Actually you haven't. You say you have but your claiming a similar level of foraging in western Europe as in the NW territories of the US which were still largely forests with small Indian settlements west of Ohio and thinly settled with minimal communications to the east of that. The route up towards Montreal is better equipped possibly but its still a rough path as the US found OTL and your heading into the group of Canadians who have most to lose from being conquered by the US.
Except I have, by noting multiple times now the smaller Army sizes in North America compared to Europe thus require smaller levels of forage and the fact that Canada isn't as devastated as Europe was after almost a decade of war in 1801. As for the "Canadians", no such identity exists at this time and most were recent American arrivals, coming after the 1780s to take advantage of land grants offered by the British.
Yes he will use less forces than in Europe and if we take you literally about not using the militia a hell of a lot less as they made up the bulk of the forces in many campaigns. This might make his operations logistically possible but also lose the numerical edge that the US had in many battles OTL which is likely to be very dangerous if not disastrous.
Canadian militia amounted to about 4,000 in total, Native forces were around 15,000 and British regulars, at the start of the conflict, were 5,200. All this compared to 35,000 American Regulars means the latter will handsomely outnumber.
The Canadian militia and local Indians will definitely be used and since their fighting for their homes, liberty and in the latter case their lives in many cases they won't be a push over.
While this rhetorical flourish is nice, the hard reality is professional troops crush militia with ease in this era. Same goes for Native formations, whom were defeated even OTL so badly the British wrote them by 1814 as evidenced by the abandonment of Detroit.
If their in the formal change of command, given how much politics played that could be an issue since Moreau will be seen as a foreigner. If their militia then their not in the direct chain of command and will have local interests to support and to support them.
Again, we have plenty of examples of foreigners in positions of power in this era and we know Moreau was repeatedly offered command positions with no political blowback. As I've also said repeatedly now, I'm completely okay with writing off militia outside of defensive duties.
As you say the US regular forces were pretty small and even without losses you would need more to garrison most of Canada as well as the American coastline.
Militias can and were used to garrison the coastlines OTL for the most part, so that's not an issue. Given low population numbers, 10,000 is sufficient to garrison Canada.
On the 2nd point that contradicts everything I've read. New England bitterly opposed the war and refused to stop trading with the Canadians over the border. They also refused to pay taxes towards the conflict or contribute forces either. That was a reason why Nova Scotia and New Brunswick never faced any attack during the war and regulars and volunteers from those colonies were able to support the rest of Canada.
New England only became resistive at the end of the conflict, as the blockade began to bite. Maine, for example, was the center of privateering during the War and this was a motivating factor in the British 1814 invasion.
There could be another issue here as well. Many of the English speaking population of Upper Canada [now Ontario] weren't from loyalist communities on the coast. They were actually from the New England area and had crossed the border to settle land in Canada, making an oath of loyalty to the British crown and all the evidence is that they stuck by that oath. Possibly especially after things such as the sack of York and the burning of villages on the Niagria border, neither of which endeared the Americans to the people they were seeking to rule. Which might have been another reason why New England was as opposed to the war as it was.
Most arrived well after the Revolution and were considered apathetic by both .
Except that as you said Metternich was seeking to establish a balance between Russia, which looked overwhelming after the defeat of Napoleon's Grand Army and France. Now your saying that this potential balance has been pretty much destroyed. Even if Napoleon is willing to agree some deal - which we remember he rejected in far less favourable circumstances OTL - Metternich is unlikely to be favourable to the sort of demands Napoleon is likely to make. Especially since in this case he's still in charge of most of Germany here.
I don't recall phrasing it like that, rather I stated that it showed Austria was willing to cut a deal with France. Indeed, Austria had previously cut a deal with France that saw them made the hegemonic power on the continent until 1812 presented the opportunity to reverse that. Regardless, as I have many times now, I'm not tied to any viewpoint here; the French could get favorable terms that Napoleon agrees to or the war continues for several more years.
Actually I'm not. You're arguing that Moreau was very important in advicing the Russians especially during this campaign. If he's lacking from before it starts then a lot of things could change even before this battle which could mean it never occurs in that location.
Moreau wasn't available until 1813, so nothing changes until the onset of the campaign. You are right things could be different, given the Tsar's advisers are more stacked in favor of aggression and attack, which Bernadotte and Moreau both cautioned against in tandem IOTL. Without the advice of caution, it's entirely likely the Allies go for the direct confrontation they were advised against historically and get an even worse defeat for their troubles.
No they won't be worse than the coalition if the latter are heavily defeated but their still likely to be heavy and Napoleon doesn't have infinite numbers of troops.
Sure, but it's going to take time to rebuild the Russian Army and Napoleon can take advantage of the destruction of the Prussians to dismember their state before turning on the Austrians. In effect, a return to the Pre-1812 status quo.
The campaign always had a conventional element, since at least Wellington's 2nd period in Portugal but it was always a combination of the slowly growing Anglo-Portuguese army and the assorted guerillas. The former meant that the French had to combine forces to oppose them while the latter meant they had to spread units all over the place to try and maintain at least some control. There were generally 5 French armies in Spain with the Army of Portugal - although it was generally based in west central Spain after about 1810/11 - often supported by elements from the army of the centre and/or the army of the south opposing Wellington. As forces were withdrawn for elsewhere, initially the disaster in Russia then to try and hold together Napoleon's faltering empire Wellington's force was able to defeat the main force in central Spain at Vitoria as you say. This forced the loss of Madrid and the withdrawal of the other French armies from the rest of Spain.
Allied armies get destroyed then and the French hold a buffer state between themselves and the Spanish, or they establish the border on the Pyrenees.
Assuming that Napoleon wins at Dresden then a lot depends on how big his win, and how costly for him, then what terms he will consider afterwards. Given his OTL reaction I can't see him accepting anything like the OTL proposals but I suspect his demands, if any would be too harsh for the allies to accept. At the same time national feeling is rising in Germany and a general weariness with his continued warmongering and the heavy taxes and devastation result so he will eventually be defeated. It could well take longer with his 1st defeat in 1815 or he could end up dying earlier.
You're looking at Napoleon surviving as Emperor into the latter half of the 1810s at a minimum. The British are removed to the South, the Prussians are removed period and the Austro-Russians are battered and need to time to rebuild. This also means the French have a breathing space.
I repeat the points above, which you have largely sough to hand wave away, as well as replying to some others you have mentioned. As I've said a proven and successful general would probably improve the performance but given the various issues it might not make much difference and is unlikely to lead to the total conquest of Canada.
No, I directly addressed them several times. Noticeably, however, you've also not addressed any of my central points that go in hand with Moreau, such as his position as being in charge of the U.S. Army would enable him to make the kind of reforms that would best utilize the superior resources of the United States against British North America.
There is one other issue that just came to mind. You said "he was offered command of all U.S. troops by President Madison". that suggests a general staff sort of role overseeing operations from afar rather than leading an individual army so at least initially he will be relying on the people already in place who seriously under-performed OTL. If he does take personal control of a single army - which would effectively be a demotion - he can still only be in one place.
This actually has historical precedent; both Lee and Grant were this in the American Civil War for their respective armies.
Mind you if he takes the job offer he could find himself in command of the militia at Washington in 1814 - assuming that's not prevented/delayed by butterflies.
Given he would be command of the entire U.S. Army, not sure why that would be the case.