Madison's General: Moreau in the War of 1812

[History Learner]

An interesting fact I learned recently is that Jean Victor Marie Moreau, the victor of the Battle of Hohenlinden and republican rival of Napoleon, was forced into exile in the United States in 1805. He initially refused all offers of a commission into the U.S. Army and enjoyed a retirement of sorts over the next several years with his wife, but upon the outbreak of the War of 1812 he was offered command of all U.S. troops by President Madison. Allegedly, Moreau was inclined to agree to such a position until he received news of Napoleon's defeat in Russia, at which point he decided to return to Europe in order to settle his dispute with Bonaparte with the encouragement of his wife. Entering into Russian service at the behest of Tsar Alexander (who's inducements helped persuade him to return to Europe in the first place), he would ultimately die in the Fall of 1813 from artillery fire by his erstwhile countrymen.

So, first, our PoD would probably be his wife meeting an early end due to her immense influence on him. Not only was her encouragement a factor in his return to Europe in 1813, but her organizing of the "Club Moreau" and its Anti-Naploeon agitation had been the final straw to force Moreau into exile after being arrested for the Club's activities. As such, let's say Eugénie Moreau dies after a bout with Yellow Fever or such sometime between 1804 and 1812. After several years of mourning his beloved French wife, Moreau ultimately takes an American one and becomes more firmly rooted in his adopted home as a result. When the War of 1812 breaks out, Moreau doesn't hesitate and accepts Madison's offer to command the U.S. Army against the British. Moreau was considered an excellent commander, having won numerous victories, so would his experience and command abilities enable the American armies to achieve decisive success in Canada?

Likewise, what would be the impact of no Moreau in 1813, during the German Campaign of the Sixth Coalition? While not having a direct command role, Moreau in his advisory capacity influenced Allied strategy via Tsar Alexander:

Logistic support, set up for an advance on Leipzig, soon broke down in the advance to Dresden. The effects of countermarching and the wet, rainy weather further fatigued and slowed the advance of the Allies. The lead elements of the Army of Bohemia arrived south of Dresden on 25 August; cold, tired, wet, and hungry. Napoleon was not yet there. Instead of attacking while Napoleon was still absent, another war council was held by the "military college" accompanying the army. Schwarzenberg and Jomini supported the Tsar's desire for an immediate attack, but Moreau and Toll advised against it. The attack was eventually put off until the next day, when discussion as to its merit resumed while the troops formed up for battle.​

​

Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr opposed the Allies at Dresden. He earned his Marshal's baton in Russia at Polotsk fighting just the type of battle the Allies now contemplated. The Allied skirmishers had already found Dresden's walled houses and gardens well fortified in response to their threatened assault. It was at this point that St. Cyr's master dramatically arrived. Once Napoleon's arrival became known the mood at headquarters rapidly changed and Alexander now favored a withdrawal, in accordance with the advice he had received from Moreau. The Prussian King, unfortunately for the Allies, asserted himself and urged the attack to continue.​

Without the influence of Moreau, it's possible the Tsar goes along with the attack on the 25th, which would leave the Allies badly exposed when Napoleon arrives. If Russian reserves are forced to be fully committed, that would result in a latter disaster as it would allow Vandamme's Corps to successfully cut off the Allied retreat at the Battle of Kulm. Such would result in the encirclement and likely destruction of the Allied armies; might Napoleon and they agree to the Frankfurt proposals as a result?

 

[WolfBear]

Moreau was considered an excellent commander, having won numerous victories, so would his experience and command abilities enable the American armies to achieve decisive success in Canada?

Even if it wouldn't, couldn't the British simply refocus on the Americans after they're done dealing with Napoleon, Frankfurt proposals or not?

 

[ATP]

An interesting fact I learned recently is that Jean Victor Marie Moreau, the victor of the Battle of Hohenlinden and republican rival of Napoleon, was forced into exile in the United States in 1805. He initially refused all offers of a commission into the U.S. Army and enjoyed a retirement of sorts over the next several years with his wife, but upon the outbreak of the War of 1812 he was offered command of all U.S. troops by President Madison. Allegedly, Moreau was inclined to agree to such a position until he received news of Napoleon's defeat in Russia, at which point he decided to return to Europe in order to settle his dispute with Bonaparte with the encouragement of his wife. Entering into Russian service at the behest of Tsar Alexander (who's inducements helped persuade him to return to Europe in the first place), he would ultimately die in the Fall of 1813 from artillery fire by his erstwhile countrymen.

So, first, our PoD would probably be his wife meeting an early end due to her immense influence on him. Not only was her encouragement a factor in his return to Europe in 1813, but her organizing of the "Club Moreau" and its Anti-Naploeon agitation had been the final straw to force Moreau into exile after being arrested for the Club's activities. As such, let's say Eugénie Moreau dies after a bout with Yellow Fever or such sometime between 1804 and 1812. After several years of mourning his beloved French wife, Moreau ultimately takes an American one and becomes more firmly rooted in his adopted home as a result. When the War of 1812 breaks out, Moreau doesn't hesitate and accepts Madison's offer to command the U.S. Army against the British. Moreau was considered an excellent commander, having won numerous victories, so would his experience and command abilities enable the American armies to achieve decisive success in Canada?

Likewise, what would be the impact of no Moreau in 1813, during the German Campaign of the Sixth Coalition? While not having a direct command role, Moreau in his advisory capacity influenced Allied strategy via Tsar Alexander:

Logistic support, set up for an advance on Leipzig, soon broke down in the advance to Dresden. The effects of countermarching and the wet, rainy weather further fatigued and slowed the advance of the Allies. The lead elements of the Army of Bohemia arrived south of Dresden on 25 August; cold, tired, wet, and hungry. Napoleon was not yet there. Instead of attacking while Napoleon was still absent, another war council was held by the "military college" accompanying the army. Schwarzenberg and Jomini supported the Tsar's desire for an immediate attack, but Moreau and Toll advised against it. The attack was eventually put off until the next day, when discussion as to its merit resumed while the troops formed up for battle.​

​

Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr opposed the Allies at Dresden. He earned his Marshal's baton in Russia at Polotsk fighting just the type of battle the Allies now contemplated. The Allied skirmishers had already found Dresden's walled houses and gardens well fortified in response to their threatened assault. It was at this point that St. Cyr's master dramatically arrived. Once Napoleon's arrival became known the mood at headquarters rapidly changed and Alexander now favored a withdrawal, in accordance with the advice he had received from Moreau. The Prussian King, unfortunately for the Allies, asserted himself and urged the attack to continue.​

Without the influence of Moreau, it's possible the Tsar goes along with the attack on the 25th, which would leave the Allies badly exposed when Napoleon arrives. If Russian reserves are forced to be fully committed, that would result in a latter disaster as it would allow Vandamme's Corps to successfully cut off the Allied retreat at the Battle of Kulm. Such would result in the encirclement and likely destruction of the Allied armies; might Napoleon and they agree to the Frankfurt proposals as a result?

British widraw from USA anyway - so,Moreau there change notching,except possible better trained army later.
In Europe - defeat in Leipizg change notching,too - Napoleon would fight and lost,only later.

So,all you changed is Moreau fate and maybe USA army future.

 

[History Learner]

Even if it wouldn't, couldn't the British simply refocus on the Americans after they're done dealing with Napoleon, Frankfurt proposals or not?

It seems doubtful, if the U.S. has successfully conquered Canada by the time the British can divert their attention, it would be fait accompli. If the Frankfurt Proposals are enacted, Britain can't afford to really send additional forces and if the War of the Sixth Coalition is still raging, they can't either; likely by the time they can after Napoleon's defeat, they'd be exhausted.

 

[WolfBear]

If the Frankfurt Proposals are enacted, Britain can't afford to really send additional forces

Why exactly? Wouldn't the FPs' acceptance immediately end the war with Napoleon?

 

[stevep]

It seems doubtful, if the U.S. has successfully conquered Canada by the time the British can divert their attention, it would be fait accompli. If the Frankfurt Proposals are enacted, Britain can't afford to really send additional forces and if the War of the Sixth Coalition is still raging, they can't either; likely by the time they can after Napoleon's defeat, they'd be exhausted.

How likely is it that the US can conquer even Upper Canada, which they failed to do to the point that the British for a while held much of the Old NW region for quite a while. Moreau may be a good general but he has to work within the limitations of the US system with a fracture government and many militia units unwilling to cross borders. Would he also seek to force the New England states into supplying men and money to the war effort - which could also backfire badly.

If the Frankfurt Proposals are agreed then Britain has a guarded peace as it rightly won't trust Napoleon but its also at peace so it can commit a hell of a lot more forces against the US earlier than OTL. - They were only on offer for about a month and in part because "The British diplomat in attendance, Lord Aberdeen, misunderstood London's position and accepted the moderate terms. " Plus I notice they made no reference to territories outside Europe so if Napoleon had the sense to agree to them quickly, and the other major continental nations went along with it I could see Britain seeking to maintain control of a lot more overseas territories, both to deny France such resources and potential bases and also to maintain the income of many of those lands, such as the OTL DEI. Which would considerable boost British wealth.

If their not then Britain won't be materially exhausted as it was the wealthiest and most developed nation in the world at that time. It was tired of war and willing to make peace on the pre-war status quo since it was a war that Britain never wanted. However if the US has occupied parts of British N America and is seeking to hold them that is a radically different matter.

 

[History Learner]

Why exactly? Wouldn't the FPs' acceptance immediately end the war with Napoleon?

Yes, but even if they accept the peace, it's going to be tense the first few years. Britain didn't really demobilize after Amiens for much the same reason. By that point, if Moreau has overrun much of Canada, it's fait accompli.

 

[ATP]

How likely is it that the US can conquer even Upper Canada, which they failed to do to the point that the British for a while held much of the Old NW region for quite a while. Moreau may be a good general but he has to work within the limitations of the US system with a fracture government and many militia units unwilling to cross borders. Would he also seek to force the New England states into supplying men and money to the war effort - which could also backfire badly.

If the Frankfurt Proposals are agreed then Britain has a guarded peace as it rightly won't trust Napoleon but its also at peace so it can commit a hell of a lot more forces against the US earlier than OTL. - They were only on offer for about a month and in part because "The British diplomat in attendance, Lord Aberdeen, misunderstood London's position and accepted the moderate terms. " Plus I notice they made no reference to territories outside Europe so if Napoleon had the sense to agree to them quickly, and the other major continental nations went along with it I could see Britain seeking to maintain control of a lot more overseas territories, both to deny France such resources and potential bases and also to maintain the income of many of those lands, such as the OTL DEI. Which would considerable boost British wealth.

If their not then Britain won't be materially exhausted as it was the wealthiest and most developed nation in the world at that time. It was tired of war and willing to make peace on the pre-war status quo since it was a war that Britain never wanted. However if the US has occupied parts of British N America and is seeking to hold them that is a radically different matter.

I agree.If Napoleon agreed to peace,England would go after USA.Only question is - how much they would take.
USA woud have here very good commander,after all.
ertainly Superior to all british which he would face.

 

[stevep]

I agree.If Napoleon agreed to peace,England would go after USA.Only question is - how much they would take.
USA woud have here very good commander,after all.
ertainly Superior to all british which he would face.

Not if initial US success means Wellington is persuaded to go west.

The likely thing would be either a status quo once the US realise their in an impossible position as Britain really didn't want the war.

Alternatively if it lasts longer probably the UK/BNA [British North America] gains at least some of the Old NW region and possibly a strip of New York to push the yanks back from the St Lawrence. Possibly if it drags on long enough New England gets pissed off enough it decides to vacate the union. This could rather change future developments in N America, especially if say the OTL 1818 treaty which established a border west to the Rockies on the 49th parallel is say moved down to the 45th say?

 

[ATP]

Not if initial US success means Wellington is persuaded to go west.

The likely thing would be either a status quo once the US realise their in an impossible position as Britain really didn't want the war.

Alternatively if it lasts longer probably the UK/BNA [British North America] gains at least some of the Old NW region and possibly a strip of New York to push the yanks back from the St Lawrence. Possibly if it drags on long enough New England gets pissed off enough it decides to vacate the union. This could rather change future developments in N America, especially if say the OTL 1818 treaty which established a border west to the Rockies on the 49th parallel is say moved down to the 45th say?

Still,we have butterflies - France lead by Napoleon dynasty,and smaller USA.Unless british decide to made another war to finish Napoleon after few years.
Would Napoleon France survive? would smaller USA manage to defeat Mexico?
Many interesting possibilities.

 

[History Learner]

How likely is it that the US can conquer even Upper Canada, which they failed to do to the point that the British for a while held much of the Old NW region for quite a while. Moreau may be a good general but he has to work within the limitations of the US system with a fracture government and many militia units unwilling to cross borders. Would he also seek to force the New England states into supplying men and money to the war effort - which could also backfire badly.

Moreau would initially be commanding troops with little training or organized supply systems, with almost no supporting administration and with restive regions in the rear. The government he serves is riddled with factionalism and is unstable, to add further issue. If you think I'm describing the United States in 1812, I'm not; I'm describing Revolutionary France in the 1790s, when Moreau made his name for himself. Every single issue listed here was applicable, often vastly more so, to France and yet Moreau turned the Army of the Rhine from a disorganized mob of revolutionaries into the fighting force that fought the best of Europe's professional armies to a standstill. Unlike during his time in France, Moreau would have several distinct advantages:

• The United States has a decisive advantage in manpower and material over British Canada.
• British logistics are far away and, in any case, focused on Europe.
• British regulars are few, with most forces being Canadian militia and natives.
• The U.S. isn't coming out of revolutionary chaos in 1812.

I have no doubt that, given time to organize his forces as he did in France before, he could sweep Canadian militia and natives before him.

If the Frankfurt Proposals are agreed then Britain has a guarded peace as it rightly won't trust Napoleon but its also at peace so it can commit a hell of a lot more forces against the US earlier than OTL. - They were only on offer for about a month and in part because "The British diplomat in attendance, Lord Aberdeen, misunderstood London's position and accepted the moderate terms. "

After Napoleon was defeated in 1814, the British did dispatch five brigades to North America. Key phrase there being after Napoleon was defeated and, even ignoring that, if Moreau has two and half years to whip the U.S. Army into shape, that five brigades is nothing in the face of the 100,000 men the U.S. organized during the War of 1812.

Plus I notice they made no reference to territories outside Europe so if Napoleon had the sense to agree to them quickly, and the other major continental nations went along with it I could see Britain seeking to maintain control of a lot more overseas territories, both to deny France such resources and potential bases and also to maintain the income of many of those lands, such as the OTL DEI. Which would considerable boost British wealth.

Given the Frankfurt Proposals specified the Netherlands would be independent, Britain retaining the DEI would be a good way of turning the rest of Europe against it for its aggrandizement. Other territories it would be useful to specify, because if Britain is going that route, it's likely Napoleon won't agree; personally I'm not attached to any outcome on this. Napoleon might accept, he might not; with the Prussian and Russian armies destroyed and Austria inclined to deal, he's not under any real pressure to agree to a non-favorable deal.

If their not then Britain won't be materially exhausted as it was the wealthiest and most developed nation in the world at that time. It was tired of war and willing to make peace on the pre-war status quo since it was a war that Britain never wanted. However if the US has occupied parts of British N America and is seeking to hold them that is a radically different matter.

Britain is politically exhausted by this point and has no real attachment to the BNA that would warrant the high costs of continuing the conflict if presented with a fait accompli.

 

[stevep]

Still,we have butterflies - France lead by Napoleon dynasty,and smaller USA.Unless british decide to made another war to finish Napoleon after few years.
Would Napoleon France survive? would smaller USA manage to defeat Mexico?
Many interesting possibilities.

That would depend on Napoleon being able to control his impulses to try and settle every disagreement by military conquests. Or how long he lives and how his successor develops. Plus German and Belgium/Dutch feeling about their lost territories.

I would suspect that the smaller US would attack Mexico, possibly earlier over the Texas revolt and defeat it given Mexico's internal problems. In part because of the losses of the northern lands both limits scope for expansion in that direction and alos because it was the south that was mainly interested in expansion in that direction and here the south is significantly more powerful as slave states are now in the majority, especially if New England does leave the union. You could see the US annex more of Mexico which could however be problematic for it.

 

[stevep]

Moreau would initially be commanding troops with little training or organized supply systems, with almost no supporting administration and with restive regions in the rear. The government he serves is riddled with factionalism and is unstable, to add further issue. If you think I'm describing the United States in 1812, I'm not; I'm describing Revolutionary France in the 1790s, when Moreau made his name for himself. Every single issue listed here was applicable, often vastly more so, to France and yet Moreau turned the Army of the Rhine from a disorganized mob of revolutionaries into the fighting force that fought the best of Europe's professional armies to a standstill. Unlike during his time in France, Moreau would have several distinct advantages:

• The United States has a decisive advantage in manpower and material over British Canada.
• British logistics are far away and, in any case, focused on Europe.
• British regulars are few, with most forces being Canadian militia and natives.
• The U.S. isn't coming out of revolutionary chaos in 1812.

I have no doubt that, given time to organize his forces as he did in France before, he could sweep Canadian militia and natives before him.

Some of that applies to the US in 1812 as well as there was significant opposition to the war and a lack of any really trained army. Also a reasonably stable government not faced by major invasion is going to be less likely to agree the large scale of militarization that a desperate revolutionary government in the early 1790's was.

Also there's going to be some other issues.
a) The logistics are a hell of a lot worse for fighting in N America. Try the very large armies living off the land approach and you will devastate a lot of the lands you reach because your army is busy starving to death and looting everything it can to stay alive.
b) He's going to be at least partially mistrusted as a foreign and there is no way he can be more than one place at a time. Given how political much of the military leadership was if he tries to remove commanders he thinks incapable he's likely to run into problems. Similarly he will have limited influence over the state militias that made up much of the early forces in the attempts to invade Canada.

After Napoleon was defeated in 1814, the British did dispatch five brigades to North America. Key phrase there being after Napoleon was defeated and, even ignoring that, if Moreau has two and half years to whip the U.S. Army into shape, that five brigades is nothing in the face of the 100,000 men the U.S. organized during the War of 1812.

That assumes that that force can be concentrated which apart from the logistical issues mentioned above would also run into the issues of a lot of local officials not being happy with their regions being left under-defended when a British blockade and the markedly earlier potential arrival of forces means that their entire coastline is exposed to attack.

If Napoleon still rejects the terms yes fighting would tie up the bulk of British forces until late 1814 at the earliest. If he does accept the terms then forces are released markedly earlier.

Given the Frankfurt Proposals specified the Netherlands would be independent, Britain retaining the DEI would be a good way of turning the rest of Europe against it for its aggrandizement. Other territories it would be useful to specify, because if Britain is going that route, it's likely Napoleon won't agree; personally I'm not attached to any outcome on this. Napoleon might accept, he might not; with the Prussian and Russian armies destroyed and Austria inclined to deal, he's not under any real pressure to agree to a non-favorable deal.

Does that include all the territory of the OTL 1814 Netherlands - including those territories south of the Scheldt and IIRC they had a claim to Luxemburg at the time? Even if it did does the agreement mention overseas territories at all? If not then at least for former French colonies that would be a matter between Britain and Napoleon but Britain would be very, very reluctant to return to a Napoleonic France any territories that could be used as naval bases having learnt the hard way after the previous peace with Napoleon. Dutch colonies, or at least some of them might be returned as OTL but there will be a desire to prevent them being used as a hostile naval base. I think under the circumstances no matter what you desire this is likely to be understood by the allies.

Britain is politically exhausted by this point and has no real attachment to the BNA that would warrant the high costs of continuing the conflict if presented with a fait accompli.

Yes Britain didn't want the conflict but the US is giving it not choice. If they do take territory and are determined to hold it then that is a totally different matter, both in terms of national pride and the issues of letting an aggressor getting away with taking territory and people from you.

Britain was traditionally a high tax nation during this period and its one reason why it was so successful. [In part because the elites weren't exempt from taxation - which was the issue that lead to the French revolution]. There was a strong sense of national identity, further reinforced by the long war against Napoleon. Furthermore with peace coming in Europe earlier Britain gets a substrantial benefit in terms of reduced military spending - including all those loans to allies - and boosted other trade as European markets are opened to British goods.

 

[History Learner]

Some of that applies to the US in 1812 as well as there was significant opposition to the war and a lack of any really trained army. Also a reasonably stable government not faced by major invasion is going to be less likely to agree the large scale of militarization that a desperate revolutionary government in the early 1790's was.

This was all, to varying degrees, applicable in both cases; this was entirely my point, because Moreau was able to achieve decisive success in the former, so why should we doubt he would in the latter? We also don't have to speculate on the latter point because we know the U.S. Army was expanded to 5x it's Pre-War size and the U.S. raised almost 500,000 militia.

a) The logistics are a hell of a lot worse for fighting in N America. Try the very large armies living off the land approach and you will devastate a lot of the lands you reach because your army is busy starving to death and looting everything it can to stay alive.

Good thing we know Moreau had ample experience in this sort of strategic situation from his career in Europe; the French Republican armies lacked much of a quartermaster corps and organized logistics chain too. Despite this, Moreau was able to organize his force into a victorious army.

b) He's going to be at least partially mistrusted as a foreign and there is no way he can be more than one place at a time. Given how political much of the military leadership was if he tries to remove commanders he thinks incapable he's likely to run into problems. Similarly he will have limited influence over the state militias that made up much of the early forces in the attempts to invade Canada.

Not sure why this would be the case, given Albert Gallatin and the Marquis de Lafayette. Likewise, again, it must be stated that French Republican Armies were initially not much more than mobs of militia either; Moreau turned his troops into a fighting force so, given time, I don't see why he couldn't here either.

That assumes that that force can be concentrated which apart from the logistical issues mentioned above would also run into the issues of a lot of local officials not being happy with their regions being left under-defended when a British blockade and the markedly earlier potential arrival of forces means that their entire coastline is exposed to attack.

The British Blockade is entirely theoretical until 1814; when the war broke out, the UK sent nine frigates across the Atlantic. The political issues related to coastal defense only became an issue in that same year as the British were able to divert forces, meaning Moreau has at least two years to work his magic on American fortunes in Canada.

If Napoleon still rejects the terms yes fighting would tie up the bulk of British forces until late 1814 at the earliest. If he does accept the terms then forces are released markedly earlier.

If Napoleon rejects the terms, it's going to be far later than late 1814; the armies left in the field are the Austrians and the British backed by their Iberian allies. The former already wants to cut a deal as evidenced by Metternich's leading role in the Frankfurt Proposals and the latter could never hope to defeat the French with their pathetically small forces. The war would drag on rather like it did after the end of the Second Coalition, where Britain was by itself until the Peace of Amiens. In such a case, it would be years until the British could divert sufficient forces to North America.

Does that include all the territory of the OTL 1814 Netherlands - including those territories south of the Scheldt and IIRC they had a claim to Luxemburg at the time? Even if it did does the agreement mention overseas territories at all? If not then at least for former French colonies that would be a matter between Britain and Napoleon but Britain would be very, very reluctant to return to a Napoleonic France any territories that could be used as naval bases having learnt the hard way after the previous peace with Napoleon. Dutch colonies, or at least some of them might be returned as OTL but there will be a desire to prevent them being used as a hostile naval base. I think under the circumstances no matter what you desire this is likely to be understood by the allies.

Everything above the Rhine; whether Joseph was to remain on the throne, I know not.

Yes Britain didn't want the conflict but the US is giving it not choice. If they do take territory and are determined to hold it then that is a totally different matter, both in terms of national pride and the issues of letting an aggressor getting away with taking territory and people from you.

Britain was traditionally a high tax nation during this period and its one reason why it was so successful. [In part because the elites weren't exempt from taxation - which was the issue that lead to the French revolution]. There was a strong sense of national identity, further reinforced by the long war against Napoleon. Furthermore with peace coming in Europe earlier Britain gets a substrantial benefit in terms of reduced military spending - including all those loans to allies - and boosted other trade as European markets are opened to British goods.

Which was rejected by the British officials involved at the time:

The late flurry of U.S. successes dashed British hopes of squeezing concessions at the Ghent talks. This led the negotiators to abandon the plan to insist on a buffer state for the defeated Native American tribes that had helped British troops. Prime Minister Liverpool gave up trying to teach the Americans a lesson: “We might certainly land in different parts of their coast, and destroy some of their towns, or put them under contribution; but in the present state of the public mind in America it would be in vain to expect any permanent good effects from operations of this nature.”​

​

The British realized that simply getting the Americans to the negotiating table in Ghent was the best they were going to achieve. They also knew that Canada was too large and too sparsely populated to be properly defended. There was also the matter of general war-weariness. British families wanted their menfolk home. Lord Liverpool feared that time was going against them. After the negotiations were concluded on Christmas Eve 1814, he wrote: “I do not believe it would have been possible to have continued [wartime taxes] for the purpose of carrying on an American war....The question there was whether, under all these circumstances, it was not better to conclude the peace at the present moment, before the impatience of the country on the subject had been manifested at public meetings, or by motions in Parliament.”​

 

[stevep]

This was all, to varying degrees, applicable in both cases; this was entirely my point, because Moreau was able to achieve decisive success in the former, so why should we doubt he would in the latter? We also don't have to speculate on the latter point because we know the U.S. Army was expanded to 5x it's Pre-War size and the U.S. raised almost 500,000 militia.

Your assuming the same result in a totally different situation.

Good thing we know Moreau had ample experience in this sort of strategic situation from his career in Europe; the French Republican armies lacked much of a quartermaster corps and organized logistics chain too. Despite this, Moreau was able to organize his force into a victorious army.

However they did have some of the richest and most economically developed lands in Europe to loot as they advanced. Try doing that with a large army in the border territories of the Old NW area and parts of Canada and your army starves.

Not sure why this would be the case, given Albert Gallatin and the Marquis de Lafayette. Likewise, again, it must be stated that French Republican Armies were initially not much more than mobs of militia either; Moreau turned his troops into a fighting force so, given time, I don't see why he couldn't here either.

That was in a position where the rebels were desperate and very dependent on French and Spanish aid. Here their a lot more confident and hostile to the idea of European influence/presence. Plus there were things like the privileges and restrains on the use of militia which caused the invaders so many problems OTL. He's not going to be able to brutally impose discipline on those forces.

The British Blockade is entirely theoretical until 1814; when the war broke out, the UK sent nine frigates across the Atlantic. The political issues related to coastal defense only became an issue in that same year as the British were able to divert forces, meaning Moreau has at least two years to work his magic on American fortunes in Canada.

That assumes that Napoleon rejects the deal, reversing the basic assumption of this thread.

If Napoleon rejects the terms, it's going to be far later than late 1814; the armies left in the field are the Austrians and the British backed by their Iberian allies. The former already wants to cut a deal as evidenced by Metternich's leading role in the Frankfurt Proposals and the latter could never hope to defeat the French with their pathetically small forces. The war would drag on rather like it did after the end of the Second Coalition, where Britain was by itself until the Peace of Amiens. In such a case, it would be years until the British could divert sufficient forces to North America.

Your assuming that Moreau's disappearance from the Russian army means disaster for the allies. Its an assumption but by no means certain. If that happened the accords would never even be offered because Napoleon would still be seeking to dominant everybody. Which would be a totally different scenario.

As was noted above Metternich wanted to cut a deal so as to have a balance between French and Russian influence in a situation where the French were on the verge of defeat and Russia looked unstoppable. What your suggesting here is totally different. Austria still had very large forces and Russia could raise more while national feeling was high in much of Germany so none of those would be happy with being controlled by Napoleon again. If that situation occurred then yes Britain would be fighting on longer but so would the rest of Europe and French losses have already been heavy.

Everything above the Rhine; whether Joseph was to remain on the throne, I know not.

By this time Joseph had already been driven from virtually all of Spain so I doubt that would be an option, although Napoleon might by this time be deluded enough to demand it in the scenario your proposing above. However your saying that the Netherlands might have a token independence but would still lose territory and be bordered by a large and aggressive France.

Which was rejected by the British officials involved at the time:

The late flurry of U.S. successes dashed British hopes of squeezing concessions at the Ghent talks. This led the negotiators to abandon the plan to insist on a buffer state for the defeated Native American tribes that had helped British troops. Prime Minister Liverpool gave up trying to teach the Americans a lesson: “We might certainly land in different parts of their coast, and destroy some of their towns, or put them under contribution; but in the present state of the public mind in America it would be in vain to expect any permanent good effects from operations of this nature.”​

​

The British realized that simply getting the Americans to the negotiating table in Ghent was the best they were going to achieve. They also knew that Canada was too large and too sparsely populated to be properly defended. There was also the matter of general war-weariness. British families wanted their menfolk home. Lord Liverpool feared that time was going against them. After the negotiations were concluded on Christmas Eve 1814, he wrote: “I do not believe it would have been possible to have continued [wartime taxes] for the purpose of carrying on an American war....The question there was whether, under all these circumstances, it was not better to conclude the peace at the present moment, before the impatience of the country on the subject had been manifested at public meetings, or by motions in Parliament.”​

Again that's assuming that the US hasn't seized British territory which changes the dynamics. After all your referred to the US having nearly 10% of its entire population under arms which is unlikely to be sustainable for long.

 

[History Learner]

Your assuming the same result in a totally different situation.

Indeed, Moreau has many positives compared to his OTL situation in Europe. Chief among them is the fact that he is facing Natives and militia mostly, as opposed to the professional armies of the Austrians, Prussians and Russians.

However they did have some of the richest and most economically developed lands in Europe to loot as they advanced. Try doing that with a large army in the border territories of the Old NW area and parts of Canada and your army starves.

Given the Rhineland and South Germany are not breadbaskets at this time, and you can't eat material loot, we can dismiss that as concern. As it were, though, you've hit the nail on the head with the latter; the army sizes in North America are smaller and, as such, so are their logistical needs.

That was in a position where the rebels were desperate and very dependent on French and Spanish aid. Here their a lot more confident and hostile to the idea of European influence/presence. Plus there were things like the privileges and restrains on the use of militia which caused the invaders so many problems OTL. He's not going to be able to brutally impose discipline on those forces.

Albert Gallatin was well after the Revolution and the problem with your hypothesis of hostility to European presence is the fact we know Moreau got offered commands repeatedly, including Madison offering him overall command. This firmly suggests to the opposite of your opinion that there was some deep seated hostility. Likewise, we don't have to speculate on militia issues when we can, again, contextualize as to the 5x size expansion of the U.S. Army during the war. Not really sure what you mean about the brutal imposition of discipline either.

That assumes that Napoleon rejects the deal, reversing the basic assumption of this thread.

Given I wrote the thread, that's not true at all as I left it open ended as to whether or not Napoleon accepts the Frankfurt Proposals.

Your assuming that Moreau's disappearance from the Russian army means disaster for the allies. Its an assumption but by no means certain. If that happened the accords would never even be offered because Napoleon would still be seeking to dominant everybody. Which would be a totally different scenario.

Given the views of the people who were there and what we know about the course of battles with hindsight, particularly knowing the terrain and disposition of forces, it does leave little room for doubt. They had to retreat through the mountain passes at Kulm and Napoleon here would be moving three corps in to block that route while bringing down the rest of his army on the shattered Russo-Prussians. Further, it does not escape my note you're just now raising concerns on this bit, while I had it in the OP since the beginning; why is this being in doubt fine for you while Napoleon possibly rejecting the deal is a violation? It's a pretty obvious double standard.

As was noted above Metternich wanted to cut a deal so as to have a balance between French and Russian influence in a situation where the French were on the verge of defeat and Russia looked unstoppable. What your suggesting here is totally different. Austria still had very large forces and Russia could raise more while national feeling was high in much of Germany so none of those would be happy with being controlled by Napoleon again. If that situation occurred then yes Britain would be fighting on longer but so would the rest of Europe and French losses have already been heavy.

Austria would be outnumbered by around 2-3x their number, the Russians would be smashed and Napoleon could march on Berlin almost unopposed. As I said, I'm not particularly tied to anyway on this; the French showed historically they could fight on for about two more years in any case, and here are in a much better position than OTL given the Prussians and Russians would have to rebuild their armies, which takes time. France can beat upon the British and Austria in the interim.

By this time Joseph had already been driven from virtually all of Spain so I doubt that would be an option, although Napoleon might by this time be deluded enough to demand it in the scenario your proposing above. However your saying that the Netherlands might have a token independence but would still lose territory and be bordered by a large and aggressive France.

I actually meant Louis, and got him confused for Joseph. As it were, most of the advantages lean towards Napoleon in this case, so he is in his right to demand a more favorable deal. If not, he marches on Berlin to burn it down and can send a 100,000 men under Ney to bash Wellington back to Portugal.

Again that's assuming that the US hasn't seized British territory which changes the dynamics. After all your referred to the US having nearly 10% of its entire population under arms which is unlikely to be sustainable for long.

The vast majority of those forces are militia, which can be sustained indefinitely as they are volunteer and posted in their own home areas for the most part; the U.S. showed it could sustain that for three years in any case, so I see nothing less than that as our window of time here. As it were, however, nothing about the U.S. taking Canada undermines the central logical expressed by British officials. Canada produces very little wealth and is hard to defend, there is no public appetite to continue the war time taxes or mobilization necessary to fight the U.S. off it either. By the time the UK is in a position to do so here, the U.S. has already overrun the colony and has for sometime. If Napoleon fights on, war exhaustion will be worse.

 

[ATP]

That would depend on Napoleon being able to control his impulses to try and settle every disagreement by military conquests. Or how long he lives and how his successor develops. Plus German and Belgium/Dutch feeling about their lost territories.

I would suspect that the smaller US would attack Mexico, possibly earlier over the Texas revolt and defeat it given Mexico's internal problems. In part because of the losses of the northern lands both limits scope for expansion in that direction and alos because it was the south that was mainly interested in expansion in that direction and here the south is significantly more powerful as slave states are now in the majority, especially if New England does leave the union. You could see the US annex more of Mexico which could however be problematic for it.

So,Bigger USA after annexing Mexico? interesting,how it look like.Slavery till 20th century? some kind of caste system with WASP lording over catholic majority?

 

[stevep]

Indeed, Moreau has many positives compared to his OTL situation in Europe. Chief among them is the fact that he is facing Natives and militia mostly, as opposed to the professional armies of the Austrians, Prussians and Russians.

He also has a number of negative ones you keep ignoring.

Given the Rhineland and South Germany are not breadbaskets at this time, and you can't eat material loot, we can dismiss that as concern. As it were, though, you've hit the nail on the head with the latter; the army sizes in North America are smaller and, as such, so are their logistical needs.

Again your ignoring the facts. The French armies lived off the locals wherever they were based. Intitally largely indiscriminate foraging, which was a factor in their abilities to move fast as being unattached to baggage trains and later in times of 'peace' by extorting resources from the areas they were based in. This was one reason that by 1812 onward they were so unpopular across much of northern Europe. Similarly they made themselves fair unpopular in France itself in 1814-15 when forced back into French territory because they continued to use the same method.

Albert Gallatin was well after the Revolution and the problem with your hypothesis of hostility to European presence is the fact we know Moreau got offered commands repeatedly, including Madison offering him overall command. This firmly suggests to the opposite of your opinion that there was some deep seated hostility. Likewise, we don't have to speculate on militia issues when we can, again, contextualize as to the 5x size expansion of the U.S. Army during the war. Not really sure what you mean about the brutal imposition of discipline either.

The central government might accept him as overall commander but will local figures when he starts issuing orders contrary to their interests/wishes?

In terms of disclipine I was thinking of what he might do when militia units as they often did disbanded when their time of service was up or refused to cross international or state borders which also happened frequently. He might also seek a harder line in terms of the New England states who refused to support the war and continued trading openly with Britain/Canada.

Given I wrote the thread, that's not true at all as I left it open ended as to whether or not Napoleon accepts the Frankfurt Proposals.

True on hindsight I did miss that although as pointed out if you assume the heavy defeat of the allied armies then such terms aren't going to be either offered or accepted.

Given the views of the people who were there and what we know about the course of battles with hindsight, particularly knowing the terrain and disposition of forces, it does leave little room for doubt. They had to retreat through the mountain passes at Kulm and Napoleon here would be moving three corps in to block that route while bringing down the rest of his army on the shattered Russo-Prussians. Further, it does not escape my note you're just now raising concerns on this bit, while I had it in the OP since the beginning; why is this being in doubt fine for you while Napoleon possibly rejecting the deal is a violation? It's a pretty obvious double standard.

Because I'm assuming that butterflies exist so its far from certain that the same events would occur. That you want them to isn't enough in itself.

Austria would be outnumbered by around 2-3x their number, the Russians would be smashed and Napoleon could march on Berlin almost unopposed. As I said, I'm not particularly tied to anyway on this; the French showed historically they could fight on for about two more years in any case, and here are in a much better position than OTL given the Prussians and Russians would have to rebuild their armies, which takes time. France can beat upon the British and Austria in the interim.

Even assuming the disaster you assume the allies can withdraw and regroup. It will take a lot longer but Napoleon is likely to be after blood and the French will have suffered losses themselves.

I actually meant Louis, and got him confused for Joseph. As it were, most of the advantages lean towards Napoleon in this case, so he is in his right to demand a more favorable deal. If not, he marches on Berlin to burn it down and can send a 100,000 men under Ney to bash Wellington back to Portugal.

Since the French had only a loose hold on Spain with ~250,000 men and that was with a markedly smaller and less developed allied army under Wellington that last bit is unlikely.

The vast majority of those forces are militia, which can be sustained indefinitely as they are volunteer and posted in their own home areas for the most part; the U.S. showed it could sustain that for three years in any case, so I see nothing less than that as our window of time here. As it were, however, nothing about the U.S. taking Canada undermines the central logical expressed by British officials. Canada produces very little wealth and is hard to defend, there is no public appetite to continue the war time taxes or mobilization necessary to fight the U.S. off it either. By the time the UK is in a position to do so here, the U.S. has already overrun the colony and has for sometime. If Napoleon fights on, war exhaustion will be worse.

That's your assumption but as mentioned above there are serious problems with such a scenario.

 

[stevep]

So,Bigger USA after annexing Mexico? interesting,how it look like.Slavery till 20th century? some kind of caste system with WASP lording over catholic majority?

Probably not annex all of it as that is likely to be more than they can manage. However could well annex more of the relatively thinly populated and loosely controlled northern provinces.

Slavery would unfortunately last longer unless this US suffers a really bad defeat which would be possible - but not certain - if it while overstretched in its Mexican colonies decided to try a return match with a undistracted UK or simply some internal problems. I could see a USCW here based on the northern states seeking to secede to avoid slavery possibly being forced onto them. [Although if New England has already gone the base for rebellion here is smaller but still significant if the region around New York, Pennsylvanian and Ohio develop pretty much as OTL and they might end up seeking/getting support from New England and the UK. Plus if plantation slavery is taking up a lot of the best land there could well be unrest among the poorer whites over the lack of land for themselves.

I doubt it would be a Catholic majority as the hold over the core Mexican territories - if annexed at all - would be fragile and also there is likely to be limitations on migration earlier, both because of lack of suitable land and xenophobic being stronger earlier. However if this southern dominance persists then your likely to have a strata similar to that in the former Spanish colonies but in this case - rich white aristocracy - poorer white merchants/businessmen - poorer white farmers [largely Protestant I would suspect - Catholics - then at the bottom blacks and surviving Indians. This assumes that such a structure lasts however with the inherent weaknesses in it.

 

[ATP]

Probably not annex all of it as that is likely to be more than they can manage. However could well annex more of the relatively thinly populated and loosely controlled northern provinces.

Slavery would unfortunately last longer unless this US suffers a really bad defeat which would be possible - but not certain - if it while overstretched in its Mexican colonies decided to try a return match with a undistracted UK or simply some internal problems. I could see a USCW here based on the northern states seeking to secede to avoid slavery possibly being forced onto them. [Although if New England has already gone the base for rebellion here is smaller but still significant if the region around New York, Pennsylvanian and Ohio develop pretty much as OTL and they might end up seeking/getting support from New England and the UK. Plus if plantation slavery is taking up a lot of the best land there could well be unrest among the poorer whites over the lack of land for themselves.

I doubt it would be a Catholic majority as the hold over the core Mexican territories - if annexed at all - would be fragile and also there is likely to be limitations on migration earlier, both because of lack of suitable land and xenophobic being stronger earlier. However if this southern dominance persists then your likely to have a strata similar to that in the former Spanish colonies but in this case - rich white aristocracy - poorer white merchants/businessmen - poorer white farmers [largely Protestant I would suspect - Catholics - then at the bottom blacks and surviving Indians. This assumes that such a structure lasts however with the inherent weaknesses in it.

So,cyvil war in which northern states try to secede from South?
UK could help them,it would be in their interest to keep two americans states.
Only good thing - indians here would be treated better.They fought for Confederacy,after all.

But,in 1914 we would have bigger Canada,Northern states allied with England,southern allied with germans,and Mexico allied with England,too.

Allies would win ,just like in OTL - but,except germans wanting revenge,we would have southerns wonting revenge,too.

Different WW2,althought Allies would win again - mainly becouse Japan would remain England ally,probably with Siberia.

So,Germany,Italy,Southern USA and soviets against England,Northern USA,and stronger Japan.Longer war,i think.