Operation Konrad II works

sillygoose

Well-known member
So I have another Hungary in 1945 what if, but one that doesn't involve any additional forces, just what was already there at the time.

Here is a history of the operation for context:
b45_campagn_map2.jpg


After their failure at Bicske, both the German Army Group South and Gille, still hoping to avoid any major relocation, made plans for the IV SS Panzer Corps to breach the Soviet defence near Esztergom and relieve Budapest across the Pilis Hills, in what was to be the northern branch of Operation Konrad II. The increasingly ominous news from the capital made this appear even more urgent.

The new German attack was launched on 9 January from Esztergom, where 200 tonnes of supplies had been collected to be transported to Budapest immediately in the event of success. As a complementary measure, Colonel-General Balck ordered a reinforced battalion under Major Philipp to smash through the Soviet obstacles near the Danube and occupy Szentendre as a refuge for the defenders after their escape. However, everybody in the Wiking Division, including Gille and Philipp, considered the plan unworkable. As the division’s staff officer put it, the Soviets were ‘hardly likely to open the shore road for jaunts’. It is also difficult to see how Balck expected the defenders to continue their withdrawal along the road from Szentendre to Esztergom, which was within the range of the Soviet weapons across the Danube. Fortunately for the Germans, the question did not arise in practice, because the relief unit’s advance soon stalled, although the 711th Infantry Division attacking southeast of it managed to capture Dobogókő.

On 10 January, with one day’s delay because of Hitler’s prohibition, the Panzer Group of the Wiking Division, including the Westland Panzergrenadier Regiment, was deployed to fill the gap. The same staff officer writes: ‘Enemy weak, completely surprised. Difficult mountain terrain of pre-Alpine character. At midnight first reports of success, prisoners mainly baggage-train crews of divisions encircling Budapest. Anti-tank gun and mortar fire. No own losses. Westland making good progress.’

By 11 January the Westland Regiment had crossed the Pilisnyereg saddle and occupied Pilisszentkereszt, 21 kilometres from Budapest. First to enter the village in his armoured personnel carrier was SS Obersturmbannführer Franz Hack, who had been wounded twice during the preceding days and was awarded the Knight’s Cross for the courage he had shown in this action. Many German vehicles and wounded prisoners were liberated after being held by Soviets in the village for a fortnight. The German Army Group South again requested permission for a break-out, hoping to capture the airfield of Pomáz in order to remove the wounded and provide supplies for the spearheads expected from the capital.

By the evening of 12 January, the advance units of the Wiking Division had reached the Csobánka fork on the road to Pomáz, only 17 kilometres from Budapest, when they were ordered to withdraw, although no outflanking counter-attack by Soviet tanks through the valleys was to be expected and Gille would have had no reason to fear that his units would be cut off in the Pilis Hills by the large Soviet force in their rear at Dorog – at least if the aim of the German offensive had been merely to rescue the defenders, rather than to relieve Budapest. The Soviet 5th Cavalry Corps between Szentendre and Pilisvörösvár, 15 kilometres from the city, would almost certainly have halted a further advance, but a co-ordinated breakout might still have been achieved as the short distance and the bad terrain considerably restricted the Soviets’ ability to resist.

In fact the Soviets actually hoped for a break-out. By this time Malinovsky was very nervous, because the siege had lasted so long. He wanted the Germans to leave the capital as soon as possible, and in order to assist them, he had a 1-kilometre gap in the Buda encirclement opened. His chief concern was the capture of Budapest, and to avert Stalin’s anger over the delay he was prepared to spare the defenders. Ironically it was Pfeffer-Wildenbruch’s and Hitler’s orders that prevented a successful break-out.

From the outset Hitler and Guderian had not expected Operation Konrad II to succeed, and had favoured an offensive from the Székesfehérvár region. On 10 January they had signalled to the German Army Group South that unless there was a radical change within hours Gille’s troops would be regrouped. On 11 January, at the request of the army group, Colonel-General Wenck had spent two hours trying to persuade Hitler to allow the break-out, but ‘all he achieved was the award of the Knight’s Cross to SS Obergruppenführer Pfeffer-Wildenbruch’. The general staff wondered whether by the end of the belated operation there would be anybody or anything to relieve, but Hitler persisted in his original plan and issued the order for Gille’s forces to regroup immediately, even before their new offensive reached its full force.

A 24-hour tug-of-war began between Gille and the army supreme command. Hitler’s order was delivered to Gille at 8.20pm on 11 January. Three hours later Gille cabled that the offensive was making progress. Gille’s superiors passed his cable to Hitler without comment. When Hitler repeated the order Gille appealed to Himmler, but in vain. As his troops had shown no spectacular results since the capture of Pilisszentkereszt he had lost his last trump card, and at 8pm on 12 January he ordered the retreat. By the evening of 14 January the Soviets had reoccupied the Dobogókő area and Pilisszentkereszt.

The cessation of the offensive has provoked heated arguments in memoirs and historical studies. In the unanimous opinion of the combatants, Hitler’s order deprived them of certain success. However, several military historians argue that the Soviets would have cut off the Germans if they had continued their advance.

So what if things were run a bit differently and Hitler had allowed the operation to reach it's full potential?

The difference here would be what the command of the IV SS Panzer Corps wanted in the first place, the use of the 6th panzer division for the operation starting on the 8th of January rather than having to pull out pieces of the 5th SS panzer division (a reinforced panzergrenadier regiment) and commit those instead after a couple of days delay. So ITTL the relatively fresh 6th panzer division launches the operation a couple of days early, as it was easier to withdraw from the front line and 5th SS panzer division takes over its section of the front rather than the other way around.

That would mean a stronger force is able to launch the operation earlier. It wasn't the entire 6th panzer division as parts had been sent off to other parts of the front, but it was substantially more than the force committed historically. Not only that, but in this particular what if since Hitler is more willing to give this operation a chance, so instead of having Kampfgruppe Philippe (a reinforced panzer battalion based on units of the FHH division that had managed to escape being trapped in Budapest with their parent division) launch it's own separate operation outside of the Pilis hills area it is added to the 6th Panzer division. With it would be the convoy of 200 tons of supplies for the Budapest garrison mentioned in the above text. Historically the entire 711th infantry division followed behind the advancing panzer units to clear the hills of Soviet troops and secure the supply lines and flanks, so would do so here too. The assumption here too is the garrison of the city would launch a complementary attack to link up with the offensive if it stalled short of the city.

The point of the operation ITTL would be to cut through the Soviet 46th army's supply lines, disrupt and distract them, and get a large amount of supplies into the city to bolster morale and keep the garrison fighting while the rest of the IV SS Panzer Corps regroups to launch the historical Operation Konrad III. Also to remove the wounded and non-essential personnel/some civilians to keep supplies going for longer and keep up morale. Plus the capture of the airfield would have allowed for more regular supply movements in and out, replacements to be brought in, and wounded out.

Historically the operation did not stall and might have succeeded as it was despite the weakness of the forces committed, considerably less than what would have been available ITTL.

Some reasons I think it could have worked from the wall of text in the quote:
On 10 January, with one day’s delay because of Hitler’s prohibition, the Panzer Group of the Wiking Division, including the Westland Panzergrenadier Regiment, was deployed to fill the gap. The same staff officer writes: ‘Enemy weak, completely surprised. Difficult mountain terrain of pre-Alpine character. At midnight first reports of success, prisoners mainly baggage-train crews of divisions encircling Budapest. Anti-tank gun and mortar fire. No own losses. Westland making good progress.’

By 11 January the Westland Regiment had crossed the Pilisnyereg saddle and occupied Pilisszentkereszt, 21 kilometres from Budapest. First to enter the village in his armoured personnel carrier was SS Obersturmbannführer Franz Hack, who had been wounded twice during the preceding days and was awarded the Knight’s Cross for the courage he had shown in this action. Many German vehicles and wounded prisoners were liberated after being held by Soviets in the village for a fortnight. The German Army Group South again requested permission for a break-out, hoping to capture the airfield of Pomáz in order to remove the wounded and provide supplies for the spearheads expected from the capital.

By the evening of 12 January, the advance units of the Wiking Division had reached the Csobánka fork on the road to Pomáz, only 17 kilometres from Budapest, when they were ordered to withdraw, although no outflanking counter-attack by Soviet tanks through the valleys was to be expected and Gille would have had no reason to fear that his units would be cut off in the Pilis Hills by the large Soviet force in their rear at Dorog – at least if the aim of the German offensive had been merely to rescue the defenders, rather than to relieve Budapest. The Soviet 5th Cavalry Corps between Szentendre and Pilisvörösvár, 15 kilometres from the city, would almost certainly have halted a further advance, but a co-ordinated breakout might still have been achieved as the short distance and the bad terrain considerably restricted the Soviets’ ability to resist.

The difference here, besides the stronger forces, is that the operation would start earlier and be combined instead of two separate forces (IOTL KGr Philippe and the 5th SS KGr) attacking in different areas (Pilis hills vs. Danube river highway which was interdicted by Soviet artillery fire that caused KGr Philippe to bog down immediately). Based on another book written by the operations officer of the 6th panzer army who operated in Hungary the Soviet 5th Cavalry Corps likely wouldn't have been nearly as big of a threat as presented above, especially against ITTL's reinforced 6th panzer division.

Also per Issaev, a Russian historian who wrote a history of the fighting in Hungary in 1945, the 46th army didn't even appreciate the threat the OTL offensive represented and only detached 3x T-34s of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps to help the defenders in the area and only on January 12th shortly before the offensive was cancelled by Hitler. Weather was poor so Soviet aerial observation or threat of attack was off the table too, which is probably why they didn't realize what was going on.

Given that the biggest issue for the defenders of Budapest was the lack of supplies, they might have otherwise been able to hold out for considerably longer and inflict heavier losses on the Soviets had they had enough ammo and food, as they still had more than half their strength when they tried their last desperate breakout attempt when they ran out of everything. The longer than Budapest held, the longer the Soviet offensive against Vienna was delayed and the greater chance the garrison could have been more permanently relieved. Not only that but the attack through the rear supply areas of the 46th Army would badly disrupt said forces and their ability to put pressure on the Budapest garrison and the relief offensive by IV SS Panzer corps.

Thoughts?
 
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History Learner

Well-known member
Establishing the frontline on the Danuabe and holding it until, say, late April/early May really changes the Cold War. A neutral Czechoslovakia, NATO Austria and the Western Allies taking Berlin with the meeting of the Red Army on the Oder really sets a Pro-Western tone in the Cold War from the outset. I could see a Soviet overreaction in Finland in 1948, perhaps also Greece and Italy. One thing though is the impact this could have in the ending stages of the Pacific War; I personally think Japan at this juncture could still pull off a compromise peace while the KMT could strangle the PRC in its cradle.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Establishing the frontline on the Danuabe and holding it until, say, late April/early May really changes the Cold War. A neutral Czechoslovakia, NATO Austria and the Western Allies taking Berlin with the meeting of the Red Army on the Oder really sets a Pro-Western tone in the Cold War from the outset. I could see a Soviet overreaction in Finland in 1948, perhaps also Greece and Italy. One thing though is the impact this could have in the ending stages of the Pacific War; I personally think Japan at this juncture could still pull off a compromise peace while the KMT could strangle the PRC in its cradle.
Do you think the Czechoslovakia would actually remain neutral? IOTL the government in exile came back post-war, but still lost when a coup was launched:
Benes even wanted to work with the Soviets, which put them in positions of power that allowed them to succeed in their coup. The Soviets weren't even in the country, but relatively nearby in Poland and East Germany (Hungary too, but not necessary ITTL).

So perhaps the further east Soviet forces were ITTL would mean the Wallies are even more complacent?

Maybe Hungary too is 'Finlandized' so is a buffer state in the Balkans ITTL, but then faces communist clandestine subversion. Question is what about Austria ITTL? Maybe as the price for leaving Hungary the Soviets demand Austria is kept neutral too?

I'm not sure that even with a defeat in Hungary the Soviets wouldn't be the first to Berlin per OTL, as the situation in Poland-East Germany shouldn't be all that different even without the push up from Hungary into Austria.

Perhaps even the greater perception of Soviet weakness delays things like the Marshal Program, which was created in response to Soviet moves in 1944-47 which violated agreements about free elections and what not, ultimately culminating after the Czechoslovak coup (if wikipedia is to be believed).

How do you figure this impacts the Pacific theater?
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Do you think the Czechoslovakia would actually remain neutral? IOTL the government in exile came back post-war, but still lost when a coup was launched:
Benes even wanted to work with the Soviets, which put them in positions of power that allowed them to succeed in their coup. The Soviets weren't even in the country, but relatively nearby in Poland and East Germany (Hungary too, but not necessary ITTL).

So perhaps the further east Soviet forces were ITTL would mean the Wallies are even more complacent?

Bohemia and Moravia being liberated by the Western Allies, in theory at least, gives the Communists less political capital to demand the same government positions they received in IOTL; in particular, the police and military.

Maybe Hungary too is 'Finlandized' so is a buffer state in the Balkans ITTL, but then faces communist clandestine subversion. Question is what about Austria ITTL? Maybe as the price for leaving Hungary the Soviets demand Austria is kept neutral too?

I'm not sure that even with a defeat in Hungary the Soviets wouldn't be the first to Berlin per OTL, as the situation in Poland-East Germany shouldn't be all that different even without the push up from Hungary into Austria.

Perhaps even the greater perception of Soviet weakness delays things like the Marshal Program, which was created in response to Soviet moves in 1944-47 which violated agreements about free elections and what not, ultimately culminating after the Czechoslovak coup (if wikipedia is to be believed).

How do you figure this impacts the Pacific theater?

All valid points.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Bohemia and Moravia being liberated by the Western Allies, in theory at least, gives the Communists less political capital to demand the same government positions they received in IOTL; in particular, the police and military.
Bohemia was largely liberated by the US and they got Benes, the head of the government in exile, back in power. Benes then willingly tried to create a coalition government with the Communists due to their large power in society right at the end of the war. That of course backfired badly, but was a Czech decision. At least as I understand it. Wikipedia isn't necessarily the best source on the complexities of politics. Though perhaps with the Soviets being beaten ITTL in Hungary and Soviet forces not getting as far as they did IOTL perhaps that calculus would be different.
 

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