Madison's General: Moreau in the War of 1812

stevep

Well-known member
So,cyvil war in which northern states try to secede from South?
UK could help them,it would be in their interest to keep two americans states.
Only good thing - indians here would be treated better.They fought for Confederacy,after all.

But,in 1914 we would have bigger Canada,Northern states allied with England,southern allied with germans,and Mexico allied with England,too.

Allies would win ,just like in OTL - but,except germans wanting revenge,we would have southerns wonting revenge,too.

Different WW2,althought Allies would win again - mainly becouse Japan would remain England ally,probably with Siberia.

So,Germany,Italy,Southern USA and soviets against England,Northern USA,and stronger Japan.Longer war,i think.

That all assumes that with changes in ~1810 those events still occur. There's a hell of a lot that could change by the end of the 1820's around the world.
 

ATP

Well-known member
That all assumes that with changes in ~1810 those events still occur. There's a hell of a lot that could change by the end of the 1820's around the world.
True.If Prussia do not conqer German states,we would never had WW1,only some local wars.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
He also has a number of negative ones you keep ignoring.

No, I directly acknowledged them and addressed them in Posts 11 and 14. If you feel I left any out, please directly elucidate them for myself and the audience so that I may address them directly, rather than leaving them undefined and thus vague for everyone else.

Again your ignoring the facts. The French armies lived off the locals wherever they were based. Intitally largely indiscriminate foraging, which was a factor in their abilities to move fast as being unattached to baggage trains and later in times of 'peace' by extorting resources from the areas they were based in. This was one reason that by 1812 onward they were so unpopular across much of northern Europe. Similarly they made themselves fair unpopular in France itself in 1814-15 when forced back into French territory because they continued to use the same method.

No, I addressed this all in Post 16.

The Rhineland and Southern Germany were not and still aren't breadbaskets, particularly in the winter of 1800 when Moreau won his defining victory at Hohenlinden. Likewise, this region had been extensively fought over and devestated in the years preceding that triumph, reducing the means of looting and was a major factor Napoleon began serious reforms to the Army's logistics and organization in 1799. Finally, as I already acknowledged in my prior post, Moreau's U.S. Army Regulars will be a smaller force than the Army he had in Europe, thus reducing its logistical needs.

The central government might accept him as overall commander but will local figures when he starts issuing orders contrary to their interests/wishes?

If they are in the formal command chain of the U.S. Army, they are dismissed. Refer to what happened to the defeated Hull after the loss of Detroit.

In terms of disclipine I was thinking of what he might do when militia units as they often did disbanded when their time of service was up or refused to cross international or state borders which also happened frequently. He might also seek a harder line in terms of the New England states who refused to support the war and continued trading openly with Britain/Canada.

Hence why I largely dismissed Militia as anything other than a defensive force and have repeatedly noted the expansion of the U.S. Army Regulars during the course of the conflict. At war's end, there was 35,000 and, if I remember correctly, 100,000 total served during the course of the conflict. As for New England, again, this issue didn't really exist until 1814-1815, at the end stages of the war. Earlier in the conflict New England contributed just as everyone else, generally speaking.

True on hindsight I did miss that although as pointed out if you assume the heavy defeat of the allied armies then such terms aren't going to be either offered or accepted.

I don't see reason to believe this given Metternich and Napoleon began discussions long before his defeat at the Battle of Leipzig.

Because I'm assuming that butterflies exist so its far from certain that the same events would occur. That you want them to isn't enough in itself.

Unless you're assuming the butterflies include an asteroid destroying the local mountains, then they can be dismissed. Human changes don't move mountains nor do they result in the general local topography and road network being displaced. Again, we have the benefit of hindsight of knowing the only means of retreat for the Russo-Prussian Armies was the local mountain passes, which the French moved to cut off in the historical battle. They failed there, but there is ample reason to believe they wouldn't here.

Even assuming the disaster you assume the allies can withdraw and regroup. It will take a lot longer but Napoleon is likely to be after blood and the French will have suffered losses themselves.

If by retreat you mean allow Napoleon to dismember Prussia and rest his armies while Russia rebuilds its own over the course of a year or two, then yes. The French have taken losses, sure, but not worse than the Coalition's.

Since the French had only a loose hold on Spain with ~250,000 men and that was with a markedly smaller and less developed allied army under Wellington that last bit is unlikely.

No, as the conflict in Spain had turned conventional by 1813 as shown by the Battle of Vitoria. At said battle, the British and their allied contingents of the Iberians numbered some 81,000 to 90,000 according to Wikipedia, as compared to 57,000 for the French. Substantial reinforcements would've changed this dynamic in the favor of the French, probably forcing Wellington back to Portugal where he had been successfully bottled up for years by the French if he isn't outright destroyed in battle.

That's your assumption but as mentioned above there are serious problems with such a scenario.

All of the problems you have cited so far I have addressed. You have yet to cite anything that contradicts the core contention of Moreau's Generalship combined with the superior resources of the U.S. as opposed to British Canada given the motherland being distracted being a winning combination. As I said earlier, if you feel I have left something out, please say it directly, as such would do wonders to advance the conversation.
 
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stevep

Well-known member
No, I directly acknowledged them and addressed them in Posts 11 and 14. If you feel I left any out, please directly elucidate them for myself and the audience so that I may address them directly, rather than leaving them undefined and thus vague for everyone else.

No, I addressed this all in Post 16.

The Rhineland and Southern Germany were not and still aren't breadbaskets, particularly in the winter of 1800 when Moreau won his defining victory at Hohenlinden. Likewise, this region had been extensively fought over and devestated in the years preceding that triumph, reducing the means of looting and was a major factor Napoleon began serious reforms to the Army's logistics and organization in 1799. Finally, as I already acknowledged in my prior post, Moreau's U.S. Army Regulars will be a smaller force than the Army he had in Europe, thus reducing its logistical needs.

Actually you haven't. You say you have but your claiming a similar level of foraging in western Europe as in the NW territories of the US which were still largely forests with small Indian settlements west of Ohio and thinly settled with minimal communications to the east of that. The route up towards Montreal is better equipped possibly but its still a rough path as the US found OTL and your heading into the group of Canadians who have most to lose from being conquered by the US.

Yes he will use less forces than in Europe and if we take you literally about not using the militia a hell of a lot less as they made up the bulk of the forces in many campaigns. This might make his operations logistically possible but also lose the numerical edge that the US had in many battles OTL which is likely to be very dangerous if not disastrous. The Canadian militia and local Indians will definitely be used and since their fighting for their homes, liberty and in the latter case their lives in many cases they won't be a push over.


If they are in the formal command chain of the U.S. Army, they are dismissed. Refer to what happened to the defeated Hull after the loss of Detroit.

If their in the formal change of command, given how much politics played that could be an issue since Moreau will be seen as a foreigner. If their militia then their not in the direct chain of command and will have local interests to support and to support them.

Hence why I largely dismissed Militia as anything other than a defensive force and have repeatedly noted the expansion of the U.S. Army Regulars during the course of the conflict. At war's end, there was 35,000 and, if I remember correctly, 100,000 total served during the course of the conflict. As for New England, again, this issue didn't really exist until 1814-1815, at the end stages of the war. Earlier in the conflict New England contributed just as everyone else, generally speaking.

As you say the US regular forces were pretty small and even without losses you would need more to garrison most of Canada as well as the American coastline.

On the 2nd point that contradicts everything I've read. New England bitterly opposed the war and refused to stop trading with the Canadians over the border. They also refused to pay taxes towards the conflict or contribute forces either. That was a reason why Nova Scotia and New Brunswick never faced any attack during the war and regulars and volunteers from those colonies were able to support the rest of Canada.

There could be another issue here as well. Many of the English speaking population of Upper Canada [now Ontario] weren't from loyalist communities on the coast. They were actually from the New England area and had crossed the border to settle land in Canada, making an oath of loyalty to the British crown and all the evidence is that they stuck by that oath. Possibly especially after things such as the sack of York and the burning of villages on the Niagria border, neither of which endeared the Americans to the people they were seeking to rule. Which might have been another reason why New England was as opposed to the war as it was.

I don't see reason to believe this given Metternich and Napoleon began discussions long before his defeat at the Battle of Leipzig.

Except that as you said Metternich was seeking to establish a balance between Russia, which looked overwhelming after the defeat of Napoleon's Grand Army and France. Now your saying that this potential balance has been pretty much destroyed. Even if Napoleon is willing to agree some deal - which we remember he rejected in far less favourable circumstances OTL - Metternich is unlikely to be favourable to the sort of demands Napoleon is likely to make. Especially since in this case he's still in charge of most of Germany here.

Unless you're assuming the butterflies include an asteroid destroying the local mountains, then they can be dismissed. Human changes don't move mountains nor do they result in the general local topography and road network being displaced. Again, we have the benefit of hindsight of knowing the only means of retreat for the Russo-Prussian Armies was the local mountain passes, which the French moved to cut off in the historical battle. They failed there, but there is ample reason to believe they wouldn't here.

Actually I'm not. You're arguing that Moreau was very important in advicing the Russians especially during this campaign. If he's lacking from before it starts then a lot of things could change even before this battle which could mean it never occurs in that location.

If by retreat you mean allow Napoleon to dismember Prussia and rest his armies while Russia rebuilds its own over the course of a year or two, then yes. The French have taken losses, sure, but not worse than the Coalition's.

No they won't be worse than the coalition if the latter are heavily defeated but their still likely to be heavy and Napoleon doesn't have infinite numbers of troops.

No, as the conflict in Spain had turned conventional by 1813 as shown by the Battle of Vitoria. At said battle, the British and their allied contingents of the Iberians numbered some 81,000 to 90,000 according to Wikipedia, as compared to 57,000 for the French. Substantial reinforcements would've changed this dynamic in the favor of the French, probably forcing Wellington back to Portugal where he had been successfully bottled up for years by the French if he isn't outright destroyed in battle.

The campaign always had a conventional element, since at least Wellington's 2nd period in Portugal but it was always a combination of the slowly growing Anglo-Portuguese army and the assorted guerillas. The former meant that the French had to combine forces to oppose them while the latter meant they had to spread units all over the place to try and maintain at least some control. There were generally 5 French armies in Spain with the Army of Portugal - although it was generally based in west central Spain after about 1810/11 - often supported by elements from the army of the centre and/or the army of the south opposing Wellington. As forces were withdrawn for elsewhere, initially the disaster in Russia then to try and hold together Napoleon's faltering empire Wellington's force was able to defeat the main force in central Spain at Vitoria as you say. This forced the loss of Madrid and the withdrawal of the other French armies from the rest of Spain.

Assuming that Napoleon wins at Dresden then a lot depends on how big his win, and how costly for him, then what terms he will consider afterwards. Given his OTL reaction I can't see him accepting anything like the OTL proposals but I suspect his demands, if any would be too harsh for the allies to accept. At the same time national feeling is rising in Germany and a general weariness with his continued warmongering and the heavy taxes and devastation result so he will eventually be defeated. It could well take longer with his 1st defeat in 1815 or he could end up dying earlier.

He's unlikely to return to Spain in large numbers given the demands in the east but might reinforce the French border to hinder an advance by Wellington's forces into France.

All of the problems you have cited so far I have addressed. You have yet to cite anything that contradicts the core contention of Moreau's Generalship combined with the superior resources of the U.S. as opposed to British Canada given the motherland being distracted being a winning combination. As I said earlier, if you feel I have left something out, please say it directly, as such would do wonders to advance the conversation.

I repeat the points above, which you have largely sough to hand wave away, as well as replying to some others you have mentioned. As I've said a proven and successful general would probably improve the performance but given the various issues it might not make much difference and is unlikely to lead to the total conquest of Canada.

There is one other issue that just came to mind. You said "he was offered command of all U.S. troops by President Madison". that suggests a general staff sort of role overseeing operations from afar rather than leading an individual army so at least initially he will be relying on the people already in place who seriously under-performed OTL. If he does take personal control of a single army - which would effectively be a demotion - he can still only be in one place.

Mind you if he takes the job offer he could find himself in command of the militia at Washington in 1814 - assuming that's not prevented/delayed by butterflies. ;)
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Actually you haven't. You say you have but your claiming a similar level of foraging in western Europe as in the NW territories of the US which were still largely forests with small Indian settlements west of Ohio and thinly settled with minimal communications to the east of that. The route up towards Montreal is better equipped possibly but its still a rough path as the US found OTL and your heading into the group of Canadians who have most to lose from being conquered by the US.

Except I have, by noting multiple times now the smaller Army sizes in North America compared to Europe thus require smaller levels of forage and the fact that Canada isn't as devastated as Europe was after almost a decade of war in 1801. As for the "Canadians", no such identity exists at this time and most were recent American arrivals, coming after the 1780s to take advantage of land grants offered by the British.

Yes he will use less forces than in Europe and if we take you literally about not using the militia a hell of a lot less as they made up the bulk of the forces in many campaigns. This might make his operations logistically possible but also lose the numerical edge that the US had in many battles OTL which is likely to be very dangerous if not disastrous.

Canadian militia amounted to about 4,000 in total, Native forces were around 15,000 and British regulars, at the start of the conflict, were 5,200. All this compared to 35,000 American Regulars means the latter will handsomely outnumber.

The Canadian militia and local Indians will definitely be used and since their fighting for their homes, liberty and in the latter case their lives in many cases they won't be a push over.

While this rhetorical flourish is nice, the hard reality is professional troops crush militia with ease in this era. Same goes for Native formations, whom were defeated even OTL so badly the British wrote them by 1814 as evidenced by the abandonment of Detroit.

If their in the formal change of command, given how much politics played that could be an issue since Moreau will be seen as a foreigner. If their militia then their not in the direct chain of command and will have local interests to support and to support them.

Again, we have plenty of examples of foreigners in positions of power in this era and we know Moreau was repeatedly offered command positions with no political blowback. As I've also said repeatedly now, I'm completely okay with writing off militia outside of defensive duties.

As you say the US regular forces were pretty small and even without losses you would need more to garrison most of Canada as well as the American coastline.

Militias can and were used to garrison the coastlines OTL for the most part, so that's not an issue. Given low population numbers, 10,000 is sufficient to garrison Canada.

On the 2nd point that contradicts everything I've read. New England bitterly opposed the war and refused to stop trading with the Canadians over the border. They also refused to pay taxes towards the conflict or contribute forces either. That was a reason why Nova Scotia and New Brunswick never faced any attack during the war and regulars and volunteers from those colonies were able to support the rest of Canada.

New England only became resistive at the end of the conflict, as the blockade began to bite. Maine, for example, was the center of privateering during the War and this was a motivating factor in the British 1814 invasion.

There could be another issue here as well. Many of the English speaking population of Upper Canada [now Ontario] weren't from loyalist communities on the coast. They were actually from the New England area and had crossed the border to settle land in Canada, making an oath of loyalty to the British crown and all the evidence is that they stuck by that oath. Possibly especially after things such as the sack of York and the burning of villages on the Niagria border, neither of which endeared the Americans to the people they were seeking to rule. Which might have been another reason why New England was as opposed to the war as it was.

Most arrived well after the Revolution and were considered apathetic by both .

Except that as you said Metternich was seeking to establish a balance between Russia, which looked overwhelming after the defeat of Napoleon's Grand Army and France. Now your saying that this potential balance has been pretty much destroyed. Even if Napoleon is willing to agree some deal - which we remember he rejected in far less favourable circumstances OTL - Metternich is unlikely to be favourable to the sort of demands Napoleon is likely to make. Especially since in this case he's still in charge of most of Germany here.

I don't recall phrasing it like that, rather I stated that it showed Austria was willing to cut a deal with France. Indeed, Austria had previously cut a deal with France that saw them made the hegemonic power on the continent until 1812 presented the opportunity to reverse that. Regardless, as I have many times now, I'm not tied to any viewpoint here; the French could get favorable terms that Napoleon agrees to or the war continues for several more years.

Actually I'm not. You're arguing that Moreau was very important in advicing the Russians especially during this campaign. If he's lacking from before it starts then a lot of things could change even before this battle which could mean it never occurs in that location.

Moreau wasn't available until 1813, so nothing changes until the onset of the campaign. You are right things could be different, given the Tsar's advisers are more stacked in favor of aggression and attack, which Bernadotte and Moreau both cautioned against in tandem IOTL. Without the advice of caution, it's entirely likely the Allies go for the direct confrontation they were advised against historically and get an even worse defeat for their troubles.

No they won't be worse than the coalition if the latter are heavily defeated but their still likely to be heavy and Napoleon doesn't have infinite numbers of troops.

Sure, but it's going to take time to rebuild the Russian Army and Napoleon can take advantage of the destruction of the Prussians to dismember their state before turning on the Austrians. In effect, a return to the Pre-1812 status quo.

The campaign always had a conventional element, since at least Wellington's 2nd period in Portugal but it was always a combination of the slowly growing Anglo-Portuguese army and the assorted guerillas. The former meant that the French had to combine forces to oppose them while the latter meant they had to spread units all over the place to try and maintain at least some control. There were generally 5 French armies in Spain with the Army of Portugal - although it was generally based in west central Spain after about 1810/11 - often supported by elements from the army of the centre and/or the army of the south opposing Wellington. As forces were withdrawn for elsewhere, initially the disaster in Russia then to try and hold together Napoleon's faltering empire Wellington's force was able to defeat the main force in central Spain at Vitoria as you say. This forced the loss of Madrid and the withdrawal of the other French armies from the rest of Spain.

Allied armies get destroyed then and the French hold a buffer state between themselves and the Spanish, or they establish the border on the Pyrenees.

Assuming that Napoleon wins at Dresden then a lot depends on how big his win, and how costly for him, then what terms he will consider afterwards. Given his OTL reaction I can't see him accepting anything like the OTL proposals but I suspect his demands, if any would be too harsh for the allies to accept. At the same time national feeling is rising in Germany and a general weariness with his continued warmongering and the heavy taxes and devastation result so he will eventually be defeated. It could well take longer with his 1st defeat in 1815 or he could end up dying earlier.

You're looking at Napoleon surviving as Emperor into the latter half of the 1810s at a minimum. The British are removed to the South, the Prussians are removed period and the Austro-Russians are battered and need to time to rebuild. This also means the French have a breathing space.

I repeat the points above, which you have largely sough to hand wave away, as well as replying to some others you have mentioned. As I've said a proven and successful general would probably improve the performance but given the various issues it might not make much difference and is unlikely to lead to the total conquest of Canada.

No, I directly addressed them several times. Noticeably, however, you've also not addressed any of my central points that go in hand with Moreau, such as his position as being in charge of the U.S. Army would enable him to make the kind of reforms that would best utilize the superior resources of the United States against British North America.

There is one other issue that just came to mind. You said "he was offered command of all U.S. troops by President Madison". that suggests a general staff sort of role overseeing operations from afar rather than leading an individual army so at least initially he will be relying on the people already in place who seriously under-performed OTL. If he does take personal control of a single army - which would effectively be a demotion - he can still only be in one place.

This actually has historical precedent; both Lee and Grant were this in the American Civil War for their respective armies.

Mind you if he takes the job offer he could find himself in command of the militia at Washington in 1814 - assuming that's not prevented/delayed by butterflies. ;)

Given he would be command of the entire U.S. Army, not sure why that would be the case.
 
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stevep

Well-known member
Except I have, by noting multiple times now the smaller Army sizes in North America compared to Europe thus require smaller levels of forage and the fact that Canada isn't as devastated as Europe was after almost a decade of war in 1801. As for the "Canadians", no such identity exists at this time and most were recent American arrivals, coming after the 1780s to take advantage of land grants offered by the British.

Given that in a lot of the areas we're talking about there's nothing really to devastate in the 1st place my point is still very valid.

The Canadian identity was definitely hardened by the war but some of it already existed.

Canadian militia amounted to about 4,000 in total, Native forces were around 15,000 and British regulars, at the start of the conflict, were 5,200. All this compared to 35,000 American Regulars means the latter will handsomely outnumber.

You referred to 35k US regulars at their peak, towards the end of the conflict.


While this rhetorical flourish is nice, the hard reality is professional troops crush militia with ease in this era. Same goes for Native formations, whom were defeated even OTL so badly the British wrote them by 1814 as evidenced by the abandonment of Detroit.

If the militia were unsupported by regulars and tried to stand in a pitched battle and if the attacking regulars were well supplied and led and motivated. If those conditions aren't met it could well be a different matter.

Again, we have plenty of examples of foreigners in positions of power in this era and we know Moreau was repeatedly offered command positions with no political blowback. As I've also said repeatedly now, I'm completely okay with writing off militia outside of defensive duties.

And there are also cases of criticism of foreign commanders, especially in highly politicized organisations.

Militias can and were used to garrison the coastlines OTL for the most part, so that's not an issue. Given low population numbers, 10,000 is sufficient to garrison Canada.

That's your opinion but it still means nearly a 3rd of your total regular forces.

New England only became resistive at the end of the conflict, as the blockade began to bite. Maine, for example, was the center of privateering during the War and this was a motivating factor in the British 1814 invasion.

Your asserting that but it contradicts what I've read.

Most arrived well after the Revolution and were considered apathetic by both .

The US seemed to think they would be welcomed as liberators, as in the 1770's and both times they were wrong.

I don't recall phrasing it like that, rather I stated that it showed Austria was willing to cut a deal with France. Indeed, Austria had previously cut a deal with France that saw them made the hegemonic power on the continent until 1812 presented the opportunity to reverse that. Regardless, as I have many times now, I'm not tied to any viewpoint here; the French could get favorable terms that Napoleon agrees to or the war continues for several more years.

Austria accepted French hegemony because they had no choice, having fought the French more often than any other major continental power. Your argument was that Metternich was seeking a balance to prevent Russia replacing France as such an hegemonic power. If France has dealt a heavy defeat on the allies and is now seeking to re-impose its control, probably as you yourself suggests with heavy repression then that's a totally different matter.


Moreau wasn't available until 1813, so nothing changes until the onset of the campaign. You are right things could be different, given the Tsar's advisers are more stacked in favor of aggression and attack, which Bernadotte and Moreau both cautioned against in tandem IOTL. Without the advice of caution, it's entirely likely the Allies go for the direct confrontation they were advised against historically and get an even worse defeat for their troubles.

Until the start of the campaign in 1813. Leipzig wasn't until October so a lot could and probably would happen before then. If the allies do crash and burn earlier then its likely to be somewhere else so the terrain features your pointing out for the crushing losses for the allies aren't going to be there.

Sure, but it's going to take time to rebuild the Russian Army and Napoleon can take advantage of the destruction of the Prussians to dismember their state before turning on the Austrians. In effect, a return to the Pre-1812 status quo.

Doubtful given the steadily reducing qualative edge between the French forces and their opponents and that training new forces was relatively quick in this time period - as long as you have troops to call upon, which both Russia and Austria do.

Allied armies get destroyed then and the French hold a buffer state between themselves and the Spanish, or they establish the border on the Pyrenees.

Not sure why your saying that as if Napoleon can send sizeable forces back into S France to challenge the Anglo-Portuguese force it will withdraw back into Spain. Its likely, coupled with Spanish support to continue to be able to maintain a presence there which means that Spain stays outside French control.

In return it means a sizeable number of French troops are tied down in southern France and living off the locals for the foreseeable future. Which isn't going to go down well with the locals.

You're looking at Napoleon surviving as Emperor into the latter half of the 1810s at a minimum. The British are removed to the South, the Prussians are removed period and the Austro-Russians are battered and need to time to rebuild. This also means the French have a breathing space.

That's your opinion. France is still taking losses it can ill afford while its isolated from areas outside its direct military control and facing continued opposition within them.

No, I directly addressed them several times. Noticeably, however, you've also not addressed any of my central points that go in hand with Moreau, such as his position as being in charge of the U.S. Army would enable him to make the kind of reforms that would best utilize the superior resources of the United States against British North America.

No you haven't. Your assumed that Moreau in charge of the entire US military means that it all immediately becomes very well trained, equipped and led. I was pointing out he's only one man and hence has limited capacity to change an entire system, especially with the communications of the time.

He's in charge as a general not a political leader. Too radical a change, apart from the time they will take is likely to face opposition from various groups and winning support of the political leadership to impose such changes will take time.

This actually has historical precedent; both Lee and Grant were this in the American Civil War for their respective armies.

Which ignores my point. He's only one man and can be in only one location. That could be Washington, to co-rdinate with his political superiors, in which case he's not on the front line. Or it could be with one army and hence out of touch with the other fronts and also Washington. Remember there are no telegraphs or railways here.

Given he would be command of the entire U.S. Army, not sure why that would be the case.

If he's the supreme military commander of the entire army and based in Washington and the British operation against Washington still occurs a lot of people would expect him to be commanding its defence.

Anyway we're not going to agree so we might as well drop the issue.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Given that in a lot of the areas we're talking about there's nothing really to devastate in the 1st place my point is still very valid.

Not in the context of the smaller armies requiring smaller logistics, which was my point. I accepted the gist of your argument, but pointed out it had a clear counter.

The Canadian identity was definitely hardened by the war but some of it already existed.

For some, yes. Even Canadian civics/history points out the deep divisions and unclear loyalties in BNA at this time.

You referred to 35k US regulars at their peak, towards the end of the conflict.

Yes, I also pointed out I think 100,000 total served and the forces grew from 7,000 at the start to 35,000 at the War's end; they didn't suddenly grow over night, of course.

If the militia were unsupported by regulars and tried to stand in a pitched battle and if the attacking regulars were well supplied and led and motivated. If those conditions aren't met it could well be a different matter.

In the vast majority of cases, no.

And there are also cases of criticism of foreign commanders, especially in highly politicized organisations.

You'd be surprised how much "criticism" you'll find for domestic officers even today; hence why the term armchair general was born. That "criticism" has any tangible effect would need to be demonstrated.

That's your opinion but it still means nearly a 3rd of your total regular forces.

No, it's based on established military science that the garrison ration needs to be 1 soldier per 50 civilians. Canada's population in 1809 was 430,000 so that divided by 50 is 8,600 men. I actually have a higher estimate because of the size of the terrain likely necessitating such. Once Canada is conquered, by the way, what exactly else is the U.S. Army supposed to do? 20,000 men can be dispersed to guard forts.

Your asserting that but it contradicts what I've read.

You've asserted what you've claim to read, but it doesn't match up with what I read either. Since you made the argument first, the onus is on you to provide the evidence for your claim, and I can respond with mine then.

The US seemed to think they would be welcomed as liberators, as in the 1770's and both times they were wrong.

Equally, they weren't treated as hated occupiers either. Most adopted a wait and see approach.

Austria accepted French hegemony because they had no choice, having fought the French more often than any other major continental power. Your argument was that Metternich was seeking a balance to prevent Russia replacing France as such an hegemonic power. If France has dealt a heavy defeat on the allies and is now seeking to re-impose its control, probably as you yourself suggests with heavy repression then that's a totally different matter.

You've made my case for me; Austria had accepted French hegemony before and with its allies defeated would be inclined to do so again.

Until the start of the campaign in 1813. Leipzig wasn't until October so a lot could and probably would happen before then. If the allies do crash and burn earlier then its likely to be somewhere else so the terrain features your pointing out for the crushing losses for the allies aren't going to be there.

Given you've changed the course of the conflict entirely, why assume Leipzig still happens? The entire Allied strategy until then was to avoid a general battle with Napoleon's main army until then; if they go for a direct battle, Dresden showed they would lose without achieving sufficient per-requisties. Napoleon could achieve an Austerlitz and wipe them out entirely.

Doubtful given the steadily reducing qualative edge between the French forces and their opponents and that training new forces was relatively quick in this time period - as long as you have troops to call upon, which both Russia and Austria do.

You would be well advised to read how Moreau and Bernadotte all advised against direct confrontation given the superiority of the French Army and Napoleon in particular. The French had no lost their edge entirely, the Coalition brought more men to the game in essence. With the veteran core destroyed and at least a year to rebuild, the edge will widen once again in the French favor.

Not sure why your saying that as if Napoleon can send sizeable forces back into S France to challenge the Anglo-Portuguese force it will withdraw back into Spain. Its likely, coupled with Spanish support to continue to be able to maintain a presence there which means that Spain stays outside French control.

Because Napoleon can with the main Allied field armies destroyed. Either the mountains or a buffer state will be established in such a case.

In return it means a sizeable number of French troops are tied down in southern France and living off the locals for the foreseeable future. Which isn't going to go down well with the locals.

One wonders where the French were getting their logistics for years on end during and before the War of the Third Coalition.

That's your opinion. France is still taking losses it can ill afford while its isolated from areas outside its direct military control and facing continued opposition within them.

An opinion informed by well reasoned analysis and facts. If we're going with each other's opinion, you didn't have to continue to reply to this.

No you haven't. Your assumed that Moreau in charge of the entire US military means that it all immediately becomes very well trained, equipped and led. I was pointing out he's only one man and hence has limited capacity to change an entire system, especially with the communications of the time.

But I did, it's why you refuse to directly outline what points you think I haven't addressed and why here you have to put words in my mouth I never said. Nowhere have I claimed Moreau would instantly fix the U.S. Army as you claim, in fact I took paints to note this would occur over the course of time as he hones into a viable force. The idea Moreau is meaningless is rather betrayed by the French experience in the 1790s and 1800s with the rise of another famous French warlord at this time.

He's in charge as a general not a political leader. Too radical a change, apart from the time they will take is likely to face opposition from various groups and winning support of the political leadership to impose such changes will take time.

Based upon what? You keep refering to things you cannot even outline as extant.

Which ignores my point. He's only one man and can be in only one location. That could be Washington, to co-rdinate with his political superiors, in which case he's not on the front line. Or it could be with one army and hence out of touch with the other fronts and also Washington. Remember there are no telegraphs or railways here.

Sure, and Napoleon managed that too. Numerous other famous commanders did at this time too.

If he's the supreme military commander of the entire army and based in Washington and the British operation against Washington still occurs a lot of people would expect him to be commanding its defence.

Again, no reason to assume such. They didn't recall Grant from Petersburg when Early raided Maryland in 1864, did they?

Anyway we're not going to agree so we might as well drop the issue.

Sure.
 

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