Operation Sealion Megathread...
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PsihoKekec
Swashbuckling Accountant
Read the document, it makes several assumptions to come to it's conclusion, first is that the Luftwaffe will start it's campaign while still fighting the French 
and will start their most successful tactics early on and keep repeating them right to the end, without RAF making any attempt to adapt to them.
And the next issue is their downright cheating by them to come to the desired conclusion. They are calculating the loss of experience amongst the Fighter Command pilots as the factor for decreased Fighter Command effectiveness but don't do the same for Luftwaffe, which was in reality hit even worse, due to their higher rate of non-recoverable casualties, actually it seems they don't consider reduced capabilities of Luftwaffe as a factor at all.
The amount of asspulls they need to get their results, shows how bad were Luftwaffe odds in the real battle.
and will start their most successful tactics early on and keep repeating them right to the end, without RAF making any attempt to adapt to them.And the next issue is their downright cheating by them to come to the desired conclusion. They are calculating the loss of experience amongst the Fighter Command pilots as the factor for decreased Fighter Command effectiveness but don't do the same for Luftwaffe, which was in reality hit even worse, due to their higher rate of non-recoverable casualties, actually it seems they don't consider reduced capabilities of Luftwaffe as a factor at all.
The amount of asspulls they need to get their results, shows how bad were Luftwaffe odds in the real battle.
History Learner
Well-known member
Definitely, but the former makes the latter possible and even if we take the position that said landings are doomed to fail, the strategic benefits still go to the Germans. Losing, say, two Divisions at maximum to decimate the RAF and Royal Navy in the Channel is a net benefit. End effect of that is likely Italy securing Malta and the Suez while avoiding the Balkan sideshow before Barbarossa.
Read the document, it makes several assumptions to come to it's conclusion, first is that the Luftwaffe will start it's campaign while still fighting the French
And the next issue is their downright cheating by them to come to the desired conclusion. They are calculating the loss of experience amongst the Fighter Command pilots as the factor for decreased Fighter Command effectiveness but don't do the same for Luftwaffe, which was in reality hit even worse, due to their higher rate of non-recoverable casualties, actually it seems they don't consider reduced capabilities of Luftwaffe as a factor at all.
The amount of asspulls they need to get their results, shows how bad were Luftwaffe odds in the real battle.
I've read it before and even have a copy saved. With respect, you are presenting strawmans here for the most part. Case in point is the claim they will start the air campaign while still dealing with the French:
CF2: What if Hitler had been fundamentally in favor of invasion from the outset?
In this case we assume that planning would be brought forward: Raeder’s visit to Hitler on 21st May would, in its effects, have taken the place of that of 20th June; air campaign planning would have been initiated much earlier than the actual 30th June.[1] We take the net result as bringing forward the air campaign by three weeks – as much as seems reasonable given the Luftwaffe’s need to make the Channel-littoral airbases operational. Thus we bring forward P1 to 16th June-17th July, and spread P2 and P3 proportionally over 18th July-6th September, with P4 thereafter. Since the battle begins early, this also gives time for the Germans to take advantage of the 26th August neap tides.
Paris was occupied unopposed on June 14th and Reynaud had resigned on June 16th. Pétain thereafter announced his intention to ask for an armistice with Germany. Historically, as noted above, Hitler had made his decision on June 20th when it became clear Britain would not follow France's lead, resulting in aerial combat starting on July 10th. What the authors are arguing here is that planning begins on May 21st instead of June 20th, allowing combat to start by June 16th, by which time all the airfields needed had already come into German hands.Likewise, the idea they are pulling out all stops for the Germans is fundamentally wrong. As already cited, they provide three baselines from which to run their counter-factuals:
1) The Battle of Britain was a 50/50 contest, and either side was just as likely to win/lose.
2) The Battle of Britain favored the British, at 84% chance of winning. This is a full standard deviation from the above.
3) The Battle of Britain was always likely to be won by the British, at ~98% chance of winning. This is two full standard deviations from (1).
Rather than them pulling out all stops, the best odds they give the Germans are 50/50. The other options favor the British, the last decisively so. Beyond that, I think you have confused their presentation as them saying all five of the scenarios they are presented happen together, rather than the reality of them all being presented as independent. For example:
CF4: What if Goering and his staff had believed that Fighter Command could be more easily destroyed on the ground than in the air?
Townsend[1] notes the belief of both Goering and staff officer Paul Deichmann that Fighter Command would be more easily destroyed in the air than on the ground (paralleling the beliefs of Big Wing advocate Trafford Leigh-Mallory in the RAF). Indeed, Townsend[2] records Deichmann’s view that the Luftwaffe should not destroy radar stations, whose work would simply bring the RAF’s fighters to the Luftwaffe’s, facilitating their destruction. Thus for this counterfactual we take an 89-day battle terminating on 6th October, with R unchanged, L untargeted, and A exceeding C, with (A, C, L, R) = (43, 33, 0, 13).
CF4 presented here is independent of the earlier CF2. CF5, however, does look at CF2 and CF4 occurring together in a concurrent scenario, but still excludes CF1 and CF3. I'm also not sure where the idea of "cheating" comes from, given they lay out their methodology and directly note its based on loss rates, pilot numbers, plane production, etc on both sides. Can you elucidate, in particular by citing the relevant passage, where you believe this cheating occurs?Finally, it is easy to say that the RAF would counter the German strategy with new tactics; it is much harder to actually outline how they would do such. If the Germans are bombing air fields and Radar sites, the only alternatives are to disperse to airfields beyond the German operational zone (A default German victory granting them air superiority over Southern England) or to try to engage them before they can do so, which was the OTL British strategy anyway. Based on their sustained loss rates, the authors found the British would fail in the latter case except in CF1, which assumes no other changes other than the Germans avoiding the London Terror Bombing campaign from September/October onward.
PsihoKekec
Swashbuckling Accountant
What strawmen?
So have I and based my critique on what I read. This is purely mathematical exercise with way too few parameters included to be considered a viable simulation.
And then you post the paper excerpt where they write how Luftwaffe will start operations against the UKwhile operations against the French were still going on. I understand that these are mathematicians with poor understanding of military operations, but starting a brand new strategic operation takes a little more than just couple of directives from the HQ.
By Battle of Britain your referring to the air combat in the south of England here? Rather than air combat further north, which would have been impossible for the Germans, or a successful invasion, which would still have been a very, very low probability for a success.
Actually what your saying is that:
a) The loss of several divisions of troops, a good chunk of what's left of the KM and a large number of very important barges would be worth further heavy losses for both the RAF FC and the LW and some losses to the RN. The latter has a decent air defence for the time period and also has the option of nullifying the German air power by operating at night.
Also while its possible that the Italians could have taken Malta which was only lightly defended the idea that the Italians could have advanced so far beyond their logistical limits with a largely foot infantry force to break through a natural block-point like El Alemein is somewhat wild to put it mildly.
b) That while the Battle of France is still in its early stages the Germans decide on an air campaign against Britain and start planning to launch it before France has submitted. The fact that the Germans had already occupied airfields in N France doesn't mean that either the air or ground crews for such operations are in position, and unlikely not to be as their directed south against the French or that the airfields are in operational order and have the necessary equipment either.
c) PsihoKekec's point was about the dubious nature of some of their conclusions rather than the scenarios you mention. Also fighting inland from the start - which is required for an attack on FC in the air - will increase LW losses as well as RAF ones, especially since shot down RAF pilots have a chance of getting in the air again - as well as accentuating the point the study ignores about the loss of LW expertise that is ignored by the study.
d) Also a RAF withdrawal to the Midlands does allow the LW control of the air over the channel - until the RAF re-enters the fight, which they would do when an invasion commences. At that point the LW mission changes drastically. Instead of having one simple mission, of flying bomber operations over the channel/S England at schedualed times, with fighter support, they now have multiple missions - continued support of bombers against air/ground targets, supports of bombers on tactical attacks on British ground forces and covering the invasion/supply fleets AND bomber attacks against RN efforts to interdict the latter. Note also that a number of those missions won't be planned in advance but reacting to British actions. This means the LW have to keep forces back for such operations and also to co-ordinate bomber actions and fighter support at short notice.
History Learner
Well-known member
Case in point being the claim they start operations while France is still fighting; they don't.
Can you outline what parameters you feel are lacking?
Except, as already shown, this is false. Petain on June 16th has asked for an armistice, concurrent to the fire aerial operations starting. Further, you're right, it takes more than just directives to start an offensive and they outline precisely that:
June 21th Hitler Meeting to July 10th aerial operations start: 21 days from decision to action
May 20th Raedar Meeting to June 16th aerial operations: 29 days from decision to action
Rather than just going off of Hitler's decision, they've factored in an extra week of preparation and, as I've already pointed out, the airfields were in German control by the start of June. Finally, if you disagree with the early start scenario despite this still, there are several others they examined; it's not their only one.
History Learner
Well-known member
Yes, as already indicated, it's a net strategic benefit.
A) Is literally impossible, the Germans lacked sufficient lift capability to lose more than two divisions at maximum. In exchange, they would be forcing the Royal Navy, British Army and RAF to prioritize the Homeland to the extent it makes Italian strategic success likely throughout the MENA. Italian logistics were sufficient to advance up to the Nile, and here the British position in Egypt would be virtually non-existent given the need to defend the Home Islands.
As for naval combat, the main British base in the Channel is Portsmouth, which is well within German escorted bomber range. The only other major naval bases are in Scotland, and if the RN is only coming out at night, then they aren't coming out at all because of the distances. It's 521 miles one way to Dover, which at 20 knots would take 22 hours; only fighting/being out at night is thus impossible. The fate of Prince of Wales and Repulse shows us what would happen otherwise...
B) As I've already pointed out, the airfields were under German control by early June and the planning here would actually include over a week of additional preparation compared to OTL. I'm also not sure why the idea of planning for the next battle while the current one is raging is outlandish, given they did exactly this historically with Barbarossa:
The next day, 22 July, Halifax officially rebuffed Hitler’s peace offer and von Brauchitsch asked Generaloberst Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the Army Supreme Command (OKH), to start studying the potential invasion of Russia. Halder called Oberst Eberhard Kinzel, Chief of Intelligence Foreign Armies East to obtain a briefing on the Red Army. He then asked Oberst Hans von Greiffenberg, Deputy Operations Chief, to assign a good planner to study the campaign.
On 29 July, the OKH appointed Generalmajor Erich Marcks to carry out preliminary planning for the invasion. Marcks was Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, recently deployed to the east to prepare defensive plans in case of a Russian attack. The same day Generaloberst Alfred Jodl (OKW) had a conference with his staff where he informed them that planning for the invasion of Russia was to commence soon and that war with the USSR could precede the defeat of Great Britain, which incited some uneasiness on his staff because this would imply a two-front war by choice.
C) Which is why I've asked for the dubious section to be cited or specific criticisms of the methodology to be outlined, rather than just stated because the qualifications of the author are strong and what's been stated so far suggests to me the paper hasn't been read or is being subjected to knee jerk rejection. Case in point is you talking about airframe losses, when that is directly and openly calculated in the study:
D) The RAF re-entering combat after having been subjected to attrition of airframes and well trained pilots is an RAF that isn't much of a threat, particularly given it will have to be-as you note-operating from the Midlands; that means reduced sortie rates, lower loiter times because they are operating from further afield, and higher attrition rates due to non-combat losses. The Luftwaffe, as the authors note, was already doing better sortie rate wise OTL, and here you've compounded British issues.
D
Deleted member 88
Guest
What about a fifth column? Let’s say there is a worse depression in Britain, and Mosley’s fascist movement is much stronger and has say 25-33% support of the country, especially in the army and navy.
Combine with a worse general strike in 1926-leading to a communist insurrection or attempted one anyway, and Britain is a far more unstable and weak country internally. Even if the government and monarchy haven’t been overthrown.
Make British fascists stronger, but not too strong they just seize the government, but strong enough that if the Germans attempt an invasion, they’ll support them.
Maybe with a stronger paramilitary and if more of the aristocracy and other elements of British society-are fascist sympathizers, you could have the Royal Navy outright sabotaged or ordered elsewhere, or have units even defect to the German side.
Thus allowing Germany to make landfall, meet local support, and go from there.
-Make Mosley and British fascism a stronger force
-do this by having a larger communist element/fear of revolution, unrest/poverty in the interwar era.
-Germans have fifth column.
@History Learner and @stevep thoughts on that?
Combine with a worse general strike in 1926-leading to a communist insurrection or attempted one anyway, and Britain is a far more unstable and weak country internally. Even if the government and monarchy haven’t been overthrown.
Make British fascists stronger, but not too strong they just seize the government, but strong enough that if the Germans attempt an invasion, they’ll support them.
Maybe with a stronger paramilitary and if more of the aristocracy and other elements of British society-are fascist sympathizers, you could have the Royal Navy outright sabotaged or ordered elsewhere, or have units even defect to the German side.
Thus allowing Germany to make landfall, meet local support, and go from there.
-Make Mosley and British fascism a stronger force
-do this by having a larger communist element/fear of revolution, unrest/poverty in the interwar era.
-Germans have fifth column.
@History Learner and @stevep thoughts on that?
That's a possibility although since Mosley - who was a Labour supporter at the POD time so it could be a different character as the leader of British fascism here- and I think most other fascists thought of Britain as a great power. As such their less likely to support its occupation and defeat by another nation just to get a chance of power in what could end up as a puppet state.
However something which means Britain is more deeply divided and possibly also means less certain support from the dominions especially could be a factor. This might mean a government less hostile to fascism or fearful of either a fascist or communist take-over could make peace after the collapse of France. Which is possibly an even more attractive option for Hitler, at least in the short term.
Steve
History Learner
Well-known member
Definitely an interesting scenario!
Personally, I do agree a successful Sealion is unlikely, based on existing German amphibious capacity and logistical issues. Whether it can be a success is, however, a different question from whether it can be attempted and the strategic impacts of even a failed attempt. Likewise, I think those that dismiss the prospects of such do so at their own peril, given the historical record of WWII. On paper, the Red Army in 1941 was better (at least materially) than the German Army and the logistical issues were obvious even before Barbarossa; despite this, within six months Leningrad was under siege and it appeared likely Moscow would fall, with the RKKA having been decimated. Likewise, Imperial Japan managed to conquer the Pacific Basin on a shoestring budget logistically and force wise. The most prominent example in this regard was Singapore/Malay, where a smaller Japanese army with virtually no supplies by the end of it managed to, via decisive action, force a larger British force into surrender despite the latter being on the defensive.
low probability =/= impossible
To get back to what I've said earlier and in other posts here, the wider strategic implications of Germany winning the Battle of Britain and then launching even a failed Sealion benefit them. Gaining air superiority over Southern England, especially London and Portsmouth, give the Luftwaffe the ability to do to the British what the British did to them in 1943 in terms of seriously crippling the military industrial capacity of the UK's war machine; a land invasion would only compound this. Likewise, attrition of the RAF's best/most experienced pilots and forcing the British Army-still recovering from Dunkirk-to take heavy losses will require them to spend months if not a year or more rebuilding, limiting British options in other fronts. Likewise, sending the Royal Navy on a death ride in the Channel is another obvious benefit, one that has clear short and long term impacts that I've already outlined.
Even outside the issue of direct losses, a failed invasion is going to politically force Churchill and others to keep large numbers of forces deployed to Great Britain to deter another attempt. If, to make up for losses and deter another attempt, the RAF and Royal Navy are depleted in the Mediterranean, then that basically leaves the Italians to occupy Malta (Shutting down the Med in of itself) and overrun Egypt. Likewise, if Britain can't make meaningful commitments in that region, the Yugoslavs, Greece and Turkey are going to be changing their strategic calculus. No invasion and occupation of Yugoslavia/Greece, and Operation Barbarossa starts on June 10th with 12th Army as part of Army Group South too:
Army Group South's initial plan envisioned a double envelopment during Phase 1, employing First Panzer Group in the North and 12th Army coming out of Rumania. Hitler soon decided against this course of action, and besides in April he ordered 12th army to Yugoslavia and Greece. Eleventh Army took over duties in Rumania but these combined forces would not be ready for 22 June 1941, giving Barbarossa its staggered start in the south. Therefore von Rudenstedt would fight mainly a frontal war, punctuated by occasional penetrations and except for Kiev relatively small encirclements.
This double envelopment is used to encircle Southwest Front in Ukraine, with the twin pincers meeting around Shepetivka and Zhitomir. This destroys the Red Army's 6th, 12th, and 26th Army, and basically leaves Ukraine wide open for AGS to take Kiev on its own and then overrun the Donets Basin in its entirety later on. AGC, meanwhile, is free to advance on Moscow in September.
Yes, as already indicated, it's a net strategic benefit.
A) Is literally impossible, the Germans lacked sufficient lift capability to lose more than two divisions at maximum. In exchange, they would be forcing the Royal Navy, British Army and RAF to prioritize the Homeland to the extent it makes Italian strategic success likely throughout the MENA. Italian logistics were sufficient to advance up to the Nile, and here the British position in Egypt would be virtually non-existent given the need to defend the Home Islands.
As for naval combat, the main British base in the Channel is Portsmouth, which is well within German escorted bomber range. The only other major naval bases are in Scotland, and if the RN is only coming out at night, then they aren't coming out at all because of the distances. It's 521 miles one way to Dover, which at 20 knots would take 22 hours; only fighting/being out at night is thus impossible. The fate of Prince of Wales and Repulse shows us what would happen otherwise...
B) As I've already pointed out, the airfields were under German control by early June and the planning here would actually include over a week of additional preparation compared to OTL. I'm also not sure why the idea of planning for the next battle while the current one is raging is outlandish, given they did exactly this historically with Barbarossa:
The next day, 22 July, Halifax officially rebuffed Hitler’s peace offer and von Brauchitsch asked Generaloberst Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the Army Supreme Command (OKH), to start studying the potential invasion of Russia. Halder called Oberst Eberhard Kinzel, Chief of Intelligence Foreign Armies East to obtain a briefing on the Red Army. He then asked Oberst Hans von Greiffenberg, Deputy Operations Chief, to assign a good planner to study the campaign.On 29 July, the OKH appointed Generalmajor Erich Marcks to carry out preliminary planning for the invasion. Marcks was Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, recently deployed to the east to prepare defensive plans in case of a Russian attack. The same day Generaloberst Alfred Jodl (OKW) had a conference with his staff where he informed them that planning for the invasion of Russia was to commence soon and that war with the USSR could precede the defeat of Great Britain, which incited some uneasiness on his staff because this would imply a two-front war by choice.
C) Which is why I've asked for the dubious section to be cited or specific criticisms of the methodology to be outlined, rather than just stated because the qualifications of the author are strong and what's been stated so far suggests to me the paper hasn't been read or is being subjected to knee jerk rejection. Case in point is you talking about airframe losses, when that is directly and openly calculated in the study:
D) The RAF re-entering combat after having been subjected to attrition of airframes and well trained pilots is an RAF that isn't much of a threat, particularly given it will have to be-as you note-operating from the Midlands; that means reduced sortie rates, lower loiter times because they are operating from further afield, and higher attrition rates due to non-combat losses. The Luftwaffe, as the authors note, was already doing better sortie rate wise OTL, and here you've compounded British issues.
In answer to point 1 your agreeing your talking only about a tactical victory over the RAF in the south, which might influence the Nazi position to a degree.
You said earlier "allowing combat to start by June 16th, " so definitely talking about attacking Britain before the fighting in France is over.
In terms of points:
a) Except that the Germans planned to commit far more forces to the invasion attempt, along with maritime resources that would also suffer heavy losses. As well as almost certain heavy air losses, especially in pilots. Also if Italy had the logistics to reach Suez why did they stop a few miles beyond the Egyptian border? They lacked any ability to advance towards the delta even if Mussolini hadn't insisted on war when he knew Italy was unprepared for a major war and if he doesn't further complicate its problems by the attack on Greece. Egypt very likely in this situation wouldn't receive any reinforcements from Britain but it won't be in a position to send forces back to the UK and units from the empire could well be given higher priority for Egypt.
b) Which ignores the points I made about the German forces being in the wrong position and less time for making the airfields suitable for large scale operation. There's a difference between planning staff looking at possibilities and people being committed to transferring resources from the ongoing battle against the French.
c) But your ignoring points being made, such as assuming that there would be a drop in RAF expertise but assuming none for the LW. Or the fact I mentioned that trying to attack the RAF in the air, which means going for them over S England than initially the channel, will increase LW losses further compared to OTL.
d) Who said the RAF would be operating from the Midlands? Bombers probably but the fighters will move forward again. Given that Britain had a larger air-frame production that Germany and can concentrate on fighters as well as are starting far more extensive pilot training they can win a war of attrition in the longer term. Coupled with the heavier LW losses their going to run out of fighters pretty damn quickly.
Plus your totally ignoring the multiple points made about the additional mission overload the LW, especially their limited number of fighters, will have once they move from trying to fight FC to supporting an invasion.
History Learner
Well-known member
Forcing the RAF to abandon contesting the airspace over Southern England isn't a tactical victory, it's an unmitigated strategic success and puts the British in the exact same position Germany was in during 1943. The important centers of production, including London, can now be subjected to focused strategic bombing the same way the RAF/USAAF did in 1943, when they completely derailed German production plans for the year.
Likewise, as has pointed out twice now, the French asked for an armistice on June 16th, with the signing of terms on the 22nd being a formality. Paris, meanwhile, had fallen two days earlier; I'm not sure how one can take the position this is impossible given that fighting had effectively ended.
A) German planning is irrelevant to what they can actually have in transit at any one time, given we have an idea of their amphibious capabilities based on ship numbers, tonnage, and ferry times as well as what they can logistically sustain. I'm also not sure where the idea of them suffering heavy losses comes from either, given you've already conceded the Royal Navy won't fight during the day. Even if they did, sending most of the Home Fleet to the bottom of the Channel or crippled and needing year(s) long repairs makes any naval losses by the Germans worth it.
As for Italy, it wasn't a "few miles" but 65 in total, with the reason for the Italian stoppage being for their engineering units to build up the local road network to support further advance. It was not, as you seem to imply, an inability on their part but rather the poor local infrastructure that acted as a bottleneck force. If, however, the Royal Navy has been denuded to defend Great Britain, their harassments operations (bombarding Italian depots, mining Benghazi harbor) don't happen, and Alexandria is now exposed to a landing by the Italian Marines. As for the forces available, see here. The British lose 7th Armored Division and essentially all of their air cover; only 4th Indian Division and 6th Australian are available by December and if 4th ID is kept, there is no East African Campaign.
B) The airfields had already long since been captured and made ready, and as part of the planning process the resources would be accounted for. This is an extra nine days of preparation compared to OTL, how come the Germans found the resources IOTL but cannot here, despite having additional planning time?
C) I'm not ignoring anything, as the basis of my argument is the paper, attack that, not whatever you believe I think on the matter of your points. As I've already pointed out, their methodology and equations are there for scrutiny; the main basis for their argument isn't even British expertise loss but in terms of overall pilot loss rate which was in the German favor as they point out until shifts in strategy/timeframe/etc. As already pointed out, the Goering strategy was to attack the RAF in the air, leaving alone Radar sites and the authors found that was to the German advantage in overall loss rates. This was basically their entire point with CF2 and CF4, and they found the loss rates in that result in the British losing and the Germans winning.
D) You did:
Likewise, the entire premise of the study-which I now feel confidant in saying you didn't read-was that under the scenarios presented the loss rates in pilots would be impossible to sustain and so Fighter Command would have to abandon 11th Area operations and retreat to the 12th AO in order to rebuild their strength. The paper directly notes airframe production by the British was sufficient to keep up with demand but pilot training was not (120 per month at the time). Could the British eventually return to the 11th AO? Yes, but the conclusion of the paper was that under most of the scenarios presented, they will be forced to concede air superiority over Southern England and the Channel for a time period sufficient to enable an invasion window.
Likewise, on terms of mission load, you have yet to present a case for that. The only difference in the context of an invasion is the need for tactical air support, which doesn't require fighters; strategic bombing, tactical bombing and suppression of the Royal Navy in the Channel were already being done by the Germans. If we are to take the position that the Royal Air Force is thrown back into the fighting as needed by desperation, it is a force low on trained pilots and thus it's impact would be marginal. As I've stated in the upthread post, I do think it's likely the British could successfully repulse the invasion. That would, however, come at the cost of much of the Home Fleet being sunk and the MENA being depleted of forces on the whole.
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PsihoKekec
Swashbuckling Accountant
There is one big problem with this premise, Fall Gelb and Fall Rot were full out efforts, Luftwaffe can't really spare more than few staff officers for future planning before the ceasefire is in effect, only then can they start concentrated planning and the logistic realignment, which takes time.
Well the Luftwaffe is lacking, they are modeling how the fighter command would be attrited but they don't model the ability of the Luftwaffe to inflict such attrition rates. Luftwaffe was suffering it's own attrition and it was influencing it's fighting abilities. As it is laid out in the paper, this mathematical model would perhaps pass the muster back in the day when all you had was couple of books, pencil, paper and your brain, but in these days with lot more data available and computers available? I could cook up same kind of ''mathematic model'' in the Excel and prove exactly the opposite, if I could be arsed to put ten or twenty hours into spreadsheats. The amount of work they put int their model would get them laughed out of the room if they tried to pass it up as bachelor's degree paper
They already prioritized the home islands OTL, yet the British still managed the operation Compass.
Their orders were to go out no matter the circumstances. So they would move out, suffer some casualties, slaughter the invasion fleet and retreat.
It depends on the level involvement, Fall Gelb and Fall Rot were all or nothing efforts, a high intensity battles of maneuver, Luftwaffe stripped flying schools of instructors to have sufficient aircrews for operations (which worked really well in the long term) and fully dedicated their staff work to winning the offensive. The best they could do for future planning at that point is to send some versagers, that nobody wanted to have around, into the janitor's closet, to draw lines on the whatever maps they could spare.
During the Battle of Britain they could spare some staff to planing of the Barbarossa as it was a static war and needed a lower level of staff commitment.
However, the British side also calculates the pilot losses while the German does not, despite the German aircrew losses being known. And this is the crux of the issue, the German aircrew attrition rates were worse than the British throughout the conflict, even during the dark days of German fighter sweeps, something the makers of the models ignored to come to their conclusions. So if the Germans continue their fighter sweep tactics, it won't bring them victory, they will just lose less badly.
So those centres in the south of the country can still be subjected to attack, which can be countered by a/c operating from beyond the range of German fighters. That could be costly for the LW bombers. Actually there was very little targeted bombing in 1943 and it was only really in early 44 that the defensive fighters were overwhelmed.
So your saying that several days before France asks for, let alone agrees an armistice, the Germans take the bulk of the LW, a/c, ground crew and equipment, out of the fight against the French so it can be relocated to airfields around Calais so they can launch an air campaign against Britain on the 16th - which is what your assuming their doing.
If they only land 2 divisions they have zero hope. Most details I have seen talk about much more.
I have pointed out that the RN can nullify the LW by attacking at night. That doesn't assume they won't fight in the day. Nor, with the bulk of the home fleet involved does it mean they will necessary suffer heavy losses in the event of LW air attack. Most of the losses at Crete for instance were after several days fighting when the AA ammo of the ships were exhausted. You think it will take that long to sink a few destroyers and transports, let alone the barges the Germans were planning to use for the bulk movement. Or bombard the landing bridgeheads if that is needed. Much of that could be done with destroyers and cruisers.
Interesting German planning is either perfect or irrelevant depending on your need.
That's still a small distance compared to the path to the Nile. A distance they did nothing to further, hunkering down in fortifications until Operation Compass several months later. In large part simply because the logistical problem was too great.
Also why would Britain move more naval units out of the Med than they did OTL? Especially after the crushing of the German invasion bid - whether its the 2 divisions your proposing which would need no naval intervention or the larger forces proposed in most plans presented. Those forces are still going to be there.
Why would the British send armoured units from Egypt back to Britain when the homeland is secure and unless you dash it through the Med it would take months. OTL some armour was sent to Egypt in October IIRC but the core of the 7th Arm was already in Egypt. Coupled with the infantry units here and some albeit limited and largely elderly air that's enough to hold a massively over-extended Italian force.
Your comment is meaningless as OTL the Germans didn't start their attacks on Britain on the 16th June as your proposing here.
I haven't looked at the paper simply because your arguments have been so flawed. I have already pointed out that a direct attack on the RAF bases and a/c from the start, rather than the priminary stages against channel shipping and then radar targets will mean heavier LW losses as they have will be fighting over Britain, rather than the channel. British losses will be heavy as well and I did accept that the RAF might have to remove themselves from the south coast for a while. However, as another posted pointed out about the paper ignoring the impact on the LW your doing exactly the same.
Actually I didn't. I said they would withdraw to the Midlands to regroup. They would then come back south when the invasion started. [Unless the LW are continuing to launch attacks on RAF airfields in the south, which they were never able to permanently knock out and is likely to be costly to them as well as limiting what they could do elsewhere.
Sufficent to enable an invasion to start. Although your now claiming that invasion would be a 2 division suicide force?? Once that started they would be sent south again and while they would take losses so would the Germans, especially if as stated below your saying the Germans are sending a lot of bombers across without fighter escort.
You have continued to make a lot of assumptions here without any real backing evidence. To mention one your saying that the LW were already suppressing the RN. This is the same RN as your saying will automatically be sunk if it comes into the channel in large numbers? It doesn't take a genius to recognise the flaw in the logic there.
The mission load is quite simple. During the OTL BoB, which will fundamentally be the same here, the LW was sending forces over to Britain to attack targets, to destroy the RAF, either by directly attacking airfields or targets that they think will force the RAF to fight them. This means they can select when and where those attacks go out and arrange air cover for them.
In an invasion phase they will want to suppress a RAF return to southern airfields but they will also have to do:
a) Air cover for the invasion force and following logistic shipping - which will require fighters. This will be needed against both air and sea attack and will be needed whether there is an attack at any point.
b) Air cover over the landing bridgehead. Again here the defenders will be able to decide when they attack this so the LW either spread their forces thinly, say over daylight hours, or risk the positions being attacked when there is no air cover. If the RAF sends forces to attack say a landing at Dover they would have come and gone before a force can be scrambled from Calais. Again this will need fighters and probably in some sort of CAP over the bridgehead, which will be costly in fighter resources.
c) They will also need to support attacks by German forces to seek to break out from the bridgehead. This the LW will have some say on the timing of but they will still need to send fighters again else if some British fighters turn up bombers will be lost.
d) There will still probably be a demand to hit other targets away from the front, whether airfields, production centres or transport links say. Again sending unescorted bombers will risk them being badly mauled, with the resultant storm inside the LW.
There are probably some other missions I'm missing.
Basically the LW and especially their fighters, of which they are desperately short of, will have a lot more demands on them when it comes from trying to suppress the RAF by planned missions to the wide range of operations that will be demanded of them when an invasion is actually under way.
Knowledgeispower
Ah I love the smell of missile spam in the morning
we also have to note the LW sucked at anti shipping duties in 1940 and would remain thus throughout the war with the exception of a select few units that went through specialized training
History Learner
Well-known member
It's not an either/or option; the pilots, planes and logistics were already in place it was a matter of said planning. See Directive 13:
3. Tasks Of The Air Force.
(a) Apart from operations in France, the Air Force is authorised to attack the English homeland in the fullest manner, as soon as sufficient forces are available. This attack will be opened by an annihilating reprisal for English attacks on the Ruhr Basin.
Commander In Chief Air Force will designate targets in accordance with the principles laid down in Directive No. 9 and further orders to be issued by the High Command Of The Armed Forces. The time and plan for this attack are to be reported to me.
The struggle against the English homeland will be continued after the commencement of land operations. With the opening of the main operations of the Army in the direction of Reims, it will be the task of the Air Force, apart from maintaining our air supremacy, to give direct support to the attack, to break up any enemy reinforcements which may appear, to hamper the regrouping of enemy forces, and in particular to protect the western flank of the attack.
Likewise:
When France fell, Hitler ordered a strategic pause, believing the British would accept a dictated peace on his terms. The Luftwaffe mounted sporadic bomb raids on southern England and shipping in the Channel. However, in the official reckoning, the Battle of Britain began July 10 with a fighter engagement over the channel; the Luftwaffe lost 13 aircraft and the RAF 10.
On July 16, Hitler ordered preparations started for Operation Sea Lion, an invasion of Britain. The German Navy said Sept. 15 was the earliest possible date it could be ready. On Aug. 1, Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to “overpower the English Air Force,” which stood in the way of the invasion.
Except they are modelling attrition rates for the Luftwaffe? See Table 1, which has air frame loss rates for both sides.
Likewise, the personal attacks aren't hitting here because they're baseless. Niall McKay, for example:
I was an undergraduate in Cambridge, a PhD student in Durham and a post-doc in Kyoto before returning to Cambridge, with fellowships at Queens' and then Pembroke colleges. In 1998 I moved to Sheffield as a lecturer, then on to York in 2000. I have served on various national committees including the councils of the ILTHE and HEA, the Education Committee of the LMS, and the Advisory Committee on Mathematics Education.
I am currently Chair of Correspondents for the INI and ICMS
Departmental roles
Head of Department
Chair of Correspondents for the INI and ICMS
Undergrad at Cambridge, PhD at Durham and now the Head of the Mathematics Department at the University of York; this isn't some amateur but rather a distinguished expert in his field. INI is the Isaac Newton Institute and International Centre for Mathematical Sciences, so he's recognized outside of the UK in terms of his broader field.
Because Compass started in December of 1940, and British intelligence had concluded by October no invasion was forthcoming, meaning they could transfer forces to elsewhere?
I agree they would go out no matter what, the problem for them is we know how well that worked out for Force X with Repulse and Prince of Wales, no? To get to the German invasion beaches from Scapa Flow is a nearly 30 hour ordeal, with about 10-12 hours of it in range of escorted bombers from France and the Lowlands. Beyond that, you have U-Boats, E-Boats and German naval mines once you reach the Dover Straits.
See earlier point.
Except this wasn't a lower level of staff commitment, it involved the main offices and top officers from the get go.
Except German pilot losses are factored in as part of their examination of air frame losses? I'm also not sure how you can come to the conclusion they would still lose when the British could not sustain their losses:
The attacks continued relentlessly. On average, the Luftwaffe sent 1,000 airplanes a day, and seldom fewer than 600. On Aug. 30 to 31, more than 1,600 came. The worst day for Fighter Command was Aug. 31 when it lost 39 aircraft and 14 pilots. Most days the Luftwaffe’s losses were even heavier than the RAF’s, but the production of Hurricanes and Spitfires was no longer keeping up with losses, and there were not enough replacements for the experienced pilots who had been killed.
Some pilots scrambled six times a day. Civilian teams from Hawker and Supermarine joined RAF ground crews, working to get damaged Hurricanes and Spitfires ready to fly again. The British people look back on this part of the battle as “the desperate days.” Looking back later, Churchill said, “In the fighting between Aug. 24 and Sept. 6, the scales had tilted against Fighter Command.”
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PsihoKekec
Swashbuckling Accountant
No they weren't, many of the units were on the airfields too far south and many airfields still needed repairs or extensions, while number of squadrons needed to be stood down temporaly, for the maintainance to catch up. All the hurdles the Germans faced are still there and three weeks earlier start is completely unrealistic, they could squeeze only a few days out of this
They only count plane losses, but not the pilot losses, which they do for RAF. They also don't calculate the combat capability of the Luftwaffe at all.
Task force X had it's AA defenses crippled by the tropical climate and was hit by an unit specially trained in anti-shipping strike, 1940 Luftwaffe would be nowhere as effective, they would extract their toll, but invasion force would still get slaughtered.
No they are not. You have count of German and British airframe losses, you have a count of British pilots lost/wounded/lightly wounded and nothing about German lost/wounded/lightly wounded.
It's simple, the Germans could sustain their casualties even less. The British greatly outdid them in both aircraft production and pilot training to the point where, even in the dark days their losses/replacement ratios were much better than those of Germans.
Churchill also knew from Enigma intercepts that the Germans were much worse off, the aim of his post war writing was to portray himself as the visionary leader who kept the nation in the fight through sheer force of will. The grim fact for the Luftwaffe is that this period is their best one, and they would still need to inflict 20-30% higher casualties on the Fighter Command to get even in airframe loss/replacement rates and even higher to get even in pilot loss/replacement rates.
History Learner
Well-known member
Okay, you're trying to have it both ways here; if the RAF has abandoned Southern England due to unsustainable losses and retreated to the Midlands, they have stopped contesting the former. If they are still running operations, why would they do the move at all, given the purpose of the move would be to give time for new pilots to be trained and airframe numbers rebuilt without taking further losses? Likewise, I have in my previous reply linked to a map that shows all targets in the South of England were in range of escorted bomber raids. If the RAF has decamped to the Midlands, then they now found themselves in the same range issues as the Germans were. For reference:
Spitefire Mk 1 Range: 415 miles
Me-109E Range: 410 miles
As for 1943 bombing, see Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, starting Page 596:
In the spring of 1943, however, the German war economy itself was sucked directly into the fighting. As we have seen, the threat of Anglo-American bombing had bulked large in German strategic thinking at least since 1940. But until early 1943 it proved remarkably easy to counter. The Royal Air Force simply did not have enough heavy bombers to do sustained damage to the German home front, nor did it have the technology necessary to guide them to their targets. The heavy air raids on Luebeck (28/29 March 1942), Rostock (23/24 April 1942) and the 'thousand-bomber raids' on Cologne (30/31 May 1942) and Essen (1 June 1942) gave some indication of what was in store, but they did not develop into a sustained campaign of aerial destruction.26 It was not until March 1943 that RAF Bomber Command had the planes with which to mount a prolonged attack on the heart of German heavy industry, or the technology with which to guide them to their targets.
The 'Battle of the Ruhr' began on 5 March with an attack on the industrial city of Essen, the home of Krupp.27 Between 8.58 p.m. and 9.36 p.m., following the invisible beam of the OBOE electronic guidance system, 362 bombers hit the main target with a combination of incendiaries and high explosives leaving a trail of blazing destruction.28 This time the RAF not only attacked in force but returned repeatedly over a period of five months, dropping a total of 34,000 tons of bombs. The sequence of heavy attacks was relentless and interspersed by daily harassing raids by small forces of light Mosquito bombers. Heavy attacks were delivered against every major node of the Ruhr conurbation: Essen (5 March, 12/13 March, 3/4 April, 30 April, 27 May, 25 July), Duisburg (26/27 March, 8/9 April, 26/27 April, 12/13 May), Bochum (13/14 May, 12 June), Krefeld (21 June), Duesseldorf (25 May, 11 June) and Dortmund (4 May, 23 May), Barmen-Wuppertal (29 May), Muelheim (22 June), Elberfeld-Wuppertal (24 June), Gelsenkirchen (25 June, 9 July), Cologne (16 June, 28 June, 3 July, 8 July). To increase the misery, on 16 May specially adapted bombs destroyed the dams on the Moehne and Eder rivers, inundating the surrounding countryside and cutting off the water supply. The bombers killed thousands of people and did heavy damage to the urban fabric. Above all, however, they struck against the most vital node in the German industrial economy, precisely at the moment that Hitler, Speer and the RVE were hoping to energize armaments production with a fresh surge in steel production.
Reading contemporary sources, there can be no doubt that the Battle of the Ruhr marked a turning point in the history of the German war economy, which has been grossly underestimated by post-war accounts.29 As Speer himself acknowledged, the RAF was hitting the right target.30 The Ruhr was not only Europe's most important producer of coking coal and steel, it was also a crucial source of intermediate components of all kinds. Disrupting production in the Ruhr had the capacity to halt assembly lines across Germany. When the first of the heavy raids struck Krupp in Essen, Speer immediately travelled to the Ruhr with a view to learning general lessons in disaster management.51 He was forced to return in May, June and July to energize the emergency response and to rally the workforce with well-advertised displays of personal bravery.32 The Ruhr was raised from the status of the home front to that of a war zone. Speer established a special emergency staff with absolute authority over the local economy and made plans for the total evacuation of the non-essential population. The remaining workforce was to be organized along para-military lines, uniformed and housed in camp accommodation so that they could be redeployed at a moment's notice to whichever plants were still operational.33
But all Speer could do was to limit the damage. He could not stop the bombers or prevent them from seriously disrupting the German war effort. Following the onset of heavy air raids in the first quarter of 1943, steel production fell by 200,000 tons. Having anticipated an increase in total steel production to more than 2.8 million tons per month and allocated steel accordingly, the Zentrale Planung now faced a shortfall of almost 400,000 tons. All the painstaking effort that had gone into reorganizing the rationing system was negated by the ability of the British to disrupt production more or less at will. In light of the steel shortage, Hitler and Speer had no option but to implement an immediate cut to the ammunition programme.34 After more than doubling in 1942, ammunition production in 1943 increased by only 20 per cent.35 And it was not just ammunition that was hit.
In the summer of 1943, the disruption in the Ruhr manifested itself across the German economy in a so-called 'Zulieferungskrise' (sub-components crisis). All manner of parts, castings and forgings were suddenly in short supply.56 And this affected not only heavy industry directly, but the entire armaments complex. Most significantly, the shortage of key components brought the rapid increase in Luftwaffe production to an abrupt halt. Between July 1943 and March 1944 there was no further increase in the monthly output of aircraft. For the armaments effort as a whole, the period of stagnation lasted throughout the second half of 1943. As Speer himself acknowledged, Allied bombing had negated all plans for a further increase in production.37 Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks.
Except I'm not at all, as has already been stated several times. Aerial options could, under the paper presented, start on June 16th, which is the same day France asked for an armistice.
I have no doubt they had plans to land more, much more in fact; contemporary British planning off the top of my ahead assumed 100,000 to 200,000 men. The bottle neck for the Germans, however, is amphibious capacity/shipping, which is the same issue the Allies had; on D-Day they only managed to land 5-7 Divisions, and this was with the largest invasion armada in history.
I know you said they could attempt that, the problem with it as I pointed out is it only works if the Royal Navy has developed Star Trek level transporters. From Scapa Flow to the Dover Straits is 22 hours, which means that they will be detected and under air attack long before they reach the invasion fleet. Besides air attack, they'd be confronted with German naval mine fields, U-Boats and E-Boats in position and being presented with a perfect target via the bottleneck of the Dover Straits.
Besides Crete, how about Force X where the Repulse and Prince of Wales had full stocks and were still sunk in the same day? Or, for an example from the other side, the Battle of Leyte Gulf? It was only a few destroyers and transports there against an overwhelmingly superior Japanese surface fleet and we saw how that turned out for them; the transports scattered and American air attacks drove them off in conjunction with able handling by the Destroyers.
Never made this claim anywhere, and I would appreciate it if you debated the argument rather than try to make personal attacks.
Except this is completely false, as has already been pointed out to you:
The 10ª Armata advanced about 65 mi (105 km) into Egypt against British screening forces of the 7th Support Group (7th Armoured Division) the main force remaining in the vicinity of Mersa Matruh, the principal British base in the Western Desert. On 16 September 1940, the 10ª Armata halted and took up defensive positions around the port of Sidi Barrani. The army was to wait in fortified camps, until engineers had built the Via della Vittoria (Victory Road) along the coast, an extension of the Libyan Litoranea Balbo (Via Balbia). The Italians began to accumulate supplies for an advance against the 7th Armoured Division and the 4th Indian Division at Mersa Matruh, about 80 mi (129 km) further on.
Rather than doing nothing, the Italians were building up the local infrastructure network.
Because after the Royal Navy's Home Fleet suffers extreme casualties in repulsing the German attack, they will need to replace said losses and the only way to do that in a timely manner is by force transfers. Case in point: what happens if the Home Fleet has few or no Battleships available come 1941 with Bismarck and Tirpitz? Or, what happens if the Germans try again and there is no naval force capable of attacking their fleet? Whether you view it as a realistic threat or not personally doesn't matter because that is via the gift of hindsight, which British leadership in 1940-1941 doesn't have.
Wrong question: why would the British be sending forces to Egypt? I have no doubt they would leave the existing forces in place but there would be no reinforcements. The "core" of 7th Division was there but it was massively reinforced by December, see their order of battles from the time.
....which is why we are discussing alternate history?
Then why bother responding to me? If you're not going to bother to review the evidence, then any dialogue between us is beyond pointless on your part because it's not in good faith. Likewise, it's not my arguments; I'm directly citing from the paper which is from a collection of Doctors (Including the head of the University of York's Mathematics Department). If you think my arguments are flawed, how about you actually read their paper instead of attacking me as a proxy?
Likewise, I'm not ignoring the impact on the Luftwaffe nor is the paper as I've already pointed out. If you would bother to read that, you would see such and I've quite literally posted a direct link to it as well as directly cited from it to show this.
Dude, you need to keep up with what you post rather than engage in kneejerk responses. This is what you said:
To which I replied by citing you saying exactly that:
Now, did you or did not post the above?
Okay, instead of engaging in strawmen, why don't we actually look at what I said? I said the Germans the lift capacity only move about two divisions at a time based off their shipping and the transfer of the Rhine Barges; this does not meant the Germans only intended to ever send just two divisions but rather is the same reason the Anglo-Americans could only land 5-7 Divisions on D-Day.
Now then, we regards to the RAF, I have already shown/linked you to maps that show the bombers would be operating with escorts, given Southern England was in range of German air cover. Nowhere did I say to the contrary of this. As for the RAF, if they have retreated to the Midlands to rebuild, German bombers will be operating unopposed. If you argue the RAF is sent into battle if/once an invasion starts, their Midlands bases means they have the same restrictions as the Luftwaffe Me-109s are operating under; this is a wash for them.
Likewise, if they have retreated to the Midlands to begin with, then the RAF Fighter Command is a weak force, having been depleted of men and machines and needs time to rebuild. Throwing it into combat in this depleted state is supposed to somehow allow it to destroy large numbers of German aircraft?
Steve, you have yet to provide any evidence in the form of citations or links anywhere. Furthermore, you have admitted, in this very post, that you have not read what I have posted in the form of the paper. Please stop with this bad faith debating tactics because they do nothing to advance the conversation. If you don't agree with what I'm saying or whatever, you are on a form that has an ignore function; by all means, put me on it if you so desire.
With regards to the Luftwaffe, there is no flaw in logic here. That the Luftwaffe was doing Anti-Shipping duties might explain why the Home Fleet was not operating in the Channel at this time in large numbers, no? Maybe why most of the capital ships are in Scotland, far beyond escorted bombing range or Stuka range?
Except this ignores several glaring issues:
1) If the RAF is operating out of the Midlands, the Luftwaffe don't have to run airfield suppression because the RAF isn't returning to its Southern Bases.
2) Even if they did return to the South, a strange concept given the German landing, this a force that has been depleted by attrition; in size it is much smaller than before and thus requires smaller resources to engage with.
3) How does the RAF magically return to the Southern airfields as soon as a German invasion happens but the Luftwaffe can't, as you've argued, operate from French air bases despite 29 days of planning and logistical buildup? It's very much a glaring double standard here, Steve.
Right I will try again to explain those points to you.
A) The RAF plan if forced to abandon the south would be to regroup out of range of enemy fighters until the invasion came. True the latter might be relatively quickly after the former but then they either have force operating from the Midland or move south again.
i) If the former both sides are operating at a range penalty to the battle zone. However the RAF can now to a degree pick its battles while the LW have far more tasks. Also their boosted by home advantage as they have radar and other information sources to detect incoming German a/c whereas the Germans lack any such ability.
ii) If the latter then their vulnerable to air attack again if the Germans can divert forces from other operations.
They could if the Germans removed the bulk of the LW from operations against France several days before the French asked for an armistice. Which doesn't seem likely at all. What about that do you fail to understand? Or are you assuming that Germany has that Star Trek transporter technology you mentioned earlier.
I haven't. I'm just point out inconsistencies in your arguments. You pointed out how important it is that the LW could make plans for an earlier air attack then dismiss the plans the combined military made for the invasion of Britain.
The problem with that assumption is that they had still made no move forwards and were caught totally unprepared when Britain lauched Operation Compass. They may have said they were building a road along the coast, which wouldn't have greatly aided their logistical problems but there was no push further eastwards until long after any German invasion would have been defeated. As such even if they were building a road the Nile region is still beyond them. Even if no reinforcements reached Egypt the forces there were almost certainly enough to defeat an Italian attack that was way beyond their supply capacity.
This is because your arguing with no clear support, that the RN will take heavy losses, especially in capital ship units in defeating any invasion of Britain. The LW has limited ability for anti-shipping warfare and I think none at night. Most of its successes off Norway and Crete were against forces that had largely exhausted their AA ammo after several days of activity. They have already found that the Stukas are death-traps against a force with air cover.
You have mentioned that the LW would inflict relentless attacks again a RN force heading south from Scapa but with what? their forces operating from Norway can only be protected by Me 110s, which are very vulnerable themselves to fighters, whether land or CV based. This assumes of course that the Germans spot them which could take quite a while to happen.
Furthermore at this point other than I think one of the twins the Germans have nothing stronger than a [very] few cruisers. Many of their destroyers have been lost at Narvik. The RN has a lot more of both present without recalling forces from elsewhere or bringing in the big ships. It can make the final approach at night, sink any enemy ships it comes across, bombard any bridgehead and then disappear back north being a long way away before daylight comes. The Germans can try chasing such forces with a/c but that will be another distraction from their other activities and since any interception is likely to be northern East Anglia at best for them they will be beyond any real air cover.
This assumes a small invasion force can even get ashore. There were a lot of fortifications and mines in the channel as well as the ground forces and what forces the RN already have in the Channel has. Trying to escort merchant ships, let alone slow barges is going to seriously constrain any covering forces even if a bit of stormy weather doesn't mean a lot of the latter are sunk on the way.
Because I'm not responding to what's in the document, which another poster has already raised points about. I'm responding to the assumptions your made additional to that. Unless that report not only discusses how the LW might win the 1st stage of an air war against Britain but also:
a) A possible Italian attack on Egypt
b) Details of the logistics of a German seaborne invasion of Britain
c) Details of air/sea and sea/sea exchanges that might happen in such a campaign.
Those are the points I'm disagreeing with you about. Unless your saying their all discussed in detail in that document?
I did post them and if you read them you will see there is no discrepancy, so I'm not the one making knee-jerk responses. I clearly stated that if the RAF was forces into the Midlands it would return when an invasion started.
You mentioned they would only have the capacity to send 2 divisions. How likely is it, between land defences, air and naval attack, other losses, especially for the river barges that many would survive to carry a 2nd wave? Especially since some transport requirements would be needed for supplies for the 1st wave past the 1st couple of days. Or that the losses in what few escorts they have would mean a calling off of further waves?
You have shown that LW bombers could be escorted over parts of S England. That's a different matter from then having escorts unless the LW is acting in the same way as earlier. That is prepared large scale pre-planned operations against set targets. If as is almost certain their doing a much wider range of actions then either a lot of the bombers are going with no escort or the escorts are being stretched very thinly. Which would expose such formations to attack by potentially overwhelming numbers as the defenders can concentrate single such missions.
Again the personal attacks. As I've pointed out above the problem is not what the paper you mentioned said its what follow on assumptions you have made, which in a number of cases seem extremely dubious. Such as:
a) That the Italians, with no logistical capacity can stroll into Cairo.
b) That the LW would be withdrawn from the battle for France at least several days before France asks for an armistice.
c) That the LW would be able to perform a much wider range of missions simultaneously when an actual invasion started.
d) That will minimal anti-ship capacity the LW would be able to inflict crushing losses on the RN.
As I've said above I doubt any of those are mentioned in the paper so its irrelevant to them.
Other than attacks on coastal convoys, which was concentrating in the 1st stage of the OTL battle and won't occur here what anti-shipping operations were the LW doing? Its a lot different trying to intercept a fast moving cruiser and destroyer force, especially since the RN already has a number of specialised AA cruisers.
This is another example of an irreverence comment. Apart from the fact your ignoring the 1st three points I made totally. The issue with the last one above is clearly wrong. No one is saying the Germans can't operate from French bases with some planning. I'm saying, as I have repeately, that I can't see them withdrawing the bulk of their a/c from the battle against France at the very least several days before France asked for an armistice, which is what your saying they will do.
On your 2nd point above then I can't see a better reason for the RAF to return to southern airfields than to help fight a German invasion. It might be a smaller force but it still has to be allowed for, especially since your insisting that every LW bomber mission will be escorted by fighters.
Even the 1st, on the assumption that the RAF stay in the midlands is dubious. This still requires the LW to escort any missions in the south of England else their vulnerable to attack. It also gives the opportunity for damaged a/c to be landed at southern airfields.
You need to consider what your saying as too much is wildly impractical.
A) The RAF plan if forced to abandon the south would be to regroup out of range of enemy fighters until the invasion came. True the latter might be relatively quickly after the former but then they either have force operating from the Midland or move south again.
i) If the former both sides are operating at a range penalty to the battle zone. However the RAF can now to a degree pick its battles while the LW have far more tasks. Also their boosted by home advantage as they have radar and other information sources to detect incoming German a/c whereas the Germans lack any such ability.
ii) If the latter then their vulnerable to air attack again if the Germans can divert forces from other operations.
They could if the Germans removed the bulk of the LW from operations against France several days before the French asked for an armistice. Which doesn't seem likely at all. What about that do you fail to understand? Or are you assuming that Germany has that Star Trek transporter technology you mentioned earlier.
I haven't. I'm just point out inconsistencies in your arguments. You pointed out how important it is that the LW could make plans for an earlier air attack then dismiss the plans the combined military made for the invasion of Britain.
The problem with that assumption is that they had still made no move forwards and were caught totally unprepared when Britain lauched Operation Compass. They may have said they were building a road along the coast, which wouldn't have greatly aided their logistical problems but there was no push further eastwards until long after any German invasion would have been defeated. As such even if they were building a road the Nile region is still beyond them. Even if no reinforcements reached Egypt the forces there were almost certainly enough to defeat an Italian attack that was way beyond their supply capacity.
This is because your arguing with no clear support, that the RN will take heavy losses, especially in capital ship units in defeating any invasion of Britain. The LW has limited ability for anti-shipping warfare and I think none at night. Most of its successes off Norway and Crete were against forces that had largely exhausted their AA ammo after several days of activity. They have already found that the Stukas are death-traps against a force with air cover.
You have mentioned that the LW would inflict relentless attacks again a RN force heading south from Scapa but with what? their forces operating from Norway can only be protected by Me 110s, which are very vulnerable themselves to fighters, whether land or CV based. This assumes of course that the Germans spot them which could take quite a while to happen.
Furthermore at this point other than I think one of the twins the Germans have nothing stronger than a [very] few cruisers. Many of their destroyers have been lost at Narvik. The RN has a lot more of both present without recalling forces from elsewhere or bringing in the big ships. It can make the final approach at night, sink any enemy ships it comes across, bombard any bridgehead and then disappear back north being a long way away before daylight comes. The Germans can try chasing such forces with a/c but that will be another distraction from their other activities and since any interception is likely to be northern East Anglia at best for them they will be beyond any real air cover.
This assumes a small invasion force can even get ashore. There were a lot of fortifications and mines in the channel as well as the ground forces and what forces the RN already have in the Channel has. Trying to escort merchant ships, let alone slow barges is going to seriously constrain any covering forces even if a bit of stormy weather doesn't mean a lot of the latter are sunk on the way.
Because I'm not responding to what's in the document, which another poster has already raised points about. I'm responding to the assumptions your made additional to that. Unless that report not only discusses how the LW might win the 1st stage of an air war against Britain but also:
a) A possible Italian attack on Egypt
b) Details of the logistics of a German seaborne invasion of Britain
c) Details of air/sea and sea/sea exchanges that might happen in such a campaign.
Those are the points I'm disagreeing with you about. Unless your saying their all discussed in detail in that document?
I did post them and if you read them you will see there is no discrepancy, so I'm not the one making knee-jerk responses. I clearly stated that if the RAF was forces into the Midlands it would return when an invasion started.
You mentioned they would only have the capacity to send 2 divisions. How likely is it, between land defences, air and naval attack, other losses, especially for the river barges that many would survive to carry a 2nd wave? Especially since some transport requirements would be needed for supplies for the 1st wave past the 1st couple of days. Or that the losses in what few escorts they have would mean a calling off of further waves?
You have shown that LW bombers could be escorted over parts of S England. That's a different matter from then having escorts unless the LW is acting in the same way as earlier. That is prepared large scale pre-planned operations against set targets. If as is almost certain their doing a much wider range of actions then either a lot of the bombers are going with no escort or the escorts are being stretched very thinly. Which would expose such formations to attack by potentially overwhelming numbers as the defenders can concentrate single such missions.
Again the personal attacks. As I've pointed out above the problem is not what the paper you mentioned said its what follow on assumptions you have made, which in a number of cases seem extremely dubious. Such as:
a) That the Italians, with no logistical capacity can stroll into Cairo.
b) That the LW would be withdrawn from the battle for France at least several days before France asks for an armistice.
c) That the LW would be able to perform a much wider range of missions simultaneously when an actual invasion started.
d) That will minimal anti-ship capacity the LW would be able to inflict crushing losses on the RN.
As I've said above I doubt any of those are mentioned in the paper so its irrelevant to them.
Other than attacks on coastal convoys, which was concentrating in the 1st stage of the OTL battle and won't occur here what anti-shipping operations were the LW doing? Its a lot different trying to intercept a fast moving cruiser and destroyer force, especially since the RN already has a number of specialised AA cruisers.
This is another example of an irreverence comment. Apart from the fact your ignoring the 1st three points I made totally. The issue with the last one above is clearly wrong. No one is saying the Germans can't operate from French bases with some planning. I'm saying, as I have repeately, that I can't see them withdrawing the bulk of their a/c from the battle against France at the very least several days before France asked for an armistice, which is what your saying they will do.
On your 2nd point above then I can't see a better reason for the RAF to return to southern airfields than to help fight a German invasion. It might be a smaller force but it still has to be allowed for, especially since your insisting that every LW bomber mission will be escorted by fighters.
Even the 1st, on the assumption that the RAF stay in the midlands is dubious. This still requires the LW to escort any missions in the south of England else their vulnerable to attack. It also gives the opportunity for damaged a/c to be landed at southern airfields.
You need to consider what your saying as too much is wildly impractical.