Poland cuts a deal in August 1939

[sillygoose]

In reading up on Polish war plans and diplomacy in 1939 it is painfully clear what a bind the Polish government engaged in. They were told flat out (behind the scenes) by both the French and British that in the event of war there would be no aid forthcoming for Poland and no monetary or material aid was available for them in the run up to war the Polish government could only hope that the Allied powers 'would come to their senses' and attack in support Poland before they were defeated (they didn't know how unprepared the Allies were). On top of that due to thinking Stalin would honor their 1932 nonaggression pact even after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact they thought the Soviets wouldn't attack them if Germany did. Obviously these were hopes not realized.

What if the Polish government, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was announced, realized the Soviets would attack too if war came and Hitler was crazy enough to do start it (he originally planned to invade on the 26th), so instead opted to accept terms? Terms at this point were Danzig, an extra-territorial road and rail link to East Prussia (Elbing to Danzig was the route IIRC), and an agreement to protect German minority rights in return for a 25 year non-aggression pact, recognition of the final border with Poland, and free use of a port in Danzig. Let's say the deal is signed by the 26th of August. What next?

How does Stalin react? What does Hitler do next? What do the Poles do? How about the Allies?

 

[PsihoKekec]

In Ciano diaries he mentions Ribentropp telling him that they don't want the terms accepted, they want war (and it's validated by Gobbels diary and other sources as well). So if deal is signed, the Germans make excuse how the duplicitous Poles broke the treaty and invade anyway.

 

[Culsu]

Yeah, honestly, by mid-1939 the train for a peaceful agreement between Germany and Poland had left the station. Had Poland been drawn into the German sphere of influence by, say, the Treaty of Munich, maybe that would be different, but by August '39 things were more or less set.

 

[sillygoose]

In Ciano diaries he mentions Ribentropp telling him that they don't want the terms accepted, they want war (and it's validated by Gobbels diary and other sources as well). So if deal is signed, the Germans make excuse how the duplicitous Poles broke the treaty and invade anyway.

Ribbentrop was leader of the war party (he had staked out that position to gain influence with Hitler) and trying to influence Hitler to go to war, so he's not exactly a reliable source about all that was going on behind the scenes:

Joachim von Ribbentrop - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Ribbentrop informed Hitler that any war with Poland would last for only 24 hours and that the British would be so stunned with this display of German power that they would not honour their commitments.[157] Along the same lines, Ribbentrop told Ciano on 5 May 1939, "It is certain that within a few months not one Frenchman nor a single Englishman will go to war for Poland".[158]

Ribbentrop supported his analysis of the situation by showing Hitler only the diplomatic dispatches that supported his view that neither Britain nor France would honour their commitments to Poland. In that, Ribbentrop was particularly supported by the German Ambassador in London, Herbert von Dirksen, who reported that Chamberlain knew "the social structure of Britain, even the conception of the British Empire, would not survive the chaos of even a victorious war" and so would back down over Poland.[159] Furthermore, Ribbentrop had the German embassy in London provide translations from pro-appeasement newspapers such as the Daily Mail and the Daily Express for Hitler's benefit, which had the effect of making it seem that British public opinion was more strongly against going to war for Poland than it actually was.[160][161] The British historian Victor Rothwell wrote that the newspapers used by Ribbentrop to provide his press summaries for Hitler were out of touch not only with British public opinion but also with British government policy in regard to Poland.[161] The press summaries Ribbentrop provided were particularly important, as Ribbentrop had managed to convince Hitler that the British government secretly controlled the British press, and just as in Germany, nothing appeared in the British press that the British government did not want to appear. Furthermore, the Germans had broken the British diplomatic codes and were reading the messages between the Foreign Office in London to and from the Embassy in Warsaw.[158] The decrypts showed that there was much tension in Anglo-Polish relations, with the British pressuring the Poles to allow Danzig to rejoin the Reich and the Poles staunchly resisting all efforts to pressure them into concessions to Germany.[158] On the basis of such decrypts, Hitler and Ribbentrop believed that the British were bluffing with their warnings that they would go to war to defend Polish independence.[158]

During the summer of 1939, Ribbentrop sabotaged all efforts at a peaceful solution to the Danzig dispute, leading the American historian Gerhard Weinberg to comment that "perhaps Chamberlain's haggard appearance did him more credit than Ribbentrop's beaming smile", as the countdown to a war that would kill tens of millions inexorably gathered pace.[162]

In Richard Overy's Goering biography the situation is told differently, with Goering pursuing a "peace solution" (relative to Ribbentrop's position) through negotiations with the British, who would (and did) pressure Poland to make concessions. Overy suggests that had Poland accepted the terms Goering would have been able to keep Hitler from invading (at least in 1939) and to pursue economic leverage and political influence to get Poland politically aligned with Hitler's foreign policy. Due to his political contacts with Britain he, unlike Ribbentrop, realized that invading Poland would mean war with the Allies, so sought to use negotiation and political and economic pressure to achieve Hitler's goal of subordinating Poland.

So I'm not convinced that had Poland agreed before Ribbentrop's increased demands after August 26th that Hitler would have invaded anyway on some pretext; Ribbentrop put way too much effort into preventing Poland from negotiating after Hitler halted the original invasion plan to allow time for more negotiations for invasion to be guaranteed. The Goering-Ribbentrop tug of war for influence with Hitler over foreign policy was what was at stake and Ribbentrop was doing everything he could to sabotage the negotiated solution Goering was pursuing to ensure he wasn't sidelined politically.

This book makes the case that it was the competition between these factions and Ribbentrop's political insecurity that caused the war rather than it being the inevitable outcome in 1939:


Nazi internal politics was a rat's nest of infighting.

Poland's strong stance played into Ribbentrop's hands for a while, but when they did start trying to negotiate under British pressure then Ribbentrop did everything he could to sabotage the effort, realizing that Goering would effectively sideline politically. If Goering got the upper hand he'd have frozen out the war faction's influence with Hitler, at least in 1939.

Assuming that war was avoided at that point the Goering 'method' would have been to squeeze Poland economically and with other methods like how Hungary was made a client state; with Poland having cut a deal and thus Goering winning the internal struggle Ribbentrop's war solution would likely be out the window, at least for the time being. The question is does Poland resist further pressure (from Britain included, as Chamberlain was quite committed to avoiding war if possible and was pressuring Poland to negotiate) or having agreed once would it make future capitulations more likely, especially if they assume the Soviets would attack them in the event of war?

If war is simply delayed until the following year who would that influence events?

 

[Buba]

I agree to the Polish Gov't being blind and stupid to many things.
However, it knew very well - being told outright by France and UK - that no aid was coming before D-Day +15. Which is absolutely normal, because this the time it takes to mobilise an army and to move troops about.
Thing is that the ruling Polish Junta expected to be slugging it out with Germany for 2-3 months as more or less equals. Truth is that the Polish campaign was over in a week and everything after September 7th was the Germans mopping up.

 

[stevep]

Yeah, honestly, by mid-1939 the train for a peaceful agreement between Germany and Poland had left the station. Had Poland been drawn into the German sphere of influence by, say, the Treaty of Munich, maybe that would be different, but by August '39 things were more or less set.

I think it had gone in 1933 when Hitler gained power. Unless he [and virtually all the Nazi party] had been removed their entire aims were based around eastern conquests and you can't start that without controlling most/all of Poland.

 

[PsihoKekec]

So I'm not convinced that had Poland agreed before Ribbentrop's increased demands after August 26th that Hitler would have invaded anyway on some pretext;

The only way for Germany not to invade Poland is if Hitler abandons the idea of Lebensraum, which was the cornerstone of his policy. The first step in acquiring the Lebensraum was the destruction of Poland, anything Göring could achieve with his peace initiatives was giving the Poland a a little more time, before it was removed as the obstacle to German expansion East.

 

[sillygoose]

The only way for Germany not to invade Poland is if Hitler abandons the idea of Lebensraum, which was the cornerstone of his policy. The first step in acquiring the Lebensraum was the destruction of Poland, anything Göring could achieve with his peace initiatives was giving the Poland a a little more time, before it was removed as the obstacle to German expansion East.

Not sure that stands up to what Hitler was doing up until 1939. Poland and Hitler were nearly allies by 1934 and Poland (among others) helped Germany divide up Czechoslovakia. Hitler repeatedly offered Poland a military alliance and was trying to get them into the anti-comintern pact up until January 1939. What changed at that point was Ribbentrop finally had made clear to him by Poland that they simply were not interested in anything more than the existing situation, so from that point on he started pushing Hitler to war with Poland, as he could foresee no other way that he could deliver a political deal with Poland that would give Hitler his pathway to invade the USSR.

POLAND AND HITLER'S OFFERS OF ALLIANCE on JSTOR

BOHDAN B. BUDUROWYCZ, POLAND AND HITLER'S OFFERS OF ALLIANCE, The Polish Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Autumn, 1958), pp. 16-29

www.jstor.org

First he pursued the pressure avenue by raising tensions and influencing Hitler (sourced in my last post) to take a more aggressive stance and seemingly hoped that would get the Polish government to deal, but that failed when the Allies supported Poland with their declaration after Hitler violated the Munich agreement. When it was clear that the Allies were trying to deal with Stalin Ribbentrop ended up pursuing the hints Stalin dropped that he'd rather cut a deal with Germany and Ribbentrop saw a way to raise his political standing with Hitler and ultimately concluded a deal thinking it would negate the Allies' declarations. It did not, but since Ribbentrop was too invested to back down at this point and thought he could present the Allies with a fait accompli, much the same way they did with the occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 they would cut a deal. To that end he did everything he could to spin up Hitler's aggressive stance toward Poland and think that war was the only solution.

In steps Goering. Much like he did with the Munich agreement, he saw a chance to swoop in and steal the glory from Ribbentrop (remember Nazi Germany was all about political infighting to get Hitler's favor) by working with the British to pressure Poland to deal. Unlike Ribbentrop Goering had a lot of powerful and influential connections in Britain for a variety of reasons, so he could theoretically arrange a deal that Ribbentrop couldn't, which Ribbentrop understood, so was in a race against time with Goering to see who could deliver results more quickly. What ultimately got Ribbentrop to win, other than sabotaging any real efforts to negotiate and avoid war, was Poland making incorrect assumptions about Stalin's trustworthiness and the Allied ability to support them (they thought it was more a problem of will rather than means), which led them to refuse any negotiations until the final moment and Ribbentrop was about to deflect that until he was able to convince Hitler to just go to war anyway (Hitler hesitated when the Allies signed a more firm defensive alliance with Poland on August 25th and Chamberlain sent Hitler a letter spelling out how serious he was about war, which Ribbentrop convinced Hitler was just a bluff).

What Hitler really wanted to avoid a general war while getting access to a path to invade the USSR and simply had been convinced that the Poles would never actually agree to any terms, so war was the only choice. Poland didn't need to be destroyed in Hitler's plans, since he had until 1939 planned on them being allies and given territory in Belarus and Ukraine. At that point Hitler's Lebensraum was entirely in the USSR and Baltic states. So if Poland had declared they were accepting the terms already on the table Goering's hand would have been dominant with Hitler, because Goering had taken the position that a deal was reachable with Poland via pressure from Britain and war could be avoided since then they could simply do what worked on Czechoslovakia. Then they could avoid the potential problem of the Allies actually fighting and the cost of even a short, sharp war as well as potential US economic sanctions. Goering's plan was once they had the initial deal they could pressure Poland into a more comprehensive political deal in 1940 while maintaining relations with Britain; Goering also understood how serious the British were about war, so saw this as the only way forward. If Poland accepted terms Goering's plan effectively would be the only viable option to maintain the relations Hitler ultimately desired with Britain, because attacking anyway after Poland cut a deal would have caused the general war Hitler wanted to avoid in 1939 since as part of the offer Poland and Germany would sign a 25 year non-aggression pact.

That's not to say that war wouldn't have come in 1940 anyway, but in 1939 it's off the table, exactly as Munich ended plans to invade Czechoslovakia for 5 months (even then it was only the Slovak declaration of independence and request for Germany to march in to protect them that initiated the takeover), which then let's Goering pull the same stuff he did with rump Czechoslovakia to push them into client state status.

The question is whether the Polish government, having made one deal and accepted Stalin would backstab them in the event of war, would resist further pressure, especially pressure involving cutting Polish trade via Danzig, since that port had the lowest cost to export out of thanks to sitting on the mouth of the Vistula and without a doubt German intelligence would work on sabotaging Gdynia's port/shipping. Real economic pressure is more painful than political pressure, especially given the fragility of the 2nd Republic at the time.

 

[ATP]

Yeah, honestly, by mid-1939 the train for a peaceful agreement between Germany and Poland had left the station. Had Poland been drawn into the German sphere of influence by, say, the Treaty of Munich, maybe that would be different, but by August '39 things were more or less set.

Exactly.Germans would agree to peace untill we made pact with british - after that,Hitler decided to destroy Poland no matter how.
But before that ? Poland would act as german "ally"/in reality - vassal state/ and go to war with soviets.Since we would start from better border then germans in 1941,Moscov would fall.Japan and Turks would join, and soviets would cease to exist.

What next ? German UE in 1945,not 2003.With big army.Jews would be send to Palestine,and nation other then german become worst human category.But it would fall thanks to economy,so we would have independent nations again.Those who survive,that is it.German could decide that killing some nation is good idea before their empire fall.