the political/economic situation IOTL. Though I don't even think I meant that the ToV would entirely go away, just the most important restrictions that would prevent Germany from countering the USSR.


Not sure why you would infer that, Poland was part of the Little Entente and a historical goal of France to weaken the Austro-Germans (and Russians since the Duchy of Warsaw sided with Napoleon), so it makes total sense why the French opted to rely on Poland as their centerpiece with Germany and Russia prostrate. Not only that, but the Poles were winning battle after battle from 1918 on, so looked much more powerful than they turned out to be.


Huh? The entire point of the Dawes plan was to get the Germans to start paying reparations again. They realized that was only possible with US loans:

Considering the reason the Dawes Plan even happened was German inability to pay it ended up being a great thing for the French and British, especially since it removed the cost for France to occupy the Ruhr and calmed down the political disagreements between Britain and France, while eventually leading to the 1926 war debt write down by 60% and lowering of the interest rate. That ensured the France and British would continue making payments on their war debt. It was only a good thing for the European Allies.

ITTL without reparations or a majorly written down version of it including the Saar coal field exploitation as part of it my gut says the French either get more loans to help them recover and finance their military or Germany gets loans to pay off reparations like in the Dawes Plan as soon as it is politically acceptable.

Likely IMHO reparations are officially put on hold except for the Saar coal region, which became French totally until 1935 per the TOV and was already implemented by the time of the POD:

The German article is much more detailed than the English one. Google translate is decent for that one.

Eventually given the situation the ToV reparations payments either do not restart due to the situation and/or there is some sort of deal equivalent to the Dawes plan to help Germany with inflation and more limited reparations payments coupled with a write down of war debts.


IOTL due to the defeat against Poland and the Soviet economic issues. ITTL there wouldn't be the issue of defeat and in fact an economic boost due to recovering Poland and probably rapidly the Baltic states. Then they'd have the NEP started, which would help the economy considerably. IOTL when Stalin took a fraction of Poland and the Baltic states the USSR had a pretty substantial economic increase, IIRC around 10%. So if the Soviets are able to retake Poland and the Baltics they'd look entirely different as a threat by 1923 than IOTL.


Do you have a source about the crippling debt repayments? I've never heard that that was actually the case for the Allies.
Yes they had destruction in their countries, but their colonies, especially those of Belgium, funded their reconstruction and in fact they were able to build up infrastructure quite heavily in the 1920s there.

France was the strongest army on the continent from the 1919 to 1940 bar none, so I don't know why you think their military power was in any way diminished by the war. If anything it was enhanced to the point that they alone outnumbered Germany even as late as 1940. Now granted ITTL that would be different, but then Germany would have to fight or at least oppose the USSR from 1920 on, which only makes France more secure.

Maybe there would be much more pressure for an early EU structure for Europe that Astride Briand wanted since they couldn't rely on the ToV to weaken Germany.


France wouldn't have to leave its Eastern Border undefended. I don't see how Germany wouldn't be tied down against the USSR even if they do have trade deals. Once Poland and the Baltics as well as most of the TOV restrictions are gone there really aren't many reasons for the Soviets and Germans to work together and both sides seemed to realize that even in 1920.


Allowing Lenin to transit through German territory doesn't make him a German agent. It was a move instigated by Lenin, not the Germans, they just allowed him through the country in a sealed train to go to Sweden and then it was on him to move from there since the Allied powers wouldn't let him out of Switzerland through their territory.

Uh...the October Revolution did little to stop the German commitments there, it was only the German offensive in February-March 1918 against Russia that forced the Bolsheviks to accept defeat and finally quit:
They were trying to wait out Germany, thinking a revolution of the proletariat was going to happen shortly.

The Bolsheviks were almost incidental to what was going on in Russia and won politically by default:

Kerensky had discredited himself, a military coup then failed, and the Bolsheviks were the last political group standing within the Soviets that had taken over Russia. Since they were the only group preaching peace the public sided with them. Of course as you can see above that worked against them and started the civil war.

There was no agreement between von Seeckt and the Soviets, just some letters exchanged about possible cooperation if the Soviet offensive ended up on the German border. His machinations were only his and didn't have the support of anyone else either, so there is no guarantee they'd actually end up working together in the end ITTL. At most it would only guarantee that the Soviets and Germans wouldn't directly fight since both sides were so weak and the Poles, even in defeat at Warsaw, would still need to be dealt with. Plus given that the Germans were in no position to help the Baltic states and that said states only were able to survive due to Poland, any agreement would simply free up the Soviets to recover Russian Imperial territories.

After that all bets are off.


The external check is Germany being allowed to trade with the world (remember naval blockades and economic sanctions?), eventually getting back the Saar, and access to US loans. If anything ending Germany's pariah status simply brings the nation back into the international fold and limits any desire to overturn an existing order that favors them with some minor quibbles that will be worked out in time (Rhine stuff, Saar). As it is Germany is guaranteed to be the British proxy against the Soviets and organizing point for the rest of Central Europe/the Balkans to resist Lenin. Plus US economic interests ensure that they'd want Germany locked into the existing system; once Germany had something to lose that they valued, they'd be much less interested in messing around. Hitler IOTL was able to do what he did with national support because of the existing system that disadvantaged Germany in Europe, which would not be the case here.

Question is what do the Czechs do and what happens after 1929.

Why do you not see the USSR as a serious threat in the East? Just because Germany and the Soviets had a temporary common interest in resetting the border back to 1914 between them doesn't mean the pre-existing Russo-German issues aren't still there but now with a major ideological issue exacerbating things.

The Allied powers are less exhausted than Germany except for France. Britain too IOTL in the 1920s was all for rehabilitating Germany except for things like naval matters, but without Poland and a USSR that has calmed down after defeat Britain is going to go all Chamberlain on things given the British ideological panic over the USSR.


Let's not forget old Churchill either, who was dead set on ending the USSR ASAP.


Germany is incredibly weak militarily and economically in 1920 due to reparations, inflation, dismantling the army, the civil war aftermath, etc. Russia is quite powerful still even with the its large armies in the field, which were several times the size of the Reichswehr. After all they had the strength to invade Poland while still wrapping up the civil war, while Germany did not despite having wrapped theirs up. The number of German men with military experience doesn't really matter given that they needed to work in the factories as they were short about 2.5 million workers and thanks to the Allied disarmament commission Germany didn't have the arms to equip more than 100,000 men. Sure they could gather civilian arms or whatever they could hide, but that would take time and even then would mean they could equip only militias. Not all that helpful against larger numbers of Russians with artillery, tanks, and cavalry. Against the Allies they wouldn't last long.

How could it be done quickly to build modern arms and equipment when the Allies had dismantled German war industries? It took 1930s Germany 5 years to be able to rebuild their industry and trained manpower to have a semi-credible army of 400,000 men. They had only 600,000 men in the standing army by 1939 and even that only thanks to capturing all the arms and industry of Czechoslovakia intact. So no it is not like flipping a light switch to rebuild the army even with veteran manpower still around.


Briand's European Union. He came up with it because it was already clear IOTL in the late 1920s that Germany couldn't be constrained even with the ToV in place. Could spiral when they have to devote everything to dealing with the potential Soviet threat?


It was about 300k men as of the early/mid-1960s. They peaked at 495k in the 1980s-90s. Seems like their growth was fueled by increased US presence in Vietnam and a draw down in Europe. Also remember the Red Army of the Cold War was much larger than they were in the 1920s. Plus again I was talking about the professional standing element, not everyone; reservists would have made it substantially larger in wartime.



What do you call trying to help the Whites in the war and preventing any non-White Russia from having access to supplies in ports? The US opposed interventions because the public felt they had been used by the Entente to fight their war for them and for warmongering industrialists/bankers that wanted to get rich. Intervention in Russia had little to do with that.


In part, but you have elections to find out what the people wanted. The reason the government changed is that they wanted something different than what Wilson and the Democrats were offering. It wasn't like there was a groundswell of support for Wilson despite the Republicans opposing him.

Wilson got what he wanted, the US public did not hence why the treaty was not ratified. In contrast to Britain the US had a more expansive electorate, so congress represented the will of the public. Since the president wasn't a dictator he simply couldn't force his vision on the US public.

Mess across eastern and southeastern Europe? Not really, that was the fault of the Entente nations who insisted Germans didn't get self determination, only punishment for losing. The way Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc. turned were all Entente initiatives to weaken Germany. That's not even getting into the shit-show that was and is the Middle East courtesy of British and French imperialism. Don't blame America for Britain fuck ups.

Crippling debt was also an Entente initiative to win at all costs regardless of what was actually in their interests. If the fucking Entente had had a brain to share between them they would have heeded Wilson's offers to negotiate and make peace short of total victory to prevent all the bad blood that led to WW2. The ToV was an Entente peace and we got WW2 for helping you lot get what you wanted. How dare America ask you to pay your bills after getting exactly what you wanted? /s


Why? What was stupid was offering unsecured loans to help you win the victory you demanded, rather than the one you should have gotten. Of course Britain didn't want to pay the debts it racked up for total victory, but you should have paid in full, no write downs, and have borne the full consequences of your bad policies. Britain wasn't good customers, the US by 1924 favored Germany for a reason.


As if there wasn't all of that in Britain? You should read about American soldiers' impression of the racial hierarchy in India the British set up that was still in force in the 1940s. Or how you treated the Irish. Remember the Black-and-Tans or your use of chemical weapons against civilians in the Middle East and other colonies that dared rebel and demand indepedence?

Or the Nazi-level shit Britain did in Kenya in the 1950s?

The point I was making was there was very real public fears of communism, just like in Britain and France at that time IOTL. If you want to start pointing fingers about bigotry in the 1920s and beyond British blokes should be very careful.


The 1914 border could potentially be yes. Overall no given the losses elsewhere.
Congress Poland? No. Where are you getting that from? If the Soviets win the Battle of Warsaw they get Congress Poland. All Germany might potentially get is a small extra sliver of territory west of the Warthe river. The Baltics would fall to the Soviets, as von Seeckt and pretty much everyone else had no interest in taking them. The Freikorps were defeated and von Seeckt was fine with the Soviets taking back Russian imperial territory if he got the 1914 border in the East.

Who said anything about deported Poles? They'd either stay in the Polish majority areas of Prussia or move to France to get away from Germany and the Soviets. If they remain armed yes they'd probably not be fully armed though they could well just fight it out with the Soviets until the Germans show up. They might well end up destroyed in the follow battles to Warsaw.


There is the Eupen-Malmedy territory and Schlewig-Holstein areas as well. There are going to be pretty big constraints given the Rhine bridgeheads, demilitarization in the west and internationalization of the Rhine, plus Franco-British control over the Saar. Germany is exhausted and demilitarized by August 1920, more so than France. Plus it has the USSR to worry about. Britain never would ally with the USSR, France wouldn't in the 1920s. Actually no one would until the 1930s. France has far too much to worry about economically to attempt to ally with the Soviets, who were more inclined to temporarily work with Germany. Plus France is pretty concerned with WW1 and pre-WW1 debts Russia owes, which the USSR was not inclined to pay on until Stalin took over.


Hindenburg is a non-factor at this time, same with the exiled Luddendorf. He is in Sweden at this point IIRC. No f-ing way he ever gets into any position of influence.

sillygoose

Again time is short and we're going over already much beaten ground.

a) If Germany is largely relieved of the ToV restrictions it can rearm pretty damned quickly. Its industrial base is still there plus the necessary knowledge. Not to mention that Germany was able to hid a fair amount of breaches of the terms when it came to weapons anyway. There was very little in the way of civil war in Germany nor material damage. In comparison France has seen much of its industrial heartland destroyed. A lot of industry was built up during the war but that was largely war related

Similarly German losses were more in total than the French but less proportionately and far, far less then the losses that Russia had suffered between WWI and the civil war between 1914-20. The Red Army by 1920, as well as having serious problems in terms of logistics wasn't exactly a well equipped and trained army. Their unlikely if Germany rearms, especially with aid in this by the western powers, to hold Congressional Poland for more than a year or so. I wouldn't suspect Germany would feel strong enough to go much further but they could easily take over at least some of the Baltics, which remember hadn't been occupied by the Soviets by this time. This is a sizable addition to a resource base that is much larger than that available to France. What is to stop Germany suddenly making further demands on France or other, smaller powers? Possibly not straight away but say 5 or 10 years down the line.

b) Also since this victory has come apart via military force what is to stop the army regaining a lot of their former power? After all they have 'rescued' Germany and central Europe from the communists and regained the nations honour by removing most/all of the Versailles restrictions. Even OTL Hindenburg became President as early as 1925 so him or some other military leader could gain such prominence again. There will no doubt be much repeating of the 'stabbed in the back' myth. Luddendorf may be a little more controversial but he's also a lot craftier than Hindenburg but possibly other army or pro-army leaders who could also gain a lot of political power.

c) I pointed out that the US was unwise to block European recovery by insisting on full debt repayment and that alternatives were available and were in fact suggested. Also the irrational phobias that often plague US policy. No need for name calling as I could match Britain 'crimes' with US ones quite easily.

d) Surprised your trying to blame France for the extremism of Germany in the 1930's. It wasn't that France was trying to compete with Germany but simply gain security against it given the imbalance in power. Unfortunately they never used the military advantage they did have until the later 30's else we might have avoided much of the following disasters. It was Germany to which concession after concession was made by the western powers and continued demanding more.

e) On the Poles check your post I was replying to. You mentioned them being deported to France or being forced into auxiliary units for the German army.

Steve
 

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