Musings on a hypothetical 1938 Sudetenland war versus analysis of the 1940 and 1939 campaigns

raharris1973

Well-known member
How many of the alleged vices of the French did the Czechs replicate versus avoid?

Aficionados of a possible Czech-German war in 1938 point to multiple things the Czechs possessed including some hills/mountains, fortifications, decent quality tanks, artillery, and aircraft, and military industry that were superior to what the Poles had in 1939, alongside with the Germans having a year less of their own production, and not having all that Czech gear.

That creates tantalizing hints of a favorable outcome for the Czechs and an unfavorable outcome for the Germans.

Meanwhile, aficionados of the 1940 campaign point to France shortchanging itself significantly by having insufficient troop training from an insufficient period of service, and poor tactical communications from insufficient distribution of radio sets. It is passe to argue that the Germans had better tanks - nobody says that anymore.

But couldn’t these discussions benefit from cross-pollination? The Wehrmacht obviously had less combat experience and fewer lessons learned in 1938 than in 1940, but was its service terms and rigor of training comparable in both years at the troop and officer levels? Were Wehrmacht tactical units connected with as dense radio networks in 1938 as 1940? Was command culture any less micro-management-y

As for the Czechs in 1938, they had some good tanks, artillery, terrain, and fortifications. The French did too in 1940. What was the term of service in the Czech army and reserve training requirements? Were they longer and more rigorous than the French? Was tactical radio any more widely employed within Czech forces in '38 than French forces in '40?

Even though the Germans were nowhere as well armed in fall 1938 as in 1940 or even 1940, and obviously they were less combat experienced, they could have pretty strong chances based on superior training, delegation of weapons control and command authority, tactical radio (I am not sure on that though) against the Czechs if the Czechs were following rigid French style command structure with limited junior officer initiative, and French levels of training regardless of some better tanks and the presence, on parts of the border, of fortifications and mountains.
 
What I was told about the Czech fortifications is that:

1) They weren't anywhere near complete(I think the defensive line was supposed to be complete in 1941-42);

2) The fortifications didn't cover the Austrian border.

This means that they will be a factor, but not as big as one as people tend to say. Biggest factor in a 1938 German-Czech War is whether the French and British will shank the Germans while they are fighting the Czechs or not.
 
Fact - the Heer in autumn '38 was shit. It was far cry from the efficiency level of autumn '39 let alone spring '40.
Why?
It was being built up from 100K men in 1933.
Such things take time. Training hundreds of thousands of men takes time.
The men coming of age 1919-33 had not served in the army, i.e. no reserves. These had to be trained, in parallel to the training of the usual age cohorts. And tens of thousands of Officers, both Regular and Reserve. Same about NCOs.

The Munich Crisis gave the Heer an opportunity for large scale field exercises, bordering on live fire, after the utter shambles that was the "invasion" of Austria half a year previous. Occupying the Sudenten was still shambles, but slightly less of a brothel on fire during a tsunami level of shambles. Nevertheless the Heer of autumn '38 was not that far from babes lost in the woods level of competence.

If France had ignored the UK and told the Czechs that it will fight AND had beaten the dimwits in Warsaw over their dropped-upon-when-they-were-babies heads that they should support Czechia, then WWII would had been over before it started.
The Polish army was shit too, but it had been around in its current form since 1921. These were not units formed yesterday. Same applies to the French.
I am eyeballing the mobilised Czechoslovak army (Active+Reserves), plus French and Polish Active Divisions to be at least equal in number to German formations. The Heer would be dogpiled and gangraped ...

Munich gave Germany tens of thousands of ready made NCOs, i.e. Germans with service in the Czechoslovak army, plus thousands of officers in the reserve.
 
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As people say the big issue is whether Britain and especially France decide to fight in support of Czechoslovakia. If so even if their no more active than in Sept 39 after the invasion of Poland Germany has the problems mentioned plus that its at war with and hence probably blockaded. This is a lot more important than OTL as without a common border with a friendly USSR the blockade is a hell of a lot more effective.

Also Germany gained considerably from looting the Czechs. They might still get its gold but instead of obtaining a fair number of decent tanks along with the considerable industrial resources of Bohemia their likely to see a lot of both the latter, as well as their OTL equipment consumed or at least damaged in the resulting fighting.

As such even if the western powers don't go to war Germany will be weaker after a bitter fight to conquer the country. A lot would depend as raharris73 says on the actual status and organisation of the Czech army but its likely to be bloody for the Germans.

If France decides to really fight and especially if they get the Poles to see sense and join them then its going to be a short war. Along with a radically different rest of the 20thC.
 
The curb stomping of the Germans predicted by many can only happen if the western allies (or Poles) actually do, something they didn't do in OTL 1939 and early 1940, actually advance, maneuver, and concentrate fire.

The Czechs and Germans actually fighting is one PoD.

The west actually declaring war over this (and doing an embargo, blockade) is another PoD.

The west actually making war, with offensive air and ground combat, making its war anything other than phony, is yet a third PoD.

Poland taking the Czech and western side is a fourth one.

It's an alternate history buffet, and the possibilities can be chosen a la carte, its not prix fixee menu of four things that all must go together if the Czechs end up fighting.

*If* all four things are ordered from the menu, of course the Germans are effed.

But, I'm arguing the Germans have a chance for local win with some bruises and a price tag in some of the a la carte options.
 
I fully agree that curbstomping the Wehrmacht requires many things to come together.
The lynchpin is France ready to fight.
As in OTL, if Paris decides not to go to war, then there is no Sudeten War.
France no go war, Czechs no fight. France no go war, Poland no fight on Czech side.
Simple :)
 
We are talking about '38 - the looting was in '39.

True with the final occupation of the Czech rump state in March 39. Here its a bit earlier but the state is likely to be in a somewhat more battered condition as would be parts of the German army.
 
The curb stomping of the Germans predicted by many can only happen if the western allies (or Poles) actually do, something they didn't do in OTL 1939 and early 1940, actually advance, maneuver, and concentrate fire.

The Czechs and Germans actually fighting is one PoD.

The west actually declaring war over this (and doing an embargo, blockade) is another PoD.

The west actually making war, with offensive air and ground combat, making its war anything other than phony, is yet a third PoD.

Poland taking the Czech and western side is a fourth one.

It's an alternate history buffet, and the possibilities can be chosen a la carte, its not prix fixee menu of four things that all must go together if the Czechs end up fighting.

*If* all four things are ordered from the menu, of course the Germans are effed.

But, I'm arguing the Germans have a chance for local win with some bruises and a price tag in some of the a la carte options.

The big issue would be France deciding to declare war. If they did I suspect Britain would follow, as France is its primary ally and it can't really afford to be isolated or leave France exposed. If so even if France does nothing militarily Germany is facing a hell of a lot of problems. The blockade without Soviet support will hamper them as will simply a state of war being in place. Also with that they won't be able to bully/conquer Poland so lack the chance to gain the OTL resources there.

Actual French attacks against a virtually undefended western Germany would make the war very short, especially since, with Hitler having not yet gained the prestige of OTL and the German generals panicking you could see a coup against him being a clear possibility.

Poland having the sense to realise this is the chance to secure its western border would be a useful addition but isn't that important. It would make for a clear curb-stomp however.

Steve
 
The big issue would be France deciding to declare war. If they did I suspect Britain would follow, as France is its primary ally and it can't really afford to be isolated or leave France exposed. If so even if France does nothing militarily Germany is facing a hell of a lot of problems. The blockade without Soviet support will hamper them as will simply a state of war being in place. Also with that they won't be able to bully/conquer Poland so lack the chance to gain the OTL resources there.

Actual French attacks against a virtually undefended western Germany would make the war very short, especially since, with Hitler having not yet gained the prestige of OTL and the German generals panicking you could see a coup against him being a clear possibility.

Poland having the sense to realise this is the chance to secure its western border would be a useful addition but isn't that important. It would make for a clear curb-stomp however.

Steve

With what army is France attacking? Why does Britain do a 180 when IOTL they directly told the French they would not fight over the Sudetenland?
 
With what army is France attacking?
With its mobilised North-West Divisions etc.
All in all France has c.40 active Divisions in the Metropole.
Like any other army these need some 14 days to mobilise and to move into attack positions.
Why does Britain do a 180 when IOTL they directly told the French they would not fight over the Sudetenland?
Imagine that the British are simply ignored.
 
i read some book about Czech army.They have good artillery,tanks and planes,but...they were divided/minorities could not fight/,and their units,unless polish in 1939,was not always fully formed.For example,among 4 light dyvisions/motorized inframtry,tanks and normal calvary/ only one was fully operational.

So,Czech on their own would fall.But if France join,Germany would fall in month.And if both France and Poland join,it would take 2 weeks.

According to what i read,Czech military wanted cooperation with Poland,polish nationalist wonted that,but unfortunatelly ruling junta decide to did nothing except retaking our land taken by Czech in 1920.
Not becouse they were german allies,/if they were,they would join Hitler,not fight him/ ,but becouse they truly belived that Poland is superpower.Morons.
 
With its mobilised North-West Divisions etc.
All in all France has c.40 active Divisions in the Metropole.
Like any other army these need some 14 days to mobilise and to move into attack positions.

In other words, they have a far smaller and weaker force than the German Army in all respects and are somehow expected to do a successful offensive they couldn't do in 1939 with almost twice the number of divisions? The Germans had five Armor divisions by December of 1938, the French didn't get their first DLM until January of 1940. It only took the Germans three at Sedan to score the decisive victory in the 1940 campaign....

Imagine that the British are simply ignored.

So no blockade and Berlin presents a fait accompli to Britain, leaving the London-Washington axis with the ability to really interfere politically with the new order of things in Europe.
 
Fact - the Heer in autumn '38 was shit. It was far cry from the efficiency level of autumn '39 let alone spring '40.
Not to mention that the March 1939 occupation of Czechia yielded enough equipment and supplies to equip 22 division, which enabled the invasion of Poland later that year.

However it should be noted that the French and British were much less ready for war in 1938 than they were a year later, especially in terms of their air forces. So really it would just be Germany vs. Czechoslovakia as the British and French could do nothing to help other than blockade Germany...which means the shittiness of the Heer at this point is rather irrelevant given how much larger and more powerful they were than the Czechs and how much help Germany would have from the Sudeten Germans in the border regions. Plus that doesn't even take into account how much better the Luftwaffe was at this point than the Czech air force, which goes a long way to negate any potential disadvantages the Heer might have vis-a-vis the Czechoslovak army.

Poland could theoretically be on Germany's side too given that they wanted Czech territory and at this point was still quite favorable to Germany overall. Likely though they just sit out the war and trade with Germany and wait and see what happens. The question is would Britain and France really keep fighting to the bitter end at that point or cut a deal? Would the Oster conspiracy really be able to topple Hitler like they claimed? There are a ton of variables at this point that make it really difficult to assess. If the coup attempt is launched it could theoretically throw off everything:
The plot was organised and developed by then Oberstleutnant Hans Oster and Major Helmuth Groscurth of the Abwehr.[2] They drew into the conspiracy such people as Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, General Wilhelm Adam,[3] Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch, Generaloberst Franz Halder, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and Generalleutnant Erwin von Witzleben. The working plan was for Count Hans-Jürgen von Blumenthal to lead a storm party into the Reich Chancellery and kill Hitler. It would then be necessary to neutralize the Nazi Party apparatus in order to stop them from proceeding with the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which they believed would lead to a war that would ruin Germany.[4]

In addition to these military figures, the conspirators also had contact with Secretary of State Ernst von Weizsäcker and the diplomats Theodor Kordt, Erich Kordt and Hans Bernd Gisevius. Theodor Kordt was considered a vital contact with the British on whom the success of the plot depended; the conspirators needed strong British opposition to Hitler's seizure of the Sudetenland.

There is a lot of debate about whether the coup was real or had any chance of succeeding, especially against a counter coup, but it is a factor to think about.
 
In other words, they have a far smaller and weaker force than the German Army in all respects and are somehow expected to do a successful offensive they couldn't do in 1939 with almost twice the number of divisions? The Germans had five Armor divisions by December of 1938, the French didn't get their first DLM until January of 1940. It only took the Germans three at Sedan to score the decisive victory in the 1940 campaign....



So no blockade and Berlin presents a fait accompli to Britain, leaving the London-Washington axis with the ability to really interfere politically with the new order of things in Europe.

Germans armored dyvisions had mainly Pz1 tanks,and almost no medium.And they break without fighting when they march to take Czech territories.
What more importantly,they have only Me109D fighters,which was not much better then french biplanes.
Even polish obsolate fighters have no problems with them in 1939.
 

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